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The eighteenth-century Enlightenment movement that swept across much of Europe, notably 
France, England and Germany, came to mean different things to different peoples, 
embodying different strands and currents of thought. Even with the national and cultural 
specificities, the common element that cut across national boundaries was the appeal to 
reason as the point of departure in interpreting individual and communal behavior. The 
Aufklärung, that is, the German strand of the Enlightenment, was particularly acute in its 
interaction and more pointedly, its challenge of traditional Christian orthodoxy and doctrines.  
 Given this obvious interest in Christian thought by the Aufklärung, it is quite 
predictable that Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI became concerned with the perspectives and 
positions of the Aufklärer. To Ratzinger, the Aufklärung marked an enduring criticism of 
revealed faith, a critique that the Church is yet to fully engage and respond to. The critique of 
faith by the Aufklärung has lost nothing of its freshness and attraction, two centuries later.  
 This task of opening avenues of rational engagements with the modes of thought of 
the Aufklärung is not just the expedient thing to do. There is a more profound reason: 
Christianity, as Ratzinger has repeatedly pointed out, is a religion of the Logos, a Logos that 
at the fullness of time (Gal 4:4), entered history. To foster this rapport between faith and the 
Aufklärung, Ratzinger therefore finds a ready tool in the Johannine appropriation of the 
Greek concept of the Logos. In Ratzinger, one discerns a five-fold usage of the concept of 
logos that could be useful in creating a space of interaction and engagement with the 
Aufklärung: As Creative Reason, Son, Person, Unity of Love and Word. These five 




 What this dissertation seeks to achieve by way of moving the needle of knowledge is 
to study Ratzinger from the philosophical prism of the Aufklärung, that is, how do 
Ratzinger’s theological ideas, convictions and conclusions place him in dialogue and 
engagement with the philosophical currents of the post-Aufklärung era, especially the 
philosophers that emerge from Germany? This thesis therefore places Ratzinger in dialogue 
with notable Aufklärung figures like Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger around the 
central Christological and Ecclesiological questions as seen in the multiple appropriation of 
the concept of logos by Ratzinger. Overall, one gains a deeper appreciation not only of 
Ratzinger’s Christo-ecclesial hermeneutical framework, but also the philosophical currents 
and presuppositions that shaped and contextualized the thinking of Joseph 
Ratzinger/Benedict XVI, especially from the prism of the dialogue between faith and reason, 
and the continuous relevance for such a hermeneutical framework for today’s Church, as we 
continue to grapple with the challenges of the autonomy of reason and science vis-à-vis the 
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Introduction – Ratzinger, the Aufklärung and Logos Christo-
Ecclesiology  
 
The eighteenth-century Enlightenment movement that swept across much of Europe, 
notably France, England and Germany, came to mean different things to different peoples, 
embodying different strands and currents of thought.1 Even with the national and cultural 
specificities, the common element that cut across national boundaries was the appeal to 
reason as the point of departure in interpreting individual and communal behavior. The 
Aufklärung, that is, the German strand of the Enlightenment, was particularly acute in its 
interaction and more pointedly, its challenge of traditional Christian orthodoxy and doctrines. 
As Alister McGrath points out, “the ultimate foundation of the theology of the Aufklärung 
may be regarded as the doctrine that the natural faculty of human reason is qualitatively 
similar to (although quantitatively weaker than) the divine reason.”2 McGrath further 
describes the Aufklärung as a Weltanschauung, rather than a system of doctrines or methods, 
a worldview best characterized as moralist, naturalist and rationalist.3 At the center of the 
Aufklärung therefore, was a human-centered perception of reality. The focus was therefore 
much more immanent that transcendent.  
Given this obvious interest in Christian thought by the Aufklärung, it is quite 
predictable that Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI4 became concerned with the perspectives 
and positions of the Aufklärer. To Ratzinger, the Aufklärung marked an enduring criticism of 
                                               
 1 Alister E. McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology: From the Enlightenment to 
Pannenberg (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc. 1953), 9.  
 2 McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology, 11.  
 3 McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology, 13.  
 4 Throughout this thesis, I will use the names Ratzinger or Benedict interchangeably. However, as a 
general rule, I will use Ratzinger in texts penned before his election as Pope, and Benedict in writings generally 
penned during and after his pontificate.  
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revealed faith, a critique that the Church is yet to fully engage and respond to. For example, 
in his very first encyclical on God’s love, Benedict wrote, regarding the Aufklärung:  
In the critique of Christianity which began with the Enlightenment and grew 
progressively more radical, this new element was seen as something thoroughly 
negative. According to Friedrich Nietzsche, Christianity had poisoned eros, which for 
its part, while not completely succumbing, gradually degenerated into vice. Here the 
German philosopher was expressing a widely-held perception: doesn’t the Church, 
with all her commandments and prohibitions, turn to bitterness the most precious 
thing in life? Doesn’t she blow the whistle just when the joy which is the Creator’s 
gift offers us a happiness which is itself a certain foretaste of the Divine?5 
 
In effect, the Church might truly have something to say to contemporary men and women on 
a whole range of issues, such as on love, on the meaning of life, family, on the just ordering 
of society, on peace, and on the final destiny of the human being. However, the critique of 
faith by the Aufklärung has lost nothing of its freshness and attraction, two centuries later. 
And to Ratzinger, this continues to explain, in large part, the unprecedented indifference or 
hostility towards Christianity, especially in large sectors of the developed world. It would 
seem that the Christianity that emerged after the Aufklärung appears to be, in Ratzinger’s 
own interpretive analysis of Kierkegaard’s famous story of the blazing circus, a Christian 
Church that modern men and women, especially in the large sectors of the Western world, 
increasingly view as a clown, dressed in fancy costumes.6 The more the Church seeks to 
speak about Christ to contemporary men and women and the more theologians put forth one 
theological insight after another, the more both Church and theologians are laughed at, for at 
                                               
 5 Benedict XVI, “Encyclical Letter on Christian Love Deus Caritas Est,” 3, at w2.vatican.va, 
accessed August 14, 2015.  
 6 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Part 1, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 30. Ratzinger cites this Kierkegaardian parable in the introduction to his 
Introduction to Christianity. It might be helpful to note that Ratzinger resonates to some degree with Søren 
Kierkegaard, on reflections related to truth, sacrifice, love, and Christendom versus Christianity. Profoundly 
influenced by Luther, however, Kierkegaard makes for some incompatibility. Yet the irony is the power and 
influence of Augustine on Luther as well as the other Reformers, as well as the influence of Augustine on 
Bonaventure’s writings, specifically his theology of history, which Ratzinger takes up in his Habilitation.  
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the end of the day, a clown is always a clown, with fanciful costumes.7 This interpretation 
shows a mind unwilling to simply yield to a defeatist vision for the Church and the world. 
 In the preface to the 1968 edition to Introduction to Christianity, Ratzinger again 
displays his unflattering sense about the state of faith and practice in the life of the 
contemporary Church. Employing the story of Clever Hans’ the lump of gold, Ratzinger 
seem to imply that an uncritical accommodation of the Church to the zeitgeist will end up 
leaving the Church with the lamentable whetstone, only fit to be thrown away.8 And to 
Ratzinger, much of this disinterest or indifference towards all things religious, towards the 
faith, is in large part an offshoot of the severing of the relationship between faith and reason 
that came with the Aufklärung, which sought to grant an unbridled autonomy to reason, as 
seen in the thinking of some of its exponents, for example, Kant and Hegel.   
After all, there is no denying the fact that the Aufklärung as a cultural and 
philosophical movement sought the exclusion of revealed religion to be replaced, at best, 
with rational faith, and at worst, with full-blown atheism that declared the death of God. This 
process of the deconstruction of religious faith was supposed to liberate human beings from 
fear and install them as masters over nature and their own destiny.9 How did large sectors of 
the Western world become engulfed in this systematic rejection or indifference to 
Catholicism? One could advance many reasons: material prosperity; science; the clerical 
abuse scandal and the cover up by the upper hierarchy; religious illiteracy; breakdown of 
culture and family life; the dominance of the entertainment industry with its foremost 
messages of eros, wealth, power and violence that are often antithetical to the Christian 
                                               
 7 Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 39.   
 8 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 31.  
 9 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 1.  
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message; and many others.10 While a complex set of factors could as well account for these 
issues, the focus on this-worldliness by the Aufklärung is certainly a contributory factor.  
But what does Ratzinger seek, in the face of this eschewing of religious dogma and 
revealed truths of faith as challenged by Aufklärung philosophical Weltanschauung? A 
dialogue. In other words, Ratzinger is not interested in rolling back the objectively good 
gains of the Aufklärung, such as the value of human rationality in moral discernment, or a 
paying of attention to the historical dimension of truth claims. Ratzinger graciously accepts 
the gains of the Aufklärung. In his conversation with Jürgen Habermas, Ratzinger takes 
seriously the opinion put forward on the question as to whether the process of European 
secularization is an aberration in need of course correction.11 Ratzinger does not think so. To 
Ratzinger, what is urgent is to open up spaces of conversation and dialogue, so that together, 
the currents of secular rationality and faith could mutually enrich each other. This calls for a 
deeper insight into the philosophical and theological currents that have shaped contemporary 
secular societies vis-à-vis the life of the Christian faith in Western Europe and other sectors 
of the Western world. 
Engaging the philosophical movement of the Aufklärung became for Ratzinger an 
urgent pastoral necessity, leading to a lively interest in the debate or dialogue between faith 
and reason. To Ratzinger, if the Church had to make new inroads into the lives of post-war 
Germans and Europeans at large, it must take seriously the claims and charges of the 
Aufklärung, especially regarding its certainties on science, religion and philosophy, often 
interpreted in a manner that renders religious faith absurd and irrational. To Ratzinger, while 
                                               
 10 Charles Taylor, A Secular World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 1-14. 
 11 Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectic of Secularization: On Reason and Religion 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 75.   
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one must not allow self to be affected by what he calls “the superficial obligatory optimism 
of certain trends,” one must likewise not only recognize the positive elements of the 
Aufklärung and contemporary culture, but must continue to bring the insights of faith, 
revealed faith, to bear on the present in order to open the path to the future.12 Hence, this 
thesis seeks to be a modest contribution to this Ratzingerian overarching goal, namely, to 
open the present to the future with the healing touch of faith. This is the mindset that will 
guide this thesis, which seeks to tell the story of Aufklärung as the hermeneutical context of 
understanding the Christological ecclesiology of Joseph Ratzinger.  
 This task of opening avenues of rational engagements with the modes of thought of 
the Aufklärung is all the more urgent and necessary for the Christian faith, not just because it 
is the expedient thing to do, but for another more profound reason: Christianity, as Ratzinger 
has repeatedly pointed out, is a religion of the Logos, a Logos that at the fullness of time (Gal 
4:4), entered history. When John characterizes Jesus as Logos, he is implying two things, 
says Ratzinger: Firstly, that the idea of rationality is implicit in Christianity as it is essential 
in Greek philosophy; and secondly, that this Logos, reason, is in this specific context, word, 
verbum.13 In this sense, rationality or the appeal to reason is something that was very early on 
assimilated from Greek philosophy into Christian thought, in the very initial stages of 
Christianity’s development. John’s appropriation of logos of Greek philosophy marks an 
early stage of Christian inculturation. From this perspective, the Aufklärung’s concern for 
reason and history are already very much present in Christian self-understanding, centuries 
before the formal beginnings of the Aufklärung in the eighteenth century.  
                                               
 12 Joseph Ratzinger, A Turning Point for Europe? (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 23.   
 13 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 189.  
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 Hence, when Ratzinger takes on the Aufklärung, in a sense, he is making a return to 
the sources of the Christian self-understanding that took roots in the context of Greek 
philosophy. Ratzinger’s approach is therefore, that of a circular movement between faith and 
reason, faith and history, theology and philosophy, seeking always to keep both in a 
dialogical equilibrium. To listen to Ratzinger:  
Philosophy, too, ought not to shut itself within its own material, within what it has 
itself thought up. Just as it has to pay heed to empirical perceptions that emerge 
within the various scientific disciplines, so also it ought to regard holy traditions of 
religions and especially the message of the Bible as the source of perception and let 
itself be made more fertile by this (…) When philosophy completely blanks out this 
dialogue with the thought of faith, it ends – as Jaspers once expressed it – in a 
“seriousness that is becoming empty.” In the end, it finds itself forced to renounce the 
question of truth, that is, it is forced to give up itself. For a philosophy that no longer 
asks who we are, what we are here for, whether there is a God and an eternal life, has 
abdicated its role as a philosophy.14 
  
For Ratzinger, therefore, severing the link between philosophy and theology constitutes a 
disservice to philosophy, for by eschewing the ultimate questions of human inquiry, it ends 
up leaving out the most relevant and significant questions about human existence. This is the 
sense in which we can understand Ratzinger when he says that “to believe as a Christian 
means understanding our existence as a response to the word, the Logos, that upholds and 
maintains all things. It means affirming that the meaning we do not make but can only 
receive is already granted to us, so that we have only to take it and entrust ourselves to it.”15 
In a word, reason and faith ought to be placed in a dialogical relationship, with a mutual 
enrichment of both. 
 To foster this rapport between faith and the Aufklärung, Ratzinger therefore finds a 
ready tool in the Johannine appropriation of the Greek concept of the Logos. By taking up the 
                                               
 14 Joseph Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 208-209.  
 15 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 73.   
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Greek philosophical concept of logos as a central theological metaphor to bridge the wedge 
between the Aufklärung and Christian faith, Ratzinger enters the history of a long 
philosophical tradition dating back to Heraclitus (535 – 475 BC), the philosopher of logos,16 
and to Justin the Martyr (100 – 165 AD). Chronologically, in Heraclitus, one encounters 
logos in a primitive and mainly materialistic way. In Justin the Martyr, we read an 
enthusiastic crediting of Heraclitus, Socrates and Plato with logos in his “First Apology.” 
Justin calls them “Christians” because of it.17 What Plato had felt, Justin found in Christ. In 
the Enneads, Plotinus subordinates logos to “an essentially immaterial being,” that is, to the 
“One.”18 The One is beyond all being, immaterial, utterly different from all. From Heraclitus 
through Plotinus, and from Irenaeus, Justin, Origen and taken up by Ratzinger, therefore, the 
concept of logos has continued to play a useful role in both philosophical and theological 
discourses. In all these sources, logos find multiple layers of meaning that are relevant to our 
investigation of Ratzinger’s appropriation of this Hellenistic concept, within the context of its 
Heraclitan philosophical foundations, which is certainly Johannine for the Christian tradition. 
This historical trajectory will be further elucidated in chapter three, in the consideration of 
Christ/Logos in its multiple appropriations as Ratzinger’s response to the Aufklärung. 
For Ratzinger, this Greek concept of logos and the choice for philosophy over pagan 
beliefs by the early church meant “the definitive demythologization of the world and of 
religion.”19 Eo ipso, the choice of logos over pagan mythology by the early Church is a 
                                               
 16 Eva Brann, The Logos of Heraclitus (Philadelphia, PA: Paul Dry Books Inc. 2011), 9.  
 17 Justin, Martyr, First Apology, I, 46, in Johannes Quasten, Patrology Vol. I. (Westminster, MD: 
Christian Classics Inc. 1993), 209.  
 18 Plotinus, Enneads, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), I, 6, 
7. 
 19 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 138.  
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choice for truth over cultural myths, illusions and contradictions. Logos is therefore a 
grounding in the faith, in terms of its application in the Ratzingerian Weltanschauung.  
In Ratzinger, one discerns a five-fold understanding or appropriation20 of the concept 
of logos that could be useful in creating a space of interaction and engagement with the 
Aufklärung:21 In the first place, the Logos as the Creative Reason of God is central to 
Ratzinger’s theology of creation. At creation, for example, it is the Creative Logos that brings 
about the cosmos, so much so that Ratzinger maintains that the only proper hermeneutical 
framework for interpreting creation theology is via the lens of Christology, granted that 
following the principle of allegory, this Creative Logos becomes the Christ of God at the 
fullness of time (Gal 4:4).22 Ratzinger writes: “Creation is born of the Logos and indelibly 
bears the mark of the creative Reason which orders and directs it; with joy-filled certainty the 
psalms sing: ‘By the word of the Lord the heavens were made, and all their host by the breath 
of his mouth’ (Ps 33:6).”23 In this sense, where the Aufklärung saw reason as autonomous 
and closed in on itself, Ratzinger will see reason as a reflection of the creative reason of God, 
and that human reason is not diminished when it opens up to the rationality of faith. For 
Ratzinger, creation is the decisive enlightenment of history, for it establishes history as truth 
and love.24 As will be seen in the later part of this thesis, Ratzinger makes the case that 
reason as understood by the Aufklärung thinkers is not an autonomous entity devoid of any 
                                               
 20 Throughout this thesis, the word “appropriation” when used regarding the five-fold meaning of 
concept of Logos, designates the manner in which Ratzinger uses the term, or more precisely, the usage of the 
term as discernable in the writings of Ratzinger. “Appropriation” does not refer in any way to the Trinitarian 
implications of the term as found, for example, in Book VI of Augustine’s De Trinitate.  
 21 Christopher Collins, The Word Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph Ratzinger 
(Collegeville, MN.: Liturgical Press, 2013), 82.  
22 Joseph Ratzinger, “In the Beginning …” A Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the 
Fall (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1986), 17-19.  
 23 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 8.  
 24 Ratzinger, “In the Beginning …,” 14.  
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bearings with God. Rather, Judeo-Christian faith rescued matter from the irrationality of 
pagan myths and elevated matter, which is the material cause of science, to the noble heights 
of rationality. 
Going further, we have the second Ratzingerian appropriation of logos as Son, Jesus 
of Nazareth, who, as Son of God, brings God’s revelation, at the fullness of time (Gal. 4:4), 
to a new and definitive phase.25 If in former times God has spoken through the prophets, in 
these latter days, God has spoken through the Son, Jesus of Nazareth. A major conviction of 
the Aufklärung is its understanding of revelation and its insistence on this historically-
conditioned nature of revelation. The Sonship of Jesus is not seen by the Aufklärung to be 
unique and exclusive, but at best, exemplary. If such is the state of things, then the figure and 
teachings of Jesus lose their obligatory character. How can we interpret the gains of the 
Christological councils with the gains of the Aufklärung in a way that Christ can still speak to 
contemporary men and women because Christ marks the definitive intervention of God into 
human history? This is the question Ratzinger takes up in his engagements with the 
Aufklärung, as will be seen in this thesis.  
The third layer of meaning of logos as appropriated by Ratzinger is that of Logos as a 
Person (Prosopon), Jesus Christ, whose life and death constitutes the defining moment of the 
emergence of the new people of God, the Church. Ratzinger argues that faith in the Logos, 
the meaningfulness of being, corresponds perfectly with a tendency in human reason. There 
is therefore, a staggering alliance of Logos and sarx, of meaning and a single historical 
figure, in the man Jesus of Nazareth.26 In this text, Ratzinger brings together two layers of 
meaning from the one concept of Logos, that is, human reason and human flesh, because 
                                               
 25 Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, 4.  
 26 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 193.  
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Logos, reason, has become flesh, and thanks to this enfleshness of Logos, we can hear Logos 
speak.27 Certainly, there is no disputing the fact that the Aufklärung in particular, and the 
Enlightenment in general marked a major achievement in terms of underscoring the 
significance of the dignity of every human being. But with the advance of science and 
technology, what does it mean today to say someone is a person? Given an ever-increasing 
utilitarian mindset, what does it mean to say that a person’s dignity is intrinsic and 
inalienable and cannot be disposed of? 
The fourth facet of Ratzinger’s theology of the Logos is that of Logos as unity of 
love, that is, embodying philia, eros and agape. If the Aufklärung tended to make the charge 
that Christianity had destroyed or poisoned eros, as one reads in Nietzsche, Ratzinger argues 
against Nietzsche that in Christ, Christianity has a more compelling and humane vision of 
love.28 The Logos that one has encountered as Creative Reason, as Word, and as Person, is 
beyond and above all God’s Eternal Son, the self-gift of the Father to the world, Love, 
because, following Augustine, the Father is the Lover, the Son, the Beloved, and the Holy 
Spirit, the bond between the Father and the Son, is Love.29 And Augustine, in his exegesis on 
Wisdom 11:20, interprets the Father as the measure without measure; the Son as the number 
without number; and the Spirit as the weight without weight.30 This Immanent Trinitarian 
reality of love finds its fullest expression in the Economic Trinity encountered in the 
Incarnation of God’s Son and the Mission of the Holy Spirit. There is little wonder thus, that 
Ratzinger began his papacy with the encyclical “God is Love,” for this to him constitutes the 
crux of Christian revelation. Logos as love therefore presents a critical space for engagement 
                                               
 27 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 346.  
 28 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 3.  
 29 Augustine, De Trinitate, trans. Edmund Hill, O.P. (New York: New City Press, 2012), VIII, 10.14.  
 30 Augustine, De Trinitate, XI, 10.17 – 11.18.  
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between the Aufklärung and Christian faith, for at its most essential level, Christianity is a 
religion that understands itself as love.  
Finally, we find in Ratzinger, the understanding of Logos as the Spoken and Written 
Word, through which we are able to discern what God has called us to become as believers: 
“We proclaim to you the eternal life which was with the Father and which was made 
manifest to us – that which we have seen and heard we proclaim also to you, so that you may 
have fellowship with us; and our fellowship is with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ” 
(1 Jn 1:2-3). The appeal to the senses is very evident: hearing, seeing, touching and looking. 
In effect, the fact of the historical entering of the Logos into the limits of time and space are 
known, thanks to the presence of the receiving community called Church, that received and 
continues to receive the spoken word of the Logos. The critique of the Church by Aufklärung 
is well documented and legendary. In Nietzsche, for example, following “the death of God,” 
the churches will become the sepulchers of God.31 While not going on the defensive against 
the Aufklärung’s biting criticisms, especially of the institutional Church as seen in Nietzsche 
and Hegel for example, Ratzinger argues that in spite of all her noticeable failures, the 
Church is the locus where the Word is not only preserved but proclaimed and encountered. 
This is a reason why one must continue to be a Christian in and with the Church, because the 
Church is the locus of encounter with the message of Christ. And this exchange between the 
Aufklärung’s critics of the Church and the Church itself could be viewed anew through the 
spectrum of Logos as the Word, spoken and written, that is preserved and transmitted as a 
message of hope for contemporary men and women.  
                                               




In precis, these five usages of Logos will therefore provide avenues by which 
Ratzinger will engage the Aufklärung. While they are clearly not exhaustive regarding the 
connecting concerns between Aufklärung and Christian dogmatics, this fivefold interpretation 
of Logos allows Ratzinger to engage key Aufklärung figures such as Kant, Nietzsche, Hegel, 
and Habermas, to cite a few. As will be seen in the evolution of the thesis, underlining these 
appropriations is the figure of Christ, the Logos of God, and it is from Christ that Ratzinger is 
able to draw the applications of logos as Son, Person, Word, Unity of Love and Reason, in 
his genuine attempts at engaging the Aufklärung. It is thanks to this method of proceeding 
that we will be able to enter into the ecclesiological and Christological positions of Ratzinger 
vis-à-vis the Aufklärung, to the extent that the Aufklärer did engage the dogmatic claims 
regarding the Church and the person of Jesus of Nazareth.  
 
0.1 Literature Review  
 
 The context of this study of Ratzinger and the Aufklärung is one in which secondary 
literature thus far, has often centered on other particularities of Ratzingerian theology, and 
not necessarily and specifically on the Aufklärung. Suffice it to state that Ratzinger’s 
theological career had him move very frequently around German-speaking universities, 
notably, Bonn (1959-1963), Münster (1963-1966), Tübingen (1966-1969), and finally, 
Regensburg (1969-1977), which Ratzinger himself considered to be his theological home. 
Paul VI made him an archbishop of Munich in 1977, and Cardinal of the Holy Roman 
Church, the same year. John Paul II would name Ratzinger Prefect of the Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith, a position that he held from 1981 until his election as pope in April 
2005. Looking at the state of the question today regarding the person of Ratzinger, most of 
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the secondary literature has tended to focus on Ratzinger’s work as a conciliar theologian. 
 This is understandable, given his public role as Prefect of the CDF for close to three 
decades, and the ensuing debates that surrounded his tenure at the CDF, from liberation 
theology to feminist theology; from inculturation and ecumenism to interreligious dialogue; 
from biblical interpretation to liturgy; from Mariology to eschatology. Secondary literature 
on Ratzinger and the Aufklärung does not exist, per se. But the sample of literature provided 
below provides a good overview that covers the Christological, Ecclesiological and 
Historical positions of Ratzinger.  This thesis will take these into consideration, as it moves 
towards the new direction of studying Ratzinger with the specific goal of the concerns, 
insights and energies of the Aufklärung. Some of this literature on many broad themes on 
Ratzinger includes the following:  
In Tracey Rowland’s Ratzinger’s Faith, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI,32 
Rowland offers a comprehensive analysis and explanation of Ratzinger’s nuanced reading of 
Western secular culture and the post-conciliar Church. She situates apparent changes in 
Ratzinger’s position on specific question on the ecclesiology, liturgy, revelation and 
scripture, not on a wider seismic shift on the part of Ratzinger, but on specific questions, 
such as the orientation to be taken in the liturgy, horizontalization or verticalization, in the 
context of the full participation of the laity that was called for by Vatican II. The Ratzinger 
that emerges from Rowland’s study is a Ratzinger who, while remaining faithful to his 
broader theological commitments rooted in the Ressourcement theological movement, is 
eager to engage and offer alternatives to the pressing questions of faith, nature, grace, 
revelation, and scripture, in a context that had clearly become secularized. 
                                               
 32 Tracey Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008).  
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Furthermore, in James Corkery, S.J., Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas: Wise 
Cautions & Legitimate Hopes,33 Corkery examines the forces and influences that shaped 
Ratzinger and largely explains how he came to discern the divergence between the world and 
the Church. Following a more historical approach, Corkery pays attention to the tension that 
Ratzinger faced as a theologian and as the Prefect of CDF, between academic freedom and 
Church authority. While eager to show the consistency in Ratzinger’s thought on key 
questions of ecumenism, ecclesiology, anthropology, soteriology and Christology, Corkery 
does not simply hallow Ratzinger but maintains a critical, though respectful approach 
towards his subject.  For Corkery, a distinguishing thread in Ratzinger’s theological tapestry 
is salvation which is received, not manufactured by us. It is this primacy of receptivity, that 
we are Christians and saved by what comes from outside, from God in Christ Jesus and not 
our own making, that underlies Ratzinger’s approach to many disputes and questions that he 
engaged with.  
In addition, in Scott W. Hahn’s Covenant and Communion: The Biblical Theology of 
Pope Benedict XVI,34 Hahn takes on the critique that has marked Ratzinger’s evaluation of 
the historical-critical method, a child of the Aufklärung, which sought to scrutinize the 
dogmatic claims of traditional interpretations of scripture. He points out that while Ratzinger 
does not hesitate to acknowledge the gains made by the historical-critical method, he does 
not shy away from critiquing its limitations. It must remain a method, and not an end in itself, 
for, if absolutized, it renders the figure of Jesus the incarnate Logos as a thing of the past. In 
addition, instead of being the living word of God meant to nourish the faithful, Scripture 
                                               
 33 James Corkery, S.J., Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas: Wise Cautions & Legitimate Hopes 
(Dublin: Dominican Publications, 2009).  
 34 Scott W. Hahn, Covenant and Communion: The Biblical Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2009).  
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becomes a thing of the experts, who increasingly subject it to new scientific theories. What 
motivates Benedict to take on the historical-critical method? The reason is simple: How we 
read and interpret the bible directly affects what we believe about Christ, the Church, the 
sacraments and the liturgy. To remedy this situation, Ratzinger proposes the hermeneutic of 
faith, which, Hahn argues, leads to a rediscovery of rich, patristic biblical images and 
typologies. 
In Emery de Gaál The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift,35 De 
Gaál offers a profound examination of the Christological foundations of Benedict’s 
theological edifice, which, in the final analysis, makes the argument that Jesus Christ is 
God’s self-disclosure, and that to know Jesus and be ready to offer him to the world, is the 
most priceless treasure that the believer can offer the world. De Gaál makes the case that 
Christology is the overriding thread in the theology of Ratzinger, lived out from the 
perspective of Ressourcement and the Fathers, the Scriptures and the Liturgy. Speaking to the 
theme of the Aufklärung, this text is very handy because in the help it offers in understanding 
Ratzinger’s Christological response to the Aufklärung. 
In addition, Brennan Pursell’s Benedict of Bavaria: An Intimate Portrait of the Pope 
and his Homeland,36 makes the case that in spite of Benedict’s universal mission and mind, 
in order to understand Joseph Ratzinger, his Bavarian roots must be taken into consideration. 
Benedict himself once declared, “in my vocation I belong to the whole world, but my heart 
beats Bavarian.” Pursell takes us from childhood through adulthood of Benedict’s life, 
stopping at each to highlight how the different geographical locations that Ratzinger 
                                               
 35 Emery de Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2010).  
 36 Brennan Pursell, Benedict of Bavaria: An Intimate Portrait of the Pope and his Homeland (New 
Haven, CT: Circle Press, 2008).  
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experienced, from Marktl am Inn to Altötting; from Freising to Munich; from Traunstein to 
Regensburg, all contributed in shaping the soul, mind, and heart of Ratzinger. As someone 
who has had the experience of visiting most of these places, I found this study very 
rewarding and engaging, especially as it provides the religious context thanks to which we 
can understand and appreciate the effects of the Aufklärung on popular piety and the life of 
faith in general, in Ratzinger’s Germany.  
Maximilian Heinrich Heim’s Joseph Ratzinger Life in the Church and Living 
Theology: Fundamentals of Ecclesiology with Reference to Lumen Gentium,37 provides a 
masterly analysis of Joseph Ratzinger and his participation at the Second Vatican Council, 
with the specific reference to the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium. 
Ratzinger participated at the Second Vatican Council, first a theological adviser to Cardinal 
Frings of Cologne, and later on, as a peritus of the Council, appointed by Paul VI. If there is 
an issue that has marked, influenced, and dramatized the ecclesial life and theological 
reflections of Joseph Ratzinger, it is unarguably his experience and subsequent interpretation 
of the Second Vatican Council. In his very first Christmas Address to the Roman Curia in 
December 2005, Ratzinger showed how dear Vatican II and its interpretation were to his 
person by reflecting on the proper hermeneutic of the Council. In a now famous address, he 
opposed the hermeneutic of discontinuity with what he called the hermeneutic of reform. 
Heim takes dogmatic constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium, and fleshes it out 
piecemeal, from the perspective of Ratzinger. It is a rigorous study, highly esteemed, that 
eventually gained a foreword by Ratzinger himself. It will be helpful to this thesis when we 
engage the Aufklärung from the perspective of Logos as Word, spoken and received, that is 
                                               
 37 Maximilian Heinrich Heim, Joseph Ratzinger: Life in the Church and Living Theology: 
Fundamentals of Ecclesiology with Reference to Lumen Gentium (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007).  
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received by the community of the Church. Herein lies Ratzinger’s preference for the 
ecclesiology of communion, in its varied expressions, implications and applications.  
Christopher Collins, S.J. The Word Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph 
Ratzinger,38 offers a blueprint on Ratzinger’s theology. Collins comes closest to my thoughts 
in my thesis, in that he takes as the central tenet of his book, Ratzinger’s theological 
treatment of Christianity as an encounter with Jesus of Nazareth, and not, to put it negatively, 
an ethical system. Much to his credit, he also fleshes out the various layers of meaning of the 
concept of the Logos, which will be very useful to our thesis: Logos; Ratio; Verbum; 
Prosopon; Filius. Collins presents Christianity as a dialogical revelatory structure, at the 
center of which is the person of Jesus Christ who as a community with the Father and the 
Spirit, brings about the Church and sets the pattern for the Church. 
Vincent Twomey, S.V.D., Pope Benedict XVI, The Conscience of Our Age: A 
Theological Portrait,39 offers a valuable theological analysis of the major works or positions 
and conclusions of Ratzinger. The text offers a useful framework of the theological corpus of 
Ratzinger along the lines of the three classification of Ratzinger’s life, namely, the early, 
middle and the later Ratzinger. Its unique perspective on Ratzingerian scholarship is that it 
studies Ratzinger the theologian from the lens of conscience: the conscience of a teacher, that 
is, Ratzinger’s university lectures and his interaction with the events of his university days; 
the role of conscience in theology, that is, in the exercise of the magisterium vis-à-vis the 
task of the theologian; and the role of conscience in politics, that is, the place of the Church 
in post-modern secular democracies. This study provides useful insights to the thesis, 
                                               
 38 Christopher S. Collins, S.J. The Word Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph Ratzinger 
(Collegeville, MN.: Liturgical Press, 2013).   
 39 Vincent Twomey, S.V.D., Pope Benedict XVI, The Conscience of Our Age: A Theological Portrait 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007).  
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especially the introductory chapter of the thesis that examines the theological currents and 
movements that prepared Ratzinger for his engagement with modern philosophical thought, 
captured by the deepest sentiments of the German Aufklärung.  
The final text in this sample of Ratzingerian literature is by Gerhard Ludwig Müller, 
(ed.), Der Glaube ist einfach.40 This text by a group of German scholars offers a rich tapestry 
of Ratzinger’s hermeneutic of faith as the defining and determining ground of Christian life 
and theological reflection. It studies the synthesis of faith and reason, of the God of Aristotle 
and biblical faith; the question of faith and biblical exegesis; and the God of Jesus Christ who 
is close and yet distant, a favorite theme of Ratzinger. This movement of a reconciliation 
between faith and reason that is put forth in this text captures the inner momentum of the 
Ratzingerian engagement of the Aufklärung, namely, to place traditional faith in conversation 
with autonomous reason. This text is especially useful to this thesis in its consideration of 
Logos as person, prosopon, for in the Ratzingerian spirit, faith is only borne from an 
encounter with a person, Jesus Christ. It is this encounter that transforms the subjective “I” of 
the faith of the individual into the collective or communal “I” of the Church, and my “I” of 
faith is nurtured to the extent that I allow myself to be taken up into the ecclesial “I” of the 
community.  
Given this sample of texts on studies on Ratzinger, what this thesis seeks to achieve 
by way of moving the needle of knowledge is to study Ratzinger from the philosophical 
prism of the Aufklärung, that is, how do Ratzinger’s theological ideas, convictions and 
conclusions place him in dialogue and engagement with the philosophical currents of the 
post-Aufklärung era, especially the philosophers that emerge from Germany? While 
                                               
 40 Gerhard Ludwig Müller, (ed.), Der Glaube ist einfach (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2007).  
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Ratzinger definitely appreciates the gains of the Aufklärung, he argues, as will be seen in this 
thesis, that an unwarranted amplification of the gains of the Aufklärung, such as the 
historical-critical method, are neither necessary nor of enduring relevance, especially to the 
life of the faith of the ordinary believer.  
Therefore, the presupposition underlining this study therefore is that to understand 
Ratzinger’s theological undertakings with the particular reference to ecclesiology and 
Christology demands getting into the philosophical currents he engaged, notably the 
Aufklärung and post-Aufklärung currents of thought. From the preceding review of 
Ratzingerian literature, it follows that the question about logos and its developing 
understandings in the doctrine of the Church in Ratzinger is a territory in need of further 
theological exploration, especially in terms of seeking to understand the impulses and 
movements that have shaped and defined Christian life, faith and practice in the 
contemporary secular world. What this thesis does, therefore, is to insert Ratzinger’s 
theological appropriations into conversations with philosophical interlocutors, in order to 
seek possibilities of common ground thanks to which contemporary men and women could 
afford a new look at the Christian faith and the Church. 
 
0.2 Thesis Structure   
 
  This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter One studies Ratzinger in terms of this 
historical outline of his life. It studies the philosophical and theological formation of 
Ratzinger that prepared him for the eventual encounter with the major figures of the 
Aufklärung. There are three things that stand out in this Chapter: Firstly, the theological 
interpretation that Ratzinger gives regarding the circumstances of his birth on April 16, 1927; 
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Secondly, the ecclesiological convictions that emerges from Ratzinger’s engagement with 
Augustine of Hippo, in which the Church, studied from the perspective of the people and 
house of God has love or caritas as her animating force. And finally, the question of the 
figure of Christ vis-à-vis the life of the Church, in terms of both the historical revelation in 
Jesus of Nazareth and what that means for and in the continuous life of the Church in its past, 
present and eschatological mission as apprehended by Bonaventure from the perspective of 
the Franciscan tradition. What this chapter succeeds in doing is to lay the groundwork in 
terms of the ecclesiological and Christological positions that Ratzinger adopts, from which 
he will engage the expansive reality called the Aufklärung.  
Chapter Two takes opens up with a treatment of the broad insights of what 
characterized the eighteen-century Aufklärung movement. It makes the argument that when 
the Aufklärer define the Aufklärung from the perspective of Reason, sapere aude, - dare to 
use your reason – what is meant here is not just the faculty of rationality that easily comes to 
mind when the word “reason” is used. As the German-Jewish historian of philosophy, Ernst 
Cassirer points out, “reason” for the Aufklärer connotes all of reality, that is, nature, science, 
history, politics, economics and much more: 
Perhaps no other century is so completely permeated by the idea of intellectual 
progress as that of the Enlightenment. But we mistake the essence of this conception, 
if we understand it merely in a quantitative sense as an extension of knowledge 
indefinitely (…) All the various energies of the mind are, rather, held together in a 
common center of force. Variety and diversity of shapes are simply the full unfolding 
of an essentially homogeneous formative power. When the eighteenth century wants 
to characterize this power in a single word, it calls it “reason.” “Reason” becomes the 
unifying and central point of this century, expressing all that it longs and strives for, 
and all that it achieves.41 
 
                                               
 41 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2009), 5.  
21 
 
Clearly, not only did the eighteenth century understanding of reason go beyond the mere 
cognitive, mere rationality, but this century had a much broader understanding of reason. 
Reason was perceived to be cross-cultural and all encompassing, of all cultures, all thinking 
subjects and nations. Reason was the ground of all reality. It was the word that meant 
everything to all people. And as Cassirer points out, “from the changeability of religious 
creeds, of moral maxims and convictions, of theoretical opinions and judgments, a firm and 
lasting element can be extracted which is permanent in itself, and which in this identity and 
permanence expresses the real essence of reason.”42 Owing to this all-encompassing 
understanding of reason, therefore, the concept of reason which is front and center in 
philosophy, serves as the ground on which Ratzinger can enter into dialogue with the claims 
and positions of the Aufklärung, and hence serves to bridge the ever-widening wedge 
between the God of faith and the God of philosophers.  
Chapter Two likewise, offers a comprehensive insight into the meaning and 
implications of the Aufklärung, from the perspective of the 1959 Inaugural Lecture of 
Ratzinger titled “The God of Faith and the God of the Philosophers.” By adopting this lecture 
as the framework of this Chapter, we are able to do two things: Firstly, confront the 
philosophical prism of Ratzinger in what has certainly remained the his most forthright and 
profound philosophical literature thus far; and secondly, this framework of the inaugural 
lecture likewise offers us the spectrum thanks to which we delved deeper into the 
distinguishing marks of the Aufklärung in its general as a pan-European and German 
movement, and the specific character of the Katholische Aufklärung.  
                                               
 42 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 6.  
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What stands out from these philosophical considerations is that one is able to discern 
a very broad understanding of the Aufklärung, thanks to which one can make the case for the 
plural appropriations of the concept of Logos or Reason that will define Chapters Four and 
Five. But before then, Chapter Three offers a historical trajectory of the philosophical and 
theological understanding of the concept of Logos. The advantage this Chapter brings to the 
conversation is that it situates the appropriations of the concept of logos by Ratzinger in a 
historical and theological framework that makes Ratzinger’s own appropriations stand out in 
sharper focus. This Chapter offers a panoramic history of the evolution of the concept of 
logos in Greek philosophy particularly with Heraclitus and follows its logical development in 
the Fathers especially Justin the Martyr, Origen and Irenaeus. This connection from Greek 
philosophy and Patristic literature thus set the background thanks to which one can read the 
further developments of Logos theology in Ratzinger. 
Chapter Four therefore builds on this broad understanding of reason, taking the Greek 
concept of logos as its point of departure. Because logos in its multiplicity has what it takes 
to act as a ground for all, as the concept of reason did with the Aufklärung’s understanding of 
reason as encompassing all of natural reality, Ratzinger is able to appropriate logos as 
Creative Reason, Son and Person. These three theological metaphors serve the purpose of a 
Christological reading of the concept of logos, from a Ratzingerian perspective.  
Chapter Five further studies Ratzinger’s theological appropriation of Logos as Love 
and Logos as Word. As Love, the Incarnate Logos is the example par excellence of oblative, 
sacrificial love that is not an anti-thesis to eros, which is the deepest and most consuming 
expression of human love. On the contrary, Logos as love provides the human possibility of 
reconciling agape and eros. And the fruit of this is the life of the Christian faith in the 
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community called Church, whose identity and mission is that of love. Next, as Word, Logos 
not only makes God’s revelation known, but in calling all to the worship of God, brings 
about the centrality of liturgical worship whose fons et culmen is the oratio rationabilis, the 
Eucharistic prayer. From these two theological understanding of the concept of the Logos, 
therefore, is discernable Ratzinger’s doctrine of the Church, that is, Ratzinger’s Ecclesiology, 
seen through the lenses of the Aufklärung.   
Chapter Six draws out the theological and philosophical implications from this 
interchange between faith and reason, philosophy and theology, and the relevance for today’s 
Church. In this chapter, it emerges that the hope which the Church can offer thanks to the 
historical revelation of Christ, accessed via faith and reason, could be helpful in overcoming 
the fragmentary seductions of post-Aufklärung contemporary world. Ratzinger presents the 
figure of Christ as the Church’s response to the Aufklärung, with the conviction that even for 
today’s secularized contemporary men and women, a second look at the figure and message 
of Christ could still offer hope and meaning to today’s scientific, naturalistic, moralistic, 
technological and media-influenced men and women. And since Ratzinger is not without his 
critics, this Chapter likewise pays attention to the central criticism levied against Ratzinger in 
the light of the Aufklärung, which is the essentially the charge that Ratzinger appears 
unwilling to subscribe to the gains made by the pure reason of the Aufklärung.  
A Conclusion that ties everything to Ratzinger’s philosophical hermeneutics of faith, 
brings the thesis to a close.  
 
0.3 The Question of Method  
 
The question of method essentially seeks to provide the hermeneutical framework in 
terms of how a given work unfolds. Method studies primary and secondary sources and the 
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perspectives brought to bear on these by the author and the conclusions obtained.43 What 
then will constitute the method of this thesis? Essentially, I hope to proceed by examining 
primary texts related to the person of Ratzinger in terms of the factors, ecclesial, historical 
and academic that shaped him and led to his adopting the conclusions he makes in his 
theology on the Church and the saving work of Christ, in the context of the Aufklärung. Two 
things will guide this methodology: Firstly, the attention to the context, for Ratzinger appears 
to always theologize from a given context, largely the post-World War II Germany, from the 
perspective of accounting for the present thanks to the antecedent forces of the past. Owing 
to this realization, the method of this thesis will largely be contextual, that is, it will seek to 
study Ratzinger from the historical metaphors and positions beginning with the late 
eighteenth century when the Aufklärung gathered momentum, to the post-cultural 
Christianity of the twenty-first century, limited to the concerns of Ratzinger regarding the 
doctrine of the Church and the Gestalt of Christ, in the midst of the world. 
Secondly, paying attention to that sense of the analogical and the historical will be 
central to the methodology of this thesis. In other words, even when caught up in the middle 
of the historical, Ratzinger as a typical Augustinian, never reads world history as a closed 
entity. History is always the story of God dealing with humans, always the story of Jesus of 
Nazareth. Ratzinger begins his theology from the context of history. He looks at the currents 
driving history at the moment, and then delves into understanding the happenings via the 
lenses of revelation and faith. In other words, the consciousness that guides this Ratzingerian 
                                               
 43 Bernard Lonergan, S.J., Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 3: 
Lonergan argues that the question of method is helpful in terms of understanding the theological conclusions 
made, for the reason that method exposes the manner in which a given theologian applies his or herself to 
sources, events, currents of thought and the engagement with other thinkers. Method is not a set of rules but a 




reading of history is what Ratzinger perceives to be the unique and singular event of all 
history, that is, the incarnation of the Logos in Jesus of Nazareth; Jesus’ life, death, 
resurrection; and the sending of the Holy Spirit and the gathering of the community of 
believers around the figure of the risen Christ in the community called the Church. This 
attentiveness to the hermeneutic of faith is therefore a guiding principle of this thesis as well.  
To Ratzinger, this entry of God into history gives history a salvific character, for it 
means that history is not neutral, but a ground from which and upon which God is always 
acting. History is the space in which God has irrevocably committed God’s self to saving 
humans, and in Christ, one of the human race has responded to God’s offer of salvation in a 
definitive and life-giving manner, assuming human nature to attain this while likewise 
stepping beyond the limits of human nature.44 In this sense, the Christian faith is intrinsically 
bound up with history, and a proper hermeneutic must take into consideration this spatio-
temporal character of the defining events of Christian history.  
In summary, paying attention to the primary works by Ratzinger that portray his 
engagements with the Aufklärung in terms of ecclesiology and Christology; attentiveness to 
the historical context from which Ratzinger writes; and finally, the faith hermeneutic, are the 
three defining marks of the methodology that will guide the writing of this thesis. 
Throughout the thesis, I will seek to provide an outlet for my own voice as well, when and 
where necessary, so that a trialogue emerges, of Ratzinger, other voices and mine.   
                                               





Chapter One: Joseph Ratzinger: The Life and Intellectual Formation of 
a Theologian  
 
Much has been written about the life of Joseph Ratzinger, and very fine literature 
exists that sheds light on the childhood and historical development of Joseph Ratzinger.1 The 
goal of this section, therefore, is not to repeat their insights, but to allow the historical data to 
help in setting the stage for Ratzinger’s engagement with the specific questions that largely 
followed the spirit of the Aufklärung. Hence, this biographical section will be selective and 
relevant to the question of how the man Ratzinger built, over time, the convictions that 
shaped his theological philosophy of the centrality of reason, which, as the defining 
Enlightenment maxim, became a theological tool in the hands of the Greek concept of the 
Logos. 
 
1.1 Biographical Outline  
 
The consensus amongst Ratzingerian scholars tends to view Ratzinger’s life in three 
stages or phases, that is, the early, middle and later Ratzinger.2 Mary McCaughey spells out 
this demarcation thus: “Details of Ratzinger’s life are usually divided into three main stages: 
firstly, his early years growing up in Bavaria and his studies as a seminarian; secondly, the 
                                               
 1 Some biographical texts include: Stephen Mansfield, Pope Benedict XVI His Life and Mission (New 
York: Penguin Group USA Inc. 2005); Brennan Pursell, Benedict of Bavaria An Intimate Portrait of the Pope 
and His Homeland (New Haven, CT: Circle Press, 2008); Lawrence Paul Hemming, Benedict XVI: Fellow 
Worker for the Truth: An Introduction to his Life and Thought (London: Burns & Oates, 2005); Georg 
Ratzinger, My Brother, The Pope (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2011); Peter Seewald, Benedict XVI An 
Intimate Portrait (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008); Marco Bardazzi, In the Vineyard of the Lord, The Life, 
Faith, and Teachings of Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI (New York: Rizzoli International Publications Inc. 
2005). In my STL thesis, Joseph Ratzinger: The Word Became Love and Truth in the Church I also dealt with 
the question of his biography in relation to the theological maxims or matrixes that emerged from such a 
historical context and background.  
 2 Vincent Twomey, S.V.D., Pope Benedict XVI, The Conscience of Our Age: A Theological Portrait 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 55-61.   
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period after ordination and his post-graduate studies up to the Second Vatican Council and 
thirdly, his work in an official capacity for the Church up to his appointment as the successor 
of St. Peter, shepherd of the universal Catholic Church.”3 Certainly, this broad division of 
Ratzinger’s life into three phases pays attention to the major changes in his life. They also 
take cognizance of the theological themes and pursuits he undertook vis-à-vis his historical 
context. For example, with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Ratzinger saw a 
momentous new era, for he suddenly realized the new field for evangelization in previously 
atheistic communist countries. The collapse of the Berlin Wall, to Ratzinger, provided an 
opportunity for Christianity to test itself out once more, as the great absent One, in the lives 
of many in the post-Soviet republics. And yet, in his own judgment, Christianity failed to 
meet the challenge of the spiritual void of the hour:  
The year 1989 brought the surprising collapse of the socialist regimes in Europe, 
which left behind a sorry legacy of ruined land and ruined souls. Anyone who 
expected that the hour had come again for the Christian message was disappointed. 
Although the number of believing Christians throughout the world is not small, 
Christianity failed at that historical moment to make itself heard as an epoch-making 
alternative.4  
 
Given this legacy of spiritual vacuity left behind by Marxism, atheism therefore became an 
urgent pastoral concern for Ratzinger, as he faced the East. Even in the West, Secularism had 
taken on a new militancy that was beginning to interpret the separation of Church and State 
as the exclusion of the Church from the public life of the State.  
Two aspects of his Ratzinger’s childhood life bear special significance, owing to the 
emphasis that Ratzinger himself places on them, viz., the significance of his birth on Holy 
Saturday which, in other words, is the beginning of the life of faith, and the reality of 
                                               
 3 Mary McCaughey, The Church as Hermeneutical Community and the Place of Embodied Faith in 
Joseph Ratzinger and Lewis S. Mudge (Bern: International Academic Publishers, 2015), 202. 
 4 Ratzinger, Introduction, 11.  
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growing up under the shadow of National Socialism in Germany. In these two events lie an 
admixture of the Christ, Person, Son, Word, Unity of Love, in the mystery of Holy Saturday, 
and the consequences of Reason detached from Faith, in National Socialism. These themes 
will be taken up in more detail in the subsequent chapters. 
 It all began on April 16, 1927, when the family of the Joseph and Maria Ratzinger 
welcomed their new baby, Joseph Aloysius Ratzinger, into this world. It was Holy Saturday. 
Ratzinger the adult theologian offers a rich symbolic meaning:  
I was born on Holy Saturday, April 16, 1927, in Marktl am Inn. The fact that my day 
of birth was the last day of Holy Week and the eve of Easter has always been noted in 
our family history. This was connected with the fact that I was baptized immediately 
on the morning of the day I was born with the water that had just been blessed. (At 
that time the solemn Easter Vigil was celebrated on the morning of Holy Saturday). 
To be the first person baptized with the new water was seen as a significant act of 
Providence. I have always been filled with thanksgiving for having had my life 
immersed in this way in the Easter mystery, since this could only be a sign of 
blessing. To be sure, it was not Easter Sunday but Holy Saturday, but, the more I 
reflect on it, the more this seems to be fitting for the nature of our human life; we are 
still awaiting Easter; we are not yet standing in the full light but walking toward it full 
of trust.5 
 
One senses the existential realism of Ratzinger in these lines: Life is such that we never 
completely have it all, but must learn to live with the incomplete, with the brokenness of 
human nature, for it is only in the full light of eschaton, of the Easter of the culmination of 
history when the Risen Lord offers all back to the Father, that the longing of the human heart 
will be fulfilled. The present time, the time of Holy Saturday, is to be lived with the reality of 
the present, for the future is yet to be.  
 In his Last Testament, Benedict still finds great significance that he was born on Holy 
Saturday. He says: “Both as a theologian and also in temporal events, which sometimes 
seemed very Holy Saturday-esque, it has been increasingly impressed upon me. I have also 
                                               
 5 Joseph Ratzinger, Milestones: Memoirs 1972 – 1977 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 8.  
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tried to understand it ever more deeply – actually as a title, something considered as a 
program for my life.”6 When Peter Seewald responds to these words of Benedict that “Your 
words concerning this are very deep and touching,” Benedict replies: “Because it is not just 
something I thought up, but something bound up with the beginning of my existence, with 
the ground of my being, which I have not only thought my way into, but lived into as well.”7 
It is certainly telling that Ratzinger sees his life as programmatic on the mysteries of Holy 
Saturday, for this says two things about Ratzinger: In the first place, prior to Holy Saturday, 
there is the Cross of Good Friday, on which Christ paid the ultimate price for fidelity to his 
saving mission. The day ends with an apparent failure on the part of Christ. He is unable to 
save himself from the powerful of the world, a helpless victim to human vengeance of the 
penned-up charges of blasphemy before the Jewish religious hierarchy, and reason before the 
Roman political authorities. That is the story antecedent to Holy Saturday.  
 But that is not the end of the story, for there is Easter Sunday, on which the apparent 
failure of Good Friday is given a decisive turn around that reverses everything and sets the 
record straight, of the truly successful, victorious and powerful: “We suffer on account of 
God’s patience. And yet, we need his patience. God, who became a lamb, tells us that the 
world is saved by the Crucified One, not by those who crucified him. The world is redeemed 
by the patience of God. It is destroyed by the impatience of man.”8 And that is what Holy 
Saturday embodies, the saving patience of God.  
                                               
 6 Benedict XVI, Last Testament in His Own Words with Peter Seewald, trans. Philip Jacobs (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 43.  
 7 Benedict XVI, Last Testament, 43.  
 8 Benedict XVI, “Homily for the Beginning of the Petrine Ministry of the Bishop of Rome” (April 24, 
2005), at w2.vatican.va,  accessed April 5, 2018.  
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 Ratzinger’s theological fascination about the circumstances is again mirrored in his 
recollections and interpretation of his baptism on the same Holy Saturday:   
Since I was born on a Holy Saturday, this day has had a special meaning for me from 
the beginning. In my early years it was important to me mainly that this was my 
baptismal day and that I was, as my parents emphasized with particular pride, the first 
to be baptized in the newly blessed Easter water. Being born on Holy Saturday 
brought home to me the privilege of a Baptism that was quite noticeably joined to the 
Christian pasch, that is, that let Baptism’s inner origin and foundation for life appear 
particularly clearly. The tidings of my birthday were thus joined in a special way to 
the liturgy of the Church; my life from its beginning seemed oriented to this strange 
coincidence of light and darkness, of pain and hope, of the hiddenness and presence 
of God.9 
 
Certainly, the overarching reading of his baptism on Holy Saturday is based on the theme of 
hope, which Ratzinger sees in the symbol of the Easter candle that illumines the darkness of 
the night. There is a passage from death to the resurrection, and that, to Ratzinger, is 
precisely what happens to the newly baptized.10 In a sense, the silence of Holy Saturday is 
filled with the mystery of hope. But this light is not without challenges to it, not without 
forces that are bent on blowing it out: “Again and again there are anticipations of hope - 
lightning strokes in which suddenly the victory of God seems to break through,” writes 
Ratzinger, “but also again and again darknesses that take everything back and confront us 
again, relentlessly, with the absence of God.”11 Life is thus a drama between these two poles, 
these two forces seeking for dominance over the human soul.  
 To Ratzinger, the strange power of the powerlessness of Christian life and witness 
that suffers on account of God’s abandonment which is precisely God’s patience, offers the 
world the opportunity to be saved. God’s patience as well offers the world the opportunity to 
                                               
 9 William Congdon, The Sabbath of History: With Meditations on Holy Week by Joseph Ratzinger 
(New Haven, CT: Knights of Columbus Museum, 2012), 135-136.  
 10 Congdon and Ratzinger, Sabbath of History, 136.  
 11 Congdon and Ratzinger, Sabbath of History, 137.  
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enter into friendship with Christ, which is life’s goal. In addition, the circumstances of his 
birth and Ratzinger’s interpretation of it reflects the sense of provisionality of all things 
temporal vis-à-vis God. In other words, it is in the nature of faith not to idolize the present of 
this world, but to remain permanently on a mission oriented towards God. The purpose of life 
is to live for and towards God, not allowing one’s self to be captured or enslaved by the 
present moment, attractive and seductive as the present might be. This is the life of faith, of 
the believer who follows Jesus of Nazareth.  
 For Ratzinger, the locus of the cultivation and flourishing of this life of faith that 
began with his birth on Holy Saturday was not only the deeply religious atmosphere of his 
biological home, but, over and above all, the home of the Church community in which he 
encountered the mysteries of the faith in the liturgical celebrations. He ruminates:  
Then I got a Schott12 for Sundays, which contained the complete liturgy for Sundays 
and feast days. Finally, I received the complete missal for everyday of the year. Every 
new step into the liturgy was a great event for me. Each new book I was given was 
something precious to me, and I could not dream of anything more beautiful. It was a 
riveting adventure to move by degrees into the mysterious world of the liturgy, which 
was being enacted before us and for us there on the altar. It was becoming more and 
more clear to me that here I was encountering a reality that no one had simply thought 
up, a reality that no official authority or great individual had created. The mysterious 
fabric of texts and actions had grown from the faith of the Church over the centuries. 
It bore the whole weight of history within itself, and yet, at the same time, it was 
much more than the product of human history (…) The inexhaustible reality of the 
Catholic liturgy has accompanied me through all phases of life, and so I shall have to 
speak of it time and again.13 
 
Ratzinger’s faith journey that began with his birth and baptism on Holy Saturday was clearly 
nurtured by two factors, viz., the religious life at home, and the liturgical life of his parish 
community, and these two are somewhat related. By giving the young boy the missals of the 
                                               
 12 The Schott was the German translation of the Missal from the Latin original, undertaken in the 
nineteenth century by the Benedictine monk, Anselm Schott, of Beuron Abbey.  
 13 Ratzinger, Milestones, 20.  
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Church sequentially, the elder Joseph Ratzinger was clearly introducing and nurturing in his 
son the knowledge and love of the sacred rites. Given this religious piety of the Ratzingers, 
perhaps, one could say that instead of the Ratzingers keeping Easter and by extension, the 
whole liturgical life of the Church, rather the liturgical life of the Church played a vital role 
in keeping the Ratzingers together, with the center being the mysteries of the faith celebrated 
in the life of the Church. At this point, one might raise the question: What might be some of 
the theological insights that Ratzinger arrives at from his reflection on the circumstances of 
his birth? 
 Firstly, there is the question about the death of God. Quoting Nietzsche, perhaps 
oddly approvingly, Ratzinger writes:  
Talk of God’s death haunts our time more and more. First, for Jean Paul (Sartre), it 
was only like a nightmare (…) With Nietzsche, it was deadly seriousness coming to 
expression in a shrill cry of dread: “God is dead! God remains dead! And we have 
killed him!” In the meantime, another fifty years later, people speak with almost 
academic composure about it and begin to inaugurate a “theology after the death of 
God,” looking about to see how to proceed and to encourage man to prepare himself 
to jump in to take God’s place.14  
 
Holy Saturday, therefore, captures the sentiments of the “death of God” for many in the 
contemporary world. To some, the noun “God” is meaningless, an empty concept that 
conveys or signifies nothing. For others, owing to one reason or the other, and in most cases, 
the reality of evil and the effect this has had on the emotive level, to believe in the existence 
of a benevolent God is an existential impossibility. The conviction that God is dead in either 
the former or the latter scenario is hence an act of the will for many contemporary men and 
women. It is not really that they cannot reason through the existence of God, but they have 
                                               
 14 Congdon and Ratzinger, Sabbath of History, 147.  
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willed God’s non-existence, even if they are unsure about what world emerges from a world 
in which God no longer exists, that is, God no longer has any signification.  
 Secondly, Holy Saturday, besides symbolizing the death of God and all that comes 
with the decision for rational and emotive atheism, likewise embodies not just the death of 
God, but likewise the hiddenness of God. It is a day which speaks of the fact of God’s 
obscurity:  
For this is Holy Saturday, the day of the hiddenness of God. It is the day of that 
frightful paradox that we express in the Creed with the words “descended into hell,” 
descended into the mystery of death. On Good Friday we could at least look at the 
Pierced One. But Holy Saturday is empty, the heavy stone of the new tomb covers the 
deceased, everything is over, faith seems definitively unmasked as fanaticism. No 
God has saved this Jesus who called himself his son. One can rest assured. Those 
sober ones, who may at times have secretly vacillated in their conviction that there is 
nothing else, they were right all along.15 
 
Holy Saturday speaks therefore, to the question of spiritual darkness in our world. While the 
previous reading of Holy Saturday sought to speak to the concerns of decided atheism, this 
second interpretation seeks to engage the frustration of those that genuinely give faith in God 
in a chance, but continuously feel a powerlessness to their human concerns and struggles, on 
the part of God. In other words, Holy Saturday captures the sentiments of those for whom 
even with the best of intentions, God has become the great absent One. While for atheism the 
difficulty lies with faith in God itself, the religious challenge that comes with the hiddenness 
of God is much more at the level of an unfulfilled longing bordering on despair, since the 
“failure” of God to save his Son from death leaves both believer and onlooker with no 
guarantees that this God who is unable to save his Son is capable of doing anything for 
anyone. 
                                               
 15 Congdon and Ratzinger, Sabbath of History, 147.   
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 A third theological insight that Ratzinger draws from Holy Saturday in the light of his 
natural and supernatural birth has to do with the symbolism of the burial of God and its 
universal and social implications, which fits into the context of the death of God and the 
hiddenness of God. Ratzinger writes:  
Holy Saturday, day of the burial of God – is that not in an uncanny way our day? 
Does our century not begin to become one large Holy Saturday, a day of God’s 
absence, a day when an icy emptiness grows even in the hearts of the disciples so that 
they prepare for the way home with shame and fear and on their Emmaus journey, 
gloomy and disturbed, sink into hopelessness, failing to notice that the one thought to 
be dead is in their midst? God is dead, and we killed him. Did we actually notice that 
this statement was taken almost word for word from the language of Christian 
tradition, that we have often enough stammered something similar in our Stations of 
the Cross prayers without being aware of the terrifying earnest and uncanny reality of 
what we are saying? We have killed him by rejecting him in the shell of antiquated 
modes of thinking, by banishing him to a piety void of reality, which becomes more 
and more a devotional slogan or archaeological curiosity. We have killed him through 
the ambiguity of our lives that obscured him.16 
 
It is perhaps astonishing to see Ratzinger “agreeing” with the Nietzschean characteristic 
maxim regarding God, though the Ratzingerian interpretation is more nuanced and complex. 
But what stands out from Ratzinger’s perspective is that the questionability of the life of faith 
and love by Christians is creating a situation of a religious desertification. This is the sense in 
which contemporary world has become a one large Holy Saturday. Thus, Holy Saturday, the 
day of Ratzinger’s birth, becomes a potent symbol for a world making choices that exclude 
God. Holy Saturday is symbolic of the loss of the sense of hope in the world. And for 
Ratzinger, this sense of hopelessness is not a spectacle for a despairing nihilism, but rather, a 
pragmatic program for the pastor. The sense of insecurity, helpless and emptiness that is 
symbolized by Holy Saturday offers an urgent invitation to ecclesial mission. Benedict says:  
For the Fathers of the Church, the parable of the lost sheep, which the shepherd seeks 
in the desert, was an image of the mystery of Christ and the Church. The human race 
– each one of us – is the sheep lost in the desert which no longer knows the way (…) 
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The pastor must be inspired by Christ’s holy zeal: for him it is not a matter of 
indifference that so many people are living in the desert. And there are so many kinds 
of desert. There is the desert of poverty, the desert of hunger and thirst, the desert of 
abandonment, of loneliness, of destroyed love. There is the desert of God’s darkness, 
the emptiness of souls no longer aware of their dignity or the goal of human life. The 
external deserts in the world are growing, because the internal deserts have become so 
vast. Therefore, the earth’s treasures no longer serve to build God’s garden for all to 
live in, but they have been made to serve the powers of exploitation and destruction. 
The Church as a whole and all her Pastors, like Christ, must set out to lead people out 
of the desert, towards the place of life, towards friendship with the Son of God, 
towards the One who gives life, and life in abundance.17 
 
On this note, therefore, rather than assuming a despairing tone, Ratzinger turns the lemon 
into lemonade, seeing, in spite of the sense of hopelessness that comes with the absence of 
God, an opportunity for Christian hope. And even after stating that today large swathes of 
society no longer seem to accept the content of the Christian faith and the values inspired by 
it owing to a crisis of faith, Benedict is still convinced, as he states in the Motu Proprio Porta 
Fidei,  that “the people of today can still experience the need to go to the Well, like the 
Samaritan woman, in order to hear Jesus, who invites us to believe in him and to draw upon 
the source of living water welling up within him (cf. Jn 4:14).”18 Consequently, the absence 
of God who offers hope and meaning to human life all the more renders urgent the mission of 
the Church as the bearer of hope, in spite of the obvious shadows eclipsing what ought to be 
the evangelical radiance of the Church and her mission in the contemporary world.  
 Finally, Ratzinger reads Holy Saturday, the day of his birth, as the expression of 
God’s solidarity with humanity in the experience of the crushing reality of death, and the 
experience of the silent tomb:  
The darkness of God of this day, of this century, which is becoming more and more a 
Holy Saturday, addresses our conscience – it has something to do with us too. But 
                                               
 17 Benedict XVI, First Messages of His Holiness Benedict XVI (Nairobi: Pauline Publications Africa, 
2005), 16-17.  
 18 Benedict XVI, The Door of Faith: Motu Proprio Porta Fidei of the Supreme Pontiff Benedict XVI 
for the Induction of the Year of Faith (Nairobi: Pauline Publications Africa, 2012), 2.  
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despite everything it also has something consoling about it. For God’s dying in Jesus 
Christ is at the same time an expression of his radical solidarity with us. The darkest 
mystery of faith is simultaneously the brightest sign of a hope that is without limits. 
And one thing further: only through the failure of Good Friday, only through the 
deathly stillness of Holy Saturday could the disciples be led to grasp who Jesus really 
was and what his proclamation truly meant. God had to die for them, so that he could 
truly live in them. Their image that they had formed of God, into which they tried to 
force him, had to be destroyed so that they could see him who always remains the 
infinitely greater. We need the darkness of God, the silence of God, in order to 
experience the abyss of his greatness and that of our nothingness, which would open 
if he were not.19  
 
To Ratzinger, therefore, Holy Saturday embodies the twin realities of pain and hope. In 
Christ, God experiences the full dregs of the cup of death and the descent into Hades, and 
even more, for death does not constitute the end point of the narrative. This experience of 
death by Divinity is the highest point of solidarity with humanity, for, if God in Christ never 
experienced death, then one could argue that God does not understand the full depth of 
humanity. Isn’t it the germ of the Christianity that the Christian God suffers, that the 
Christian God knows pain from the inside? This is certainly not an anthropocentrism of God 
but rather, a kenosis of Divinity, a self-emptying that can only come about thanks to God’s 
freedom and love.  
 And yet in a world increasingly shaped by the this-worldly mentality, the irony is not 
lost to the believer that the sleep of Christ on Holy Saturday captures the sentiments in some 
of a God who sleeps while the issues pertaining to God appear to be sinking in a boat. 
Ratzinger voices this iconic situation: “God sleeps while his affairs are about to sink – is that 
not the experience of our own lives? Do the Church and the faith not appear like a little 
sinking ship that uselessly struggles against wind and waves while God is absent?”20 And 
                                               
 19 Congdon and Ratzinger, Sabbath of History, 148.  
 20 Congdon and Ratzinger, Sabbath of History, 148.  
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from the depths of current crises and challenges of the faith in today’s world, Ratzinger utters 
a heartfelt prayer to the Lord: 
Wake up – don’t you see that we are sinking? Wake up, don’t let the darkness of Holy 
Saturday last forever, let a gleam of Easter fall in our day too. Go with us when we 
walk despondently to Emmaus so that our hearts may be enkindled by Your nearness. 
You who, in hiddenness, guided Israel’s path, until finally you were a man among 
men, don’t leave us in darkness; don’t let Your Word be drowned in the prattle of 
these days. Lord help us, for without You we would perish. Amen.21 
 
It is certainly symbolic that Ratzinger turns to prayer, in encapsulating his theological 
insights regarding his birth on Holy Saturday. It reflects the spiritual heart of Ratzinger, for 
whom theology opens the soul to the impracticability of human self-sufficiency, thereby 
preparing the soul for an opening to the transcendent, to the Divine experience of 
encountering the God of Jesus Christ. 
 Nevertheless, even as a child with the happy family atmosphere at home and the joys 
of childhood such as the family’s celebration of Easter, Christmas and other Bavarian 
cultural delights, Ratzinger was already exposed to the ugliness of political absolutism, in 
terms of the coming to power of National Socialism in Germany.22 Standing in threatening 
opposition to the life of family and faith of the Ratzingers and all of Germany was the 
growing ideology of National Socialism. Despite claims that Joseph Ratzinger was a pro-
forma member of the “Hitler Youth,” it is important to state here that there was no iota of 
affection for Nazism in the Ratzinger family, both in the parents, their children and extended 
relations. Like every seminarian, Ratzinger was registered into the “Hitler Youth” by the 
seminary authorities who had registered all the seminarians, in order to save the seminary 
from the Nazis who wielded power in Germany at the time. Ratzinger is convinced that being 
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a Christian is irreconcilable with the Nazi ideology. Talking about the Nazis, Benedict 
recounts:  
It was really clear to us that a clergyman must be against the Nazis. Our father was so 
against them you cannot imagine that anyone in the family would have supported 
them. Aunt Theres, one of my father’s sisters, was particularly fierce against the 
Nazis. She had a house with several siblings in Osterhofen, with some ground on 
which the railway ran. When a train with Nazi top brass shot past on the train, she 
showed them the long nose (Pope makes a gesture, laughing). They were enraged, but 
there was nothing they could do from a speeding train.23 
 
Ratzinger’s brother, Msgr. Georg Ratzinger, offers a corroborative account of the family’s 
anti-Nazi sentiments: “Father spoke with us very little about politics at that time, for he knew 
the proverb: ‘Children and fools speak the truth.’  (…) At any rate, our parents made no 
secret of the fact that they were anti-Nazi and despised Hitler wholeheartedly.”24 This first-
hand experience of Nazism will create in Ratzinger a very measured sense of expectation 
regarding politics. It would not be out of place to conclude that Nazism formed in Ratzinger 
a very suspicious view about the closeness between the Church and the political state. He 
consistently argues for the autonomy of each, to the extent that any usurpation of the role of 
the other becomes counterproductive to both and therefore unhelpful to the wider society.  
 
1.2 The Question of the State of the Church in the Perception of the Young Ratzinger   
 
 To Ratzinger, the Enlightenment principle of the separation of Church and State, - a 
principle dear to secular democracies who see themselves as heirs to the Aufklärung – is 
foundational in the de-sacralization of Caesar that the Christian Church took up following the 
teaching of Christ. Nevertheless, this in no way implies the exclusion of the life of faith in 
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the public discussion and discernment of the State, for freedom of religion does not imply 
freedom from religion, and neither should it be understood as restricted to freedom of 
worship. 
 In the introduction to this thesis, it became evident that Ratzinger as early as the 
1960s was already sensing that the world, understood in terms of the wider society, was 
already moving away from the life of faith as proposed by the Church. And not only was he 
perceiving the erosion of the life of the Church in many of the baptized, he was likewise 
noticing that even the figure of Christ, which ought to shape the Church’s faith and Christian 
spirituality, was likewise being eviscerated by patterns of thought shaped by secular currents 
of the Aufklärung. Reflecting on this eclipse of the Christological foundations of the Church, 
whose absence had a clear corrosive effect regarding the faith of many in post-war Germany 
and essentially, Western Europe, Ratzinger declares:  
Herein (ecclesiology) lies the cause of a good part of the misunderstanding or real 
errors which endanger theology and common Catholic opinion alike. My impression 
is that the authentically Catholic meaning of the reality “Church” is tacitly 
disappearing, without being expressly rejected. Many no longer believe that what is at 
issue is a reality willed by the Lord himself. Even with some theologians, the Church 
appears to be human construction, an instrument created by us and one which we 
ourselves can freely reorganize according to the requirements of the moment. In other 
words, in many ways a conception of Church is spreading in Catholic thought, and 
even in Catholic theology, that cannot even be called Protestant in a “classic” sense. 
Many current ecclesiological ideas, rather, refer to the model of certain North 
American “free churches,” in which in the past believers took refuge from the 
oppressive model of the “State Church” produced by the Reformation. Those 
refugees, no longer believing in an institutional Church willed by Christ, and wanting 
at the same time to escape the State Church, created their own church, an organization 
structured according to their needs.25 
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It certainly comes across as highly significant that Ratzinger will zero in on ecclesiology as 
the fulcrum of contention in the theological landscape of Catholicism. In effect, what 
Ratzinger perceives as the crisis of spiritual and religious desertification is at bottom a crisis 
of the meaning, place and mission of the Church. He is eager to maintain the supernatural or 
transcendental dimension of the origins of the Church, because the supernatural life is what 
the Church is all about, and what the Church has to offer the world. Ratzinger states:  
If the Church, instead, is viewed as a human construction, the product of our own 
efforts, even the contents of the faith end up assuming an arbitrary character: the 
faith, in fact, no longer has an authentic, guaranteed instrument through which to 
express itself. Thus, without a view of the mystery of the Church that is also 
supernatural and not only sociological, Christology itself loses its reference to the 
divine in favor of a purely human structure, and ultimately it amounts to a purely 
human project: The Gospel becomes the Jesus-project, the social-liberation project or 
other merely historical, immanent projects that can still seem religious in appearance, 
but which are atheistic in substance.26 
 
There remarks criticize the tendencies sometimes to want to square the church not only with 
the zeitgeist, but to invest in and place accents on the institutional and administrative 
dimension of the Church, seen in a replete of conferences, structures, organizational plans 
and ever new bureaucracies that, while sapping much of the human resources of the church, 
does not leave in its wake a concomitant evangelical fruitfulness. Ratzinger would surely 
have in mind the astonishingly large bureaucratic character of the modern German church, 
whose chancelleries are loaded with staff, while the pews grow empty, with minimal 
sacramental life. Ratzinger counsels, “In general, the Church should keep the administrative 
arrangements she makes for herself as minimal as possible. She should not 
overinstitutionalize herself; rather, she should ever remain open to the unforeseen and 
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unplanned call of the Lord.”27 If such is the case, it is necessary that initiatives of 
institutionalization remain open to the divine path already evident in the Church.  
As religious practice and Church life diminishes especially in the previous heartland 
of Christianity, that is, Europe, it is worth noting that already in 1969 Ratzinger articulated 
his assessment of the reality of the present-day Church in terms of its future, in words that are 
strikingly prophetic and breathtaking, almost as if he wrote those words today. Granted that 
the sentiments expressed therein encapsulate the eclipse of God, Christ, and the Church, 
which is the framework from within which we will analyze the developing understandings of 
the Logos, it is necessary to cite this text at length: 
The future of the Church can and will issue from those whose roots are deep and who 
live from the pure fullness of their faith. It will not issue from those who 
accommodate themselves merely to the passing moment (…) It will be shaped by 
saints, by men and women whose minds probe deeper than the slogans of the day, 
who see more than others see, because their lives embrace a wider reality (…)  It 
means that the big talk of those who prophesy a Church without God and without 
faith is all empty chatter. We have no need of a Church that celebrates the cult of 
action in political prayers. It is utterly superfluous. Therefore, it will destroy itself. 
What will remain is the Church of Jesus Christ, the Church that believes in the God 
who has become man and promises us life beyond death (…) From the crisis of today 
the Church of tomorrow will emerge – a Church that has lost much. She will no 
longer be able to inhabit many of the edifices she built in prosperity (…) The Church 
will be a more spiritual Church, not presuming upon a political mandate, flirting as 
little with the Left as with the Right (…) It will be hard going for the Church, for the 
process of crystallization and clarification will cost her much valuable energy. It will 
make her poor and cause her to become the Church of the meek (…) But when the 
trial of this sifting is past, a great power will flow from a more spiritualized and 
simplified Church (…) I am equally certain about what will remain at the end: not the 
Church of the political cult but the Church of faith.28  
 
This text clearly speaks to the inner spirit or heart from which Ratzinger sees the Church. 
Like Augustine, he is realistic enough to see the present challenges and sufferings of the 
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Church in their true clear colors. But again, and still like Augustine, Ratzinger is conscious 
that the city of the world that is very much present in the Church will not forever define the 
life and the future of the Church. In the final analysis, the city of God, which is the life of 
faith, hope and love of believers, triumphs over the shadow of worldliness that disfigures the 
face of the Church. This reclaiming of the beauty of the Church does not preclude her 
purifying trials. 
 However, for Ratzinger, the greatest challenge facing the Church today is what he has 
repeatedly and forcefully pointed out on several occasions as the crisis of faith. It therefore 
came as no surprise to many observers of Ratzinger that as Pope, Benedict declared 2012-
2013 a “Year of Faith,” with the Motu Proprio “Porta Fidei.” Ratzinger paints the 
challenging picture of faith today in the life of the Church thus: 
We must acknowledge, however, that faith is seriously weakened and threatened 
within the Church. Even we in the Church have lost courage. We feel it to be 
arrogance or triumphalism to assume that the Christian faith tells us the truth. We 
have picked up the idea that all religions are the products of history, some developing 
this way and others that, and that every person is as he is because of the accident of 
birth. Such a view reduces religion from the level of truth to the level of habit. It 
becomes an empty flux of inherited traditions which no longer have any significance. 
But this view eliminates a crucial affirmation from the Christian faith, namely, 
Christ’s ‘I am the Truth’ – and hence the Way, hence also the Life.29  
 
Ratzinger’s diagnosis runs thus: Firstly, the current Church is undergoing a crisis of faith. It 
is difficult to argue against this premise, if one were to call to mind not only the decline in 
religious practice especially in the large sectors of the Western world, but also the emptying 
of the pews, with the ever-increasing numbers of people being indifferent to religion. 
Secondly, this crisis of faith is due in large part to the abandonment of the conviction that 
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contemporary men and women can know the truth. We seem to have become radical 
agnostics and skeptics. Thirdly, the crisis of truth which has elicited the crisis of faith is a 
consequence of the abandonment of the centrality of the person of Jesus Christ in the history 
of the world.  
 Following the recent emphasis on religious pluralism, an interpretation is winning the 
day in which Jesus Christ is one religious figure in a supermarket of religious figures, in 
which we can pick and choose. It is possible to ignore Jesus Christ, and there will be nothing 
wrong with that, for being Christian is simply an accidental occurrence of history. I am a 
Christian because I was either born in the Western world, or perhaps missionaries from 
Europe came to my village in Africa, Asia or Latin America. The Christian faith becomes 
culture-bound. And finally, because the Church has given up on truth and on Jesus, she is 
lacking in courage to bring others into friendship with Christ, which, to Ratzinger, is the 
purpose of being a Christian. From my analysis, therefore, faith, truth, Jesus and courage, are 
the four marks that brings the current diagnosis of the state of the Church into bold relief. 
Along this line of thinking, Ratzinger observes:  
In our generation the Christian faith finds itself in a much deeper crisis than at any 
other time in the past. The problem of whether it is still possible in this century to live 
an honorable life by this faith and to have confidence in it in time and in eternity is 
met not only by those who find themselves on the fringe of the Church, but every 
single one of us. In this situation it is no solution to shut our eyes in fear in the face of 
pressing problems, or to pass over them. If faith is to survive this age, then it must be 
lived, and above all, lived in this age. And this is possible only if a manifestation of 
faith is shown to have value for the present day, by growing to knowledge and 
fulfillment.30 
 
I think three key words stand out from this text, viz., manifestation, knowledge and 
fulfillment. In other words, if faith is to survive today, believers or those who have received 
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the gift of faith, must be willing to live out the faith today. Such a willingness cannot be 
something that is postponed or set aside until other more pressing needs are met or 
considered. Put differently, the only testimony to faith is a life of faith itself, lived in the 
present, in the here and now. And to Ratzinger, this sense of manifestation of the faith is not 
a pompous proclamation, but, in the spirit of the logic of the gospel, a manifestation that is a 
hidden sign, an obscure God hidden in the ordinary day to day events, such as was the case 
with the proclamation of the angels to the shepherds: “And here is a sign for you: you will 
find a baby wrapped in swaddling clothes and lying in a manger” (Lk 2:12).  
 In other words, says Ratzinger, “the sign for the shepherds is that they will find no 
sign, but only God in the form of a child; and despite this concealment they must still believe 
in God’s nearness. The sign demands of them that they learn to discover God in the unknown 
nature of his concealment.”31 In effect, given the secular age in which the Church is called to 
proclaim God today, Ratzinger, in his understanding of what it means for the Christian to live 
out the faith today, that is, Christian manifestation, opts for a sense of Christian witness that 
seeks to reveal the life of God in the ordinariness of life. To witness, therefore, invites the 
believer to cultivate the capacity to discern God in surprising places and act as a lens thanks 
to which men and women could find God today, God in “strange” and unexpected places. 
 For this to happen, the second concept which we identified above, that is, knowledge, 
enters the picture. Knowledge here must be understood as a deeper formation into the 
theoretical principles of faith. Though essential, knowledge should not encapsulate the entire 
story of Christian witness. Hence, when Ratzinger talks about growing in knowledge in the 
text cited above, it must be understood as a growth that is organically related to the praxis of 
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faith, growing from not just the theoretical principles, but from allowing a synthesis of theory 
and practice. In this sense, Christianity emerges as an experience that is not gnostic, some 
secret knowledge, but as a growth in a friendship with Christ that comes about thanks to 
spending time with Christ and getting to know Christ more intimately.  
 And it is from this friendship that the third key term follows, fulfillment. When 
talking about Christian fulfillment, or the fulfillment that comes from being a Christian, 
Ratzinger’s sophistication as a theologian comes into bold display. He appears reluctant to 
concede to theories that seek to convey the message that belonging to the Church solves all 
problems. Even if Ratzinger appreciates the attempt to explain history as divided between the 
era before and after Christ, signifying sin and redemption respectively, Ratzinger makes the 
case that even the period after Christ is existentially experienced as before Christ.32 In other 
words, while there was a historical advent, the realities of our personal lives, the realities of 
the Church and the realities of world undeniably point to the fact that we continue to live in 
advent. In this sense, can I be completely fulfilled in this life, or do I have to wait for another 
life to experience the complete joy of knowing Christ? Does history, especially in its modern 
form, attest to a post-redemptive era that should follow the Christ-event? And shouldn’t we 
be living in a better time in terms of human fulfillment because of the Incarnation? Isn’t a 
better and more fulfilling life what the Old Testament oracles pointed at as a sign of the 
Messianic era? These questions and more ring urgent in the light of certain biblical 
prophecies and oracles, such as this from the prophet Isaiah:  
The wolf shall dwell with the Lamb, 
and the leopard shall lie with the kid, 
and the calf and lion and the fatling together, 
and a little child shall lead them. 
The cow and the bear make shall feed; 
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their young shall lie down together; 
and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. 
The sucking child shall play over the hole of the asp, 
and the weaned child shall put his hand on the adder’s den. 
They shall not hurt or destroy in all my holy mountain; 
for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord  
as the waters cover the sea 
(Isa 11:6-9, Revised Standard Version, Catholic Edition).  
 
Ratzinger concedes that the images contained in this text are metaphorical expressions that 
while they convey the image of peace, are certainly not intended to be concretely actualized 
in the world of today.33 But as Ratzinger points out, these images have a deeper significance, 
for they point to peace as the sign of the redeemed, that is, the redeemed are men and women 
of peace who no longer act from malicious or vicious intentions, thanks to the fact that the 
earth is full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea.34 But Ratzinger the 
pragmatist is not still content with this interpretation. Looking around him, Ratzinger further 
queries: 
But what has happened to this vision in the Church among us who call ourselves 
redeemed? We all know that it has not been fulfilled, that the world has been and is 
still more than ever a world of strife and unrest, a world which lives on war between 
men, a world stamped with the mark of evil, of enmity and egoism; a world which is 
not covered with the knowledge of God – as the earth is by the sea – but which lives 
separated from him, surrounded by darkness.35  
 
Such a pragmatic assessment might come across as pessimistic, but it is difficult to deny the 
fact of what Ratzinger states here, for in the final analysis, the question of fulfillment derived 
from the life of following Christ is about the practicability of the Christian message. In other 
words, if the Church is to make inroads into the hearts of contemporary men and women, the 
latter must find the message of the Church useful, or one would say, in a language of the 
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digital age, “user-friendly,” to the effect that I can feel the power of the message of the 
Church in my life. Along this line of thinking, Ratzinger makes a challenging diagnosis, 
worth citing at length here: 
I believe that the real temptation of today’s Christian does not consist in the 
theoretical problems of whether or not God exists, or of whether he is three persons in 
one; nor in whether Christ is simultaneously God and man. Rather, what troubles and 
tempts us today is the impracticability of Christianity; after two thousand years of 
Christian history we do not see that there has come about any new state of affairs in 
the world – a world which is filled with the same fears, doubts, and hopes as before. 
In our private lives, too, we notice the weakness of the Christian truth in comparison 
with all the other forces which oppress us. And if, after living a Christian life in the 
midst of struggle and temptation, we take a look at the final result, we are once again 
filled with the feeling that the truth has slipped through our fingers, that we have lost 
it and are left with nothing but the weak flame of our good will as a last resort. At this 
point, in these moments of depression, when we look back over the path we have 
taken, a question springs to mind: what is the point of all this dogma, of religion, and 
of the Church if at the end we still find ourselves engulfed in our wretchedness?36 
 
In effect, to be a Christian demands an honest assessment and acknowledgement that the 
world and one’s own subjective life, are often far from the message proclaimed by 
Christianity. Any talk of fulfillment will be superficial if it does not take cognizance that 
even with the best of intentions, the reality of Christian living is that we continuously miss 
the mark. How often do we feel left to our own strengths and efforts? In this consciousness 
that we do not fully experience the promises of Christianity lies the discrepancy between 
hope and fulfillment. To Ratzinger, the message of Christian hope is vital in helping the 
Christian today to make meaning of Christian spirituality:  
Christian theology, which was soon confronted with the discrepancy between hope 
and fulfillment, made the kingdom of God a heavenly kingdom situated in the 
hereafter; it changed the salvation of mankind into the salvation of the soul; which 
also takes place in the next world, after death. But this is no answer. For the greatness 
of the teaching lies in the fact that our Lord is not only speaking about the hereafter or 
about the soul, but is challenging the body, the whole man in his very person and as 
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part of history and society; the wonderful thing is that he has promised his kingdom 
to the man who actually lives, bodily, in society.37 
 
In effect, by confronting head-on the challenge of another-worldly Christianity, Ratzinger is 
saving Christianity from the charge of being considered an opium that disillusions people 
against challenges of the present. If many have abandoned and are abandoning Christianity in 
large sectors of the Western world, while other reasons abound as I pointed out earlier in the 
introduction, it cannot be denied that the feeling that Christianity is not fulfilling, not meeting 
my needs, constitute a great concern for many. This is especially the case in the affluent and 
scientific communities. Wealth and science appear more fulfilling than the Christian 
message, which apparently promises much but ends up delivering little, at least, in the here 
and now of this world.  
 But such a view of Christianity, as attractive as it might to some, misses an essential 
aspect of the good news of Jesus Christ, which is that in my daily search for meaning and 
fulfillment, I am not alone. In Christ, grace is offered me such that I am not only counting on 
my own efforts.38 Even if in all our illnesses, weaknesses, loneliness, distress, anxieties, we 
continue to be under the power and constant presence and power of death, the Christian, if 
living true to Christianity, is always with Christ. This to me, is how Ratzinger understands 
Christian fulfillment: not that I cease having anxieties; not that I cease carrying that yoke of 
sin, of brokenness and even death, but that even will all these, and more, such as the joy 
which the Lord also gives, I am never alone, but always with Christ. Christian fulfillment is 
not to live without life’s burdens and hopelessness, but to live with those burdens because 
God in Christ has entered my human situation, can understand it and has not left me alone, 
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even when I suffer, he suffers with me, on the ultimate path to redemption of that suffering 
and the whole cosmos. Along these lines, Benedict recently commented:  
Let’s place ourselves in front of the incredible amount of evil, violence, falsehood, 
hatred, cruelty and arrogance that infect and destroy the whole world. This mass of 
evil cannot simply be declared non-existent, not even by God. It must be cleansed, 
reworked and overcome. Ancient Israel was convinced that the daily sacrifice for sins 
and above all the great liturgy of the Day of Atonement (Yom-Kippur) were necessary 
as a counterweight to the mass of evil in the world and that only through such 
rebalancing the world could, as it were, remain bearable. Once the sacrifices in the 
temple disappeared, it had to be asked what could be opposed to the higher powers of 
evil, how to find somehow a counterweight. The Christians knew that the temple 
destroyed was replaced by the resurrected body of the crucified Lord and in his 
radical and incommensurable love was created a counterweight to the immeasurable 
presence of evil. Indeed, they knew that the offerings presented up until then could 
only be conceived of as a gesture of longing for a genuine counterweight. They also 
knew that in front of the excessive power of evil only an infinite love was enough, 
only an infinite atonement. They knew that the crucified and risen Christ is a power 
that can counter the power of evil and save the world. And on this basis, they could 
even understand the meaning of their own sufferings as inserted into the suffering 
love of Christ and included as part of the redemptive power of such love.39 
 
In the final analysis, Christian fulfillment lies not in the denial of the reality of evil and 
brokenness in this world, but in the faith that evil, irrespective of its volume and ubiquitous 
presence, is restricted by the power of good that entered in the world in the life, death, 
resurrection, ascension of Christ, and the sending of the Holy Spirit. And this life of Christ is 
lived in the community of the Church, a people called from the nations, “a story God himself 
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1.3 Ratzinger’s Philosophical Formation  
 
 Studies in philosophy and theology have long been a prerequisite for men preparing 
for ordained ministry in the Catholic Church. After the war, Joseph and his elder brother 
Georg, enrolled in seminary studies for the priesthood for the Archdiocese of Munich und 
Freising. How did the young Ratzinger view this intellectual phase of his preparation for the 
Catholic priesthood? In his own words:  
We were forward-looking. We wanted to renew theology from the ground up, and 
thereby form the Church in newness and vitality. In this respect we were lucky that 
we lived in a time in which both the youth and liturgical movements had opened up 
new horizons, new paths. Here we wanted to press forward with the Church, so that, 
in precisely this way, she should be young again.41 
 
From the onset, therefore, Ratzinger had what might be considered an ecclesial sense of his 
academic formation in the seminary and at the University of Munich. Studies were not to be 
an end in themselves but a means to helping the Church speak meaningfully and profoundly 
to the concerns of contemporary men and women.  
 This pastoral orientation of studies in no way diminished the fervor with which 
Ratzinger engaged the world of philosophy and theology, for as he himself says, “I was 
fascinated by academic theology. I found it wonderful to enter into the great world of the 
history of faith; broad horizons of thought and faith opened up before me, and I was learning 
to ponder the primordial questions of human existence, the questions of my own life.”42  In 
his memoirs, Milestones, Ratzinger writes concerning the orientation of himself and his 
seminary peers that “we wanted not only to do theology in the narrower sense but to listen to 
the voices of man today.”43 This portrays Ratzinger as someone for whom studies do not 
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entail belonging to another planet. Rather, the theologian is one who, while delving into 
sacred science, does so in a spirit of carrying of the baggage of the challenges, difficulties, 
joys and hopes of the world. This gives a very contextualizing manner of doing theology, one 
that reflects Ratzinger’s attentiveness to the socio-political and economic issues of the day.  
 What constituted, in broad terms, the academic structure and contents of Ratzinger’s 
intellectual formation in philosophy and theology? Who were the authors he engaged that 
shaped his thinking and listening to, in his own words, “the voices of man today”? Ratzinger 
gives us a broad and comprehensive picture of his philosophical and theological formative 
landscape:  
We also followed closely the recent developments in the natural sciences. We thought 
that, with the breakthroughs made by Planck, Heisenberg and Einstein, the sciences 
were once again on their way to God. The antireligious orientation that had reached 
its climax with Haeckel had now been broken, and this gave us new hope. Aloys 
Wenzel, a philosopher from Munich who had first specialized in physics, wrote a 
much-read work, his Philosophy of Freedom, in which he tried to show that the 
determinist world view of classical physics, which left no room for God, had been 
dispelled by an open conception of the world in which there was room for something 
new, something unforeseen and incalculable. In the domain of theology and 
philosophy, the voices that moved us most directly were those of Romano Guardini, 
Josef Pieper, Theodore Hacker and Peter Wust (…). I read Steinbüchel’s two volumes 
on the philosophical foundations of moral theology which had just appeared in a new 
edition, and in them I found a first-rate introduction to the thought of Heidegger and 
Jaspers as well as to the philosophies of Nietzsche, Klages and Bergson. Almost more 
important for me was Steinbüchel’s book Der Umbruch des Denkens (The revolution 
of thought): here I read how, just as now we could affirm that physics was 
abandoning the mechanistic worldview and turning toward a new openness to the 
unknown – and hence also to the known Unknown, namely, God – so, too, in 
philosophy we could detect a return to metaphysics, which had become inaccessible 
since Kant.44 
 
Several things stand out from this narrative that help better appreciate the thinking of 
Ratzinger: Firstly, one senses a certain philosophical curiosity regarding the new ways of 
thinking about the questions of metaphysics and epistemology, on Ratzinger’s part. In this 
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vein, the question of being as the ultimate question of metaphysics is linked to the question 
of knowing, which is the ultimate question of epistemology. Given this philosophical 
integration, both metaphysics and epistemology are tied to anthropology, to the human 
subject, who as a concrete being is a seeker of knowledge, either through empiricism, 
rationalism or, living in a post-Kantian world, the transcendental idealism of Kant.45 In 
addition, this tying together of the different strands of philosophy, in this case, metaphysics, 
epistemology and anthropology, are indicative of Ratzinger’s instincts of overcoming 
compartmentalization and seeking a reconciliation of positions and specific disciplines. This 
sense of a synthesis of truth, as Hegelian as it appears, could very well be described as 
Ratzingerian. 
 Second, present in Ratzinger’s explanation of his educational landscape is the reality 
of the science of theology in dialogue with the non-theological sciences. Ratzinger prefers 
theology to be in dialogue with what one might refer to as the other hard scientific 
disciplines, because the place of God in physics ought to be protected, if physics must serve 
its noblest and truest goals and expectations. In other words, matter was not eternal, an 
autonomous entity, capable of ordering itself, but a creation of the Divine Mind who orders 
all things into being. In this sense, the truths of physics could not exclude God on the 
grounds of the very hermeneutics of the physical sciences.46 This explains his clear 
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excitement with what he perceives to be the opening of science to God in the works of 
Planck, Heisenberg and Einstein, in that matter, physics, is not closed in on itself, but, in the 
process of its bursting forth with energy, still unfolds under a cosmic sense of the 
transcendence.  
In other words, the interplay of philosophy and theology constitutes an interpretive 
trajectory that provides Ratzinger with the context thanks to which he is able to nurture and 
sustain his Christian faith and scholarly undertakings. Faith cannot be severed from reason, 
as shown the early church’s decision in favor of the God of philosophy over and against the 
gods of pagan myths and piety. More so, faith cannot be severed from reason because the 
decision for the God of philosophy, as will be seen in Chapter Three, guarantees, for 
Ratzinger, that the fateful demolition of pagan religious piety that followed paganism’s 
rejection of philosophy, does not recur with the Christian religion:  
Early Christianity boldly and resolutely made its choice and carried out its 
purification by deciding for the God of the philosophers and against the gods of the 
various religions. Wherever the question arose as to which god the Christian God 
corresponded, Zeus perhaps or Hermes or Dionysius or some other god, the answer 
ran: To none of them. To none of the gods to whom you pray but solely and alone to 
him to whom you do not pray, to that highest being of whom your philosophers 
speaks (…) When we say God, we do not mean or worship any of this; we mean only 
Being itself, what the philosophers have expounded as the ground of all being, as the 
God above all powers – that alone is our God.47 
 
Ratzinger’s interest in philosophy, therefore, naturally finds good company, not in something 
extrinsic to theology or the life of faith, but in the very experience of the Christian faith itself, 
viz., the life of the early Church and its embrace of Greek philosophy. In other words, the 
relationship between philosophy and theology, faith and reason, appeared to Ratzinger as that 
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which grounded Christian faith as it struggled to emerge in a world of competing religious 
affiliations, pieties and contradictory myths.  
 In effect, philosophy aided Christianity in its struggle to wrestle humans from the 
worship of nature, for by inserting reason into piety, it introduced what Kant would later 
describe as critical reason into the discourse of faith helping to expose the latent 
irrationalities and blind anthropomorphisms of pagan piety and religion.48 To quote 
Ratzinger,  
The movement of the logos against the myth, as it evolved in the Greek mind in the 
philosophical enlightenment, so that in the end it necessarily led to the fall of the 
gods, has an inner parallelism with the enlightenment that the prophetic and Wisdom 
literature cultivated in its demythologization of the divine powers in favor of the one 
and only God.49 
 
Clearly, Ratzinger feels indebted to philosophy, and this chapter offers the opportunity to 
take a closer look at that in terms of Ratzinger’s academic formation, not only in the 
Hellenistic sense of Greek philosophy of logos, but as well in the philosophical spirit closer 
to Ratzinger and contemporary German Catholicism, namely, the Enlightenment. Ratzinger’s 
particular reading of this relationship between philosophy and theology is presented in the 
formal structure of a dialogue between the God of philosophers and the God of theologians. 
This interchange between philosophy and theology was so significant to Ratzinger that he 
took it up in his inaugural lecture as a university professor. This will be dealt with in the next 
chapter.  
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 At this point, one can pose the question: What kind of philosophical position best 
describes Ratzinger? The possibilities are many. In the first place, Ratzinger characterizes 
himself as a Platonist: “To a certain extent I am a Platonist. I think that a kind of memory, of 
recollection of God, is, as it were, etched in man, though it needs to be awakened. Man 
doesn’t simply know what he is supposed to know, nor is he simply there, but is a man, a 
being on the way.”50 Perhaps it suffices to say here that amongst the ancient philosophers 
Plato comes closest to Christian theology, and hence Ratzinger’s affinity could very well be 
because of the discernable possibilities Platonism and Neo-Platonism offer to Christian 
theology, beginning with the Fathers. One can recall here that when narrating the incident of 
his conversion in Book VIII of the Confessions, Augustine tells us that Simplicianus 
congratulates him for not falling into “the writings of other philosophers which are full of 
vain deceits, according to the elements of this world, whereas in the Platonists God and his 
Word are everywhere implied.”51 Given Ratzinger’s affinity for Augustine, perhaps such a 
ringing endorsement of Platonism from the latter might have predisposed Ratzinger towards 
Platonism.   
 A second philosophical category that one discerns in Ratzinger is that of Personalism, 
understood as a position of active engagement with the personhood of the other as other, as 
someone thanks to whose being I am able to delve into the profound depths of my own 
existence. The person stands in the light of truth, with all of his or her brokenness, strengths 
and struggles. This explains Ratzinger’s devotion to Augustine and Martin Buber. Ratzinger 
recounts in his memoirs:  
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We then found the philosophy of personalism reiterated with renewed conviction in 
the great Jewish thinker Martin Buber. This encounter with Personalism was for me a 
spiritual experience that left an essential mark, especially since I spontaneously 
associated such personalism with the thought of Saint Augustine, who in his 
Confessions had struck me with the power of all his human passion and depth. By 
contrast, I had difficulty penetrating the thought of Thomas Aquinas, whose crystal-
clear logic seemed to me to be too closed in on itself, too impersonal and ready-
made.52  
 
For Buber, Personalism is essentially a relationship that takes the form of an I-Thou, in such 
a way that the center of one’s being is taken up not only in the You of God but in the You of 
the Other. And all these encounters are graced happenings.53 Personalism for Buber is both 
theo-centric and anthropocentric, engaging the neighbor, the stranger, the other person.54 
These encounters are not primarily self-orchestrated: “The You encounters me by grace – it 
cannot be found by seeking (…). Thus, the relationship is election and electing, passive and 
active at once. An action of the whole being must approach passivity, for it does away with 
all partial actions and thus with any sense of action.”55 From this encounter with God, comes 
the mission into the world, in which other comfortable tendencies such as the I-I, I-it, and 
Us-Them are re-centered and given new meaning by the I-Thou relationship. This 
Personalism of Buber caught the attention and affection of the young Ratzinger, especially as 
it corroborated his spontaneous instincts of the dialogical nature of Christian revelation and 
salvation history, as seen in his Habitation thesis on Bonaventure.  
 Recently, Benedict reaffirmed his profound affection for Buber in his conversations 
with Peter Seewald:  
I revered Martin Buber very much. For one thing he was the great representative of 
Personalism, the I-Thou principle that permeates his entire philosophy. Of course, I 
have also read his complete works. He was a bit fashionable at that time. He had 
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newly translated the Holy Scriptures together with Rosenzweig. His personalistic 
viewpoint and his philosophy, which was nourished by the Bible, were made fully 
concrete in his Hasidic tales. This Jewish piety, completely uninhibited in faith and 
simultaneously always standing in the center of the concerns of this time, his mode of 
having faith in today’s world, his whole person – all this fascinates me.56 
 
It is not difficult to see why Ratzinger has remained fascinated by Buber, for both men share 
that sense of pietas, of a profound humility before the mystery of God, not only from a 
philosophical perspective, but from their active life of faith and worship.  
 Going further to Augustinian existentialism, Ratzinger says in Salt of the Earth: The 
Church at the End of the Millennium: “From the beginning, St. Augustine interested me very 
much - precisely insofar as he was, so to speak, a counterweight to Thomas Aquinas.”57 But 
what form of Thomism was Ratzinger reacting against? Ratzinger explains that what he and 
his peers eschewed was the post-war “rigid, Neo-Scholastic Thomism that was simply too far 
afield from my own questions.”58 Perhaps the Neo-Thomism of the post-World War II 
Europe had become a caricature of what Thomas envisaged in the larger picture of his 
Summa – God, Man and Christ, to the extent that it had taken on the coloring of an 
uninspiring, dry, syllogistic system of theologizing fixed on logical coherence and precision 
that did not encounter the flesh and blood spiritual choices of everyday Christians. In his Last 
Testament conversations, Benedict once more emphasizes, this time, a more measured 
demonstration of his Augustinian sensibilities over and against Thomas:  
The personal struggle which Augustine expresses really spoke to me. Thomas’ 
writings were textbooks, by and large, and impersonal somehow. That said, there is of 
course a personal struggle standing behind them, which you only discover later. 
Augustine battles with himself, and indeed continues to do so after his conversion. 
And that is what makes the subject compelling and beautiful.59  
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Here, one finds in the later Ratzinger a much more generous appreciation of the 
scholasticism of Thomas.  
 Nevertheless, though finding the Neo-Thomism too abstract for his liking, 
Ratzinger’s memories of the course on the history of philosophy is much warmer and more 
appreciative: “More helpful, on the other hand, was a four-semester course of lectures on the 
history of philosophy by a young professor, Jakob Fellermeier, who provided us with a 
comprehensive overview of the intellectual struggle, beginning with Socrates and the pre-
Socratic up until the present. This gave me a foundation in philosophy for which I am still 
grateful today.”60 This testifies to a broad and perhaps comprehensive philosophical 
perspective for the young Ratzinger, a foundation that seemingly never left him.  
  Overall, one can make the claim that the early Ratzinger’s interest in philosophy 
owed in large part to the link that he saw between history and metaphysics, for at the center 
of Ratzinger’s thought is salvation history and the place of the Incarnation as the defining 
moment in salvation history. Metaphysics, dealing with the question of the reality of being as 
being, provided a helpful possibility of engagement of the facticity of the Incarnation as a 
real event, not something Gnostic, but a reality, a being, that precisely by happening in real 
history, changed history. In effect, because metaphysics deals with being, and because for 
Ratzinger the question of being is essentially Christological in a historical context since it 
ultimately amounts to the being of Christ in salvation history, it is therefore possible to read 
in Ratzinger a close relationship between metaphysics and the historical sense of liberation.61 
In this sense, one can talk of a theological metaphysics in describing Ratzinger, for he opens 
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up the question of being to the question of truth and freedom, which he ultimately ties to 
God. Says Ratzinger:  
When man poses the questions that are most vital to him, questions that are 
inescapable, i.e., about truth and freedom, he is asking ontological questions. The 
question of being, which is so slandered today, arose for no other reason than the 
desire for freedom, which cannot be divorced from man’s need for truth. So it cannot 
be said that the question of being belongs only to a particular phase of mankind’s 
intellectual development, to the age of metaphysics, which A. Comte, in accordance 
with this three-stage law, allots to the middle phase, between the mythical age and the 
positive age. (In Comte’s view, we are now in the latter stage, in which the erstwhile 
metaphysical question is obsolete).62 
 
One can deduce in this text the classical formulations of metaphysics regarding the so-called 
transcendental properties of being, in which being is identifiable with truth, goodness, beauty 
and oneness. If Ratzinger is restating this position here by emphasizing that the path to truth 
passes through being and that in rejecting truth, modern philosophy is jettisoning being, the 
consequence for this rejection of truth through the rejection of being comes into bolder relief. 
This is explainable in that once the question of being is shown the exit sign, then there is 
nothing left for humans to stand on, for the ground of existence is that there is being. In 
effect, we become people lacking firm roots, and as Ratzinger points out in another text, 
humans will become “tools of self-alienation and hence of man’s enslavement. The question 
of truth and the question of freedom are involved in the question of being and therefore also 
in the question of God. Indeed, they are the question of God.”63 Herein emerges a theological 
metaphysics, that is, tying the question of truth to being and tying both, truth and being, to 
God, seen by Ratzinger as the source of both.   
 Ultimately, Ratzinger believes that truth and being are too important to be left 
exclusively to the whims and caprices of modern subjective philosophy, for in the final 
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analysis, if they are not tied to God, then life becomes a matter of the strongest imposing 
their “truth” on everyone. This is the sense in which we can understand Ratzinger’s 
eagerness to argue for a space for God, for as we have seen in the afore-cited texts, without 
truth and being as its complementary component, humans face self-alienation and 
enslavement, for the question about being and truth is essentially the question about the 
dignity of the human being, in terms of origin, identity and mission. Ratzinger attributes to 
and decries as a consequence of the excesses of the post-Aufklärung socio-praxis modes of 
thinking, the abandonment of the metaphysical considerations of life64 In summary, 
Ratzinger emerges from his philosophical formation as one with affinities for Platonism, 
Personalism and Augustinian Existentialism, and these three philosophical trends, 
coincidentally, will find themselves, in one form or another, engaged and challenged by 
German Enlightenment philosophers. Much of these will be dealt with in the subsequent 
section dealing with these philosophical figures. 
 
1.4 Ratzinger’s Theological Formation  
 
On the theological plane, Joseph Ratzinger found his bearings as a protégé of Gottlieb 
Söhngen, who served as the supervisor of Ratzinger’s doctoral thesis as well as his 
habilitation.65 Ratzinger found his seminary curriculum of theology to be profoundly open to 
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new questions and theological possibilities, rooted in the tradition and yet not stifled by the 
tradition: “It was defined by the fact that it was completely biblically orientated, working 
from Holy Scripture, the Fathers and the liturgy, and it was very ecumenical. The Thomistic-
philosophical dimension was missing; maybe that was its real benefit.”66 There was, 
certainly, in Ratzinger’s theological faculty in Munich, an enthusiasm for a new way of doing 
theology that sought to provide answers to the burning questions of post-World War II 
Europe. Quite naturally, one senses in Ratzinger’s appraisal of his theological studies, an 
earnest perception of the ecclesial character of theology, as it engages Ratzinger beginning 
with Scripture through the Fathers, the liturgy, and ecumenism.  
To Ratzinger, the contents of the science of theology precede the individual 
theologian, owing to the nature of the Church which is being studied by the theologian under 
the discipline of theology. Thus, theology, like the Church that it studies, is not something 
devised by us, but something that precedes us. Ratzinger remarks:  
If theology wishes and should be something other than religious studies (…) then it can 
only be based on starting from an answer that we ourselves have not yet devised; yet in 
order for this to become a real answer for us, we have to try to understand it, not to 
resolve it. That is what is peculiar to theology, that it turns to something we ourselves 
have not devised and that is able to be the foundation of our life, in that it goes before 
us and supports us; that is to say, it is greater than our own thought. The path of 
theology is indicated by the saying, “Credo ut intelligam”: I accept what is given in 
advance, in order to find, starting from this and in this, the path to the right way of 
living, to the right way of living, to the right way of understanding myself.67  
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Similar to the Divine origins of the Church, the discipline of theology, for Ratzinger, is not 
restricted to the subjective strengths of any given theologian. That is, there is more that 
explains what the theologian can do given his or her human capabilities. Therefore, “without 
what was given in advance, which is always greater than we can devise ourselves and never 
becomes part of what is just our own, there is no theology.”68 Thus, the reality of the 
substance of the faith that we seek to understand is not imagined and created by us, but is 
something that we receive from outside of us, precisely because we humans could not have 
created such a mystery that certainly eludes our full comprehension. It is with this sense of 
expectancy of the more, of that which transcends my particularity, that one should view the 
theology of Joseph Ratzinger in general, and his ecclesiological convictions in particular.  
For Ratzinger, the starting point for theology is reason, understood as being much 
more than an intellectual faculty. Drawing on John’s Prologue, Ratzinger maintains that 
“theology is based on the assumption, accepted by faith, that what is believed, that is, 
theology’s own foundation, is reasonable, is, indeed, reason itself.” 69 Further developing this 
rational character of theology, Ratzinger opines: “Theology necessarily follows from the 
blending of biblical faith and Greek rationality upon which historical Christianity is based, 
already in the New Testament.”70 Ratzinger sees this blending between the Gospel and Greek 
rationality in the Prologue of the Gospel of John, in which Jesus is described as the Logos: 
“The passage (Jn. 1:1) expresses the conviction that what is reasonable, indeed, fundamental 
reason itself, comes to light in the Christian faith; it means to say that the very foundation of 
being is reason, and that reason is not a random byproduct of the ocean of irrationality from 
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which everything actually sprang.”71 By implication, Christian faith brings reason (logos) to 
light because as faith, it demands reason for its own self-understanding and self-actualization.  
Precisely because faith seeks to understand itself in terms of its contents, 
methodology, structure and sources, reason is therefore an essential part of this process of 
faith that we call theology. Ratzinger therefore draws this conclusion, “This means that 
theology takes up the fundamental question of Greek philosophy, with which the human 
mind had entered into a new stage of its history: the question about truth itself, about being 
itself. The Christian theologian does not merely interpret texts but inquires about the truth 
itself, and he regards man as capable of apprehending the truth.”72 The primacy of reason for 
theology inadvertently leads to the question of truth, for what does reason search for; what is 
the purpose for the questions asked, if not to arrive at the truth? In other words, if theology is 
in its core an undertaking in faith, does it not become impossible to ground it on reason, 
granted that it belongs to reason to question while it belongs to faith to believe, that which 
has already been revealed? Is it not the case that because theology already has its answers 
even before it debates; if theology is offering only ready-made certainties, then theology 
cannot really claim the autonomy and freedom that belong to the faculty of reason?  
 Theology’s conviction that there is truth that can be known and adhered to becomes 
an irrational position that does not fit into the culture of the modern university, that is now 
guided by the creed of radical skepticism regarding both reason and truth. It suffices to recall 
here that not even the forebears of modern philosophical skepticism, for example, 
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Nietzsche,73 went as far as given up on the possibility of truth. In this context, theology faces 
a serious temptation:  
Instead of searching for the truth itself in its authoritative texts, theology can explain 
the historical conditions in which these texts came into being, attempt to reconstruct 
their original meaning by historical methods, and critically compare them with the 
interpretations that have come to light in their history of the influence of the texts. This 
means that theology can retreat into a thoroughgoing professionalism and thus prove 
that it completely measures up to the canon of positivistic reason. In this way it attains 
the same rank as the other specialized disciplines of scholarship. The only problem is 
that the special task originally assigned to it and to philosophy now drops out: the 
question about the whole, transcending the separate disciplines, is no longer asked.74 
 
Given the classical Western Pre-Reformation position which following Aquinas, held that 
truth is convertible with being,75 all truth is one, even if looked at from different perspectives 
or from the different academic disciplines. The difficulty today, however, is that metaphysics 
does not hold sway over contemporary thinking, even in Western societies, as was previously 
the case. 
 
1.4.1 Ratzinger’s Doctoral Thesis: The People and House of God in St. Augustine’s Doctrine 
of the Church  
 
 Why did Ratzinger choose to write on the topic of the Church in his doctoral thesis? 
Aidan Nichols, O.P., suggests that it was because Ratzinger shared the conviction with 
Romano Guardini that theologically speaking, the twentieth century was the “century of the 
Church.” From this conviction, Ratzinger turned to no other than the Father of Western 
theology to look at what Augustine had to say regarding the nature of the Church.76  Overall, 
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from a theological perspective, Ratzinger is a decided Augustinian. In Augustine, Ratzinger 
found an existential liveliness of the faith put forth with an amazing erudition.  
 To Ratzinger, Augustine of Hippo (354-430) is not just one theologian amongst 
others, but the theologian whose life and thought shaped and defined Ratzinger’s life down to 
particular details, as well as shaping the life of Western Christianity. Ratzinger says: “This 
man of passion and faith, of the highest intelligence and tireless in his pastoral care, a great 
saint and Doctor of the Church, is often known, at least by hearsay, even by those who ignore 
Christianity or who are not familiar with it, because he left a very deep mark on the cultural 
life of the West and on the whole world.”77 Augustine fought and won many consequential 
battles, from Manichaeism to Donatism, Arianism to Paganism, not leaving out Skepticism. 
On many counts, Augustine taught the Church what the Church believed, in sacramental 
theology, creation, Christian anthropology, original sin, predestination, ecclesiology, 
eschatology, epistemology, theodicy, Trinity, and Psychology. 
 Augustine defined Western Christianity and the Western world in an inimitable way, 
for after all, here was a man who through the vicissitudes of his life, had presented the world 
of his time and future generations with an unprecedented trilogy of history: firstly, a 
“history” of God (De Trinitate): Augustine gives a full picture of the story of God as a 
Trinity of Persons. The Father as Lover loves the Son, the Beloved, and the love between the 
Father and the Son is the Holy Spirit. Augustine produced a history of the world (De Civitate 
Dei), in which world history is presented as a battle between two loves which define life’s 
choices and life’s destiny. And finally, Augustine produced a history of the human being 
(Confessiones), which tells the story of fallen man’s quest for happiness and meaning in life. 
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And in De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine left the Church with the basic principles of 
interpreting Scripture, which continues to be relevant today. Commenting on the timeless 
character of these main texts and the entire literary legacy that Augustine bequeathed to the 
Church and to the world, in the disciplines of philosophy, theology, psychology, sociology 
and politics, Ratzinger writes:   
When I read Saint Augustine’s writings, I do not get the impression that he is a man 
who died more or less 1,600 years ago; I feel he is like a man of today; a friend, a 
contemporary who speaks to me, who speaks to us with his fresh and timely faith. In 
Saint Augustine, who talks to us, talks to me in his writings, we see the everlasting 
timeliness of his faith; of the faith that comes from Christ, the Eternal Incarnate 
Word, Son of God and Son of Man. And we can see that this faith is not of the past 
although it was preached yesterday; it is still timely today, for Christ is true yesterday, 
today, and forever.78   
 
Therefore, by engaging Augustine from an ecclesiological perspective in his doctoral thesis 
The People and House of God in St. Augustine’s Doctrine of the Church, Ratzinger treated 
issues that were significant to theology, viz. the relationship between the Old and New 
Testaments; how the law is related to the sacraments; and the life of Christians under pagan 
or secular role. In accordance with this path of Scripture, the sacraments and Christian living, 
the sense of the Church that emerges from Augustine, at least in Ratzinger’s reading of him, 
is that of a people and house of God that is intently connected to the concept of the Body of 
Christ, “founded on the Christological reinterpretation of the Old Testament and on the 
sacramental life centered on the Eucharist, in which the Lord gives us his Body and 
transforms us into his Body.”79 Given this realization, Ratzinger maintains, “it is, then, 
fundamental that the Church, the People of God in a Christological and not a sociological 
sense, be truly inserted into Christ.”80 Augustine exposes this Christological character of the 
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Church as the people and house of God when, talking about Christian prayer and Christian 
liturgical worship, the Bishop of Hippo writes that Christ “prays for us, prays in us, and prays 
by us; he prays for us as our priest; he prays in us as our head, and he prays by us as our God: 
let us therefore recognize him as our voice and ourselves as his.”81 It is this Christic character 
of the Church that Ratzinger sought to study from Augustine, in his doctoral work.  
 Nichols points out that Ratzinger’s engagement with Augustine places the latter head-
on in the trajectory of the history of religion in Augustine’s age.82 Certainly, Augustine’s 
Neoplatonism set the framework for Augustine’s theological conclusions. Added to his 
philosophical background was Augustine’s experience of the Church in Roman Africa, with 
all its never-ending concomitant theological controversies. In Ratzinger’s reading of the 
Bishop of Hippo, what was of paramount importance was not merely the philosophical or 
theological formative influences on Augustine’s ecclesiology, but an examination of the role 
that Augustine’s ecclesiology performed. Ratzinger explains his motives:  
I began with the theme of the Church, and it is present in everything. Only, in dealing 
with the Church it was important to me, and it has become increasingly important, 
that the Church not be an end in herself but exist so that God may be seen. In that 
respect I would say that I study the theme of the Church with the intention of opening 
a vista onto God. And in this sense, God is the real central theme of my endeavors.83 
 
In this doctoral thesis, therefore, Ratzinger sought to offer what he saw as a necessary 
correction to the horizontalization of the Church, by grounding the Church on its Christic 
foundation, which emerges along two lines, of faith and love.  
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 From the brief summary of his life presented above, Augustine’s life showed an 
adventure with different schools of thought, in which, while all the while seeking the truth, 
he heavily relied on reason, that is, his own intellect, as the path to truth. His initial rejection 
of Christianity after reading Cicero’s Hortensius was due in large measure to the fact that 
Augustine found the Old Testament to be rationally and literarily weak, especially with its 
numerous accounts of wars waged between Israel and the surrounding kingdoms.84 At some 
point, Augustine had to let himself be taken over by the hand of the Lord, he had to believe 
in order that he might understand – crede ut intelligas.  
 In this context, the Church’s rites and sacraments ushered in a new path for 
Augustine. He learned to focus, not on the physicality of the rites, but on what was invisibly 
conveyed. The interior life of grace with God became something real for Augustine, and this 
to him, was what defines and shapes the Church as the people of God, for in baptism, we 
seek faith from the Church which is the invisible doorway that we enter into this new people 
of God with Christ as head. As Nichols points out, to Ratzinger, it is not difficult to 
comprehend why the young Augustine, struggling to find truth, and engaging intensely with 
issues of authority and skepticism, would have been struck by the conception of “faith” 
incorporated by a universal Church, capable of fulfilling a mediatory role and a uniquely 
magisterial function.85 Thus, the idea of a necessary relationship between the Church and 
“faith” is because, - to cite Ratzinger’s interpretation of Augustine’s struggle to faith and the 
Church:  
                                               
 84 Augustine of Hippo, The Confessions, trans. F. J. Sheed (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc. 2006), III, v). Augustine writes: “When I first read those Scriptures, I did not feel in the least 
what I have just said: they seemed to me unworthy to be compared with the majesty of Cicero. My conceit was 
repelled by their simplicity, and I had not the mind to penetrate into their depths.”  
 85 Nichols, Thought of Benedict XVI, 33.  
69 
 
This Church is the place where God gives us the Invisible to feed upon in visible 
form, thus leading us ever more towards the Invisible until we become adults in his 
presence. Because of man’s wounding through sin, the Church now becomes a 
necessary stage in the ascent of the soul to Wisdom. All must pass through the triad 
of credere, auctoritas, humilitas. “have faith, accept authority, practice humility,” if 
they are to see the divine wisdom in its beauty.86  
 
Thus, faith is the doorway through which one ascends to God through the people of God, the 
Church, which occupies an indispensable place in this journey to God, through her 
sacramental life, meaningful only through the eyes of faith. In other words, membership in 
the Church is borne from faith, nurtured and sustained in faith.  
 In addition to faith, love as the bond of unity shapes the Church as the house of God. 
For Augustine, this unity must be catholica in character, not sectarian, provincial or national, 
for a household divided in itself could not be sustained. This explains Augustine’s fierce 
battle with the Donatists in North Africa. Ratzinger describes this anti-Donatists 
ecclesiological exegesis of Augustine this way:  
The multitude of nations who live within the earth’s girdle now stands forth as the 
single people of Abraham, brought together out of their mutually separating 
multiplicity and bound together in an inner unity through the Seed of Abraham, Jesus 
Christ.87  
 
To Ratzinger therefore, the unity of the Church, for Augustine, is not a later, accidental 
development, but something that is integral and constitutive of the very life and fabric of the 
Church. As Nichols points out, Ratzinger maintains that the greatest sin of the Donatists, at 
least according to Augustine, was what Ratzinger describes as the lack of “objective charity 
which does not betoken a subjective attitude, but rather belonging to the Church, and more 
specifically to that Church which itself lives in Charity,”88 that is, in Eucharistic love-
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relationship with other Christians in the whole world.”89 To belong to the Church is 
therefore, to participate in this universal life of caritas, which binds the whole Church 
together.  
 To Augustine, maintains Ratzinger, even the presence of sinners in the Church – 
something that elicited very strong sentiments from the Donatists - was not a sufficient 
justification to sever the bonds of love, charity and unity in the Church. This in no way 
denies the reality of the anti-witness of sinful living by those professing to be Christians. In 
fact, Ratzinger maintains, Augustine does not hesitate to denounce the sinful lives of 
Christians, as seen in Augustine’s homily on the weeds and wheat, for which Ratzinger 
provides this interpretation in his thesis:  
Augustine can say: The Catholic Church is the true Church of the holy. Sinners are 
not really in her, for their membership is only a seeming reality, like that of the 
mundus sensibilis. But on the other hand, he can stress that it is no part of the 
Church’s business to discharge such sinners, just as it is not her affair to cast off this 
body of flesh. It is the Lord’s task, who will awaken her (at the End) and give her the 
true form of her holiness.90  
 
Rather than adopting a schismatic position towards sinners as demanded by the Donatists, 
Augustine, as Ratzinger reads him, sees in the Church the space of encounter of God’s 
merciful love that is patient, benign and salvific. In his catechesis on Augustine, Benedict 
XVI characterizes this Augustinian realization of the presence of sin, even in the Church, as a 
third stage in Augustine’s conversion, the other two stages being his intellectual conversion, 
and his conversion to humility and simplicity, in other words, his pastoral conversion. 
Speaking about this third stage, that is, Augustine’s realization that sin does not completely 
cease to be even after baptism, Ratzinger declares: 
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But there is a last step to Augustine’s journey, a third conversion, that brought him 
every day of his life to ask God for pardon. Initially, he thought that once he was 
baptized, in the life of communion with Christ, in the sacraments, in the Eucharistic 
celebration, he would attain the life proposed in the Sermon on the Mount: the 
perfection bestowed by Baptism and reconfirmed in the Eucharist. During the last 
part of his life he understood that what he has concluded at the beginning about the 
Sermon on the Mount – that is, now that we are Christians, we live this ideal 
permanently – was mistaken. Only Christ himself truly and completely accomplishes 
the Sermon on the Mount. We always need to be washed by Christ, who washes our 
feet, and renewed by him. We need permanent conversion. Until the end, we need this 
humility that recognizes that we are sinners journeying along until the Lord gives us 
his hand definitively and introduces us into eternal life.91 
  
This Augustinian realization of the continuous need for God’s mercy in opposition to 
Donatism leads Ratzinger to draw the conclusion that the conflict between Augustine and 
Donatus was an “inner-dogmatic affair,” because – in Ratzinger’s reading of Augustine – 
Donatism is not a heresy because it taught re-baptism, which is clearly a departure from the 
practice of the universal Church. Rather, Donatism is a heresy because it is schisma 
inveteratum – that is, on the basis of rejecting sinners or those who refused to withstand 
persecution of the faith – it had separated itself from the ecclesia catholica, from the 
universal Church. It has fractured love and unity. This is a grave situation because as 
Augustine himself often stated, “I am in the Church, whose members are all those Churches 
about which we know in truth from Holy Scripture that they originated and grew by the 
activity of the apostles. I will never give up communio with her, neither in Africa nor 
anywhere else, so help me God.”92 With this manner of professing the Catholic faith, 
Ratzinger maintains that Augustine became the doctor of catholicity.93 Thus, this context of a 
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schismatic experience for Augustine becomes the locus thanks to which the Church emerges 
as a people and house of God.  
 Patrick McGlinchey raises an important question relating to Ratzinger’s handling of 
Augustine’s conversion experience, and what that says to us about the ecclesial consequences 
of this experience of Augustine for Ratzinger. In other words, what can we deduce from 
Ratzinger’s ecclesiology from the way in which Ratzinger incorporated and integrated the 
conversion experience of Augustine into Ratzinger’s general understanding of Augustine’s 
thought? This question is crucial because Ratzinger is clearly aware of the puzzle regarding 
Augustine’s 386 AD conversion, that is, was Augustine’s conversion to the Gospel, 
specifically, his garden experience, a conversion to spirituality or to the historic Christian 
faith?94 Ratzinger offered a conclusive picture of where he stands in relation to this question 
in his catechesis on Augustine as Benedict XVI. Talking about the garden scene in which 
Augustine is exhorted tolle, lege, tolle, lege, - the text turns out to be from Paul’s Letter to 
the Romans, chapter 13:13-14, Ratzinger comments:  
He (Augustine) understood that those words in that moment were addressed 
personally to him; they came from God through the Apostle and indicated to him 
what he had to do at that time. Thus, he felt the darkness of doubt clearing, and he 
finally found himself free to give himself entirely to Christ: he described it as “your 
converting me to yourself” (Confessions VIII, 12, 30). This was the first and decisive 
conversion.95 
 
To Ratzinger, this decisive experience of Augustine was possible because of Augustine’s 
passion for the human being and for the truth. Augustine’s search for God was driven by 
passion, and when Augustine allowed Christ to find him and placed his life in the hands of 
Christ in faith, Augustine suddenly discovered that his search for God, his pursuit of truth, 
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had come to an end, for truth is Christ, God made flesh.96 But we should note that this recent 
rendition or interpretation of Augustine’s conversion experience by later Ratzinger is 
markedly different from the reading of the same text by Ratzinger.  
 In his Introduction to Christianity, the young professor Ratzinger offers this reading 
of Augustine’s conversion experience: “The program of the early Augustine, - God and the 
soul – nothing else-,” is impracticable: and it is also unchristian. In the last analysis there is 
no religion along the solitary path of the mystic, but only in the community of proclaiming 
and hearing.”97 It is not immediately clear how the middle Ratzinger arrived at this reading of 
Augustine, but what stands out in his later reading cited above, is that by relating Augustine’s 
personal conversion, not primarily to spirituality or at worst, simply an inner development 
along the path of Neoplatonism, Ratzinger makes the case that the individual’s search for 
God, for truth, in this case, Augustine’s, is incomplete when it bears no reference to the 
visible Church. Speaking on the centenary of the death of John Henry Newman, Ratzinger 
returns to this theme of Augustine’s solitary conversion vis-à-vis the Church:  
When Augustine was converted in the garden at Cassiacum he understood conversion 
according to the system of the revered master Plotinus and Neo-Platonic 
philosophers. He thought that his past sinful life would now be definitively cast off; 
from now on the convert would be someone wholly new and different, and his further 
journey would be a steady climb to the ever-purer heights of closeness to God.98 
 
 As McGlinchey points out, the words employed in the preceding citation by themselves 
“suggest that Ratzinger saw even Augustine’s Christian conversion as being heavily overlaid 
by philosophical presuppositions drawn not from the deposit of faith, but from a 
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philosophical/spiritual worldview derived from the mystical experience of Plotinus.”99 In 
effect, Ratzinger leads the reader of his doctoral thesis into the nuances of Augustine’s 
conversion by highlighting the two strands of conversion present in Neo-Platonism, that is, 
the regal path known only by the philosophers which entails a metaphysical search for the 
truth and undertaken by the few, and the universal way, with lesser standing, meant for the 
masses and undertaken via the religious cultus.100 While the former is clearly esoteric and 
elitist, the latter was clearly commonplace and accessible to all.  
 To Ratzinger, therefore, the great moment in Augustine’s conversion was the 
movement from the regal path of philosophy, limited and restricted to the few, to the 
universal way of salvation, opened to the masses. Ratzinger guesses that it must have been 
impressive and at the same time questionable to Augustine that the Christian religion lays 
claim to be both popular salvation (salus populi) and the regal path.101 Nevertheless, grace 
has the better of Augustine and he is able to realized that the Church mediates full salvation 
for all, for the masses, salvation that was presumed by the philosophers to be for a select few 
of the regal path. Ratzinger considers this a significant change in Augustine, for this, to 
Ratzinger, is when faith begins, that is, that one is no longer the architect of one’s salvation, 
but rather, that one opens the self to what comes from the outside, receiving it in faith, a faith 
similar to the attitude that one displays, for example, towards one’s parents.102 Faith as the 
fundamental attitude in which one does not rely on one’s strength but opens the self to the 
help that comes from the other, from outside, is the defining and determining attitude of 
being a Christian.  
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 Augustine, therefore, cannot rely only on his own strength to sustain the mystical 
vision of God. He has to depend on the Church, his new mother who now plays the maternal 
role Monica has played in his ante-conversion life. As Ratzinger points out, “in his weakness, 
Augustine cannot bear the divine ‘food’ in its pure form. Therefore, the divine Word has 
mingled itself with flesh so that humanity can enjoy it.”103 In other words, the only 
possibility for the human being to experience the life of divine bliss comes about only if God 
himself takes the initiative to reach out to humans, to stretch out a helping hand and life 
humans up, to the level of the Divine. And for Ratzinger, this appears to be the role of the 
Church, that is, the helping hand that God stretches out to humans by means of the 
sacraments, thanks to which the Church is able to mediate God’s saving presence for 
humanity. This is the context thanks to which one should understand the Church as that 
people and house of God, in the midst of the world, the nations.  
 Ratzinger identifies three fundamental representations of this Augustinian concept of 
the Church as the people and house of God: In the first place, this categorization refers to 
Israel, the first people called by God, the people of the promises, of the patriarchs. Secondly, 
granted that Israel was not called to be closed in on itself but to be a sign for the nations, for 
the people of God for the future, the designation people and house of God refers as well to 
the spiritual Church of all those baptized in Christ Jesus, from all the nations of the world. 
Lastly, the people and house of God is the heavenly and eschatological counterpart of the 
spiritual Church, that is, the Church triumphant in heaven.104 The final stage of this people of 
God is therefore the heavenly Church, which is the longing of all those on the way. Perhaps it 
is worth noting how remarkably similar this trajectory is, with what one will find in the 
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structure of the Second Vatican Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen 
Gentium, especially in Chapter One, On the Mystery of the Church. Not only is the Church 
traceable to Israel as the qahal YHWH, but chapters seven and eight, on eschatology and 
Mary, brings the reality of the Church to its definitive fulfilment in the communio sanctorum, 
in which the earthly Church reaches its definitive realization.  
 Ratzinger also sees in the mosaic art of Church architecture in the North Africa of 
Augustine’s day, a representation of the ecclesiological description of the Church as the 
people and house of God. Ratzinger points out that one of Augustine’s mosaics had the 
inscription Ecclesia mater. Seen this way, the Church building is the visible form of Mother 
Church, whose stones and mosaics constitute an image of the living stones of God’s people: 
ecclesia dicitur locus, quo ecclesia congregatur. The Spirit of God makes a dwelling in this 
people, as the Spirit did in the temple of Zion of old. Mutual charity is what binds the bricks 
of this house of God, absent which the house will not be constructed.105 Charity or love is 
therefore the internal form of the people and house of God.  
 Another aspect that Ratzinger takes on in his doctoral work is the theme of the life of 
the Church in the midst of a pagan world, that is, Augustine’s De Civitate Dei. In 410AD, 
Rome fell into the hands of the Goths. The charge was then levied against the Christians: 
Rome had fallen because Rome had abandoned its pagan gods for the Christian God, who 
clearly were unable to protect Rome. This devastation could only be remedied with a renewal 
of the pagan cult. Sacrifices had to be offered to the pagan gods of Rome, for atonement and 
restoration of Rome and for the welfare of the citizens of Rome. With De Civitate Dei, 
Augustine offered a robust defense of the Christian faith that sheds a crucial light on his 
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liturgical ecclesiology, from a Ratzingerian perspective. To Ratzinger, the central nexus of 
Augustine’s argument is that sacrificial worship is the offering of human life, that is, a life 
lived according to the precepts of God. In other words, sacrifice is right living. Roman 
sacrifices were futile because the Romans themselves were living immoral lives. Owing to 
sin, the human relationship with God has been severed. This calls for a mediator who will not 
only share mortality with us, but likewise blessedness with God. This mediator, out of mercy 
for humanity, will save humanity from the subjection to the demonic, from the futile 
sacrifices made to the Roman gods.106 This insight of the definiteness of the cult of Christ as 
replacing not only pagan Roman cults but all cults before it, will be further developed in 
chapter five, which studies Ratzinger’s liturgical ecclesiology of the word and logos, that is, 
the true sacrifice as oratio, prayer, the worship and sacrifice of the mind and spirit.  
 Accordingly, by his life, death, resurrection and the sending of the Holy Spirit, Jesus 
Christ is the sacrifice that should be offered but could not, because of the Roman decision for 
the pagan cult. Nichols comments: “It is this sacrifice of the Mediator, which is to be, in the 
polis that no being lives outside, the true worship, the cultus of the City of God.”107 How 
does this sacrifice of Christ bring about or relate to the Church as the people and house of 
God? Tracing Augustine’s analysis through Justin, Athanasius and other Anti-Arian Fathers, 
Ratzinger gives a pneumato-ecclesia response, to the effect, as Nichols summarizes it, that: 
We are united with Christ by faith whereby his Spirit dwells in us; yet the Spirit of 
Christ is no other than the grace of Christ, the caritas which is spread abroad in our 
hearts by the Holy Spirit; in referring to such caritas we overstep the boundaries of 
the individual to enter the realm of the community, the Church which is Christ’s 
body. And while that ecclesial Corpus Christi is not directly accessible to us, it may 
be found in its holy sign, its sacrament, the Eucharist.108 
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This synthesis shows the essential characterization of the Eucharistic ecclesiology of 
Ratzinger, for in the sacrament of the Eucharist, the true sacrifice of the Church, is contained 
the inner Leib-Christi-Sein of the holy people of God in Christ Jesus, and their existence as a 
body of Christ. The hub of this people is caritas, which is the animating principle of the 
whole body. In this light, what is most interior is what is most exterior, in living out Christian 
caritas, as Ratzinger points out: 
Charity is the unity of the Church, and more; it is the real, sober, working love of the 
Christian heart. And that means that every act of genuine Christian love, every work 
of mercy is in a real and authentic sense, a sacrifice, a celebration of the one and only 
sacrificium christianorum.109  
 
In other words, the moral life of Christians is shaped by and lived from the Eucharistic 
fellowship. Charity, therefore, is the link between Church and Eucharist. When Ratzinger 
reflects about caritas as the mark of the house of God for Augustine, Ratzinger understands 
caritas to mean objective charity not contingent, restricted or defined by subjective 
dispositions.  
 Christianity sees charity as the defining principle of what it means to be a Christian. 
The Church is perceived as subsisting in charity, that is, “in Eucharistic love-relationship 
with other Christians in the whole world.”110 But this does not imply a blanket pass to all the 
members of the universal Church, on the part of Ratzinger. In fact, Ratzinger maintains that 
though by virtue of membership in the universal Church one shares in the outward and 
visible participation in charity, there abound in the universal Church who in reality belong 
with the Donatist schismatics, owing to their nature as “sinners,”111 precisely because by 
opting out of the mother Church, they have severed the bounds of charity. 
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  Clearly, what Ratzinger seeks to achieve with his reading of Augustine’s caritas as 
defining the universal Church as the at house of God, is essentially to establish a firm basis 
for the mediatory role of the Church. Given that the spiritual goods of the Church, that is, the 
sacraments, are not regional in character but universal, it can only be sensible that such a 
Church, in order to correspond to the universal character of her goods must of necessity be 
universal as well. And this universality is verifiable thanks to the concreteness and visibility 
of the Church. In addition, this reading of Augustine by Ratzinger offers a realistic picture of 
the presence of the mystery of iniquity, of sin, in the lives of believers, in those who enter the 
portals of the Church. In this sense, the Church emerges as that space wherein healing is 
offered to the wounded and the sinful, and the sacraments are therefore healing remedies 
offered by the Church to the sinful and the broken that enter her gates.  
 Going further, for Augustine, caritas serves as a unifying force for humanity to the 
extent that men and women recognize God as the summum bonum of the entire world.112  If 
love is severed from God, it becomes self-serving. This worldly love fundamentally differs 
from the love that animates the civitas Dei, for not only is the latter love oriented towards the 
good of the other, agape, but it is a love that hopes for something beyond this world. It is 
transcendental love. In this Augustinian reading, therefore, two loves are discernible: the 
cupido of the earthly city and the caritas of the heavenly city. These two cities, the earthly 
and the heavenly, differ in their origin, development and ends.113 To Ratzinger, the reality of 
the earthly colony in the objective sense and character as it stands in contra-distinction to the 
heavenly city has profound implications for historical theology, which was something that 
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was of great interest to the Aufklärung thinkers, who tended to advocate for an autonomous 
earthly city, with little, if any reference to the heavenly city.   
 In all, it might be important to note that though Ratzinger adopts the position of 
physicality in the reading of Augustine, that is, the Church is visible and concrete and thanks 
to this visible presence we can access the life in Christ through the sacramental experience of 
the Church, Ratzinger is not oblivious of the fact that present in Augustine is also the sense 
of an interior, spiritual, invisible and I dare say, mystical Church. This appears to give 
support to the position that Augustine’s conception of the nature of the Church is not 
monolithic. If anything, it appears dialectical. Ratzinger cites De Magistro where the Bishop 
of Hippo declares that the temple of the spiritual God is the interiority of the human being.114 
This appears especially for concerning for Ratzinger, for as McGlinchey points out, if one 
were to adopt De Magistro as the hermeneutical key to Augustine’s doctrine on the Church, 
realities like Church and sacraments are noticeably absent.115 No doubt, as Nichols observes, 
Ratzinger sees this as a serious shortcoming on Augustine’s part in De Magistro, which was 
rectified by a more ecclesial notion of God’s temple in in the later Augustine, especially 
when Augustine confronted the regional schismatics of North Africa, the Donatists.116 The 
true Church is the Church of the nations, the ecclesia omnium gentium, visible in all parts of 
the world and not just restricted to the pure of Roman Africa. To Ratzinger, therefore, 
believing with the Church is an indispensable part of the interior journey of faith.  
 In a word, Ratzinger’s doctoral thesis portrays Ratzinger’s conviction of a Church 
that is visible and concrete, containing both saints and sinners, over and against the Donatist 
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position of a more spiritual Church of the pure. Ratzinger wholly adopts the Augustinian 
position. We also encounter a Church in battle for the soul of the world, a battle waged by the 
corpus Christi against the corpus Diaboli. This Augustinian sense of battle never actually 
leaves Ratzinger, for as we will see later on in the thesis in Ratzinger’s treatment of logos as 
love in his response to the Aufklärung’s critique of Christian love, Ratzinger emphatically 
argues from the perspective of a love that is torn in opposite directions, earthly and heavenly, 
and yet a love that can only find its fullest expression and meaning in God, in the heavenly 
city, whose foretaste is encountered in the corpus Christi. All taken together, visibility, 
universality and caritas are the defining traits that stand out from Ratzinger’s study of 
Augustine’s ecclesiology, and these will become handy in the later engagements that will 
emerge following the appeal to a primacy of the sense of the historical, of the expressive 
understanding of love, and of the particularizing ecclesiological positions that, following the 
spirit of the Aufklärung, will become dominant in the post-World War II and post conciliar 
Church, especially in the heartland of Europe. When the Aufklärung placed human rationality 
front and center, thereby placing the human being as the center of faith as one sees in Kant’s 
Religion and Hegel’s Phenomenology, Ratzinger warns of the dangers of a one-sided 
horizontal ecclesiology. Faith constitutes the people of God, while caritas or love constitutes 
the house of God, in Ratzinger’s reading of Augustine’s ecclesiology.  
 
1.4.2 Ratzinger’s Habilitation: The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure  
 
 Ratzinger wrote his post-doctoral thesis or Habilitation on The Theology of History in 
St. Bonaventure. As earlier pointed out, metaphysics, existentialism and personalism were 
the philosophical preferences of Ratzinger for the simple reason that he has always been 
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interested in the nature of salvation history, and saw in these philosophical resources  - the 
possibility of constructing a theological response to what he perceived as the discontents of 
contemporary civilization and world history, especially with the religious and socio-political 
analysis that emerged with the Aufklärung and subsequent modern secular thinking. In 
Bonaventure’s theology of revelation, Ratzinger was able to arrive at the conclusion that the 
saving plan of God is embedded in history, for Revelation was not something of the past but 
was an ongoing reality of the Spirit in the life of the Church.  
 However, and this is what landed Ratzinger into hot waters, Ratzinger argued that 
revelation refers to the act in which God shows God’s self to a creature, not to the objectified 
result of this act. In this sense, the receiving subject is always also a part of the concept of 
revelation. Therefore, concludes Ratzinger, “where there is no one to perceive ‘revelation,’ 
no re-vel-ation has occurred, because no veil had been removed. By definition, revelation 
requires a someone who apprehends it.”117 If Bonaventure is right that the receiving subject 
of revelation constitutes an integral part of revelation, then it follows that revelation precedes 
Scripture and is deposited in Scripture, while not identical with Scripture. It also implies that 
revelation is always more than what is written down. This further implies that sola scriptura 
is an untenable option, because an “essential element of Scripture is the Church as 
understanding subject, and with this the fundamental sense of tradition is already given.”118 
In other words, without a recipient of revelation, there is no revelation, there is no pulling off 
of the veil so that the human being can clearly see the face of God. Ratzinger writes:  
In Bonaventure (as well as in theologians of the thirteenth century) there was nothing 
corresponding to our conception of “revelation,” by which we are normally in the 
habit of referring to all the revealed contents of the faith: it has even become a part of 
linguistic usage to refer to Sacred Scripture simply as simply “revelation.” Such an 
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identification would have been unthinkable in the language of the High Middle Ages. 
Here, “revelation” is always a concept denoting an act. The word refers to the act in 
which God shows himself, not to the objectified results of this act. And because this 
is so, the receiving subject is always also a part of the concept of “revelation.” (…) If 
Bonaventure is right, then revelation precedes Scripture and becomes deposited in 
Scripture but is not simply identical with it. This in turn means that revelation is 
always something than what is merely written down.119 
 
To Michael Schmaus, Ratzinger’s habilitation thesis reader, this Ratzingerian reading of 
Bonaventure amounted to a modernist subjectivation of the concept of revelation that had to 
be rejected outright. Schmaus, schooled in scholastic spirit that was dominant in the Neo-
Thomism of the pre-conciliar era, must have seen in Ratzinger’s push for the indispensable 
place of the receiving subject in the process of Divine revelation, a creeping anthropocentric 
notion of God and the whole concept of God’s self-disclosure to humans, that is, divine 
revelation. But what was probably overlooked by Schmaus was the indispensability of the 
ecclesial context that Ratzinger sought to established, vis-à-vis revelation, in that because 
revelation is not a closed-in act, revelation, at least in Ratzinger’s interpretation of 
Bonaventure, is such that it arrives and it is perceived in the Ecclesia.120 This implies that 
“the living organism of the faith of all ages is then an intrinsic part of revelation.”121 Rather 
than a failed grade, the compromise was for Ratzinger to rework the thesis taking into 
consideration the objections of Schmaus.122 Ratzinger eliminated the “controversial” section 
on Bonaventure and revelation, leaving Bonaventure’s reading of history to stand as the 
corrected version of the thesis. This revision passed and Ratzinger was awarded 
professorship in dogmatic theology, February 21, 1957, after “weeks of restless waiting.”123 
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Following the successful end of his Habilitation drama, Ratzinger became a lecturer at the 
University of Munich and in the philosophical-theological college in Freising.  
 This experience of his Habilitation clearly left an indelible mark on Ratzinger, in that, 
as he himself says in Milestones:  
At the moment I could hardly feel any joy, so heavily did the nightmare of what had 
happened weigh me down. But slowly the anxiety that had taken root in me began to 
dissolve (…) I made the resolve not to agree easily to the rejection of dissertation or 
habilitation theses but whenever possible – and respecting the integrity of the 
procedure – to take the side of the weaker party. This attitude will later play a role in 
my academic career, as will see.124 
 
With the drama of his habilitation defense over, what insights can one glean from Ratzinger’s 
study of Bonaventure that could be pertinent to Ratzinger’s ecclesial engagements with the 
Aufklärung?  - To respond to this question, it is helpful to recall, as Ratzinger himself points 
out, that the context of Bonaventure’s theology of revelation is very much the controversy 
stirred up by the interpretations of Joachim of Fiore (c. AD 1132-1202), a Cistercian abbot, 
mystic and apocalyptic writer. In synthesis, Joachim put forth a Trinitarian philosophy of 
history in which history was seen from the perspective of three periods or ages, viz., the Age 
of the Father, the Age of the Son and the Age of the Spirit.125 This Trinitarian reading has a 
very scriptural imprint.  
 The Age of the Father (ordo conjugatorum) corresponded with the Old Testament and 
was defined by the Mosaic Law. The Age of the Son (ordo clericorum) spanned from the 
advent of Christ to circa AD 1260. This era is marked by the mediation of God’s grace 
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through the rituals and sacraments of the Church as administered by priests. Finally, the Age 
of the Spirit (ordo monachorum) began around the mid-thirteenth century, ushered in by St. 
Francis (c. AD 1181/1182 – October 3, 1226), and his community of Friars. This Age of the 
Spirit will see a new outburst or flourishing of universal brotherly love that will render 
ecclesiastical organization and structures superfluous.126 To Joachim, it was only within the 
Age of the Spirit that the full import of God’s revelation in Christ would be properly 
comprehended. Thereafter will come an era of peace and tranquility, with the Franciscans 
being instrumental in bringing about this new era of tranquility and world peace.127 The 
Franciscan movement would be interpreted as the new people of God, the ecclesia 
contemplativa, a new charismatic condition heralded by Francis, of an unmediated access to 
grace by all, that called for the following of the poor Christ poorly.   
 When Bonaventure became Master General of the Franciscan Order in 1257, he took 
over from John of Parma who had been forced to resign, owing to the tensions that were 
facing the Franciscan movement in terms of those calling for a radical following of the poor 
Christ poorly, the Spiritualists, on the one hand, and those preferring a more accommodating 
spirit with the materialistic, opulent, medieval Church, on the other hand. Ratzinger 
maintains that though Bonaventure never mentions the name “Joachim” in the Hexameron, 
Bonaventure “had debated Joachim’s ideas extensively and, as a man of the center, had 
striven to keep what was useful in order to integrate it into the ecclesial order.”128 And 
Ratzinger was apparently sympathetic with this approach of Bonaventure, in which a 
conscious attempt is made to preserve the good while eschewing the unhelpful.  
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 In the context of this conflictual reading of the prophecies of Joachim by the so-called 
Spiritual Franciscans, Ratzinger maintains that Bonaventure reinterpreted Joachim back into 
tradition against the Joachimites that were interpreting him against the tradition. This helped 
preserve the unity of the Franciscan Order.129 Thus, Ratzinger not only clearly admired the 
method of Bonaventure, of saving what was salvageable in the theology of history of 
Joachim, but, more profoundly, Ratzinger admired the unity and harmony restored by 
Bonaventure to the Franciscan Order.  
 Ratzinger’s study of Bonaventure concentrated on the Collationes in Hexaemeron 
(1273). The overriding theme of the study is ecclesiological and eschatological, in the sense 
that it concerned itself with the ultimate destiny of the world and the responsibility of the 
Church in bringing about this destiny.130 The point of departure is the priestly account of 
creation in Genesis, in which the six days of creation becomes the six periods of salvation 
history: Adam to Noah; then Abraham; then David; and then the Babylonian Captivity and 
the Return from Exile; then Christ; and finally, the Finis Mundi, the end of the world. The 
first four periods correspond to the Old Testament, while the last two are of the New 
Testament.131 By looking at history through the epochal events that marked salvation history, 
Bonaventure thus provides a link between history and theology, as Ratzinger points out: “In 
this way, Bonaventure arrives at a new theory of scriptural exegesis that emphasizes the 
historical character of the scriptural statements in contrast to the exegesis of the Fathers and 
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the Scholastics that had been more clearly directed to the unchangeable and the enduring.”132 
What can we deduce from this Ratzingerian study of Bonaventure?  
 Firstly, the sense of a historical ecclesiology heading towards a fulfilment in the 
future. The Church for Bonaventure was not something of the past. In fact, the full meaning 
of the Church was such that it could only be grasped when viewed from the perspective of 
the consummation of the journey of the Church through history, through time and space. 
From Bonaventure’s reinterpretation of Joachim’s prophecies in which the figure of Christ is 
moved from the end to the center of history, the eschatological character of the Church 
becomes something that is not set over and against the institutional and sacramental 
dimension of the Church. In effect, because Christ is the center of the Church, it is the case 
that the Church will eventually emerge triumphant or victorious at the consummation of 
history. This Church, as part of human history, rises from Abel the Just, ecclesia ab Abel, 
goes through the vicissitudes of history, making men and women into a community of 
persons capable of living with God forever.  
 As Ratzinger points out, “the historical ascent of the Church from the Patriarchs at the 
beginning to the People of God of the final days is simultaneously a growth of the revelation 
of God.”133 In evidence in this text is the influence of Bonaventure on Ratzinger, in that not 
only does Ratzinger again assert the indispensable place of the human subject, in this case, 
the Patriarchs and Israel, in the unfolding of God’s revelation, but, unlike Joachim and 
following Bonaventure, Ratzinger holds a broader sense of the consummation of history that 
clearly transcends the Joachimites. But still within the Franciscan school of history and 
revelation, one can assert, regarding the destiny of the Church and the world, that truth will 
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triumph over falsehood, good over evil, in the Church of the Perfect or the Triumphant 
Church. But this sense of the eschaton should not be mixed up with present political utopia 
aimed at bringing about such a definitive reading of the pilgrim Church in the sense of its 
future to the present.   
 Still within this historical perspective of the Church, Ratzinger adopts the 
Bonaventurian position on this historical evolution of the Church, which evolves according 
to the Seven Seals of the Apocalypse: The White Horse is symbolic of Christ; the Red Horse 
symbolizes the Age of the Martyrs; the Black Horse stands for the time of the heretics; the 
Pale Horse is the Age of the False Christian and concomitantly the time of the founding of 
the religious orders; the Earthquake is the Age of the persecution by the Anti-Christ; and the 
Silence is the Age of the Eternal Vision.134 In this sense, the history of salvation is the history 
of the Church, with Christ marking a new and decisive beginning in this history whose 
culminative point is the Church of the Perfect, beyond time, in eternity:  
With this it becomes decisively clear that the revelation of the final age will involve 
neither the abolition of the revelation of Christ nor a transcendence of the New 
Testament. Rather, it involves the entrance into that form of knowledge which the 
Apostles had; and thus, it will be the true fulfillment of the New Testament revelation 
which has been understood only imperfectly up till now. And so the final age will be 
truly and in the full sense of the word, the New Testament.135  
 
This conviction of Ratzinger of the decisive finitude of the New Testament could be 
indicative of his attitude to questions around inter-religious dialogue. Ratzinger clearly 
believes that because of the figure of Christ whose mission is passed on in the Church, the 
presence of the Church in history is already a sign that awaits the final consummation of 
salvation history, the Sabbath rest of the Church.  
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 Secondly, from Bonaventure Ratzinger discerns a historical reading of Scripture in 
which Scripture is understood, not as an act, an artifact closed in on itself and impenetrable, 
but rather as a witness or testament to the act of revelation. In this sense, though the word of 
revelation as recorded in Scripture is definitive, nonetheless, because Scripture is a “book of 
the Church” in that the Church is the reading subject of Scripture, new depths of meaning 
must be uncovered in every age through the Church’s reception of Scripture. As Ratzinger 
points out, 
At no time does Bonaventure refer to the Scriptures themselves as ‘revelation.’ He 
speaks of revelare and facies revelata primarily when a particular understanding of 
Scripture is involved, namely that “manifold divine wisdom” which consists in 
grasping the three-fold spiritual sense of Scripture – the allegorical, the anagogical 
and the tropological. These three are understood in analogy with the three divine 
virtues of faith, hope and love.136 
 
In the light of this understanding, the role of the Spirit does not close with any particular age, 
as Joachim had maintained, but the Spirit is present in every age. The Spirit continuously 
opens the Church to a deeper understanding of the Scripture. While being attentive to the 
Spirit, the senses of Scripture enables the Church to discern her future, says Ratzinger: 
Scripture points to the future, but only the one who has understood the past can grasp 
the interpretation of the future because the whole history develops in one unbroken 
line of meaning in which that which is to come may be grasped in the present on the 
basis of the past (…). In this way, the exegesis of Scripture becomes a theology of 
history, the clarification of the past leads to prophecy concerning the future.137  
 
This new way of historical exegesis opens up a new interpretation of salvation history within 
the life of the Church. Between the fifth and the sixth ages, that is, between Jesus Christ and 
the Finis Mundi, there will be space for what Ratzinger calls an “inner-historical 
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transformation of the Church.”138 The sign of this inner-historical transformation, obviously 
for Bonaventure, was Francis of Assisi, the Seraphic Father. Francis marked the time of 
peace preceding the final storm foretold in the seventh chapter of the Book of Revelations. In 
line with Joachim of Fiore’s prophecy that the Angel of the Seal would receive the full power 
to renew Christianity, Francis was understood both by Joachim and Bonaventure, Ratzinger 
maintains, as marked with the seal of the living God, the stigmata, the very impress of the 
crucified Christ. Given this understanding, the final people of God, the 144,000, would be the 
community of contemplative men and women, for whom the form of life realized in Francis 
is the norm. The Franciscans will therefore enjoy the peace of the seventh day that will 
precede the Parousia.139 Predictably, Ratzinger is cautious about a whole-sale identification 
of the Franciscan Order with the final era, even if intrigued by Bonaventure’s analysis:  
Though this new people of God may rightfully be called Franciscans, and though it 
must be said that it is only in this new people that the real intention of the Poverello 
will be realized, nonetheless, this final Order is in no way identical with the present 
Order of Franciscans. It may be that the present Order was originally destined to 
inaugurate the new people immediately. But even if this had been the case, the failure 
of its members has frustrated this immediate determination. For the present, the 
Dominican and the Franciscan Orders stand together at the inauguration of a new 
period for which they are preparing, but which they cannot bring to actuality by 
themselves. When this time arrives, it will be a time of contemplatio, a time of the 
full understanding of Scripture, and in this respect, a time of the Holy Spirit who 
leads us into the fullness of the truth of Jesus Christ.140 
 
In other words, though Ratzinger clearly sees the significance of the figure of Francis in the 
life of the Church, and how the inner life of Francis, the contemplative life, will eventually 
triumph in the Church, Ratzinger is not eager to read in the person of Francis an immediate 
sign of the end of history or the culmination of the Church’s life. Ratzinger is no doubt 
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clearly sympathetic to the life of Francis. To Ratzinger, Francis, the simplex, the idiota, at the 
consummation of the Church and history, will turn to have a more penetrating and profound 
view of life, because Francis loved God more.141 This love for God remains a central 
leitmotif in Ratzinger’s theological landscape. Even as pope, he felt his most pressing 
attention was to remind the Church and the world that God is love, in his first encyclical.  
 Thirdly, by placing Christ at the center of the Church and of history as Bonaventure 
does, Ratzinger reads in this centrality of Christ, the pattern for the Church in the midst of 
world history. The Mystical Body of Christ, that is, the Church, must thread the same path as 
Christ, the center and head of the Church. The rejection that Christ faces should likewise be 
expected of the Church. This rejection and persecution prepare the Church for the final 
Sabbath rest.142 Ultimately, therefore, with the eyes of faith and focusing on Christ as the Sun 
that enlightens the Church, we can already see the ultimate triumph of Christ and the Church 
in the spirit of the poor Friar of Assisi whose angelic life is a triumph over the anti-Christ 
forces of the world.  
 Fourthly, Bonaventure provides Ratzinger with a nuanced reading of the institutional 
dimension of the Church. We should recall, as shown above, that in the prophecies of 
Joachim which Bonaventure engaged, the Age of the Spirit was such that Christian life was 
going to be unmediated, with a direct access to grace by all the members of the evangelical 
community. Joachim was therefore suspicious of attempts at structuralizing the Franciscan 
Order, in fidelity to what he perceived to be the original intent of Francis of Assisi. But when 
Bonaventure took over as Superior General, Bonaventure adopted a realistic vision of the 
necessity of some form of structure or institution, if the Franciscan Order was to remain in 
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existence. As Ratzinger points out, “without feeling any infidelity towards the holy Founder, 
Bonaventure could and had to create institutional structures for his Order, realizing all the 
while that Francis had not wanted them.”143 Pragmatically, Bonaventure saw that the 
eschatological form of life advocated by Francis could not literarily be adapted to the here 
and now. The life of Francis, that is, a life without structures and institutions that relies solely 
on unmediated grace could only be realized as a break-through of God’s grace in the soul of 
the individual, till such a time of the completion of history with the final eschaton.  
 This Bonaventurian reading of history has proven helpful to Ratzinger in his response 
to opinions that are overly critical of the structural form of ecclesial life, more precisely, the 
hierarchical organism of the Church. Ratzinger points out that through institutionalization, 
Bonaventure was able to preserve the eschatological character of what could be preserved.144 
But such a defense of the hierarchical structure of the Church by Ratzinger does not imply a 
blindness or deafness on Ratzinger’s part to the excesses of institutionalism in the life of the 
Church. In fact, in anything, Ratzinger has been a frequent critique of the large bureaucracies 
that continue to expand in the post-conciliar Church, especially in his native Germany:  
Nowadays the opinion surfaces occasionally even in ecclesiastical circles that a 
person is more Christian the more he or she is involved in Church activities. We have 
a kind of ecclesiastical occupational therapy: a committee, or any rate some sort of 
activity in the Church, is sought for everyone. People – according to this way to this 
way of thinking – must constantly be busy about the Church, they must always be 
talking about the Church, or doing something to or in her. But a mirror that reflects 
only itself is no longer a mirror; a widow that no longer lets us see the wide-open 
spaces outside, but gets in the way of the view, has lost its reason for being (…) The 
more administrative machinery we construct, be it the most modern, the less place 
there is for the Spirit, the less place there is for the Lord, and the less freedom there 
is.145  
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Ratzinger is therefore, very much conscious of the dangers of institutionalism, that structures 
could easily become self-serving if not unevangelical. For Ratzinger and in line with 
Bonaventure, it is critical to keep on the radar the instrumental value of ecclesial structures, 
that is, they are never to be end in themselves, but rather the means that the pilgrim Church 
employs in the service of the mission of the Church. 
 Finally, it is worth nothing that Ratzinger is lukewarm regarding the assertion 
regarding the “Church of the poor” that stands as the foundation of the Age of the Spirit, 
especially in the interpretation of this “poor caste” as replacing the mediatory priestly class of 
the Church. This objection is based on the fact that Ratzinger does not believe in separating 
the Church into classes of sacramental dispensers in distinction of the poor. Maximilian 
Heim suggests that this Ratzingerian reading of Bonaventure “had key importance for 
Ratzinger in the later debate about the eschatological aspects of the Constitution on the 
Church and about the different ways in which it was received in ecumenical circles as well as 
by proponents of Latin American liberation theology.”146 Following Bonaventure’s 
reevaluation of the Joachim’s Age of the Spirit which had put forth a this-worldly 
eschatological fulfillment of history, Ratzinger is suspicious of a this-worldly claims of 
economic, political or religious messianism.  
 To Ratzinger, this promise within history of Joachim that Bonaventure refuted, 
nevertheless, marked a synthesis of utopia and eschatology that set the stage for subsequent 
philosophical and socio-economic trends: “Joachim concretely formulated such a promise 
and so prepared the way for Hegel (…) Hegel, in turn, furnished the intellectual model for 
Marx.”147 In a word, if Ratzinger showed hesitance towards some aspects of present-day 
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liberation theology, it could in large measure to what he sees as a divide between 
Christological and Sacramental Church on the one hand, and the Pneumatological and 
prophetic Church of the poor on the other, which claims to be able to bring about a utopia by 
their way of life. Definitely, Ratzinger has shown multiple positions towards liberation 
theology overtime,148 which, even if not always coming across as sympathetic, reveals two 
things: Firstly, that Ratzinger definitely takes liberation theology seriously especially in the 
promises it offers in the continent of Latin America; and secondly, that Ratzinger is 
conscious of the socio-economic factors that necessitated liberation theology, that is, he 
might agree with the diagnosis but disagrees with the prescription. 
 Certainly, the question of history and faith takes on a sharper focus with the 
challenges brought about by the Aufklärung, in terms of its penchant for the historical-critical 
method of approaching not only Scripture but the doctrinal contents of faith as a whole. With 
the above insights in mind, one could say that Bonaventure and Augustine played no small 
roles in preparing Ratzinger for the challenges based on the nature of historically verifiable 
claims, that was characteristic of the Aufklärung. As we will see in the subsequent treatment 
of the engagements between Ratzinger and the postulates of the Aufklärung on love, person, 
creation, and reason that Ratzinger takes up thanks to the flexible character of the Greek 
concept of logos, the concern for Ratzinger will not be to deny the import of these concepts 
from the philosophical point of view, but to open these concepts up to the rationality of faith 
and love, from Augustine, and dialectical claims of history in an ongoing transcendental 
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sense, from Bonaventure. In all, the fulfillment of all human hopes and aspirations in this 
side of history presents a false hope, for human hopes, rightly experienced in history, will 
find their ultimate fulfillment in a Christological completion at the end of history. 
 In confronting the historical claims of the Aufklärung on love, person, reason, word 
and the rational understanding of Jesus’ sonship as one finds, for example, in Hegel’s Spirit 
of Christianity and the Positivity of Religion, Ratzinger clearly engages these positions with 
the Augustinian insights, as will subsequently be seen in this thesis. Chapter Two thus sets 
the philosophical foundations and framework from which these Augustinian ecclesiological 




Chapter Two: Ratzinger: From Augustine and Bonaventure through 
the Aufklärung to the God of Faith and the God of the Philosophers 
  
 Chapter One of this thesis delved into the biographical outline of Ratzinger’s life, and 
how, following the reading which Ratzinger himself makes of the circumstances of his birth, 
there emerges a sense of openness to the provisionality of this side of human existence and 
likewise the sense of the sacred, even in what could appear ordinary events of life. Chapter 
One also considered in greater detail Ratzinger’s engagements with Augustine and 
Bonaventure, the two figures that largely shaped and defined Ratzinger’s theological outlook 
especially regarding the question of the Church. For Augustine, love or caritas is the defining 
characteristic of the Church, while Bonaventure’s view of the Church is one of a Christo-
centric character. Likewise, in Chapter One, the theological contours of the Church for 
Ratzinger emerge thanks to the insights drawn from Augustine and Bonaventure. For the 
former, the Church is the people and house of God in the midst of the world. For the latter, 
the emphasis is on the ultimate triumph of the Church as the community of the just, brought 
about and sustained thanks to the historical and supernatural revelation beginning with Israel 
and finding its culmination in the figure of Christ.  
 In this sense, one could say that Ratzinger’s engagement with Augustine and 
Bonaventure was not only an intra-ecclesial experience, but also prepared him for a more 
robust public engagement in terms of the life of faith which is the life of the Church, in the 
public arena. That said, it might be noteworthy to remark that just as Augustine’s 
ecclesiological positions were shaped by historical events such as the sack of Rome by the 
Barbarians or the Pelagian controversy, so too with Ratzinger, only in this instance, the 
ecclesial context will no longer be the spirit of the Barbarians but the spirit of the Aufklärung. 
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In this sense, one can talk of Ratzinger’s theological formation as having a contextual 
character.  
  And again, Chapter One shows that while, on the one hand, Ratzinger affirms the 
rational spirit of the Aufklärung, Ratzinger is not caught up in a tug of war between faith and 
reason, but seeks to go beyond, transcending the antithesis into a reconciliation of both. 
Along these introductory lines and insights, therefore, one can recall the famous question that 
Tertullian had posed centuries ago, viz. what has Athens got to do with Jerusalem? 
Ratzinger’s response could very well be described as: Everything. Such a conclusion is likely 
in the sense that if an academic’s inaugural lecture is anything to go by, then Ratzinger 
already pointed to this direction of the relationship between philosophy and theology as 
constitutive of the hermeneutical framework of his theology.  
 Indeed, as seen in Chapter One, this reading of theology with the help of philosophy 
and history was something that emerged from Ratzinger’s study of Augustine and 
Bonaventure and his wide reading of modern philosophy. This is very much evident in 
Ratzinger’s 1959 Inaugural Lecture at the University of Bonn entitled “The God of Faith and 
the God of Philosophers.” In this lecture, Ratzinger sought to foster a dialogue between faith 
and reason, an interchange that he sees as necessary for both if faith and reason are not only 
to attain their highest aspirations in the essential roles that both are called to play in the 
world. This lecture offers a profound insight into Ratzinger’s thinking particularly about 
modern philosophy as an indispensable interlocutor of theology. But before delving further 
into Ratzinger’s ecclesial reading of the philosophical currents that came with modern 
thought in the Aufklärung, what are the defining qualities of the Aufklärung to which 
Ratzinger engages?  
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2.1 The Peculiarities of the Aufklärung 
 
 The Aufklärung as a pan-European movement marked a conclusively irrevocable 
change in the political, religious and social life of the old continent.1 Europe was taken over 
by the ideas of liberty, fraternity and equality, which translates into individual freedom, 
religious toleration and the equality of citizens before the law. Europe witnessed the 
flowering of culture and polite society in the eighteenth century. The Aufklärung also 
reflected an optimism in the belief in social progress.2 But this optimism about human 
potentials was not blind, for even at the positivism and optimism that characterized the 
Aufklärung, Europe was still conscious of the potentials of debasement rooted in the human 
heart. As Nicholas Till points out:  
The philosophes and the Aufklärer were certainly believers in progress; but while one 
eye of the Enlightenment was always focused gladly on the bright future, the other 
eye was trained uneasily on the recent past. For the Enlightenment had been born in 
the shadow of the disintegration of social order which had occurred throughout 
Europe in the seventeenth century, following what seemed like an almost total 
collapse of political and religious authority. Civil war on a scale hitherto unknown 
had riven nations and overthrown established political powers; religious doubt had 
come to assail those not possessed and consumed by the new fanaticisms; status and 
property no longer offered security and certainty. The unrest of the mid-seventeenth 
century forced a fundamental reappraisal of the principles of social order, which led 
people to ask whether the traditional bounds could ever gain be adequate.3  
 
Given this atmosphere of socio-political and economic uncertainties, the Aufklärung as a 
pan-European movement sought to offer new interpretations of human nature, of society and 
of the moral life, in an otherwise uncertain Europe.4 One can therefore read two sides 
                                               
 1 Alister E. McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology: From the Enlightenment to 
Pannenberg (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 9.  
 2 Ian R. Boyd, Dogmatics Among the Ruins: German Expressionism and the Enlightenment as 
Contexts for Karl Barth’s Theological Development (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004), 205.  
 3 Nicholas Till, Mozart and the Enlightenment (London: Faber and Faber, 1992), 1.  
 4 Boyd, Dogmatics Among the Ruins, 205.  
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regarding the Aufklärung coin: on the one hand, the awareness that the medieval social order 
that saw a harmony between throne and altar was no longer sustainable became a position 
held by large sectors of the intelligentsia class.  On the other hand, there was an eagerness or 
optimism for forging a new basis for the social order that had to emerge from the ruins of the 
collapsed medieval order.5 Thus, both pessimism and optimism characterized the emergence 
of the Aufklärung spirit across Europe.  
 Added to this sense of social change as a contributory factor to the development of 
the Aufklärung was the rise of capitalism in early modern Europe. In the medieval period, 
Till writes:  
Most people had been borne into a predetermined social position that defined them 
throughout their life, and placed them within a network of hierarchies and institutions 
understood to be part of the divine, unchanging order: a person was inseparable from 
his or her role in society; he or she was a peasant, an artisan, a knight, and not an 
individual who happened to have this or that occupation; and the medieval person’s 
role carried with it a number of pre-ordained obligations such as those of kinship or 
feudal duty. Binding this multiplicity of institutions and hierarchies together was the 
authority and power of the Church (…) The stability of medieval society was 
undermined from within by the dynamics of economic growth; the opening-up of 
markets, the widening circulation of commodities, the accumulation of wealth by a 
new class that derived its power from money rather than status. This in turn forced 
into being another class without status obligations, which sold its labor in exchange 
for a wage. Thus, the demands of economic activity gave rise to some of the basic 
ideals of the Enlightenment itself: individual freedom, legal equality, religious 
toleration.6 
 
One can therefore make the case that the Aufklärung was a rejection of the socio-economic 
determinism. People were eager to move upwards in the social strata of society. People felt 
hard work had to be rewarded, and the sense of a privileged economic class eschewed. And 
with free markets came new found wealth for the masses, and with wealth came the desire 
                                               
 5 Boyd, Dogmatics Among the Ruins, 205-206.   
 6 Till, Mozart and the Enlightenment, 207.  
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for power, in this case, political power, which inevitably meant the discarding of monarchical 
and royal power, in what one might consider as a clash of irreconcilable wills. The emerging 
socio-political order that came into being with material prosperity was articulated via the 
language of equality, and sustained by the spirit of freedom, liberty and fraternity amongst 
the emerging business class. 
 Underlying all of Europe in terms of characterizing the Aufklärung was what Ernst 
Cassirer described as the libido sciendi, that is, the lust for knowledge, which, as Cassirer 
claims, “theological dogmatism had outlawed and branded as intellectual pride.”7 The 
eighteenth century saw the search for knowledge as a prerogative of the soul, and the 
Aufklärer largely felt that it was their duty to defend this right of every person to knowledge, 
without any censors. A proof of this was the emergence of the Encyclopedia, championed by 
the French thinker Diderot, which Diderot saw not only as a source of a body of knowledge, 
but more importantly, as a tool meant to change the way people thought about all of reality.8 
And this is quite understandable, for it would have been meaningless to champion the usage 
of reason without allowing for an unbridled access to all knowledge, especially in the broad 
sense of reason that the concept took in the minds of the Aufklärer.  
 Notwithstanding these pan-European orientations, the Aufklärung had its own 
peculiar German character that distinguished it from its French and English counterparts, 
some of which we can identify to be the following: 
 
 
                                               
 7 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. 
Pettegrove (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 14.   
 8 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 14.  
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2.1.1 The Aufklärung’s Alertness to Christianity as a Religious-Cultural Phenomenon 
 
 Firstly, unlike the French Enlightenment, the Aufklärung cannot be assessed as 
specifically anti-religious or anti-Christian movement:  
The Church was much more than its institutions and doctrines, and it was impossible 
for reformers to conceive of their culture as divorced from its religious context. There 
persisted the belief in the possibility of a harmony between the civil and religious 
authority – the concordia sacerdotii et imperii – in which the sum was greater than its 
parts. This is evident, first of all, in the reformer’s interest in ecclesiastical and 
religious history.9 
 
Thus, the Aufklärung showed a keen interest in the religious dimension of the German 
society, albeit with a critical and reformist orientation.  
 In this sense, “the theologians of the Aufklärung were concerned to reformulate 
Christian doctrines upon the basis of premises more justifiable upon rational grounds, either 
by reducing them, reinterpreting them or eliminating them.”10 In other words, the Aufklärung, 
particularly in its initial stages of the eighteenth century, was not representative of an 
adversarial and confrontational relationship between faith and reason, philosophy and 
theology, Church and state, even if it tended to subordinate faith to reason, theology to 
philosophy, and called for a healthy autonomy in the intertwining relationship between 
Church and state.11 Alister McGrath explains that the reason for such a benevolent attitude 
towards faith and hence towards the Church owed to the conviction that “God is the 
ontological principle or being which determines what exists, and the structure of existence.”12 
Aufklärung thinkers therefore saw reason, faith and the institutional Church through a 
harmonious lens, albeit maintaining that revelation, faith and the practices of faith as put 
                                               
 9 Michael Printy, Enlightenment and the Creation of German Catholicism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 156.  
 10 McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology, 10.  
 11 McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology, 10.  
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forth by the Church had to be judged on the basis of reason, which occupies the first place in 
the grand scheme of things.   
 The bottom line at this point in terms of the relationship between Christianity and the 
Aufklärung on the part of the latter is that “truth is not something which can be regarded as 
mediated to man from outside (for example, on the basis of a recognized authority), but 
something which arises within man on account of its conformity with his rationality.”13 
McGrath thus concludes based on this subsequent parting of ways between faith and reason, 
that, even with Kant, Hegel and perhaps Heidegger, “it will therefore be evident that there 
was an inherent tendency within the Aufklärung to regard the concept of supernatural 
revelation with suspicion.”14 How so? I think because of the sense of the historical vis-à-vis 
revelation that eventually emerged with the Aufklärung. And at the center of this dialectics 
between history and revelation stands the question of the historical verifiability of religious 
truth claims.  
 
2.1.2 The Aufklärung and the Sense of the Historical-Religious Experience   
 
 In effect, as the spirit of the Aufklärung further developed the disconnecting of reason 
from faith raised the question whether the concept of divine revelation was historically 
defensible, especially under the claims of autonomous rationality. In this light, and as 
McGrath points out, Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768) applied the Aufklärung insights 
to the nature of truth and history, with very astonishing results for the claims of Christian 
faith.15 In effect, the Aufklärer called into question the historicity and accuracy of the life of 
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103 
 
Christ as presented in the scriptures. They argued for the insufficiency of the events recorded 
in scripture, particularly the New Testament, even if they were eye witness accounts. As 
McGrath points out, “The origins of the ‘Quest of the Historical Jesus’ may be seen in the 
Aufklärung conviction that the gospels contained material concerning Jesus which was 
unacceptable (because it was immoral, or supernatural) and which thus required correction in 
the light of modern thought.”16 The real Jesus was clearly different from the Jesus of the 
gospels. As McGrath maintains, the Aufklärer “attempted to evolve methods of internal and 
external criticism by which an historical re-evaluation of dogma might proceed, leading 
ultimately to the exclusion of doctrines which were considered to be irrational or morally 
indefensible.”17 An example of such a doctrine will be the divinity of Christ, which was often 
reinterpreted in purely moral terms. And even when other truths of revelation such as the 
incarnation of the Logos in Christ were accepted, they were represented as a recognition of 
the fact that spiritual truths can take palpable and historical forms.18 Thus, one must note the 
distinction between the concept acceptable to the Aufklärer, and the content that was 
subjected to a radical historical criticism. A good example of this is Kant’s treatment of the 
Gestalt of Jesus in the Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in which the 
supernatural claims of Christianity were rationalized and reduced to categories of rationality.   
 On this basis, therefore, McGrath points out, the Aufklärung poses three 
Christological challenges: Firstly, the traditional two natures of Christ were called into 
question, following the naturalistic and rationalistic logic of the Aufklärung. Modern reason 
could jettison this “relic” of the early Church without much controversy.19 Secondly, if 
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following the logic of the Aufklärung, Christ’s significance had to be conceived in purely 
naturalistic terms, how would the Church represent the unicity of Christ? The Aufklärung 
generally presented Christ as a moralist, a teacher of the good life whose superiority over 
other moral teachers is based upon the supremely moral character of Christ’s teachings.20 As 
McGrath points out, “there seemed to be no way in which his uniqueness could be 
established without resorting to a discredited supernaturalism.”21 Such a view of the 
Aufklärung of Christ as an ethics teacher would naturally be a concern to someone of the 
spiritual and intellectual temperament such as Joseph Ratzinger. Thirdly, another 
Christological challenge of the Aufklärung vis-à-vis the Christian faith has to do with the 
certainty of our knowledge of Christ.22 How can we be sure about the Christ of the gospels, 
when following the dialectics of history, one cannot ascertain with objective certainty that 
what we read in the Scriptures is true?  
  
2.1.4 The Aufklärung and the Duel between Divine-Human Rational Supremacy  
 
 McGrath maintains that “the ultimate foundation of the theology of the Aufklärung 
may be regarded as the doctrine that the natural faculty of human reason is qualitatively 
similar to (although quantitatively weaker than) the divine reason.”23 The world of the 
Aufklärung is in essence, a rational cosmos in which the human being works out his or her 
own moral perfection by conforming the self to the moral structures of the cosmos. Moral 
activity is therefore the highest destiny of the human being, and reason is the only practical 
guide to this destiny. This rationality of the Aufklärung is best summarized in these three 
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propositions: firstly, all reality is rational; secondly, the human being has the necessary 
epistemological capabilities to unearth the rational Ordnung of reality; and thirdly, the 
human being is adept at acting upon this cognition of reality in order to achieve his or her 
rational destiny by acting morally.24 In this light, the human being is capable of attaining 
morality without any external assistance, and revelation and the authority of God was 
perceived to be such an extrinsic assistance. In other words, unaided reason was capable of 
bringing about a just and moral society. In this world-view, religious faith as a source and 
sustainer of morality was no longer essential, for one could be moral or ethical without being 
religious.   
 Such a view of the Aufklärung naturally runs contra to the Christian orthodoxy that 
over the years of observation, reflection and pondering on the actions of the human being vis-
à-vis the moral law, had come to discern in revelation the woundedness of human nature in 
the doctrine of original sin. While not rejecting the value of human rationality in discerning 
and arriving at moral truths, Christianity recognized as well, the place of God’s revelation in 
the moral landscape. The orthodox position, following Augustine, has been that on account 
of original sin, the human intellect is blinded and the will is weakened, so much so that the 
human being cannot function as an autonomous moral agent.25 As fallen creatures, therefore, 
God’s moral law in historical revelation purifies and strengthens reason’s natural reflections 
and discernments. In the eyes of the Aufklärung, this doctrine of original sin certainly posed a 
conceptual obstacle to moral perfection and even smacked of Manichean dualism. The 
doctrine clearly had become obsolete and in need of abandonment.26 Therefore, in order to 
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counteract doctrines like original sin, the science of the development of dogma emerged from 
the Aufklärung movement.27 In this sense, it was not sufficient to simply believe what the 
Church teaches as doctrine. A critical understanding of the formulation and historical 
evolution of a given doctrine was as critical as the doctrine itself.  
 
2.1.5 The Aufklärung, the Nature of Reality and its Christological Implications  
 
 Another distinguishing characteristic of the Aufklärung was the Aufklärung’s 
understanding of the nature of reality. As McGrath points out, the theologians of the 
Aufklärung regarded rational truth as necessary, eternal and universal, in the sense that “it 
was axiomatic that such knowledge could not be had through an historical religion, in that 
history was not capable of conveying the necessary, unchanging and eternal core of rational 
reality. Historically mediated rational truth was regarded as a contradiction in terms.”28 This 
was because the spirit of the Aufklärung read historical as conditionally shaped, relative to a 
specific time and space.  
 If the truths of revelation were to be necessary, that is, unchanging and eternal, they 
could not be historically revealed because that would have meant they were conditioned. 
Spinoza captures this interpretive dynamic when he declares that knowledge of God “should 
be derived from general ideas, in themselves certain and known, so that the truth of an 
historical narrative is very far from being a necessary requisite for our attaining our highest 
good.”29 Or, to phrase the mindset more pointedly as Lessing does, the “accidental truths of 
history (zufällige Geschichtswahrheiten) can never become proof of necessary truths of 
                                               
 27 McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology, 11.   
 28 McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology, 11.   
 29 Baruch Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus 4, in Works, Vol. 1, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1951), 61.  
107 
 
reason (notwendige Vernunftwahrheiten).”30 Underpinning this Aufklärung’s reading of 
history is a static perspective of reality, in which history is interpreted in a relative sense, 
with no absolutes. If all things in history and from history are relative and conditional, how 
must we now understand God and the truths of faith, given that God is by nature, timeless? 
The likely conclusion could be that it would be impossible to derive the truths of God from 
history or historical events, as recorded in the gospels.  
 The Aufklärung therefore placed history and revelation in a tense dialectical 
relationship, for following this relativization of history, Christ is primarily understood as a 
moral teacher in his lifetime, a moral exemplar whose main goal was to call people to excel 
in the moral life. Jesus’ death is a supreme example of self-giving. In addition, the 
Aufklärung interpreted Christ as embodying the potentials of every human being towards 
perfection.31 Put differently, the moral perfection possessed by Christ is latent in every 
human being. Christ therefore inspires every human being to strive for this latent 
perfection.32 In the final analysis, this position of Christ as moral exemplar and inspirer 
implies the discrepancy between the historical Jesus and the apostolic Church from whom the 
accounts recorded in the gospels emerged. 
 
2.1.6 The Aufklärung and the Educated Classes of German Society  
 
 To Michael Printy, the Aufklärung “must be understood as the product of the growth 
of a literate, educated class of readers and writers, who more and more found themselves in 
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the service of the state or the church.”33 The Aufklärung is traceable to the universities and 
the world of the academia. Many of the main proponents of the Aufklärung were university 
professors. Already in the eighteenth century, Germany was filled with an unusually large 
universities that filled the semi-autonomous regions of the German lands due to political and 
religious fragmentations that saw to the establishment of courts and bureaucracies. Most of 
these universities were almost always economically independent, and therefore paved an 
intellectual path of their own.34 German university intellectuals tended to view with suspicion 
certain religious devotions that had marked the faith experience of their fatherland for long 
periods of time. And the universities could have such a sway over the religious culture 
because the universities were key institutions in the intellectual life of the established 
churches, Protestant and Catholic alike.35 What is more, as Printy points out, “the power 
struggle over educational reform lies at the core of the German Catholic Enlightenment in the 
eighteenth century.”36 This implies that the universities actively sought to bring about the 
religious changes that they felt were more in sync with the modern spirit of the Aufklärung. 
We see this trend on full display in Kant’s Vernunftglaube with its objective moral 
categories, and Hegel’s religious ladder, moving from consciousness through self-
consciousness, to reason, spirit, religion and absolute knowing. In addition to universities, 
books and periodicals largely focused on philosophy, theology and history, constituted 
another layer of influence on Aufklärung by the educated elite class.   
  While one can see in these realities, viz., the attentiveness to the religious experience 
called Christianity; the active role of the educated classes of Germany; the rationalization and 
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modernization of historical truth claims of Christianity in order to give it a more natural 
character; the question about the supremacy of Divine versus human reason; the nature of 
reality in terms of its cosmic identity; German nationalism and piety.37 Ratzinger sought, in 
his theological works, to respond to these Aufklärung concerns, differing, agreeing, pushing 
and integrating the different strands, with the overall goal of helping the spiritual and 
evangelical life of a modern Catholicism. It is also critical to see to what extent the issues at 
play were of interest to Ratzinger and how they formed and engaged him.  
   
2.2. Ratzinger’s 1959 Inaugural Lecture: God of Faith and God of the Philosophers  
 
 On June 24, 1959, in the lecture hall VIII located in the main building of Bonn 
University, Ratzinger delivered his inaugural lecture as a university professor titled “The 
God of Faith and the God of Philosophers: A Contribution to the Problem of Theologia 
Naturalis.”38 With hindsight, Benedict would declare this lecture as containing the main 
themes of his thought – Der Leitfaden meines Denkens.39 Ratzinger sought in this lecture to 
investigate the ways by which the God of revelation is different from the God of the 
philosophers, in order to ascertain the kind of rationality that might be suitable for Christian 
theology.40 Clearly, the inaugural lecture can be seen as a synthetic logical development of 
Ratzinger’s intellectual formation and development, from Augustine to Bonaventure. Armed 
with the ecclesiological insights from Augustine and the Christo-ecclesial gains from 
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Bonaventure, Ratzinger appears comfortable placing the God of faith in an open and 
unfiltered dialogue with the God of the philosophers. As will be seen in the subsequent 
analysis, the relationship between ancient Greek philosophy and biblical faith is critical in 
answering this question. In other words, does Greek rationality belong to the essence of 
Christianity or was the alliance formed between Athens and Jerusalem an unfortunate, 
disastrous misunderstanding?  
 To highlight the two approaches to the question, Ratzinger offers as paradigmatic the 
positions of Thomas Aquinas, who brings the God of faith and the God of the philosophers 
close to each other, on the one hand, and the Swiss Protestant dialectical theologian Emil 
Brunner (1889 – 1966), a staunch defender of the theologia naturalis, on the other hand.41 
For Aquinas, philosophy represents a welcoming highest point that the unaided human mind 
can reach regarding the question of God. On the other hand, for Brunner, the God of the 
philosophers cannot arrive at what the human spirit ultimately seeks, namely, a communion 
with the divine. Such is the case because physici, the domain of the theologia naturalis which 
properly belongs to the philosophers, cannot make the leap to communion with the God of 
faith. As Emery de Gaál, points out, to Ratzinger, therefore, “Brunner infelicitously develops 
an irreconcilable contradiction between the God of the philosophers and the one of faith.”42 
Ratzinger therefore hopes, by his lecture, to overcome this chasm between the dialogical God 
of the Bible and the monological God of Greek philosophy, showing points of convergence 
and the eventual transformation that biblical faith brought to the God of philosophy, moving 
being qua being into being in relation with the other.  
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 The lecture not only stresses the necessity for a dialogue between faith and reason, 
religion and philosophy, but likewise points out that though the relationship between faith 
and reason is as old as humanity, humanity would cease to exist were we to consider this 
question as once for all settled. The dialogue of faith and reason therefore constitutes one of 
the serious issues of our times, especially given the different conceptions of God that emerge 
from both philosophy and theology.43 And hence, Ratzinger hoped by this lecture to once 
again invite both sides of the aisle, the believer and the rational Aufklärung thinker, into a 
conversation.  
 In calling for such a dialogue, it is important to note from the outset that Ratzinger 
does not assume a simplistic identification between philosophy and theology, faith and 
reason, regarding the question of the nature of God. Ratzinger acknowledges the fundamental 
difference between the God of philosophy and the God of theology. Ratzinger writes: 
In it then at the same time an important contrast to the Greek philosophical 
relationship with God becomes clear: In philosophy it is man who seeks God on his 
own initiative, in biblical faith it is God himself and God alone who in creative 
freedom establishes the relationship between man and God. So now the contrast 
between the name of God and the concept of God, the God of faith and the God of 
philosophers becomes clearer and more definite. The God of the philosophers “is the 
God to whom one does not pray, the God with whom there is unity - namely the unity 
which thinking itself thinks” as the deepest truth – “but no community” - community 
which is founded by God himself.44 
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Here, Ratzinger makes two arguments: Firstly, Greek philosophy was able to achieve the 
unity of God, later a cornerstone of Israel’s faith, as one finds in the Shema O Israel 
proclamation. Secondly, this unity, while an achievement, was also a limitation, for in the 
intrinsic fidelity to itself, philosophy could not make space for communication with this 
unity, for this unity was a self-subsistent being, closed in on itself. So, while on the one hand, 
there is a meeting point between philosophy and theology on the oneness or unity of the 
Biblical God, on the other hand, there appears an unbridgeable gap or wedge between the 
two, for one, that is, theology, is capable of going beyond unity into communion, into 
communication, while philosophy remains simply at the level of an ineffable idea. This is the 
framework of Ratzinger’s inaugural lecture, that is, how to bring these two seemingly 
irreconcilable positions together, in order to attain a harmony that serves the human person, 
since it is the human person who is simultaneously a thinker and a believer.  
 In a word, Ratzinger’s position is essentially Thomistic. Having been critical of the 
neo-Thomism of his seminary days, Ratzinger still found in Thomas the philosophical 
principle on which a dialogue between faith and reason, theology and philosophy, could be 
cultivated and should be cultivated, for the simple reason that for Thomas, philosophy is the 
highest possibility of the human spirit: 
For Thomas, the God of religion and the God of philosophers are completely 
intertwined, whereas the God of faith and the God of philosophy are partially 
different; the God of faith exceeds the God of philosophers, adds something to it. The 
religio naturalis - and that means any religion outside Christianity - has no higher 
content and can have no higher content than the philosophical doctrine of God offers 
it. On the contrary, all it contains beyond or contrary to it is apostasy and aberrance. 
Outside the Christian faith, according to Thomas, philosophy is the highest possibility 
at all of the human spirit. 45 
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Such is the case for as Aquinas taught, grace does not destroy but perfects nature - gratia non 
tollat naturam, sed perficiat.46 It is therefore, only with philosophy, that is, Greek 
philosophy, that unaided human reason was capable of arriving at the notion of the oneness 
or unity of the divine Being, the Unmoved Mover or First Cause, that Thomas will call God 
in his demonstrations of the existence of God.  
 However, though interrelated, the God of faith is not just identical with the God of 
philosophy or reason, for the reason that faith adds something to reason. Ratzinger, thus, 
introduces a new analogical mirroring of the bond between Aquinas and Aristotle: 
The Christian faith in God absorbs and perfects the philosophical idea of God. To put 
it bluntly, the God of Aristotle and the God of Jesus Christ are one and the same. 
Aristotle has recognized the true God, whom we are permitted to grasp more deeply 
and more purely in faith, just as we will grasp God’s nature more intimately and 
closer in the beatific vision of God. One could perhaps say without violence to the 
facts: Christian faith relates to the philosophical knowledge of God in the same way 
as the beatific vision of God relates to faith. It concerns three stages of a single path.47 
 
Three insights are evident here: Firstly, following Aquinas’ reading of Aristotle, Ratzinger 
states that the God of philosophy, the God recognized by Aristotle as Supreme Being, Prime 
Mover, is the true God. Secondly, what Aristotle was capable of discerning thanks to 
philosophic reason, the believer gets to grasp by faith. This Supreme Being is the One God of 
                                               
höheren Inhalt haben als die philosophische Gotteslehre ihn bietet. Im Gegenteil, alles was sie darüber hinaus 
oder im Widerspruch zu ihr beinhaltet, ist Abfall und Verirrung. Außerhalb des christlichen Glaubens ist nach 
Thomas die Philosophie die höchste Möglichkeit des menschlichen Geistes überhaupt.”  
 46 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q.1 art. 8, ad 2. trans. Laurence Shapcote, O.P. (Lander, 
Wyoming: The Aquinas Institute, 2012).  
 47 Ratzinger, Der Gott des Glaubens, 16: “Der christliche Gottesglaube nimmt die philosophische 
Gotteslehre in sich auf und vollendet sie. Scharf gesagt: Der Gott des Aristoteles und der Gott Jesus Christi ist 
ein und derselbe, Aristoteles hat den wahren Gott erkannt, den wir im Glauben tiefer und reiner erfassen dürfen, 
so wie wir in der jenseitigen Gottesschau abermals inniger und näher Gottes Wesen erfassen werden. Man 
könnte vielleicht ohne Vergewaltigung des Tatbestandes sagen: Der christliche Glaube verhält sich zur 
philosophischen Gotteserkenntnis etwa so wie sich die endzeitliche Gottesschau zum Glauben verhält. Es 
handelt sich um drei Stufen eines einheitlichen Gesamtweges.”  
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Christian monotheism. And thirdly, - and this is where Ratzinger starts going beyond 
Thomas and Aristotle - Ratzinger makes the point that the relationship between the God of 
Aristotle and the God of faith mirrors the relationship that faith in the present has with 
eschatological faith. In other words, that faith which is full, supreme, and in need of no other 
which we will experience in the eschaton, could be seen as what happens when philosophy 
turns towards faith. Such is the case because it does not lose sight of what it has already 
attained, but sees before it, in faith, a fuller picture of what is to come. In other words, 
Christian faith is related to the philosophical knowledge of God, as the eschatological vision 
of God is to faith.  
 To Ratzinger, the name revealed to Moses commonly transliterated in English as 
Ehyeh asher ehyeh – “I am who I am” (Ex 3:14) - was certainly mysterious and he is 
sympathetic to a mysterious translation interpretation of the tetragrammaton. However, this 
sense of the mysterious and the transcendent should not lead to a theological agnosticism 
before the tetragrammaton. On the contrary, God is mysterious because God is also being, 
the One who is, the I Am. There is a surprising agreement between biblical faith and Greek 
philosophy, between divine existence and essence, in the sense that what human 
metaphysical reflection sought to achieve and what Scripture (the LXX translation) reveals 
about God, coincides. As Ratzinger points out, if there is no positive connection between 
monological philosophy and dialogical revelation, then the analogia entis ought to be 
considered illegitimate and incomprehensible.48 The ontological and the pragmatic-
existential, therefore, coincide in the religious experience and manifestation of the 
tetragrammaton.  
                                               
 48 Ratzinger, Der Gott des Glaubens, 22.  
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 Ratzinger thus safeguards both positions, that is, the Greek Fathers’ sense of mystery 
and transcendence, on the one hand, and the philosophical sense of being, of ontology, on the 
other: 
On the one side there is the God, who grants himself to be known as You in the 
naming of his name and opens himself to man, presents himself to him, to the 
community. On the other side, there is philosophical thinking, which sees an 
anthropomorphism in the revelation of the name, but with which, however, the 
revelation itself rejects sufficient reason-thinking itself does not want to recognize 
anything that comes from beyond its own possibility.49 
 
Therefore, the possibility of mystery and concreteness, of transcendence and immanence is 
not simply a matter of the highlighting or preferring one over the other but is essentially a 
realization that comes from revelation. In other words, God is both mystery and being 
because God has revealed himself to us that way. Without revelation, Moses would not have 
had the experience of not only being capable of knowing God’s name, but likewise of 
knowing that the name is not nonbeing, not nothing, but signifies the ground of all being, is 
being par excellence. But more importantly, because God is also being and not just an 
ineffable name, it is possible to enter into communion with God. This marks a major 
distinction between the God of faith and the God of the philosophers, for whom the self-
subsistent being, though one, a unity, cannot enter into a relationship with creatures.  
 With this distinction in mind, Ratzinger then poses the question as to whether the 
suspicion of some of the Greek Fathers had any value or was warranted in any form. He 
offers a nuanced response: 
                                               
 49 Ratzinger, Der Gott des Glaubens, 21-22: “Da steht auf der einen Seite der Gott, der sich in der 
Nennung seines Namens als Du zu erkennen gibt und sich öffnet auf den Menschen hin, sich ihm zur 
Gemeinschaft darbietet. Da steht auf der anderen Seite das philosophische Denken, das in der 
Namensoffenbarung einen Anthropomorphismus sieht, damit aber letzterdings die Offenbarung selbst ablehnt.  
“- Das sich selbst genügende Vernunftdenken will nichts anerkennen, was von jenseits seiner eigenen 
Möglichkeit kommt. - ” 
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In view of such serious and far-reaching consequences, the question must be asked 
once again and anew whether and to what extent the dash drawn by the Fathers of the 
Church between the God of Faith and the God of Philosophy, whose justification and 
necessity had hitherto been demonstrated by the general problem of monotheism, was 
justified especially with regard to the biblical concept of God. This can first be 
answered: It was justified if and insofar as the biblical faith in God wanted and ought 
to be monotheism.50 
 
In effect, the Fathers were able in their theology to communicate Christian biblical 
monotheism, a monotheism that resonated with the philosophical monotheism of Greek 
philosophy. The Fathers were aided in this process thanks to their embrace of Greek 
philosophy, thereby establishing a rapport between the God of philosophy and the God of 
faith. But this rapport does not imply a complete identification, for Biblical faith’s 
monotheism conveys a personal God, while the God of philosophy is an impersonal God. 
With the tetragrammaton, Israel had to come to the realization that God was not a God of a 
given location but was going to accompany them as a personal God. Such an existential 
realization could only be possible thanks to the fact that this God who will be with Israel in 
the manner in which he will be with them. This God was, primarily, a God who is, a God 
who, precisely because he is being, is able to accompany beyond the geographical limits of 
Egypt, the land of slavery, into Canaan, the promised land.  
 Besides the question of a personal God who is such because he is in the first place 
being and hence is able to accompany Israel, Ratzinger likewise points out that the suspicion 
towards philosophy likewise contributed in large measure to the severing of the relationship 
                                               
 50 Ratzinger, Der Gott des Glaubens, 29: “Angesichts so ernster und weittragender Konsequenzen ist 
die Frage noch einmal und neu zu stellen, ob und inwieweit der von den Kirchenvätern gezogene Bindestrich 
zwischen Glaubensgott und Philosophengott, dessen Berechtigung und Notwendigkeit bisher vom allgemeinen 
Problem des Monotheismus her aufgewiesen wurde, speziell im Hinblick auf den biblischen Gottesbegriff 
berechtigt war. Darauf kann zunächst geantwortet werden: Er war berechtigt, sofern und soweit der biblische 
Gottesglaube Monotheismus sein wollte und sollte.” 
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between nature and grace, a severing which finds its crescendo in Luther’s battle cry of sola 
scriptura. Herein lies a fundamental difference between Catholicism and Protestantism, in 
which the latter, by following Luther, tended to relegate philosophy and consequently, 
reason. What solution does Ratzinger offer to this impasse posed, on the one hand, by Luther 
against the God of Philosophy, and, on the other hand, by Aufklärung scholars against the 
God of Faith? Ratzinger goes beyond the mere concept of faith and reason as standing 
independently, each, as an autonomous self-subsistent being, into a relationality between the 
God of philosophy and the personal life of the believer: 
Let us start from the philosophical concept of God, which now, in contrast to the God 
of faith, presents itself to us in a sharpened way as the concept of God in Greek 
philosophy. It is not sufficient to know and adopt a certain form of definition in order 
to understand it. Rather the relationship must be seen in which this concept of God 
stands to the spiritual and religious world in which it was found and in which it was 
classified in this way or in another way. For the pre-Christian philosophical concept 
of God undoubtedly also stood in some relation to religion, which there too was 
something different from philosophy, and only when this relationship is seen, is the 
philosophical concept of God seen by the Greeks as such and as a whole correctly; in 
principle the same applies to any philosophical concept of God.51 
 
Ratzinger makes the case for the difference between the pre-Christian God of philosophy 
from philosophy itself, in the sense that the concept of this pre-Christian God is a religious 
concept, utterly different from a non-confessional sense of philosophizing. In effect, it is not 
simply a question of intellectual cognition or rational clarity, but one of a person-centered 
relationship that effects and shapes our conception of God. 
                                               
 51 Ratzinger, Der Gott des Glaubens, 23-24: “Gehen wir aus vom philosophischen Gottesbegriff, der 
sich uns nun, im Gegenüber zum Gott des Glaubens, in zugespitzter Weise als der Gottesbegriff der 
griechischen Philosophie darstellt. Es genügt zu seinem Verständnis nicht, eine bestimmte Definitionsformel; zu 
kennen und zu übernehmen. Es muß vielmehr die Beziehung gesehen werden, in der dieser Gottesbegriff zu der 
geistigen und religiösen Welt steht, in der er gefunden und in die er so oder anders eingeordnet wurde. Denn in 
irgendeiner Beziehung hat ja zweifellos auch der vorchristliche philosophische Gottesbegriff zur Religion 
gestanden, die auch dort etwas anderes war als Philosophie und erst wenn diese Beziehung gesehen ist, ist der 
philosophische Gottesbegriff der Griechen als solcher und ganzer richtig gesehen; im Prinzip gilt Gleiches für 
jedweden philosophischen Gottesbegriff.” 
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 For Ratzinger, it is only when this pre-Christian philosophical concept of God of the 
Greeks is seen through the religious lens, that a sensible relationship between the God of 
philosophy and the God of religion can thus be perceived, apprehended and appreciated. 
Ratzinger probably had before him the argument of Paul in his Letter to the Romans: “For 
what can be known about God is perfectly plain to them since God himself has made it plain. 
Ever since God created the world his everlasting power and deity – however invisible – have 
been there for the mind to see in the things he has made. That is why such people are without 
excuse” (Rm 1:20). Along this line of thinking, not only is it possible that pre-Christian 
philosophy such as that of the Greeks was capable of rightly accessing the truth of God as the 
Supreme Being or the One Beyond Being, but, following Ratzinger, it was incumbent on 
unaided reason to necessarily arrive at the truth of God because the grammar of God is 
written in the human intellect and in creation.  
 Quite certainly, Ratzinger would have seen the 1998 encyclical Fides et Ratio by 
John Paul II in which the pope sought a rapprochement between the God of philosophy and 
the God of religious faith, as a magisterial stamp on the essential insights of his inaugural 
lecture. In this light, therefore, the relationship between the God of philosophy and the God 
of faith is further buttressed by the primacy of truth which is not only antecedent to both 
material subjects, but likewise, does not separate reason and faith. Ratzinger therefore 
concurs with John Paul II when the latter writes that “Faith and reason are like two wings on 
which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth; and God who has placed in the 
human heart a desire to know the truth – in a word, to know himself – so that, by knowing 
and loving God, men and women may also come to the truth about themselves.”52 To 
                                               
52 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter on the Relationship between Faith and Reason Fides et Ratio 
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana: 1998), 3.  
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Ratzinger, this relationship of two wings is connatural. It comes to him almost effortlessly, 
like a self-evident proposition, given Ratzinger’s penchant for overcoming any dichotomy 
between faith and reason, as demonstrated in his push for the reconciliation between the God 
of faith and the God of philosophers.  
 An example of such a rapprochement would be how philosophy and theology 
perceived the being of God, as the ultimate foundation of all proof on which every thought 
rests. Such a foundation is never measured but only perceived. That both philosophy and 
reason hold the unverifiable nature of God is significant for Ratzinger: “We cannot verify 
God as we would verify some measurable object. There is question here also of an act of 
humility: the acceptance of the fact that one’s own intellect has been called by the eternal 
intellect.”53 Common areas between faith and reason therefore caution against an excessive 
distinction between the two, which, to Ratzinger, will deprive faith of its objectivity and 
again, split object and subject, that is, the individual person with his human rationality who is 
also a believer, into two different worlds.  
 
2.3. The Reconciliation of the God of Faith and the God of Philosophers 
 
 How does Ratzinger reconcile the divergent positions regarding God by philosophy 
and theology in his lecture? Ratzinger becomes heavily Pascalian, for in the experience of 
Pascal the mathematician and scientist, reason is not rejected per se, but reaches its limits and 
has to make room for something, or more precisely, for someone that one can existentially 
relate to, in a personalistic and pragmatic sense. Ratzinger explains the experience of Pascal: 
                                               
 53 Joseph Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology, 
trans. Mary Frances McCarthy, S.N.D. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 73. 
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It begins after a very careful indication of day and hour with the words: “Fire. God of 
Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of philosophers and scholars.” The 
mathematician and philosopher Pascal asked the living God, the God of faith, to 
awake and, in such living encounters with the You of God, to grasp in dismay and 
joyful astonishment how different the epiphany of the reality of God is compared to 
what the mathematical philosophy of a Descartes, for instance, knew to say about 
God.54 
 
Thus, Pascal’s cry to God is an epiphany, to the extent that it shows that the God of 
mathematics, of mere rationality as one finds in Descartes and later on in Kant, is incapable 
of meeting the highest aspirations of the human heart, the greatest longings of the human 
heart, namely, the ability to love and be loved, the ability to enter into communion, of 
communication between the “I” and the “You.” Two things, therefore, stand out in this text: 
Firstly, Ratzinger’s ringing admiration for the experiential nature of Pascal’s faith, in which 
Ratzinger discerns the experiential model of religious faith, of Christianity as a flesh and 
blood experience that engages the whole person and not just the rational faculty. And 
secondly, the contrast between Pascal’s faith and the rationalism of Descartes, for whom the 
experience of God came about thanks to a process of rational deductions from clear and 
distinct ideas.55 Clearly, for Ratzinger, the God of Jesus Christ is such that rational processes 
of deductions, as commendable as they might be, cannot lead the individual into a life-
changing and life-orienting engagement. In other words, the Cartesian mathematical God that 
Pascal moves beyond is a God that cannot know me as an individual. A God that cannot 
know my name, that cannot enter into a relationship with me, that cannot comprehend my 
                                               
 54 Ratzinger, Der Gott des Glaubens, 11-12: “Es beginnt nach einer sehr sorgfältigen Angabe von Tag 
und Stunde mit den Worten: “- Feuer. ‘- Gott Abrahams, Gott Isaaks, Gott Jakobs -’ nicht der Philosophen und 
Gelehrten.” Der Mathematiker und Philosoph Pascal hatte den lebendigen Gott, den Gott des Glaubens erfahren 
und in solch lebendigem Begegnen mit dem Du Gottes offenbar in bestürztem und freudigem Erstaunen erfaßt, 
wie anders der Einbruch der Wirklichkeit Gottes ist im Vergleich zu dem, was die mathematische Philosophie 
etwa eines Descartes über Gott zu sagen wußte.” 
 55 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1993), III, 38, 26.  
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struggles, challenges, joys and sorrows, cannot save me. Such a God is irrelevant. He might 
be useful in terms of mental clarity and apologetic reasoning, but when the chips are down, I 
cannot count on such a God for help.  
Therefore, while Ratzinger appreciates this Cartesian demonstration that faith is not 
irrational, he does not see in it the warmth, enthusiasm and personalism in this, in his own 
words, “mathematical philosophy” of Descartes that he so much appreciates and relishes in 
Pascal. Ratzinger does not reject Kant’s rational faith, for as he argues below, a faith that 
cannot be rationalized cannot be dogmatic, for dogma is a rational presentation of the faith, 
but he strives to go beyond Kant, beyond reason, as well, moving from Descartes via Pascal 
to Kant and back to Pascal:  
Only the disintegration of speculative metaphysics by Kant and the shift of the 
religious into the extra-rational and thus also extra-metaphysical space of feeling by 
Schleiermacher finally brought Pascal's thoughts to a breakthrough and only now led 
to the radical aggravation of the problem: Only now is the gap between metaphysics 
and religion unbridgeable, metaphysics, i.e. theoretical reason, has no access to God; 
religion has no seat in the room of ratio: it is experience which eludes scientific 
measurability; it nevertheless attempts to subtract from it an unreal scheme, the God 
of philosophers. This has another consequence: religion that cannot be rationalized, 
cannot basically be dogmatic either, if indeed dogma is to be a rational statement 
about religious contents.56 
 
Faith, therefore, must of necessity emerge from the experience of the individual and not from 
a preconceived thought-project, such as one finds in Cartesianism. In this sense, 
Cartesianism, in spite of its best intentions, is inadequate to capture the full compass of faith, 
                                               
 56 Ratzinger, Der Gott des Glaubens, 12-13: “Erst die Zertrümmerung der spekulativen Metaphysik 
durch Kant und die Verlagerung des Religiösen in den außerrationalen und so auch außermetaphysischen Raum 
des Gefühls durch Schleiermacher brachte den pascalschen Gedanken endgültig zum Durchbruch und führte 
nun erst zur radikalen Zuspitzung des Problems: Jetzt erst ist der Graben zwischen Metaphysik und Religion 
unüberbrückbar, Metaphysik, d.h. theoretische Vernunft hat keinen Zugang zu Gott; Religion hat keinen Sitz im 
Raum der ratio: Sie ist Erleben, das sich der wissenschaftlichen Meßbarkeit entzieht; diese dennoch versuchen, 
bedeutet aus ihr ein unwirkliches Schema abziehen, den, ‘Gott der Philosophen.’ Das hat eine weitere Folge: 
Religion, die nicht rationalisierbar ist, kann im Grunde auch nicht dogmatisch sein, wenn anders Dogma eine 
rationale Aussage über religiöse Gehalte sein soll.”  
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its challenges, promises and expectations. When Ratzinger argues as he does above, that 
religion “has no seat in the room of ratio,” it does not imply a rejection of the rational, the 
cognitive, for that will create the false narrative that to be a believer is to be anti-rational, 
anti-reason. Rather, Ratzinger is inviting reason to go beyond reason, to allow the mind to go 
beyond the postulates that mere rationality has imposed on it, owing to Ratzinger’s 
conviction that reason alone cannot account both for the grandeur of faith and for the expanse 
of all of what one might called the reality of life, of the world.   
 Therefore, going further, one can assert that reason qua reason is insufficient to 
provide the firm ground on which religious faith can flourish, if such a faith never lives itself 
out in concrete religious experiences. In other words, it is in the nature of faith to be 
existential and pragmatic. Faith engages the concrete life choices of the believer. Faith is a 
primordial disposition that shapes all subsequent life choices and actions of the one who 
opens the self to the gift of faith. Secondly, such a religious faith cannot be reduced to the 
rules of scientific measurability, cannot be gauged according to the mathematical, for the 
obvious reason that it is in the nature of faith to transcend the temporal, the here and now, 
and to open up the temporal to the infinite, time to eternity, and by so doing, transcend the 
limits of science and the mathematical.  
 In fact, faith is such that it must necessarily transcend the temporal and live in the 
simultaneity of the present and the not yet. It is in the nature of faith to abide in uncertain 
physical grounds, so much so that, as the Letter to the Hebrews defines it, “the assurance of 
things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen” (Heb 11:1). This transcendental nature of 
faith frees the believer from the anxieties of a self-sufficiency in the vicissitudes of life. The 
believer is able to allow the self to be touched by the support that comes from the outside, 
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from the wholly Other. Due to the transcendent nature of faith, therefore, the insufficiency of 
reason, of the God of philosophy to account for and sustain religious faith, invites for a 
rapprochement between reason and faith, between the God of the philosophers and the God 
of faith, which the Inaugural Lecture offers.  
 From the preceding sections, the key insights that stand out from the inaugural lecture 
are: Firstly, the autonomy of the God of faith and the God of the philosophers. While the 
former is dialogical, the latter is monological, for the God of philosophy is essentially a self-
enclosing One or Unity, while the God of faith is fundamentally a communion of Persons, 
Father, Son and Spirit, who enters into communion with human beings. Secondly, Ratzinger 
sees a convergence of biblical faith with Greek philosophy in the LXX translation of the 
tetragrammaton, in which, thanks to the Divine name, Being, an otherwise ontological 
concept, takes on relationality. Israel’s God will be with Israel in the manner in which this 
God will be. The God of revelation is therefore not a local deity, but a God of the entire 
universe, accompanying Israel and the new Israel across space and time. Thirdly, to 
Ratzinger, there is a conversion of this God of the philosophers into the personal God of 
Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Jesus Christ, modeled in the personalist experience of Pascal and 
other believers. God is not just the God of place, but also a personal God.  
 This particularization has a universal significance, for Israel as a people was called 
for the sake of the nations, beginning with the encounter with the Hellenistic world. The fact 
that Biblical faith took form in Greek philosophical thought before spreading to the Gentile 
world was not accidental. On the contrary, it was a providential act that reason and faith were 
to find a synthesis so that what is common to all the nations, namely, the faculty of 
rationality, will not be something extrinsic to faith but will find in congenial rapprochement 
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with Biblical faith. These insights from the inaugural lecture therefore, lay the groundwork 
for the synthesis of faith and reason as mutually enriching dialogical partners.  
 This dialogue between faith and reason is seen in the post-Aufklärung era in the 
admixture between secular atheism and religious beliefs, in a sense, a concrete mixture of the 
God of faith and the God of philosophers. One of the manifestations of secularism, as 
Charles Taylor points out, “consists in the falling off of religious belief and practice, in 
people turning away from God, and no longer going to Church. In this sense, the countries of 
western Europe have mainly become secular – even those who retain the vestigial public 
reference to God in public space.”57 On the other hand, given this falling away from religious 
practice, we find in contemporary advanced societies, “a move from a society where belief in 
God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one 
option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace.”58 In this sense, materially 
developed societies have moved from a culture in which it was virtually out of place not to 
believe in God, to a culture in which faith, even for the fervent and devout believer, is simply 
one possibility among many. It is no longer axiomatic to believe in God, given the presence 
of other alternatives and possibilities.59 These signs of a world without God, for Ratzinger, 
are crucial indications that, rather than resigning to a godless, secular, fait accompli, the 
question now is not only to understand the historical precedents that led to such a proclivity 
for unbelief, but more importantly to seek to once again engage the post-Aufklärung culture 
of the experiential rational with the gospel message, as Ratzinger sought to do in his 
inaugural lecture. 
                                               
 57 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 2.   
 58 Taylor, A Secular Age, 3.  
 59 Taylor, A Secular Age, 12.  
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2.4.  Building on the Inaugural Lecture: The God of Faith and God of the Philosophers 
in the Introduction to Christianity 
 
 Ten years after the inaugural lecture, in 1968, Ratzinger again takes up the question 
of the relationship between faith and reason, between the God of philosophy and the God of 
faith, in terms of the overlapping relationship between the two, in his Introduction to 
Christianity. To Ratzinger, the God of faith, that is, the God of revelation, is not in 
opposition to the God of faith, in terms of oneness of the Divine essence. However, the 
understanding of God in philosophy is not simply convertible with how religious faith 
understands God, for the God of faith is able to enter into communion with the believer, a 
relationship that cannot exist in the context of the Unmoved Mover and Greek philosophers. 
Such is the case because though on target as a unity, thus, an equivalence of Biblical 
monotheism, the One of philosophy is a self-enclosed thought thinking thought. Building 
upon his inaugural lecture, therefore, Ratzinger sought in his Introduction to further develop 
this distinction and simultaneously, unity, between the God of faith and the God of 
philosophers:  
On the other side, it must be noted that the ancient world itself knew the dilemma 
between the God of faith and the God of the philosophers in a very pronounced form. 
Between the mythical gods of the religions and the philosophical knowledge of God 
there had developed in the course of history a stronger and stronger tension, which is 
apparent in the criticism of the myths by the philosophers from Xenophanes to Plato, 
who even thought of trying to replace the classical Homeric mythology with a new 
mythology appropriate to the Logos.60 
 
To Ratzinger, then, the pointing out of the inner contradictions of Greek mythology was a 
sizeable achievement of the philosophers, akin, one could say, to the criticism of Israel by the 
prophets. In other words, philosophy saved Greek piety from a blind faith thanks to the 
                                               
 60 Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2004), 138-139.  
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introduction of reason, of logos, into the religious imagination of the Greeks, as seen in 
Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Plotinus. And Ratzinger finds an inner 
parallel here between Greek philosophy and the Enlightenment philosophy, in that “for all 
the differences between them, both movements coincide in their striving toward the Logos.”61 
The logos as reason, therefore, was what could have saved Greek religion from its irrational 
and illusory myths, Ratzinger maintains, for it would have introduced the concept of truth 
into religious piety.  
 This absence of logos as reason and the consequent and fatal absence of truth, to 
Ratzinger, accounted for the demise of Greek religion and piety, for instead of treating 
religion as a question of truth, it treated it as a question of the regulation of life according to 
the whims and caprices of the gods.62 To buttress his argument, Ratzinger cites the text in 
Paul’s Letter to the Romans: “For what can be known about God is plain to them, because 
God has shown it to them … But although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or 
give thanks to him … They exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling 
mortal man or bids or animals or reptiles” (Rom 1:19-23). Based on this Pauline text, 
Ratzinger concludes:  
Religion did not go the way of the logos but lingered in myths already seen to be 
devoid of reality. Consequently, its decline was inevitable; this followed from its 
divorce from the truth, a state of affairs that led to its being regarded as a mere 
institutio vitae, that is, a mere contrivance and an outward form of life. The Christian 
position, as opposed to this situation, is put emphatically by Tertullian when he says 
with splendid boldness: “Christ called himself truth, not custom” – Dominus noster 
Christus veritatem se, non consuetudinem cognominavit (…) In my view, this is one 
of the really great assertions of patristic theology. (…) Christianity, thus put itself 
resolutely on the side of truth and turned its back on a conception of religion satisfied 
to be mere outward ceremonial that in the end can be interpreted to mean anything 
one fancies.63  
                                               
 61 Ratzinger, Introduction, 139.  
 62 Ratzinger, Introduction, 140.  




To justify this outwardly ceremonious religion of convenience, maintains Ratzinger, Greek 
polytheism was able to put forth three theologies, viz., physical, political and mythical. With 
the aid of these trio, Greek religion was able to justify the separation of myth from the logos 
by ceding first place to the feelings of the people and the good of the political state. Mythical 
theology was therefore employed as a tool for political theology, weighing truth against 
custom and usefulness against truth. “But what can go on existing only through interpretation 
has in reality ceased to exist,” maintains Ratzinger, for “the human mind rightly turns to the 
truth itself, not to what by means of devious interpretation can be shown to be reconcilable 
with the truth, though no longer containing any truth itself.”64 And this demise of Greek 
polytheism has significant lessons for today’s church.  
 In the first place, maintains Ratzinger, Christianity must reject the two methods Greek 
polytheism employed and lost the battle for its survival, namely, eschewing the inner 
necessity of reason in the life of faith, and secondly, cultural Christianity, or a Christianity of 
convenience, of the political, that works for the state. With contemporary Christianity in 
mind, Ratzinger warns against the temptation of repeating the errors of Greek polytheism, 
which he sees in the current Church in these forms:  
On one side, we have the retreat from the truth of reason into a realm of mere piety, 
mere faith, mere revelation; a retreat that in reality bears a fatal resemblance, whether 
by design or accident and whether the fact is admitted or not, to the ancient religion’s 
retreat before the logos, to the flight from truth to beautiful custom, from nature to 
politics. On the other side, we have an approach I will call for short “Interpreted 
Christianity”: the stumbling blocks in Christianity are removed by the interpretative 
method, and, as part of the process of thus rendering it unobjectionable, its actual 
content is written off as dispensable phraseology, as a periphrasis not required to say 
the simple things now alleged, by complicated modes of exposition, to constitute its 
real meaning.65 
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In effect, Christianity cannot afford to abandon reason because it cannot do away with truth, 
and the recent attempts to transform Christianity into a “feel good” religion will end up with 
catastrophic consequences. Just as of old, the Church today must resist the myths of a diluted 
version of Christianity and stick with reason, truth, logic and language, that is, with the God 
of philosophy, as did the early Christians.   
 
2.5.  The Transformation of the God of Philosophers by Faith in Ratzinger’s 
Introduction to Christianity  
 
 Summing up the organic development from Ratzinger’s inaugural lecture to the 
Introduction to Christianity, De Gaál writes that for Ratzinger, “both faith and reason stand 
to gain from relating to one another time and again. Were faith to retreat from rationality into 
the realm of ‘mere piety,’ it would betray the Incarnation of the eternal Logos, Jesus Christ, 
as Ratzinger later demonstrates in his classic Introduction to Christianity.”66 As with his 
inaugural lecture, Ratzinger, in his Introduction does not simply embrace the God of 
philosophy as philosophy, that is, in accordance with the material and object senses of 
philosophy. In other words, when the Christian faith adopted the God of philosophy over and 
against the myths of pagan religions, something happens to the God of philosophy. 
Something changes. There is a transformation that occurs with the Prime Mover, Pure Being, 
of the God of philosophy: 
The God who had previously existed as something neutral, as the highest, culminating 
concept; this God who had been understood as pure Being or pure Thought, circling 
around forever closed in upon itself without reaching over to man and his little world: 
this God of the philosophers, whose pure eternity and unchangeability had excluded 
any relation with the changeable and transitory, now appeared to the eye of faith as 
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the God of men, who is not only thought of all thoughts, the eternal mathematics of 
the universe, but also agape, the power of creative love.67 
 
Effectively, therefore, Christianity did not only appropriate the God of philosophy, but it 
radically transformed the whole notion of the God of philosophy, removing this God from 
the mere intellectual or academic realm to the realm of the living experiences of believers. 
This movement does not imply that natural reason qua natural reason could not lead to a 
worship of God, for as Aquinas points out: “It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that 
man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should do this or that 
determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason, but is established by 
Divine or human law.”68 However, the encounter between the God of natural reason and the 
God of revelation introduces a living and dynamic accessibility and relationality that was 
hitherto absent in the realm of natural reason alone. The God of philosophy, the God of 
natural reason, thanks to the encounter with Christianity, has become a living, accessible and 
approachable Being. Ratzinger writes:  
So, in this sense there is the experience that the God of the philosophers is quite 
different from what the philosophers had thought him to be, though he does not 
thereby cease to be what they had discovered; that one only comes to know him 
properly when one realizes that he, the real truth and ground of all Being, is at one 
and the same time the God of faith, the God of men and women.69 
 
Given this transformation, the God of philosophy, like the God of faith, becomes capable of 
emotions, can rejoice, and seeks to enter into human relations. Ratzinger maintains that the 
God of philosophy is no longer the “unfeeling geometry of the universe, neutral justice 
standing above things undisturbed by a heart and its emotions; he has a heart; he stands there 
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like a person who loves, with all the capriciousness of someone who loves.”70 It is therefore, 
not naïve anthropomorphism to believe that the Supreme Being of philosophy cares about the 
human person and really wants to cultivate a relationship with the humans. To Ratzinger, it is 
precisely the fact that the Supreme Being of philosophy, the greatest, takes interest in the 
small, in the human being, that the true divinity of the Supreme Being stands out:  
Precisely this overstepping of the greatest and reaching down into the smallest is the 
true nature of absolute spirit. At the same time, we see here a reversal in value of 
maximum and minimum, greatest and smallest, that is typical of the Christian 
understanding of reality. To him who as spirit upholds and encompasses the universe, 
a spirit, a man’s heart with its ability to love, is greater than all the milky ways in the 
universe. Quantitative criteria become irrelevant; other orders of magnitude become 
visible, according to which the infinitely small is the truly embracing and truly 
great.71 
 
This process of the great taking interest in the small, of the supreme becoming little, 
constitutes the germ of the transformation of the God of philosophy when this philosophical 
apprehension encounters faith. While faith accepts the intuitions of reason in its postulation 
of the Supreme Being as utterly different and highest form of existence, faith liberates the 
God of philosophy from its unbridgeable distance, and in the process, “corrects philosophy 
and lets us know that love is higher than mere thought.”72 Not only does faith move 
philosophy’s God from the point of a self-contemplative thought, a thought thinking itself to 
a position of relationship, but thanks to this movement, faith is able to present the God of 
philosophy as a God of love. In the final analysis, therefore, the absolute Being of philosophy 
is creative love, based on the conviction that to love is divine, a position Ratzinger analyzes 
as the Creative Logos: “The logos of the whole world, the creative original thought, is at the 
same time love; in fact, this thought is creative because as thought, it is love, and, as love, it 
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is thought.”73 This bonding of the truth of philosophy’s intuition of the Supreme Being with 
love, therefore, ensures the identification of truth and love.   
 With the new way of thinking that came with the new sciences and the prominent 
philosophers that emerged from the spirit of the Aufklärung - either employing reason to 
make the case for reason or reason to make the case for what they saw was the irrationality of 
the Aufklärung such as one finds with Nietzsche -  reason, logos, becomes the possible 
concept through which Ratzinger is able to bring his Augustinian, personalist and 
existentialist philosophical background to bear on the questions of Christology and 
Ecclesiology, promoted by the Aufklärer and their successors. That the Aufklärer adopted 
reason to connote a broad spectrum, that is, nature, science, consciousness, social and 
political life, the metaphysical domain, the moral order, and finally, the supernatural order of 
revelation, opens the way for a concomitant appropriation of reason or logos by Ratzinger, in 
this instant, from a theological perspective.  
 As will be seen in Chapter Three, underlining these Ratzingerian appropriations of 
Aufklärung reason or logos as Creative Reason, Person, Unity of Love, Word and Son, is the 
conviction, as de Gaál points out, that for Ratzinger, “philosophical truth becomes personal, 
divine-human truth in Jesus Christ as the Logos. Truth and charity become synonymous in 
Christ.”74 With this Christological outcome comes the realization of human insufficiency 
without the God of Jesus Christ who is continuously mediated by an imperfect Church. 
Christology and Ecclesiology are therefore the overriding hermeneutical framework. 
Ratzinger therefore opens up the Aufklärung concept of reason to the horizon of the highest 
human aspirations regarding such sublime concerns of the source of all things, that is, 
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creation by Creative Reason; secondly, who the human being is as a person, that as logos and 
Personhood; the human vocation of love, that is, Logos as Love; what does it mean to speak, 
that is, Logos as Word; and finally, the definitive opening of the finite to the infinite, or more 
precisely, the breaking forth of the infinite into the realm of finite existence, with the Logos 
becoming Son, at the fullness of time (Gal 4:4). These theological appropriations eschew the 
attraction of a superstitious human self-sufficiency motivated by an unwarranted 
amplification of the concept of reason. 
 However, it is important to note that Ratzinger would not have been able to make 
these appropriations if he had not first demonstrated as he did in in both his inaugural lecture 
and in the Introduction, the possibility of faith actively engaging reason and shaping it from 
within, and vice versa. Hence, de Gaál asserts that Ratzinger’s inaugural lecture is the best 
demonstration of the remarkable theological consistency of Joseph Ratzinger regarding the 
positions, insights and lines of argumentation of the theologian Ratzinger over the decades.75 
Not only does the inaugural lecture build on the personalist conception of the God of 
revelation and Christian faith that is largely Augustinian in texture, - a debt to Ratzinger’s 
doctoral studies as seen in Chapter One -  but more so, it opens up this personal God of faith 
to the gains of the secular Aufklärung by acknowledging the achievements of what Kant will 
call, mere reason, especially the achievement of monological God of Greek philosophy 
attained through unaided reason. And Ratzinger carries these insights from his doctoral work, 
through his inaugural lecture and into his Introduction to Christianity, as seen in the first two 
chapters of this thesis. Under this ambiance of the dialogue between faith and reason, 
Ratzinger can thus make the five-fold theological appropriations of Logos, of reason, which 
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is constitutive of Chapter Three. This is done bearing in mind that reason is not understood as 
a mere rational faculty, but the ground for all being, that which encompasses all and holds all 




Chapter Three: A Ratzingerian Reading of the Historico-Philosophical 
Trajectory of the Concept of Logos as the Bridge to the Aufklärung  
 
 Thus far, we have seen how Ratzinger has sought to keep a rapprochement between 
faith and reason, between the God of philosophy and the God of theology. Chapter Two also 
exposes the broad understanding of the concept of reason that came with the Aufklärung. 
Reason is not mere rationality, but a concept designating all of reality. Nothing was excluded 
from the gaze of reason, not even revelation. As seen from Ratzinger’s treatment of the 
synthesis between the God of faith and the God of philosophers, Ratzinger is not opposed to 
reason. However, to Ratzinger, the light of reason alone is insufficient in terms of 
enlightening humans and their concerns. Reason has its limits, and the depths of reason are 
all the more discovered under the stimulus of revelation, irrespective of the legitimacy of 
human reflection, philosophy and the sciences. On crucial life questions, one quickly comes 
to terms with the limits of reason, for example: Why do I exist? What is my destiny? Why is 
there suffering in the world? Who do bad things happen to good people? What is there when 
this earthly life is over? These questions and more, causes us to come to terms with the 
insufficiency of reason in terms of explaining of all phenomena.  
 This is not to say that proponents of mere reason do not raise these sorts of questions 
and seek to answer them. The bone of contention is that their answers, if they are to remain 
within the boundaries of mere reason, - to use a Kantian terminology – still leave many 
questions unresolved. In other words, because mere reason must limit itself to pure reason, it 
must be satisfied with the empirically accessible only. But the human mind remains curious 
of possibilities beyond reason, which could be available to us, as Maurice Blondel 
demonstrates in L’Action. Blondel seeks to establish the supernatural or transcendental as a 
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hypothetical necessity to resolve the dialectic opened up by Blondel’s synthetic analysis of 
the phenomenon of willed human action as it opens up in human subjectivity, that is, what 
Blondel refers to as the one thing necessary.1 To Blondel, this one thing necessary is the 
inevitable transcendence of human action. This is the consciousness of reason that transcends 
all particular motives and mobiles and to Blondel, pushes towards the infinite.2  Faith 
therefore extends to where reason cannot reach. This is the sense in which one can asserts 
that without the light of Christ, the light of reason is insufficient in the face of the most 
penetrating questions of human life.  
 Having established a broad reading of reason this third chapter gets to the crux of the 
matter, it studies Ratzinger’s employment of the Greek philosophical concept of logos in the 
theological categories that serve the purpose of taking his reconciliatory movement of what 
one could describe as the counter-Aufklärung to a level in which the Greek philosophical 
heritage is opened up to the gains of the Aufklärung, with both brought into a theological 
service of Ratzinger’s ecclesiological and Christological conclusions, of Creative Reason, 
Person, Son, Word and Unity of Love. These areas are not meant to be exhaustive or 
comprehensive, that is, there is no intention of stating that these five areas cover all of 
Ratzinger’s engagements with the thoughts that are representative of the Aufklärung 
movement. On the contrary, Creative Reason, Person, Son, Word and Unity of Love are 
meant to be representative of the central concerns of modern theology. And to the extent that 
Ratzinger engages them, one can find, as will be seen, many points of convergence and 
divergence with the central concerns, arguments and presuppositions of the Aufklärung.  
                                               
 1 Maurice Blondel, L’Action (1893), trans. Oliva Blanchette (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame Press, 
2007), 339 – 341.  
 2 Blondel, L’Action (1893), 117.  
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 The concept of logos is therefore the consistent thread underpinning and undergirding 
Western philosophical reasoning, a concept that, as we saw in as early as Justin, was already 
taken up into the language of theological reflection and Christian apologetics. As Heraclitus 
pointed out in antiquity, therefore, everything happened in accordance with the logos,3 
thereby giving the logos a universal import and application. Following this Heraclitean 
reading, it is on target to conclude that the “failure to understand the logos results in an 
epistemic state that is both child-like and apparently not significantly different from sleep.”4 
If ignorance of the logos is likened to being asleep, then knowledge of the logos is 
awakening. It means logos provides a sense of epistemic cognition of things, of the truth of 
things.  
In the light of these assertions regarding logos in Greek philosophy such as its 
commonality, universality, and it being the ground of cognition and hence the condition for 
the possibility of truth, one can see why such a concept, preeminent as well in the Western 
mode of thinking, must have been readily attractive to Ratzinger. The Ratzingerian body of 
texts is therefore replete with examples of Ratzinger’s appropriation of the Greek concept of 
logos. For example, in Ratzinger’s trilogy on Jesus and the post-synodal apostolic 
exhortation Verbum Domini, Ratzinger makes a case for the primacy of the Prologue of 
John’s Gospel which clearly stands out for him as his favorite hermeneutical key, because of 
the concept of logos contained therein. In Verbum Domini, Benedict ties together the 
different layers of meaning of Logos in a harmonious, interrelated symmetry: 
As the Prologue of John clearly shows us, the Logos refers in the first place to the 
eternal Word, the only Son, begotten of the Father before all ages and consubstantial 
with him: the word was with God, and the word was God. But this same Word, Saint 
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John tells us, “became flesh” (Jn 1:14); hence Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, 
is truly the Word of God who has become consubstantial with us. Thus, the 
expression “word of God” here refers to the person of Jesus Christ, the eternal Son of 
the Father, made man. While the Christ event is at the heart of divine revelation, we 
also need to realize that creation itself, the liber naturae, is an essential part of this 
symphony of many voices in which the one word is spoken. We also profess our faith 
that God has spoken his word in salvation history; he has made his voice heard; by 
the power of his Spirit “he has spoken through the prophets.” Finally, the word of 
God, attested and divinely inspired, is sacred Scripture, the Old and New 
Testaments.5 
 
In all, at the center of Ratzinger’s logos theology stands the figure of Christ, the one who 
gives the multiple theological appropriations of logos their ultimate bearing. This is crucial in 
understanding Ratzinger’s theological appropriation of the philosophical concept of the 
rational logos because as Christopher Collins, S. J., points out in The Word Made Love:  
If Jesus is not the Eternal Word who has descended from above and is really made 
known in the flesh, in history, there is, for Ratzinger, ultimately no spiritual meaning 
and efficacy in him. It is precisely the fact that the Eternal Logos is expressed in 
history as sarx in Jesus Christ that makes the hope of salvation within history real. In 
Christ, the Logos that had been understood as the principle of coherence for all of 
creation is now seen as a person: The Logos made flesh, manifested in love.6  
 
In other words, Ratzinger’s appropriation of logos is not just a pragmatic, this-worldly sense 
of utilitarianism, but is because the same Logos now present in history, is simultaneously the 
source or originator of history. The event of the incarnation is therefore, not something that is 
extrinsic to the inner contours of history. It is Logos, Creative Reason that is behind the start 
of history, entering history to bring history unto a new level of being, shaped by the 
humanizing and concomitant divinizing of history thanks to Gestalt of the Eternal Logos, 
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Jesus Christ. Collins is therefore right in emphasizing the interrelationship between faith and 
historical consciousness in Ratzinger’s thought.  
 As Benedict himself maintains in Verbum Domini when talking about Logos and 
historical consciousness, the Logos has been “abbreviated,” that is, it has become “shorter” in 
that it has become historical in order to be apprehended and understood by human beings.7 
And as Benedict puts it again in his Christmas homily of 2006, “the eternal word became 
small – small enough to fit into a manger. He became a child, so that the Word could be 
grasped by us.”8 Collins comments: “This is the classic kind of Benedict-ine formulation that 
is startling in its tenderness and pastoral sensitivity, drawing the suspicious contemporary 
audience into a highly intimate encounter – the kind of encounter for which the contemporary 
person longs.”9 Therefore, one notices a strong sense of the eternal in Ratzinger’s 
appropriation of the philosophical concept of logos. And this vantage point of eternity is 
what makes the entry into history comprehensible and possible, for the incarnation of the 
Logos is the meeting point between eternity and time, between the pre-historical and the 
historical.  
 Given this sense of eternity and history, therefore, one can make an interpretive 
reading of the historical evolution of the philosophical concept of logos through a 
Ratzingerian lens. This is possible because Ratzinger’s theological usage of the logos 
concept, as indicated above, is profoundly historical, even if pre-historical and 
simultaneously trans-historical, since, in the final analysis, what one is dealing with here is 
the Gestalt of Christ, the Eternal Son who is the new present Adam who opens the way to the 
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future. It is thanks to this line of thinking that we can bring Ratzinger into contact with Greek 
philosophers that had a great influence in the development of the concept of logos, such as 
Heraclitus. The aim is not to make the case that Ratzinger explicitly cites Heraclitus, for 
example, but to show that the Ratzingerian sense of the eternity of the Logos who as Logos in 
eternity is likewise present in history and has been guiding history as its originator, was much 
present in the history of thought, even before the event of the Incarnation.  
 In other words, it is not out of place to study Heraclitus as a prelude to getting to the 
gist of Ratzinger’s theological appropriation and actual usage of the concept of the logos. If 
anything, by placing the Ratzingerian reading of the concept of the logos in its twin 
dimensions of eternity and history in the middle of Greek philosophy, a new possibility can 
open up for theological and philosophical dialogue and rapprochement, which, as seen in 
Chapter Two, remains an underlining concern for Ratzinger. Consequently, the historical-
philosophical trajectory of the concept of the logos that pits Ratzinger and the Greek 
philosophical heritage of the logos together is another concrete example of the possible 
dialogue between the God of faith and the God of philosophers, between faith and reason, 
always paying attention to the Ratzingerian principle of faith as providing a wider framework 
and not obstructing or impeding the dictates of reason qua reason.  
 
3.1. Heraclitus and the Logos  
 
 The Greek philosophical tradition is traceable to Heraclitus, the philosopher of the 
logos. In the one-hundred-and -thirty-one surviving fragments from Heraclitus, the concept 
of logos takes on multiple roles of meaning that very well serves a Ratzingerian 
appropriation and reading, at least from a theological point of view: Firstly, we have the 
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sense of logos as the verb legein on which the noun logos is built on. In this context, logos 
connotes the sense of picking up, laying down, lay by, to collect, to count up, to tell as in a 
tale, and hence, to give account.10 These largely are related to speech, which, from a 
philosophical perspective, is the vehicle for human rationality, in that thanks to speech, we 
can get to know what the mind was thinking in and by itself. The word that says it, the saying 
that expresses it, the sentence that states it and the sense of meaning conveyed by it as well as 
the explanations expanded and the arguments enforced, are further expatiations of the 
activity of the mind.11 Given this rational character, logos moves from being simply speech 
that is uttered to reason as rationality. 
From a theological point of view, this sense of logos as speech that becomes creative 
reason in the beginning becomes readily useful in John’s Prologue, which Ratzinger appeals 
to both in his Introduction to Christianity and in Jesus of Nazareth, particularly volumes I 
and III, in putting forth the figure of Christ as the culminative omega point of the aspirations 
of Greek philosophy and pagan cosmology. As the Logos of God, declares Ratzinger, “the 
man Jesus is the dwelling-place of the Word, the eternal divine Word, in this world (…). 
Jesus’ origin, his provenance, is the true ‘beginning’ – the primordial source from which all 
things come, the light that makes the world into the cosmos. He comes from God. He is 
God.”12 Because he is from God, Jesus is able to communicate God to the world, “the God 
who revealed his face only in Israel, even though he was also honored among the pagans in 
various shadowy guises. It is this God, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the true God, 
whom he has brought to the nations of the earth.”13 Thanks to this presence of Logos as Jesus 
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of Nazareth in history, we can now see the face of God and call upon God. God is no longer 
so distant and remote from us, but has become one of us, Immanuel, establishing an 
anthropological relationship of communicability and mutuality with human beings: “For to 
all who received him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of God; 
who were born, not of blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God” 
(Jn 1:12).  
A second philosophical component of logos has to do with relationality, for as Brann 
points out, telling is relating: “The logos brings terms into relations to each other, particularly 
the ratio-relation that connects two terms in mutually determining juxtaposition, especially in 
respect to their common measurability.”14 Logos is therefore a relation in the sense that 
brings together two terms without merging them. It puts together a thinking and speaking 
capacity so much so that they can “say the same,” homo-logein, all the while remaining 
different.15 One does not cease to be because of the other. The sameness of love between the 
Father, Son and Spirit speak one word, love, but their individual persons do not cease to be 
owing to this sameness. On the contrary, the sameness of love connects them in a 
relationship of mutual love and self-giftedness, as amplified by Augustine of Hippo.  
In addition to logos as speech-reason and logos as relation, the third facet of logos 
that emerges from Greek philosophy is logos as unity, oneness. In the fiftieth fragment of 
Heraclitus, we read: “ouk emou, alla tou logou akousantas homologein sophon estin hen 
panta einai – Listening not to me but to the logos, it is wise to acknowledge that all things 
are one.”16 Everything is one – hen, panta. In the Greek philosophical concept of logos, 
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142 
 
therefore, there is present the roots from which biblical faith could relate its belief in a 
monotheistic God. Ratzinger attests as much: 
However, there remains the fact that monotheism consists in nothing else than this 
hyphen, which connects the Absolute – the “God of the Philosophers” – and the God 
of man – the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. The hyphen, which St. Augustine put 
“between neo-Platonic ontology and the biblical Knowledge of God,” is legitimate in 
the case of Monotheism, it is the tangible way in which the hyphen between the God 
of the Philosophers and the God of Faith and mankind had to manifest itself.17 
 
In this text, Ratzinger draws a link between the unity of Greek philosophical principle and 
biblical monotheism. At the height of Greek philosophy stands the unity of the Prime Mover 
or Unmoved Mover or the Supreme Being or the ascent towards the ecstasy of the 
immateriality of the NeoPlatonic One who is beyond all being, as seen in the Enneads.18 This 
One beyond all being is “the first principle of causal dependence. It is the source of 
derivation and aspiration of being.”19 Given this understanding of the One as the primary 
principle of dependence, Christian Mofor rightly concludes that “the One beyond being is 
neither ‘this’ nor ‘that’ particular reality in the world which it generates. In other words, the 
One beyond being transcends the activity which is generated from the perfection in it.”20 The 
One therefore transcends all attributes that could be made of the One. The One is absolute 
transcendence. Indeterminateness. Hence, one can only speak about the One in terms of what 
                                               
 17 Joseph Ratzinger, Der Gott des Glaubens und der Gott der Philosophen (Bonn: Johannes-Verlag 
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it is not, rather than in terms of what it is. In this sense, this absolute transcendence of the 
One or logos is quite strikingly similar or identical to the Judeo-Christian understanding of 
God as an absolute transcendent being, whose essence cannot be captured by the finite 
intellect of creatures. This explains why in talking about God in relation to creatures, one 
must employ the principle of analogy of being.  
 Given this Plotinian insight, it is certainly remarkable that philosophy was able to 
attain this insight of the unity and uniqueness of the One or God. This philosophic 
achievement, in a sense, laid the groundwork for the monotheism of biblical faith, from the 
Supreme Being or the One Beyond All Being of Greek Philosophy to the One God of 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. In a word, there is a correlation between biblical monotheism and 
philosophical monotheism.   
 The fourth aspect of logos deducible from the philosophical fragments of Heraclitus 
is that of the logos as a speaker. Heraclitus declares: “Listening not to me but to The Speaker, 
there is a Wise Thing to agree with – One: Everything.”21 Expressed in this text is the 
subordination of the human being to the logos, in which the human being is the faithful 
listener to a chosen speaker. Given this context, the listener becomes capable of uttering what 
he or she has heard from the Logos-Speaker, after the experience of profound listening. It is 
difficult not to see in this understanding of logos as Speaker and the human being as the 
recipient of the speech of logos, the inner dynamics of Ratzinger’s understanding of the 
process of revelation in his Habilitation thesis on Bonaventure, as seen in Chapter One. Just 
like the speech of the Greek logos, Ratzinger, in his Habilitation work, makes the case that 
revelation is not the Bible itself, but that the Bible is the medium or channel of revelation 
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who is God. Revelation is God revealing God’s self through the speech of the Bible. 
Ratzinger found in Bonaventure that revelation transcends the written text: 
If Bonaventure is right, then revelation precedes Scripture and becomes deposited in 
Scripture but it is not simply identical with it. This in turn means that revelation is 
always something greater than what is merely written down. And this again means 
that there can be no such thing as pure sola scriptura (by Scripture alone), because an 
essential element of Scripture is the Church as understanding subject, and with this 
the fundamental sense of tradition is already given.22 
 
There is therefore, a clear dynamic between subject-object, between revelation and 
the recipient of revelation, speaker and the listener, between speech uttered and the recipient 
of the uttered word, that, all the while describing Ratzinger’s reading of Bonaventure’s 
theology of revelation, largely resonates with similar dynamics in the treatment of logos as 
speech uttered by Heraclitus and the Greek philosophical tradition. Ratzinger can thus 
conclude:  
By its application to Jesus of Nazareth, the concept of logos acquires a new 
dimension. It no longer denotes simply the permeation of all being by meaning; it 
characterizes this man: he who is here is “Word.” The concept of logos, which to the 
Greeks meant “meaning” (ratio), changes here really into “word” (verbum). He who 
is here is Word; he is consequently “spoken” and, hence, the pure relation between 
the speaker and the spoken to.23 
 
In this sense, logos as speaker constitutes the basis for relationality in the Christian economy, 
for the art of speaking presupposes a recipient or audience vis-à-vis the one who speaks or 
what is spoken.    
 The fifth quality of logos that one finds in the fragments of Heraclitus connotes the 
logos as wisdom: “Of all whose logoi I have heard, not one has come this far – to know that 
‘Wise’ is separated (kechorismenon) from everything.” And in another fragment: “The Wise 
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Thing, one and only, wants and does not want to be called by the name of Zeus.”24 These 
senses of logos as wisdom indicates that as wisdom, as the wise thing, logos is not only 
separated from all things, but is likewise at work within everything. Brann ties the aspect of 
logos as wisdom with logos as speech that is uttered and listened to by an active recipient 
thus:  
Our logos and our logoi, the sense we receive and the words we in turn say, should be 
informed by our having heard the Logos. This great Logos has a wisdom, or rather it 
is the Wise Thing, and this Wise Thing has a maxim, or rather it is that practical 
principle which guides everything through everything, relates all things to all things, 
which says One: Everything.25 
 
Following classical tradition and continuing with a Christic reading of logos-wisdom, 
Ratzinger reads logos as wisdom personified in the Son of God, whom assuming flesh, 
entered the world as Jesus of Nazareth, whose heart is the heart of God. Jesus is the Logos 
who, as wisdom, enables us to be logical, and this wisdom, maintains Ratzinger, is a sharing 
in God’s way of perceiving reality which only comes about thanks to our unity with God in 
the person of Christ Jesus.26 Certainly, this goes beyond the Greek conception of logos, but it 
is not completely foreign to the concept of personhood being introduced into the concept of 
logos, for as we saw when we highlighted the fourth aspect of the Heraclitan logos, the 
consciousness of logos as speaker is likewise present in Greek philosophy.   
 The sixth characteristic of logos in Heraclitus that resonates with Ratzinger is that of 
logos as common to all creatures. Heraclitus declares: “Therefore one must follow what is 
common (toi xynoi). But although the logos is common (xynou) the many live as if they had a 
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private mind (phronesin), in the sense of mindful insight.”27 The charge made here by 
Heraclitus is that though the logos is common to all creatures in that all are naturally 
endowed with understanding which presupposes the gift of reasoning, many are inattentive to 
the presence of the logos in their lives. Given this insight, when Ratzinger argues as he did in 
his Regensburg address, against the dehellenization of the Christian faith, he is not rejecting 
the genuine novelties and significant contributions of other cultures vis-à-vis the Christian 
faith.28 On the other hand, his pointing out of logos as common to all persons could serve as 
the foundation for the dialogue between cultures and religions.  
 As Ratzinger observes regarding the relationship between logos and biblical faith in 
terms of its synthetic commonality, “A profound encounter of faith and reason is taking place 
here, an encounter between genuine enlightenment and religion. From the very heart of 
Christian faith and, at the same time, the heart of Greek thought now joined to faith, Manuel 
II was able to say: Not to act ‘with logos’ is contrary to God's nature.”29 In this light, 
Ratzinger appears to make the argument that this commonality of logos has an inherent 
potential, if considered by the various religions, to foster religious tolerance and overcome 
religious extremism in which violence is perpetuated in the name of God. In precis, these six 
insights provide a platform from Greek philosophy that clearly resonate with theological 
appropriations by Ratzinger, as put forth above. In the subsequent section, Ratzinger 
consolidates these philosophical footpaths into five concepts around the logos, as expatiated 
below. 
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3.2 Justin Martyr and the Logos  
 
With Justin Martyr (AD 100-165), the treatment of logos takes on a sense of historical 
fulfillment. Justin sought to expose the similarities between Christian thought and Greek 
philosophy, with the ultimate goal of showing Christianity as the true and safe philosophy 
worth adhering to. In terms of the Logos, Justin’s point of departure is first of all the 
transcendence of God, who as God, is an ineffable Father who is without origin or beginning. 
There is therefore an insurmountable wedge between God and creatures. Only the Logos is 
capable of bridging this abyss between finite creatures and an infinite and transcendent God. 
The Logos is therefore the guide to God and the instructor for man and woman. Justin sought 
to illustrate that creation and salvation were fulfilled in Jesus Christ, the Logos, that is, the 
eternal Word and Creative Reason:  
For whatever either lawgivers or philosophers uttered well, they elaborated by finding 
and contemplating some part of the Logos. But since they did not know the whole of 
the Word, which is Christ, they often contradicted themselves. And those who by 
human birth were more ancient than Christ, when they attempted to consider and 
prove things by reason, were brought before the tribunals as impious persons and 
busybodies. And Socrates, who was more zealous in this direction than all of them, 
was accused of the very same crimes as ourselves (…) For no one trusted in Socrates 
so as to die for this doctrine, but in Christ, who was partially known even by Socrates 
(for He was and is the Logos) who is in everyman, and who foretold the things that 
were to come to pass both through the prophets and in His own person when He was 
made of like passions, and taught these things, not only philosophers and scholars 
believed, but also artisans and people entirely uneducated, despising both glory, and 
fear, and death, since He is a power of the ineffable Father, and not the mere 
instrument of human reason.30 
In this sense, the same Logos who revealed himself to the Hebrew prophets, as we find in the 
First Apology, likewise manifested himself in seeds of truth in Greek philosophy, especially 
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in Socrates. Hence, “the doctrine of the Logos is the most important doctrine of Justin, 
because it forms a bridge between pagan philosophy and Christianity.”31 To listen to Justin:  
I confess that I both boast and with all my strength strive to be found a Christian, not 
because the teachings of Plato are different from those of Christ, but because they are 
not in all respects similar, as neither are those of the others, Stoics, and poets and 
historians. For each man spoke well in proportion to the share he had of the spermatic 
word, seeing what was related to it. But they who contradict themselves on the more 
important points appear not to have possessed the heavenly wisdom, and the 
knowledge which cannot be spoken against. Whatever things were rightly said among 
all men, are the property of Christians.32 
 
Therefore, though Justin disputed Greek philosophy and its contradictions, and although 
Justin affirms that the fullness of the Logos only took form in Christ, Justin maintains that the 
seed of the Logos was already very much present in much of humankind, long before the 
arrival of Christ on the historical scene, for all humans possess a seed of the Logos in their 
rational faculty. Justin is therefore decisive in orienting all philosophical truths to the Logos, 
thereby making a claim regarding the universality and veracity of the Christian religion. The 
Old Testament and Greek philosophy are therefore two paths pointing to Christ, and this 
happens thanks to the presence of seeds of the Logos in these historical antecedents to the 
Christian era. Commenting about this approach of Justin to philosophical fulfillment in 
Christ, Benedict XVI declares: 
Overall, the figure and work of Justin mark the ancient Church's forceful option for 
philosophy, for reason, rather than for the religion of the pagans. With the pagan 
religion, in fact, the early Christians strenuously rejected every compromise. They 
held it to be idolatry, at the cost of being accused for this reason of "impiety" and 
"atheism" (…) Philosophy, on the other hand, represented the privileged area of the 
encounter between paganism, Judaism and Christianity, precisely at the level of the 
criticism of pagan religion and its false myths (…) In fact, the pagan religion did not 
follow the ways of the Logos, but clung to myth, even if Greek philosophy recognized 
that mythology was devoid of consistency with the truth. Therefore, the decline of the 
pagan religion was inevitable: it was a logical consequence of the detachment of 
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religion - reduced to an artificial collection of ceremonies, conventions and customs - 
from the truth of being. Justin, and with him other apologists, adopted the clear stance 
taken by the Christian faith for the God of the philosophers against the false gods of 
the pagan religion.33 
With this line of interpretation of Justin by Benedict, it follows that the choice of philosophy 
in opposition and even in contrast to pagan mythology by the early Church as embodied in 
Justin, was a choice in favor of truth as opposed to contradictory myths of the pagan 
religions. In other words, Justin’s choice for the logos, for reason, was a choice for the object 
of the intellect, which is truth.  
 Another aspect of Justin’s theology of the Logos that anticipates Ratzinger’s is 
understanding of logos in terms of a theology of worship. In the First Apology, Justin writes: 
“The only honor that is worthy of him is not to consume by fire what he has brought into 
being for our sustenance, but to use it for ourselves and those who need, and with gratitude to 
him to offer thanks by praises and hymns for our creation.”34 As Johannes Quasten points 
out, one cannot understand Justin’s concept of sacrifice except one takes into consideration 
Justin’s doctrine of the Logos. To Quasten, what Justin rejects is the material sacrifice of the 
Jews and pagans. By means of the concept of sacrifice, Justin intends to bridge the gap 
between pagan philosophy and Christianity. To quote Quasten:  
[Justin’s] ideal is the logikē thusia, the oblatio rationabilis, the spiritual sacrifice 
which the Greek philosophers declared to be the only veneration worthy of God. 
Here, as in the case of the Logos, Christianity represents the fulfilment of a 
philosophical ideal because it possess such a spiritual sacrifice.35 
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For Justin, therefore, there is no longer any need for bloody material sacrifices, for the 
Eucharist is the long desired spiritual sacrifice. In the Eucharist, the logikē thusia, the Logos 
himself, Jesus Christ, is the victim. To Quasten, this insight of the logikē thusia by Justin was 
a tremendous achievement with profound implications, for thanks to it, Justin was able to 
appropriate the highest achievements of Greek philosophy for Christianity, while 
simultaneously stressing the newness and uniqueness of Christian worship. Justin “retained 
an objective sacrifice while on the other hand he emphasized the spiritual character of 
Christian worship. Thus, the term oblatio rationabilis, in the canon of the Roman Mass 
expresses better than any other word Justin’s concept of sacrifice.”36 The Eucharist, as the 
logikē thusia, the oratio rationabilis, is the true sacrifice that has brought all material, animal 
sacrifices to their completion. As will be seen in chapter five, Ratzinger builds on this insight 
of Justin in his treatment of logos as word, which essentially captures the core content of 
Ratzinger’s theology of worship.  
3.3 Irenaeus of Lyons and the Logos  
 
 With Irenaeus of Lyons (AD 130-202), one finds the appropriation of the Logos as a 
Recapitulation, in which the Logos is identical with the Son of God, with the God-man Jesus, 
with our Saviour and Our Lord. The heart of Irenaeus’ claim is that since by the fall of Adam 
the whole human race was lost, the Logos had to become man in order to effect a recreation 
of humankind: “When he became incarnate and was made man, he recapitulated in himself 
the long history of man, summing up and giving us salvation in order that we might receive 
again in Christ Jesus what we had lost in Adam, that is, the image and likeness of God.”37 
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Christ is thus the true prototype of the human person, for it is in Christ that humanity 
becomes liberated from the condition of sin and oriented towards becoming more and more 
like God.  
 This reality of the person of Christ has a cosmic dimension, involving both creation 
and redemption. Therefore, in Christ, the New Adam, creation is not only remade, but 
endowed with the ultimate potential for divinization. In other words, as Irenaeus explains, the 
Incarnation of the Logos is the singular event that brought about not only the divinization of 
the human being, but likewise, the entry into divinity of human nature. Irenaeus writes: 
And for this reason did the Word become the dispenser of the paternal grace for the 
benefit of men, for whom He made such great dispensations, revealing God indeed to 
men, but presenting man to God, and preserving at the same time the invisibility of 
the Father, lest man should at any time become a despiser of god, and that he should 
always possess something towards which he might advance; but, on the other hand, 
revealing God to men through many dispensations, lest man, falling away from God 
altogether, should cease to exist. For the glory of God is a living man; and the life of 
man consists in beholding God.38 
 
This is the perspective, that is, of the divine-human meeting in Christ, that one can 
understand Irenaeus’ doctrine of recapitulation (anakephalaiosis), in which the whole of 
reality is gathered into Jesus Christ. In this light, Jesus is an embodiment of human history. 
Jesus shares and sums up all of human reality except sin. Thanks to his humanity in which he 
passes through all stages of human development from childhood to full adulthood, Jesus 
redeems humanity in all its stages of growth and development.  
 What then, did the Logos now incarnated as Christ Jesus bring? And more 
importantly, what did the Christ leave behind to continue to bring about this work of 
recapitulation? This is the meeting point between Christology and Ecclesiology, for God 
sums up in Christ (recapitulation) not only the past but the future as well, and therefore has 
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made the incarnated Logos the head of the Church in order to perpetuate through the Church 
God’s work of reimaging the world, until the consummation of the ages. As Irenaeus writes, 
“The invisible is become visible, the incomprehensible is become comprehensible, and the 
impassible passible; and the Logos is become man, recapitulating all things in himself (…) 
He takes the primacy to himself and by making himself the head of the Church, he will draw 
all things to himself at the appointed time.”39 Here, one notices not only that Irenaeus is 
emphasizing the entrance of the Logos into history, but likewise that the Logos comes forth 
in the Church. In this wise, the Church becomes the locus of encounter with the Logos, 
especially in the sacramental life of faith of the Church. 
 Two central aspects, therefore, stand out, in Irenaeus’ theology of the Logos. Firstly, 
there is the refutation of Gnosticism and the insistence of the true bodily nature of the man 
Jesus. As Ratzinger comments, “firmly rooted in the biblical doctrine of creation, Irenaeus 
refuted the Gnostic dualism and pessimism which debased corporeal realities. He decisively 
claimed the original holiness of matter, of the body, of the flesh no less than of the spirit.”40 
It is truly as man that Christ saves us. The earthly life of Jesus of Nazareth was not simply a 
mirage, an appearance. Jesus truly took on flesh in the incarnation. Jesus truly experienced 
the human conditions of biological existence. And Jesus truly suffered, died and rose from 
the dead. In a word, in the Incarnation of the Logos, Jesus experiences and sums up all of 
human reality in his person.  
 The second aspect, as indicated above, has to do with the Church, which, for 
Irenaeus, finds its authenticity in the apostolic tradition that is public, one and pneumatic. 
There is no secret doctrine of Christianity that is meant for the intellectuals. The only 
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doctrine that the Church has is her simple faith, meant for all. And this faith is the preaching 
of the apostles, guaranteed in an unbroken line of apostolic succession thanks to the presence 
of the Spirit in the Church.41 Benedict’s admiration for Irenaeus is clear, as he even describes 
Irenaeus as the first systematic theologian of the Church, the one who created systematic 
theology.42 From his theology of the Logos, therefore, Irenaeus bequeathed to the Church a 
Christology that is anthropological and an Anthropology that is likewise Christological. And 
these two realities, a Christological anthropology and an anthropological Christology flourish 
in the locus of the community of the Church, hence making room for a Christological 
Ecclesiology.  
 
3.4 Origen of Alexandria and the Logos  
 
Still within this historical trajectory of the concept of logos, one finds, very early on, 
Origen of Alexandria (AD 184-253), an outstanding teacher and intellectual of the early 
Church who served as head of the Catechetical School of Alexandria. Origen was the 
successor to Clement of Alexandria. Benedict says about Origen: “He was a true ‘maestro,’ 
and so it was that his pupils remembered him with nostalgia and emotion: he was not only a 
brilliant theologian but also an exemplary witness of the doctrine he passed on.”43 For 
Origen, the foundations of theology lay in the interpretations of the Scriptures. Origen’s 
magisterial work, De Principiis, testifies to the primacy of the Scriptures in his soul. In 
Origen, one finds what Benedict calls a “perfect symbiosis between theology and exegesis.”44 
Owing to his extant writings that extended from exegesis to dogma, to philosophy, 
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apologetics, ascetical theology and mystical theology, Benedict characterizes Origen as the 
“most prolific author of Christianity’s first three centuries.”45 Personally, it can come across 
as symbolic that during his apostolic visit to Cameroon and Angola in March 2009, Benedict, 
in his address to the Bishops of Africa, called for the a reopening of Origen’s Catechetical 
School of Alexandria, albeit in a different form today.46 Perhaps this is a dream for the 
African Church awaiting fulfilment.  
In terms of Origen’s theology, one could point out that with language reminiscent of 
Platonism, Origen maintains that just as the soul dwells in the body and gives life to the 
body, so does the Logos dwell in the Church, the mystical Body of Christ. In other words, the 
Logos is the life-giving principle that not only brings about the Church, but animates and 
sustains the Church in being:  
We say that the Holy Scriptures declare the body of Christ, animated by the Son of 
God, to be the whole Church of God, and the members of this body – considered as a 
whole – to consist of those who are believers; since, as a soul vivifies and moves the 
body, which of itself has not the natural power of motion like a living being, so the 
Logos, the Word, arousing and moving the whole body, the Church, to befitting 
action, awakens, moreover, each individual member belonging to the Church, so that 
they do nothing apart from the Word.47 
 
To Origen, this intrinsic relationship between Logos and Church finds its ultimate point of 
convergence in the Cross of Christ, which Origen sees as the narrow way of salvation that is 
diametrically opposed to the wide and easy way of worldly philosophy. In this sense, 
maintains Origen, the vision of the Logos is attainable only at the point at which we as 
members of the Church die to the world. The cross is therefore the fullest expression of the 
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Logos, the crucified Jesus, at once priest and victim.48 One can thus describe the Logos 
theology of Origen as a Logos-Cruxis, in which what is most central is the ultimate self-gift 
of the Logos on the wood of the Cross.  
 In synopsis, while one could certainly allude to other patristic figures that provide 
historical evidence of the appropriation of the Greek concept of the logos, what emerges 
from the above analysis of Justin, Irenaeus and Origen is clearly the Christological and 
Ecclesiological bridges that the concept of logos served in their theologies. In the first place, 
it is about the person of Christ, who as the Eternal Son of the Father, predates creation and 
yet enters creation as Jesus of Nazareth. In a sense, the Christologies of these Fathers 
prepared the Church for the eventual formulations of Nicaea (325), Ephesus (431) and 
Chalcedon (451).  
 In addition, this Christological reading of Logos, of reason, Incarnate, finds in the 
community of the Church, the place wherein the believer can enter into the mystical body of 
Christ, as explained by Origen above. This implies that for the Fathers, there is always an 
ecclesiological dimension to their Christology. In other words, one cannot have Christ, 
encounter Christ, the Logos of God, while excluding the Church. Irenaeus stressed the 
Pneumatological Character of the Church, to the extent that the degree of the presence of the 
Spirit in the life of the believer is made visible in the love for the Church that emanates from 
the believer’s life. 
 In commenting about Ratzinger’s appropriation of logos, Roland Millare points out 
that “the key to understanding Ratzinger’s use of the word logos throughout his works is to 
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underscore that logos is to be understood as truth and love.”49 These two aspects of truth and 
love coincide in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, and this, as Millare points out in his reading 
of Ratzinger, partly explains the limitations of rationality, of reason in the face of revelation, 
owing to the fact that “truth is a person and not simply an abstract idea.”50 Given this 
personalistic reading of truth, more has to be demanded of reason if reason is to fully grasp 
the profundity of truth. And it is at this point that love comes in, for love open reason beyond 
reason by establishing a personalist relationship with truth embodied, that is, with Jesus, who 
promises to reveal himself to those who love (Jn 14:21).   
 One can note that this view of a personalistic perspective of love is clearly a fruit of 
Benedict’s engagement with Bonaventure as seen in chapter one, for, as Benedict pointed out 
in his General Audience of March 3, 2010, “for St. Bonaventure the ultimate destiny of the 
human being is to love God, to encounter him, and to be united in his and our love.”51 Love 
does not erase reason, but propels reason to embrace truths that go beyond the mere rational. 
In this same General Audience, Benedict points out the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius on 
Bonaventure regarding the realization of love as exceeding the capacity for reason. Benedict 
writes:  
Whereas for St. Augustine the intellectus, the seeing with reason and the heart, is the 
ultimate category of knowledge, Pseudo-Dionysius takes a further step: in the ascent 
toward God one can reach a point in which reason no longer sees. But in the night of 
the intellect love still sees; it sees what is in accessible to reason. Love goes beyond 
reason, it sees further, it enters more profoundly into God’s mystery.52  
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 This is the frameworks thanks to in which one ought to read the various 
appropriations of logos by Ratzinger, namely, that notwithstanding the merits of reason, left 
to itself, reason cannot grasp the full picture of revelation. This therefore calls for a 
metamorphosis of reason, of logos, into other theological consciousnesses, such as Creative 
Reason, Son, Person, Unity of Love and Word, as one finds in Ratzinger. Ratzinger explains 
this theological appropriation and transformation thus:  
God is Logos. But there is a second characteristic. The Christian faith in God tells us 
also that God – eternal Reason – is Love. It tells us that he is not a being turned in on 
himself, without relation to others. Precisely because he is sovereign, because he is 
Creator, because he embraces everything, he is Relation and he is Love. Faith in the 
Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, and in his suffering and death for mankind, is the 
supreme expression of a conviction that the heart of all morality, the heart of being 
itself and its deepest principle, is love.53 
 
Once again, in this text, one finds Ratzinger bringing interpreting logos at its most profound 
level to be an experience of the creative love of God, which finds its fullest expression in the 
sacrificial life of Jesus of Nazareth. In Christ, Logos is not only love, but likewise relation, 
for love invites into relationship, love brings about communion, companionship. Thus, 
wherein the eighteenth-century Aufklärung saw reason, rationality, as the ground of all reality 
as seen in chapter two, Ratzinger, thanks to a retrieval of the classical multifaceted concept 
of the logos which he gives a Christological reading to as love, sacrifice and relationship, 
puts forth this Christological reading of logos as the steady ground of all reality. Ratzinger 
explains:  
Two features characterize this concept of God. God himself is Logos, the rational 
primal ground of all that is real, the creative reason that gave birth to the world and 
that is reflected in the world. God is Logos – meaning, reason, and word, and that is 
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why man corresponds to God when his reason is open and he pleads the cause of a 
reason that is not allowed to be blind to the moral dimensions of existence.54  
 
In this sense, God is Logos as evident in the rational framework of natural reality such as in 
creation. Chapter Four of this thesis will engage this more detailly. In addition, God is Logos 
as evident in the ability of humans to enter into a relationship with God, thanks to word, to 
speech that is spoken. Chapter Five will offer a fuller treatment of this theological concept of 
Logos as love, in its varied forms pertaining to the individual and communal dimensions of 
love.  
 In summary, therefore, that the concept of logos that originated in Greek philosophy 
as seen in Heraclitus’ treatment of it above, found a home in the thought of the Fathers as 
sampled above. This treatment of the concept of logos in philosophy and the Fathers as seen 
in this third chapter, exemplifies the synthesis of faith and reason, of the God of philosophers 
and the God of faith, considered in detail in chapter two. Chapters four and five therefore, 
takes up Ratzinger’s own theological appropriation of the concept of logos from identically a 
Christological and Ecclesiological perspective, only this time, with a different framework of 
the Fathers, namely, the secular mode of thinking that largely emerged and followed the 
eighteen century Aufklärung.  
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Chapter Four: A Christological Reading of Ratzinger’s Theological 
Appropriation of Logos as Creative Reason, Son, and Person, vis-à-vis 
the Aufklärung 
 
 Thus far, it has been ascertained, as seen in chapter three, that the Greek concept of 
logos is very versatile. With Heraclitus, it became evident that logos, for Greek philosophy, 
meant the ground of everything, the field on which all can stand. Chapter three also 
demonstrates that the Church Fathers did not hesitate to embrace this metaphor, following the 
clear lead in the Prologue of the Gospel of John, in which the Eternal Word becomes the 
Incarnate Logos. Owing to the all-encompassing character of the concept of logos, it is not 
surprising that it serves as the bridge thanks to which Ratzinger puts forth his Christological 
positions, in the face of Aufklärung reinterpretations of the classical declarations of 
orthodoxy. This chapter therefore, studies logos from a Christological perspective, in the 
light of Creative Reason, Sonship and Personhood. The goal is not only to arrive at a deeper 
Christological picture of the Ratzingerian positions, but even more, to see what Ratzinger 
makes of these positions beyond the theological formulas that state them.  
  
4.1 Logos as Creative Reason: Ratzinger’s Engagement with the Aufklärung’s 
Necessary Causality of Nature and Dialectical Materialism  
 
 This section will study Ratzinger’s theological appropriation of logos in the light of 
the Aufklärung’s understanding of nature as an autonomous principle in need of no divine 
help, in the sense that nature itself is eventually a divine principle, a spirit, a process, 
unfolding in history. In other words, as will be seen, the theological metaphor of logos as 
Creative Reason captures Ratzinger’s theology of creation as a response to the Aufklärung’s 
understanding of nature as autonomous and self-driving.   
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 Regarding nature in terms of cosmology, the Aufklärung sought for a rapport between 
the sensible world and the intelligible world because the natural world had to be read from 
the perspective of the physical laws of the sciences, especially after Newton. Given this 
reading of nature by the Aufklärung, one notices to things: Firstly, there is a certain 
continuity in terms of understanding with the preceding scholasticism of the middle ages, an 
age that saw reality as constitutive of God, the human soul and he world. All of knowledge, 
in the scholastic point of view, had to be oriented towards these three realities.1 When the 
Aufklärung talked of nature or creation, therefore, it was not a new concept out of the blues. 
Rather, they were taking on a concept that was central to medieval scholasticism.  
 Going further, it is worth noting that the Aufklärung radically transformed the 
scholastic understanding of nature, in that it sought to give nature an independent grammar 
that had to be profoundly severed from a religious undercurrent. In other words, there had to 
be no other foundations of certainty about the world. In the worldview of the Aufklärung, 
there had to be an inner affinity between nature and the intellect that was freed from any 
religious constraints. In other words, the natural world was not simply an ontological 
phenomenon. Nature was likewise an epistemological phenomenon. It was not just a way of 
being, but it was a way of seeing life. Nature defined and imposed its own perspective of life. 
Nature had its own eyes that it wanted it used in the seeing of reality. As Cassirer points out:  
Nature, therefore, does not so much signify a given group of objects as a certain 
‘horizon’ of knowledge, of the comprehension of reality. To nature belongs 
everything in the sphere of ‘natural light’ (lumen naturale), everything whose 
understanding and confirmation require no other aid than the natural forces of 
knowledge.2 
 
                                               
 1 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
 Press, 2009), 39.  
 2 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 39.  
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This insistence, as it were, on the autonomy of nature by the Aufklärung ushered in a new 
dichotomy between the realm of nature and the realm of grace. While the former is 
communicated to us through sense perception through processes of logical judgments and 
inferences as seen in Kant, for example, the realm of grace, on the other hand, is accessible 
thanks to the power of divine revelation. 
 Such a sharp distinction between nature and grace certainly marked a remarkable 
rupture of human thinking about reality or nature, which preceded the Aufklärung. If 
anything, it was a given to the Scholastic mode of thinking to see nature and grace in terms 
of the latter being completing the former. Though grace overshadows nature, it does not 
impinge on the existence of nature. Grace rather completes nature.3 To the scholastics, this 
perfection of nature had to be sought not in nature itself but in the supernatural sphere. To 
perfect nature, one had to go beyond nature. Supernatural assistance is a conditio sine qua 
non to bring nature to nature’s perfection. Medieval scholasticism consequently articulated 
this understanding of nature from the perspective of natural law (lex naturalis) and divine 
law (lex divina). Natural law is accessible to and dominated by human reason. By itself, 
however, lex naturalis is unable to restore the original knowledge of reality that was lost 
thanks to the fall of man and woman, at the dawn of creation. Thus, while reason is critical in 
the understanding of nature and nature’s laws, reason essentially plays an auxiliary role to 
revelation, to the lex divina.4 Thus, it was in the nature of philosophy not to be an 
autonomous science, but one that had to be in lure of another, namely, theology. And even in 
this intrinsic relationship between the two, it had to be that one had constantly correct the 
other and bring the other to its fullest potentials, that is, faith leading reason to fullness.  
                                               
 3 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 40.  
 4 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 40.  
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 Looking at this scheme of things, therefore, when the Aufklärung assumed the battle 
cry to dare to use one’s reason, it was an implicit and explicit rejection of the subordination 
of nature to grace, of philosophy to theology, of reason to faith, and in the words of 
Ratzinger’s inaugural lecture, of the God of the philosophers to the God of faith. As Cassirer 
comments, the basic tendency of the Aufklärung was that “the true essence of nature is not to 
be sought in the realm of the created (natura naturata), but in that of the creative process 
(natura naturans).”5 In other words, nature is much more than just creation in terms of an 
objective, substantial matter. Rather, nature was a process, an ever-unfolding process in 
which the divine was an intrinsic part of nature. The divine was in the essence of nature as a 
principle inherent in nature. The dualism between creator and creation as seen in 
Scholasticism and all of Judeo-Christian religious experience is now abolished in the 
Aufklärung mode of thinking. Nature is now an original divine power, a formative principle 
moving from within. As Cassirer states:  
Through its capacity to unfold and take on form from within itself, nature bears the 
stamp of the divine. For God is not to be conceived as a force intervening from 
without and exerting its influence as a moving cause on matter foreign to itself; God 
Himself enters directly into the processes of nature.6 
 
In this process, God is an internal principle of motion within nature, with this nature being 
God’s own nature. Creation is thus elevated into the sphere of the divine. Creation enters into 
the infinity of the divine nature. And this includes the individuality, particularity and 
independence of all of creation. This is the understanding which Kant brings into the 
conversation, when he asserts that the categorical imperative be such that it is not only 
                                               
 5 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 40.  
 6 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 41.  
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universal and human, but above all, that it be autonomous.7 In other words, the universal 
moral maxim should be such that everyone can endorse it. It makes room for autonomy as 
opposed to heteronomy. No distinction ought to be between the lawgiver and the law, for the 
law must be such that it is of the same nature with the lawgiver. The Aufklärung therefore, 
took a step towards essentially reducing the independent being of God to the level of nature 
or creation as a whole, so much so that nature or creation becomes divinized. As Cassirer 
explains, “the law which governs individual entities is not prescribed by a foreign law giver, 
nor thrust upon them by force; it is founded in, and completely knowable through, their own 
nature.”8 This self-legislation avoids constraint on the subject, affirming the primacy of the 
individual over any external principles or persons, which was very much an expression of the 
spirit of the Aufklärung. Also, nature becomes a first principle with an inherent causality. 
Nature or creation causes itself to be, given that there is no God outside nature or creation to 
cause it to be. Where Scholasticism following Aristotle had explained nature in terms of 
causality with God as the Uncaused Cause, the Aufklärung pivoted to the position of creation 
as an eternal process unfolding in, and generating history, with and in self-motion.  
 The challenge of this new mode of thinking about nature for Christian orthodoxy that 
catches Ratzinger’s attention resides in the fact that not only is nature or creation now 
accorded an eternal, divine status, but more importantly, nature or creation becomes a new 
source of truth, independent of God, of revelation, since God at this point, is understood to be 
the natural processes of history. As Cassirer explains:  
This truth is revealed not in God’s word but in his work; it is not based on the 
testimony of Scripture or tradition but is visible to us at all times. But it is 
understandable only to those who know nature’s handwriting and can decipher her 
                                               
 7 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 4:421; 4:429; 4:431.  
 8 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 41.  
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text. The truth of nature cannot be expressed in mere words; the only suitable 
expression lies in mathematical constructions, figures and numbers. And in these 
symbols nature presents itself in perfect form and clarity. Revelation by means of the 
sacred word can never achieve such brightness and transparency, such precision, for 
words as such are always varicolored and ambiguous admitting a variety of 
interpretations. Their meaning must always be given them by man and must therefore 
be fragmentary. In nature, on the other hand, the whole plan of the universe lies 
before us in its undivided and inviolable unity, evidently waiting for the human mind 
to recognize and express it.9 
 
This Weltanschauung reflects not only the triumph of the scientific mindset over the 
religious, but likewise the substance of science, namely, the order of matter, over the voice of 
revelation in the apprehension of the truths of creation. Mathematics and physics are seen as 
paramount in explaining the deeper processes of creation, more so than any theology of 
creation of biblical physics. Human knowledge therefore emerges as victorious over divine 
knowledge or divine science. Consequently, “the correlation between nature and human 
knowledge has now been established once and for all and the bond between them is 
henceforth inseverable.”10 Put differently, nature in the human being meets nature in the 
cosmos half way and discovers its own essence there. The human being is therefore called 
not to impose the person’s subjective ideas on creation, but to follow creation’s own course 
and determine it by observation and experimentation, by measurement and calculation. There 
is therefore a self-sufficiency of nature and the human intellect, given that “the autonomy of 
the intellect corresponds to the pure autonomy of nature.”11 If such is the state of things, any 
mediation based on a transcendental power or a transcendental being between nature as 
cosmos and nature as human becomes superfluous, for it does not add anything to the bond 
already in existent between the former and the latter.   
                                               
 9 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 43.  
 10 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 44.  
 11 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 45.  
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 Quite the contrary, the intervention of the transcendent being or God loosens the bond 
between nature and the subjective mind and must therefore absolutely precluded. As Cassirer 
renders it, “against this relapse into transcendence the philosophy of the Enlightenment 
proclaims the pure principle of immanence both for nature and for knowledge.”12 To the 
Aufklärung, therefore, the eighteenth century was the time that had come to force nature to 
give up its secrets, for creation was no longer a mystery to be left in the dark to be marveled 
at as an unfathomable mystery. Creation had to be brought under the bright light of reason in 
order for it to be analyze with all its essential potencies. And to attain such a critical 
apprehension of creation by reason, the bond between theology and physics had to be 
severed, once and for all. Biblical physics and theological physics had to be completely 
eschewed.13 This was certainly a remarkable new point for the Aufklärung, as Cassirer notes:  
This was the first important victory of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. It 
finished in this respect what the Renaissance had begun; it marked off a definite field 
for rational knowledge within which there was to be no more restraint and 
authoritative coercion but free movement in all directions. By virtue of this freedom 
philosophy could attain to full self-knowledge and to knowledge of its inherent 
forces.14 
 
This newfound philosophical project of unmasking creation according to nature’s laws in 
terms of stylometry employed as tools, experimentation, deduction and analysis, for the mind 
had to critically observe creation, test out these observations and then draw conclusions from 
these observatory tests. Sense perception therefore played a crucial role in this process, as 
empirical phenomena held sway on many counts. Finally, the question of God has been 
settled as a question of nature – deus sive natura – Spinoza provided the formula that 
                                               
 12 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 45.  
 13 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 48.  
 14 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 49.  
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captured the sentiments of this Aufklärung achievement.15 The laws of creation which govern 
and determine all phenomena are nothing but the eternal decrees of God.  
 In this sense, materialism understood in terms of the absolute primacy of matter is 
justified and defended, not just as a scientific dogma, but more so, as an imperative that seeks 
to establish a thesis concerning the nature of things. It also sought to command and to forbid 
the inclusion of any reference to the transcendent being as different from nature and as the 
interpreter of nature. Theology thus appears as a superstitious manifestation: “Man must free 
himself from all idols, from all illusions concerning the original cause of things, for only by 
do doing can he succeed in ordering and establishing the world according to his own ideas.”16 
Theology is thus construed as an inhibiting force against the sciences, who must shed the 
shackles of theology if they are to make any real progress: “The notions of God, freedom and 
immortality are to be uprooted once and for all, so that the rational order of nature shall not 
be threatened and overthrown by constant intervention from the supernatural world which 
these notions seem to construct.”17 In the final analysis, reason, logos, has turned nature into 
a necessary cause unto itself, and in the process, excludes God and divinizes nature or the 
material universe.  
 In engaging this position of the Aufklärung vis-à-vis the natural order, Ratzinger 
displays a profound appreciation of the employment of reason or the rational mind in 
presenting the natural order, which Ratzinger sees as a product of the logos. Ratzinger writes: 
For Logos designates a reason that is not merely mathematical: it is the basis of the 
good and guarantees the dignity of the good. Faith in the God who is Logos is at the 
same time faith in the creative power of reason. It is faith in the Creator God and faith 
                                               
 15 Baruch Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (New York: Hebrew Union College Press, 2001), 
cap. Iii, sect. 7 
 16 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 70.  
 17 Cassirer, Enlightenment, 70.  
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that man is created in the likeness of God and therefore shares in the inviolable 
dignity of God himself.18  
 
This text reveals the framework thanks to which one begins to understand the theological 
contours of Ratzinger’s appropriation of the concept of logos as Creative Reason, namely, 
that creation is not an arbitrary, accidental, evolutionary product, but a reality that is thought-
through and willed by God. In this sense, while appreciating the Aufklärung’s scientific 
presentation of nature from a rational perspective, Ratzinger still makes the case that 
Scripture’s account of God’s creative act at the start of history is the true Enlightenment, 
because it is a work of Reason:  
Hence, this creation account may be seen as the decisive “Enlightenment” of history 
and as a breakthrough out of the fears that had oppressed humankind. It placed the 
world in the context of reason and recognized the world’s reasonableness and 
freedom. But it may also be seen as the true Enlightenment from the fact that it put 
human reason firmly on the primordial basis of God’s creating Reason, in order to 
establish it in truth and in love, without which an “Enlightenment” would be 
exorbitant and ultimately foolish.19 
 
To its credit, therefore, the Aufklärung, by seeking to interpret the phenomenon of the natural 
world through the prism of reason, of logos, liberated nature from the perception of an 
arbitrary and capricious entity. But employing reason or logos in the manner in which it does, 
that is, to the exclusion of creative reason or reason as an act of God over matter, swings the 
pendulum to another extreme that distorts the harmony that ought to exist between faith and 
reason vis-à-vis the subject matter of nature or material creation. What emerges in place of 
this excessive amplification of logos by the Aufklärung is what Ratzinger describes as human 
beings as creators, replacing God the Creator: “God’s creation and ‘nature’ are having to 
                                               
 18 Joseph Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2006), 112.  
 19 Joseph Ratzinger, “In the Beginning…”: A Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the 
Fall, trans. Boniface Ramsey, O.P. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 14.  
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defend themselves against the limitless pretensions of human beings as creator. Human 
beings want to understand the discovered world only as material for their own creativity.”20 
In this new scenario, the doctrine of creation appears as the cause of the pillage of the world.  
 And what drives this sense of humans as creators via mere rationality – at least in the 
Ratzingerian reading of things – is that the question of what humans can do has replaced the 
question of who humans being are. To Ratzinger, these two questions are inseparable, that is, 
the question of who we are and the question of what we can do.21 And the two questions bear 
a striking semblance to the question of being and time that so much concerned the Eleatics. 
To Ratzinger, Plato and Aristotle will later on resolve this question in favor of being, that is, 
given primacy to who we are before what we do or can do, which shows itself in time.22 
Ratzinger argues that it is with Hegel that the decisive turning point against being happens, 
for with Hegel’s phenomenology of the human spirit as spirit returning to itself in history, 
being itself is now regarded as time. The logos becomes itself in history. The logos “cannot 
be assigned, therefore, to any particular point in history or be viewed as something existing 
in itself outside of history. All its historical objectifications are but movements in the whole 
of which they are parts.”23 All of history is therefore a self-evolution of the logos as it seeks 
to bring about a universal reconciliation, from consciousness to self-consciousness through to 
reason to spirit, to religion and finally, to absolute knowing. Through these stages, faith 
emerges as knowledge, in which one share God’s knowledge of himself and his world, or 
                                               
 20 Ratzinger, “In the Beginning…,” 81.  
 21 Ratzinger, “In the Beginning…,” 82.  
 22 Joseph Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology, 
trans. Mary Frances McCarthy, S.N.D. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 16.  
 23 Ratzinger, Principles, 16.  
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when our knowledge becomes constitutive of what God is. God is appearing as Pure Spirit, 
not extrinsic to the self, but within the self.  
 Unfortunately, Ratzinger maintains, while the Aufklärung clearly focused on the what 
we can do, on humans as actors as is evident in the Hegelian dialectic that Ratzinger invokes 
as highlighted above, the Aufklärung largely submerged the question of being in favor of the 
question of doing, of activity. As seen in Hegel, for example, spirit is an active process of 
consciousness in a circle of unfolding unto itself, bringing action to the level of absolute 
knowing. However, even when the human being in this process of nature becomes the 
absolute self to the extent that human beings eschew God the Creator for human creators, the 
effect, as Ratzinger sees it, is that humans end up sawing off the branch on which they sit, for 
who we are as humans is rooted in the unique and transcendental origins in God the Creator 
of Heaven and Earth. It is as a consequence of our dignity in God that we can live a life of 
hope, for hope is a theological virtue in which the believer places his present and his future 
into the hands of a good and loving God.   
 Ratzinger sees the development of the rejection of the doctrine of creation by the 
mode of thinking of the Aufklärung as having emerged in three stages, in what he describes 
as culminating in the crisis of modern consciousness or modernity. Firstly, the starting point 
for Ratzinger is with the philosophy of Giordano Bruno, in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Bruno was responsible for the emphatic rediscovery of the cosmos in its divinity. 
To Ratzinger, it is precisely this reversion to a divine cosmos that brings about the recession 
of faith in creation. Here, “re-naissance” means “relinquishing the Christian so that the Greek 
can be restored in all its pagan purity.”24 The world thus appears as a divine fullness at peace 
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within itself. By contrast, creation makes the world to depend on something other than itself, 
so much so that for Bruno, as per Ratzinger’s reading of him, the Christian idea of the 
world’s dependence of this something else seems to deprive the world of its power. The 
world must therefore be protected against this divine threat, for the world itself is self-
grounding. The world itself is divine. While one can acknowledge the contingency of 
individual things, any talk of contingency of the world as a whole cannot be accepted. 
Ratzinger maintains that in the final analysis, this perspective of seeing the world as a whole 
as self-sufficient and contingent on no other is an aesthetic prelude to an increasingly 
dominant idea in the modern mind which increasingly views religious faith with suspicion, 
seeing it “ as the real barrier to human freedom, that basis of all other restrictions, the first 
thing needed to be eliminated if humankind is to effectively liberated.”25 Hence, the rejection 
of the doctrine of creation is an expression of the Aufklärung’s quest for liberty, understood 
as the absence of any reliance on an external God. 
 The second phase of this journey away from faith in creation by the modern mind 
coincides with the figure of Galileo. Ratzinger maintains that with Galileo, one encounters 
the return to Greece, not in its aesthetic and emancipatory form, but in a reversion to the 
mathematic side of platonic thought: “God does geometry is the way he expresses his 
concepts of God and nature as well as his scientific ideal. God wrote the book of nature with 
arithmetic letters. Studying geometry enables us to touch the traces of God.”26 To Ratzinger, 
this position of Galileo implies that the knowledge of God is turned into the knowledge of the 
mathematical structures of nature. The concept of nature as science therefore takes the place 
of the concept of creation. Given this state of affairs, the whole of knowledge is hereby fitted 
                                               
 25 Ratzinger, “In the Beginning…,” 84.  
 26 Ratzinger, “In the Beginning…,” 84.  
171 
 
into the schema of subject and object, so much so that what is not objective is subjective. The 
challenge this position poses is that only the object is defined by natural science as objective, 
that is, only the things that can be concretely exhibited and examined are defined as 
objective. As Ratzinger comments:  
The subjective is everything arbitrary and private, everything outside of science; as 
arbitrary, it is unworthy of knowledge. “God does geometry.” Determined by this 
axiom, God has to become platonic. He dwindles away to be little more than the 
formal mathematical structures perceived by science in nature.27  
 
Thus, even if Galileo does not explicitly reject God as First Cause of nature, the fact that God 
as First Cause reveals itself only in nature, in the mathematics of nature and not to humans in 
revelation, is clearly a God that has abandoned humans to a realm of beyond the sphere of 
influence of this God. In the final analysis, such a First Cause is no longer God but a 
scientific hypothesis. On the other hand, maintains Ratzinger, a God who is likewise 
restricted to the inner world of piety with nothing to do with the rationality of creation is also 
no longer God, for he is devoid of reality and ultimately meaningless. As Ratzinger argues:  
Only when creation and covenant come together can either creation or covenant be 
realistically discussed – the one presupposes the other. A mere first cause does not 
express the idea of creation because it thinks of causa in terms of the scientific idea of 
causality. Such a cause is not God, but just a cause – a hypothetically postulated 
active member of a series of things that can be postulated in science.28 
 
Once again, Ratzinger’s penchant for the synthesis of faith and reason comes into play here. 
While the mathematical God of Galileo is insufficient in terms of explaining nature, a 
pietistic God that has nothing to do with mathematics is likewise inadequate, for such a God 
will have nothing to say about matter, and a God that has nothing to say about matter is 
irrelevant and useless, for the materiality is essential to what it means to be. One must 
                                               
 27 Ratzinger, “In the Beginning…,” 84.  
 28 Ratzinger, “In the Beginning…,” 85 – 86.  
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therefore find a common ground between the geometrical God of Galileo, the God of reason, 
and the pietistic God of the believer who is open to the voice of revelation, the God of faith. 
Only with such a rapprochement are we able to find the full breadth of meaning in creation as 
nature and the covenant as God’s invitation to humans to participate in the act of co-creating 
the world. Thus, it is by acknowledging the limitation of the subject/object schema of Galileo 
and the limitation of pietistic irrational sentimentalism that we can arrive at a fuller picture of 
reality as created and yet in need of human rationality to bring nature to its full potentials.  
 To Ratzinger, the third phase of the movement away from creation that we have seen 
in Bruno and Galileo finds its locus with Martin Luther. With Bruno and Galileo, one finds a 
passionate desire to return to a pre-Christian, Greek and pagan world, as it were, beyond the 
synthesis of Jerusalem and Athens that had been formed over time. They thus laid the 
foundation of the post-Christian world of reason. For Luther, the Greek element symbolizes 
the alienation of Christianity which must be gotten rid of, in order to establish a pure 
Christianity: “The Greek element that he tries to eliminate from Christianity he finds above 
all in the concept of the cosmos, in the question of being, and therefore in the area of the 
doctrine of creation.”29 Being for Luther is an expression of the burden of the past, of the 
shackles and chains of one’s damnation.  
 Redemption happens when one is liberated from the chains of the past, from the 
shackles of being. Redemption is the rejection of nature and the embrace of the nothingness 
of God, for the human being cannot help the self, for there is nothing good in nature. Only 
faith and hope in God’s saving goodness, that is, grace, can save one. As Ratzinger sees 
things, “grace is seen here in radical opposition to creation, which is marked through and 
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through by sin; it implies an attempt to get behind creation.”30 Luther must hold on to grace 
in opposition to creation because the world to Luther is one of intrinsic corruption. Without 
the mystery of redemptive love, therefore, the world inevitably becomes dualistic, for by 
nature, the world is geometry; but as history, the world is the drama of evil, from which 
Luther cries out for a merciful God that can save his soul. 
 To Ratzinger, only with Hegel do we arrive at a crescendo of the currents building up 
from Bruno, Galileo and Luther. “It was Hegel,” Ratzinger writes, “who made the systematic 
attempt to resolve this antimony and thereby to achieve the supreme philosophy. Hegel’s 
system is ultimately a gigantic theodicy.”31 Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit reveals a God 
who must not be seen as the eternal self-existent Almighty Being, different from the reality 
of the world. Rather, God for Hegel exists in the process of reasoning. This God comes into 
being only in the other and in exchange with the other. In other words, God is the spirit of the 
community, as Hegel himself explains in his understanding of the meaning of religion. All 
cultural and intellectual activities, Hegel explains:   
Find their ultimate center in the one thought of God, God is the beginning of all 
things and the end of all things. God is the one and only object of philosophy. Its 
concern is to occupy itself with God, to spread everything in him, to lead everything 
back to him, as well as to derive everything particular from God and to justify 
everything only insofar as it stems from God, is sustained through its relationship 
with him, lives by his radiance and has within itself the mind of God. Thus, 
philosophy is theology, and one’s occupation with philosophy – or rather in 
philosophy – is of itself the service of God.32 
 
                                               
 30 Ratzinger, “In the Beginning…,” 88. Ratzinger maintains that this rendition of Luther here certainly 
does not give a complete description of Luther’s doctrine of creation, but only a spiritual aspect, which results 
from the drama of Luther’s experience of grace.   
 31 Ratzinger, “In the Beginning…,” 89.  
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The whole universe, the whole of history is therefore in this process of reason, and the 
individual moments in this process from consciousness to absolute knowing find their 
meaning as parts of the whole, as spirit unfolding in various processes and coming home to 
itself. As Peter C. Hodgson points out, “Spirit” or “mind” (Geist) is in fact the ultimate 
Hegelian category, descriptive of that process of embodied consciousness which 
encompasses finitude and yet is itself intrinsically infinite, universal and absolute.33 In this 
Hegelian sense of spirit, God is spirit, but also is the human being, though in the modality of 
finitude and differentiation.  
 Spirit, therefore, first appears in the form of finite consciousness, and the telos of both 
logical idea and finite spirit is the actuality of God as absolute spirit. God, as an absolute 
idea, is the beginning of all things. God as absolute spirit, is the end of all things. Hodgson 
maintains, “at each stage of consciousness, spirit remains unfulfilled and is constantly drawn 
beyond itself in the quest for a more adequate and encompassing reconciliation of estranged 
antithesis.”34 Looking at Hegel’s ladder, therefore, one sees consciousness as being in 
constant motion, with each stage following the next. There is no possibility of being static. 
As Paul Ricoeur points out, each form of consciousness in Hegel’s ladder finds its meaning 
in what follows. What is before us, therefore, is a teleology of consciousness in which spirit 
is constituted as spirit in the very dialectic of transition from one figure to the next.35 And 
this quest for spirit is essentially a religious quest! 
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 Given this Hegelian religious dialectic, Ratzinger writes that the historical religious 
data, such as Good Friday as the day of Christ’s crucifixion, becomes, in the Hegelian 
scheme of things, an expression of the speculative Good Friday, that is, of the necessity of 
rising up to oneself after the experience of defeat.36 This is the sense in which the Hegelian 
system appears as a gigantic theodicy, in which the problem of theodicy is resolved. Insight 
replaces sin, and evil is bound up with finitude and therefore is unreal vis-à-vis infinitude. 
Suffering is the pain of limitation and when taken up into the whole of reality, suffering is 
abolished.37 The Hegelian system is therefore largely idealistic, though not devoid of political 
motivation,38 as seen in the Marxist call to action.  
 To Ratzinger, this Hegelian theoretical dialectic finds concreteness with Marx, in 
whose thought it becomes a call to action. Redemption is now construed as the “praxis” of 
the human being, a denial of creation or indeed, as per Ratzinger’s reading, as an antithesis to 
faith in creation.39 Ratzinger makes his case of the Marxist fulfilment of the Hegelian 
dialectic with two arguments:40 Firstly, “the individual is taken up and abolished in the 
whole.”41 The individual as individual “is robbed of reality.”42 The instrument of operation 
within history is the party, “the organized form of class.”43 The “I” of the individual ceases to 
be of any significance, as the individual consciousness is taken up into class consciousness, 
in which individual suffering no longer counts.44 What matters is the logic of the system and 
the sustainment of that system through human work understood as human creation.  
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 Secondly, creation is defined as dependence, origin ab alio.45 Creation is taken over 
by the category of self-creation, accomplished through work. Ratzinger concludes: “Since 
creation equals dependence, and dependence is the antithesis of freedom, the doctrine of 
creation is opposed to the fundamental direction of Marxist thought.”46 To Ratzinger, 
therefore, creation is the total antithesis to Marxism.47 This rejection of dependence and life 
as encountered is the strongest fuel for the Marxist movement. These points said, it can be 
noted that Ratzinger’s reading of Marxism places accent on its perceived weaknesses, 
perhaps to the point of overlooking the issues in need of redress that might have motivated 
Marx, such as the socio-economic imbalances in the world.  
 Overall, however, it is clear that to Ratzinger, the historical trajectory of Bruno, 
Galileo, Luther, Hegel and Marx is indicative of the fact that the concept of creation 
constitutes a crossroads in the intellectual development that marked the Aufklärung. 
Ratzinger identifies three strands or modes of concealment of creation exhibited by the 
intellectual character of the Aufklärung: Firstly, the concept of creation is concealed by the 
scientific concept of nature, understood exclusively in the sense of the object of science, 
admitting of no other meaning. Given this positivistic view of “science,” Ratzinger points out 
that “theological arguments about the ‘nature of humans’ or ‘natural rights,’ resting as they 
do on the concept of creation, meet a look of blank incomprehension; in fact, they seem 
nonsensical, the relic of an archaic ‘natural philosophy’.”48 But this naturality of science does 
not correspond to reality, for life is about daily choices, and this implies that decision making 
must find a criteria beyond mere naturalness. Absent a criterion for decision making, humans 
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would appear “condemned” to a formless freedom.49 Life could easily degenerate into a 
meaningless cycle.  
 Ratzinger thus concludes antithetically to the Aufklärung’s self-sufficiency of nature, 
that “if creation cannot be recognized as the metaphysical middle term between nature and 
artificiality, then the plunge into nothingness is unavoidable.”50 Secondly, the concept of 
creation is further concealed in modern enlightenment mode of thinking in the form of a 
resentment against humans, seen as a disease of nature. Humans are perceived as disturbing 
of the beautiful balance of nature, diseased by their mind and its consequence, that is, 
freedom. As Ratzinger claims, mind and freedom are the sickness of nature, and humans and 
the world must be delivered from these if there is to be a redemption. To restore the balance, 
humans must be healed of being human. This is seen, Ratzinger contends, in various forms of 
nihilism becoming an ever-greater temptation for the youth of the West.51 A third and final 
form of concealment against the concept of creation by the Aufklärung mode of thinking 
takes place on the theological level. Ratzinger asserts that here, “nature is undermined for the 
sake of grace; it is robbed of its belongings and gives way, so to speak, before grace. Here we 
should recall the crucial text of 1 Corinthians 15:46: ‘It is not the spiritual which is first but 
the physical, and then the spiritual’.”52 To Ratzinger, therefore, and in line with St. Paul, the 
logic does not flow such that the spiritual precedes the physical. It always has to be the other 
way round, in order for us not to be absorbed into a monism of grace. Once we skip over the 
physical, creation is denied and grace is deprived of its foundation:  
A selflessness that tries to abolish one’s own “I” degenerates into “I-lessness,” and 
then “Thou-lessness” follows directly. This undermining of creation can never 
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become a vehicle of grace, but only of an odium generis humani, a Gnostic 
disenchantment with creation, which ultimately does not and cannot desire grace any 
longer.53 
 
In other words, the valuable contribution of Thomas Aquinas that grace builds and does not 
destroy nature, continues to be irrevocable for Ratzinger, for as he asserts above, creation, in 
this case, embodiment, constitutes a unique source of grace in its own right.  
 In defending the human body and in arguing against could be characterized as 
Christian spiritualism, Ratzinger invokes the foundationality of love in the Christian religious 
experience. In other words, Christian love presupposes faith in the Creator, for it implies an 
acceptance of the self as God’s creature and a love of the Creator’s creation in me. This love 
for the Creator must lead one to the freedom of accepting one’s self and any other person as 
equal members of the Body of Christ.54 In a word, one could say that love for the Creator 
implies not only a total rejection of ancient Gnosticism 
 Following Ratzinger’s thinking, therefore, it would not be wrong to draw the 
conclusion that the Aufklärung’s rejection of creation as a conscious act by a benevolent 
God, opting rather for a self-sufficiency of nature as ordered by an inherent necessary 
causality, is a return of the ancient heresy of Gnosticism that the early Church had to deal 
with, albeit this time under the guise of mere rationality of nature. With this rebirth of 
Gnosticism comes a rejection of “the mystery of suffering, of love, of substitutionary 
redemption, in favor of a control of the world and of life through knowledge.”55 Isn’t this 
what one encounters in Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, for example, that is, this rejection of 
redemptive substitutionary suffering, and love? This rejection of the whole Christian 
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experience of a personal God who though utterly different from one, knows one because this 
God is both Creator and Redeemer.  
 Because faith in God as Creator implies dependence on God and given that such a 
dependence is an antithesis to the Aufklärung’s objective of knowledge and power through 
knowledge, nature as necessary causality not needing a Creator is the only logical exit. 
Consistency demands that the Aufklärung not entrust the self to a world already created. It 
could only entrust one to a world still to be created, so that skill, and not trust or religious 
faith, constitutes the only requirement or precondition for participation in such a world.  
 For the believer, the option is the exact opposite of this Gnostic model of the 
Aufklärung, for all of nature is a fruit of God’s creative love. In biblical revelation the very 
first line introduces the theme of creation. Holy Writ begins with the words: “In the 
beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form and void, and 
darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the Spirit of God was moving over the face of 
the waters. And God said, ‘Let there be light’; and there was light” (Gen 1:1-2). The Priestly 
account continues with the beautiful refrain that accompanies the narrative, “and God saw 
that it was good.” For much of orthodox Christianity, particularly Roman Catholicism, these 
words constitute the first reading of the series of readings that constitute the Solemnity of the 
Easter Virgil. This biblical text is “translated” into the first article of the Nicene Creed, as 
revelation continued to unfold as the tradition of the church developed. These first lines of 
the Creed constitute at once a prayer of praise and a confession of one of the core beliefs of 
the church: that God is the “maker of heaven and earth, of all that is seen and unseen.” The 
creation theme recurs again and again in the prophetic and wisdom literature, in the Pauline 
writings, and in the Gospels. Finally, in the Apocalypse we find a hymn in praise to the 
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Creator: “You are worthy, our Lord and God, to receive glory and honor and power, for you 
created all things, and by your will they existed and were created” (Rev 4:11). 
On the other hand, because the words of Genesis belong to Israel’s faith – though its 
contents are shared with all the great civilizations of the world - it is worth noting that a 
proper theological understanding of Israel’s faith in creation ought to be located during the 
Babylonian Exile of Israel’s geo-political and religious history.56 Israel had lost its land and 
temple, and according to the mentality of the time this was something incomprehensible, for 
it meant that the God of Israel was vanquished – a God whose people, whose land, and 
whose worshippers could be snatched away from him.57 A God who could not defend his 
worshippers was seen to be, at the time, a weak God. Indeed, he was no God at all; he had 
abandoned his divinity. Thus, being driven out of their land and being erased from the map of 
the earth was for Israel a terrible trial: “Has our God been vanquished, and is our faith void?” 
Israel wondered!58 One could say that Israel’s exile posed a fundamental threat to Israel’s 
conviction about her understanding of God.  
Something unique happens at this stage of Israel’s faith: “The prophets opened a new 
page and taught Israel that it was only then (in exile that) the true face of God appeared and 
that he was not restricted to that particular piece of land. He had never been.”59 Though God 
had promised this piece of land to Abraham before Abraham settled there, he had been able 
to bring his people out of Egypt. God could do both things because “he was not the God of 
one place but had power over heaven and earth.”60 He could, therefore, drive his faithless and 
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disobedient people into another land in order to make himself known there. In her seeming 
defeat, Israel entered a new understanding of her God.  
 In the context of real physical suffering, Israel came to understand that her God was 
unlike the other gods, that he was the God who held sway over every land and people. He 
could do this, however, because he himself had created everything in heaven and on earth. It 
was in exile and in the seeming defeat of Israel that there occurred an opening to the 
awareness of the God who holds every people and all of history in his hands, who holds 
everything because he is the creator of everything and the source of all power. This faith now 
had to find its own contours, and it had to do so precisely in opposition to the seemingly 
victorious religion of Babylon, vis-à-vis the great Babylonian creation accounts of Enuma 
Elish marked by splendid displays in liturgies like that of the New Year, in which the re-
creation of the world was celebrated and brought to its fulfilment.61 The world was said to be 
produced out of a struggle between opposing powers.  
 The world assumed its form when Marduk, the god of light, appeared and split in two 
the body of the primordial dragon. Heaven and earth came to be from that sundered body, the 
firmament and the earth from the sundered body of the dread dragon, and the human beings 
from the blood of the Marduk.62 In other words, the world is a dragon’s body, and human 
beings have dragon’s blood in them. As Ratzinger points out, “at the very origin of the world 
lurks something sinister, and in the deepest part of humankind there is something rebellious, 
demonic, and evil.”63 Given this milieu, only a dictator, the king of Babylon, Marduk’s 
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representative, can repress the demonic and restore order to the world. Ratzinger makes a 
nuanced synthesis of this state of things of the ancient Near East religions:  
Such views were not simply fairy tales. They expressed the discomfiting realities that 
human beings experienced in the world and among themselves. For often enough it 
looks as if the world is a dragon’s lair and human blood is dragon’s blood. But 
despite all oppressive experiences the scriptural account says that it was not so. The 
whole tale of these sinister powers melts away in a few words: “The earth was 
without form and void.” Behind these Hebrew words lie the dragon and the demonic 
powers that are spoken of elsewhere.64 
 
It is only with the context of the confusing myths of Babylon that one can see in bolder relief, 
the dramatic confrontation implicit in the biblical text. The world emerges as a creation of 
God’s Reason and God’s Word. The Sun and the Moon are no longer gods, but lamps placed 
by God in the sky for the measurement of time – a sacrilegious statement to make, to near 
Easterners. The world was not a product of a demonic confrontation but of God’s Logos. 
Creation therefore places the world in reason and freedom. This is the context in which 
Ratzinger sees the theology of creation as the true Aufklärung dispelling the darkness of fear, 
violence, darkness and the demonic.65 Reason, love and freedom are the enlightened fruits 
that characterize faith in Creation as opposed to the violence of the Babylonian and pagan 
myths of the near Eastern religions. Creation as an act of the Logos of God, God’s word, as 
one finds in Genesis, finds its fulfilment as testified in the New Testament, in which the 
Creator becomes the Redeemer, at the fullness of time (Gal 4:4). Creation and Redemption 
are therefore not extrinsic to each other, but mutually enrich and complement each other. One 
can make the argument that creation itself is God’s redemption of the material from the non-
God of violence, chaos and contradictory and irrational mythologies.  
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 Summarily, Ratzinger’s argument is that by understanding nature as an object, the 
Aufklärung sought to explain the self-sufficiency of nature in order to dispense of the 
necessity of God, of creatural dependence on God, which is a precondition for faith in the 
Creator God. But nature on its own cannot explain the being of creation, for nature as 
objectified by the Aufklärung denies the indispensable place of the subjective which gives 
meaning and interprets the objectified. By rejecting faith in creation in reference to the 
necessary causality of nature, it rejected love, the only reason for God to create the world. By 
rejecting faith in creation, it likewise rejected the transcendental dignity of the human being 
created in the image and likeness of God, leaving the human being at the mercy of the 
dragon’s blood, a product of the carcass of creation. And finally, by rejecting creation for the 
concept of causality as natural necessary which takes the determination of things in 
themselves to be the determination of things in time, this conception of necessary natural 
causality of the Aufklärung cannot explain how character is built, and how one can hold 
someone responsible outside the framework of free action which characterizes the theology 
of creation, as expressed in the Genesis accounts of creation. Given these, it is difficult not to 
see why faith in God, Creator of Heaven and Earth, offers a more compelling alternative or 
proposition to the necessary causality or self-sufficiency of matter as propounded by the 
Aufklärung, as specifically illustrated by Hegel, as demonstrated in this section.  
 From a Christological perspective, what emerges from the above considerations, in 
the first place, is the realization that for Ratzinger, the figure of Christ who as Creative 
Reason is at the source of creation, reflects what one might call as a Christological rationality 
of love and freedom. Because Christ is at the origin and center of creation, there is no room 
to view creation from the perspective of fear and irrationality, from the view of Marduk. 
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Who is Christ? Christ is the Eternal Logos, Reason, and by his word, the heavens were made 
(Ps 33:6). This implies that faith in the person of Christ is not antithetical to reason, does not 
diminish the value of matter, of nature and of creation. On the other hand, rather than 
asserting that creation emanated from a chaotic, evil, irrational principle, the Christological 
orientation of the creation theology of Ratzinger asserts that creation is not only reasonable, a 
conscious act of God, but is likewise good. Creation is a fruit of the benevolence and 
rationality of the Logos who is Creative Reason.  
 This implies that even from an evolutionary perspective, God is not absent from 
creation as an ongoing process. In Christ, God is intrinsic to creation. Deism is not the 
Christian option. God remains Immanuel, with us. This points to the fact that Christ is not 
distant from the world, but, in recreating the world in the act of redemption, Christ is forever 
a part of creation. In other words, the fact of the incarnation has opened up a new dimension 
in the creation. The entrance of the figure of Christ into creation marks an evolutionary leap. 
In Christ, Creative Reason, creation has transcended the boundaries imposed by time and 
space, the aprioriness of time and space, to reference Kant, and has entered into a new phase 
of infinity, of boundlessness, precisely because of the event the incarnation and the 
resurrection have forever opened the limits of creation to the limitlessness of Divine Power.   
 Christologically speaking therefore, the new creation in Christ is the opening of the 
present of creation into the infinity and freedom of the Spirit that comes with the fact of the 
resurrection. It means that in the resurrection of Christ, creation has been liberated, as Paul 
says, from bondage, from slavery (Rom 8:21), into freedom. Only in this sense does creation 
not only return to its pristine form of goodness, beauty, and innocence, but even more, enters 
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into the definitive form of divinization that comes with the incarnation, the resurrection and 
the sending of the Spirit who breathes life into the new creation in Christ, into all of creation.  
 At this point, Christology opens to Pneumatology, for creation becomes remade and 
taken over by the Spirit of Christ, sent forth to renew the face of the earth and all creation (Ps 
104:30). The Christology of Ratzinger’s theology of the Logos as Creative Reason can 
therefore be characterized as a Christological Pneumatology, to the extent that creation is 
freed from fear, liberated from the darkness of the pagan myths and enters into the free spirit 
of Christ who imparts his Spirit unto creation. The person of Christ and the historical 
entrance of that person into history, into creation, forever changes the dynamics of creation. 
One could say that the Christology of creation, built on the person of Christ, makes creation a 
miracle, in the sense that God’s power, unleashed in its fullness in God’s Incarnate Son, is 
capable of suspending the laws of nature, of bringing nature to a new height of 
boundlessness, opening all of creation into the infinite possibilities of the New Adam, so 
much so that creation is prepared for that consummation which no eye has seen, nor ear 
heard, no the human mind conceive (1 Cor. 2:9). In other words, owing to the centrality of 
the figure of Christ in Ratzinger’s theology of creation, it is the case that creation will only 
reach its fullest potentials when creation enters the new heavens and the new earth (Rev. 
21:1-2). In this sense, Ratzinger’s Christological theology of creation spans from Christology 
to Pneumatology, while opening up to Eschatology, wherein Christ as the New Adam offers 





4.2 Logos as Son: Ratzinger’s Engagement with the Aufklärung’s Reinterpretation of 
the New Testament Gestalt of Jesus Christ 
 
 To the extent that the Aufklärung sought to demystify Christianity, it is axiomatic that 
the figure of Christ could not be left untouched by the Aufklärer, especially given that 
Christology, as we saw in Chapter Two, Section One, largely legitimized priestcraft and 
mediatory religion – a bone of contention for many of the Aufklärer. In other words, 
Christology – the life, death and resurrection of Christ – as propagated by institutional 
Christianity, perpetuated an infantile religious spirit by continuously making the people 
dependent on the priestly class that was now acting, as classical orthodoxy understood it, in 
persona Christi capitis. The figure of Christ and his central place in Christianity therefore 
made revelation as understood and interpreted by the religious hierarchy and as transmitted 
in the living tradition of the Church, the final arbiter of truth. This is untenable to the 
Aufklärung, that saw reason, and not revelation and priestcraft that propagated the tenets of 
revelation based on the figure of Christ, the final arbiter of truth.  
 To Kant, for example, this process of reason as the determinant of the existence of 
God and all else regarding religion constitutes the central nexus of the Aufklärung:  
Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. 
Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding (= reason) without the 
guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of 
understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of 
another. Sapere aude! [Dare to be wise!] Have courage to make use of your own 
understanding [= reason] is thus the motto of enlightenment.66  
 
To Kant, therefore, the process of reason’s ultimate autonomy is one that human beings must 
all work towards. If Kant had such a disdain for priestcraft as reflected in Religion, amongst 
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other reasons, it is precisely because he saw the priests as depriving people from thinking for 
themselves, since they established themselves as mediators between God and people. Kant 
out rightly rejects this priestcraft dominion of the clergy “over minds by pretending to have 
exclusive possession of the means of grace.”67 Priestcraft represents an unacceptable 
infantilizing of people that must be eschewed, once the religion of reason becomes 
commonplace in the world. To attain this, Kant had to reinterpret not only the figure of Christ 
and the God of biblical revelation, but the entire Christological assertions built on Christ.   
 Specifically, for Kant, the concept of the Divine Sonship of Christ is essentially 
humanity’s desire for the perfection, for moral perfection. To say that Jesus Christ is the Son 
of God says nothing about the ontological constitution of Jesus, neither does it entail any 
unique sense of purpose regarding the man Christ vis-à-vis a wholly different God. For Kant, 
Christ is the appearance of “a person whose wisdom, even purer than that of the previous 
philosophers, was as though descended from heaven.”68 The virgin birth of Christ is an “idea 
of reason.”69 It has nothing to do with a unique revelatory phase of God’s dealings with 
Israel, in the form of a messianic fulfillment of Old Testament prophecies. Talking about the 
suffering of Christ, Kant notes that it represents the contrast between the freedom of the 
children of heaven and a mere son of the earth, the central leitmotif being that it is profitably 
to die rather than compromise on virtue.70 To Kant, therefore, the suffering of Christ for the 
sake of the moral duty is clear enough for every human being to recognize as his or her duty. 
The rational meaning of the scriptural story, therefore, is that there is absolutely no salvation 
for human beings except by the innermost adoption of the genuine moral principles in their 
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disposition.71 In effect, salvation is not about accepting God’s offer of the new life in Christ 
Jesus, but the opening of the self to the moral law that lies within the self. The idea of the 
vicarious expiation of sin by Christ is therefore superstitious, even if testified to by Scripture. 
In fact, it is in the nature of things for Scripture to find an inner rapport with reason, for only 
then can the true meaning of Scripture emerge:  
Finally, any attempt like the present to find a meaning in Scriptures in harmony with 
the most holy teachings of reason must be held not only as permissible but as duty, 
and we may be reminded at this point of what the wise teacher said to his disciples 
regarding someone who went his own way, by which, he would have had eventually 
to come to the same goal: ‘Forbid him not; for he who is not against us is for us.72 
 
Strange as it might sound to believing eyes, it is the teachings of reason, not of Scripture that 
are most holy, for Kant, as he points out in this passage. It is the obedience to reason that 
brings about the proper moral disposition necessary to live as persons. Scripture is therefore, 
not an independent voice that gives guidance to reason, but rather, is such that it can only 
come to its true self when it passes through the purifying route of the pure moral disposition 
of reason.  
 The Gestalt of the Jesus that emerges from Kant is essentially that of a moral teacher, 
a wise teacher, whose path is prepared not by the Hebrew prophets or by John the Baptist, 
but by the Greek sages. Synthetically, the Jesus of the Gospels is four things for Kant: 
Firstly, Jesus is the one that announces himself as sent from heaven; Secondly, Jesus is the 
one who declares that service faith is inherently null and void and of no consequence; 
Thirdly, Jesus is the preacher of the moral faith of good life and conduct; and finally, Jesus 
provides an example of a humanity that is well-pleasing to God.73 The Kantian Jesus is 
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therefore a natural, good and wise moralist, with the sole task of teaching humans how to live 
a moral life that is pleasing to God.  
 Given this Weltanschauung, the resurrection of Jesus, the central event in defining the 
Gestalt of Jesus for orthodox Christianity, seemingly has no place in the Kantian scheme of 
things. Kant himself writes:  
The more esoteric story of his resurrection and ascension (which, simply as ideas of 
reason, would signify the beginning of another life and the entrance into the seat of 
salvation, i.e. into the society of all the good), added as sequel and witnessed only by 
his intimates, cannot be used in the interest of religion within the boundaries of mere 
reason, whatever its historical standing.74 
 
Thus, even if orthodox Christianity considers the resurrection as the defining event of what 
shapes Christianity, such a position clearly does not fit in with the Kantian system of rational 
faith, of moral religion, which essentially invites the adherent to will one’s duties as divine 
commands, for the sole purpose of attaining a pure moral disposition. In the Kantian scheme 
of things, therefore, happiness is equivalent to living the moral law as a self-willed duty, not 
a subservience of the self to some religious practices or cult. The rational Jesus of Kant 
therefore fits in with the Kantian moral religion.  
 Turning to Hegel as another example of the Aufklärung reinterpretation of the Gestalt 
of Jesus Christ, one finds, again, - in the spirit of the Aufklärung’s maxim of sapere aude - a 
picture of Christ the moralist, whose mission appears exclusively as that of a teacher of 
virtue. To Hegel, theological concepts such as the divinity of Christ, take on an inelastic and 
an all-inclusive character that empties any sense of uniqueness vis-à-vis the person of the 
historical Jesus of Nazareth. The presupposition underpinning Hegel’s philosophical 
theology is that God is not some extrinsic being, separate from humans and making demands 
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on humans. God is the moral law latent within every human being, and the historical Jesus of 
Nazareth is essentially a figure that comes along to awaken the ethical consciousness within 
each human being. The only way Christianity had to hold itself from degenerating into 
folklore will be if Christianity becomes a religion of reason and virtue.75 Given this 
understanding, the Jesus of Hegel is an apostle of virtue and reason.  
 To Hegel, therefore, biblical theophanies such as the voice from heaven that 
confirmed the divine sonship of Jesus were all invitations and confirmations of the 
foundationality and indispensability of the moral law: “Only this voice from heaven can 
instruct you concerning the higher demands of reason; and only by believing in it and 
heeding it does one find peace of mind and true greatness, and thus discover the dignity of 
which mankind is capable.”76 And in tandem with the general spirit of the Aufklärung, Hegel 
situates this moral law in the human being in the rational faculty:  
Indeed, by endowing man with reason the Deity so distinguished humankind from the 
rest of nature that man came alive with the reflected splendor of the divine essence; 
and only through his faith in reason does man fulfill his high destiny. Reason does not 
condemn the natural impulses, but governs and refines them; and whoever does not 
listen to it – by not duly appreciating its light, by failing to nourish it in himself – 
passes judgment on himself, having thus shown by his actions what sort of a fellow 
he is.77 
 
One notices here a tension in the Hegelian dialectic regarding nature. On the one hand, 
Hegel, the Tübingen theologian appears to subscribe to the notion of an a priori Deity or God 
who is the First Cause of the cosmos in general, and of man in particular. There is an action 
on the part of God, in that God is the source of reason in humans, a faculty that Hegel 
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considers to be of the divine essence. On the other hand, Hegel, the Tübingen Aufklärung 
post-Cartesian and post-Kantian thinker is eager to argue for the autonomy of reason in a 
manner that is independent of any religious Deity or confessional creeds and the restrictions 
that come with such cultic professions. It appears to be the case that while Hegel does not 
want to subscribe to a God who is extrinsic to nature and hence, directs nature with the 
resultant effect of religious absolutism and the offshoot of political despotism that 
accompanies it, Hegel is likewise unable to completely do away with the notion of God or of 
the religious. In the final analysis, a reconciliation of some sort is achieved when God 
becomes the spirit of the people in an all-inclusive sense.  
 Given this Hegelian worldview, therefore, the point of departure from which Hegel 
looks both at the Gestalt of Jesus and the New Testament presentation of Jesus, is essentially 
that of a moralist, an ethicist on a mission of reawakening the human race from an ethical 
slumber that is lethal. Clearly, even if Hegel sought to distance himself from Kant’s 
categorical imperatives, on the question of religion, specifically the Christian religion and the 
figure of Jesus of Nazareth, Hegel, like the rest of much of the Aufklärer, is heavily Kantian 
in his reinterpretation of Christianity. Notwithstanding, Hegel clearly displays a much more 
nationalistic bent in his divinization of what he considers to be the spirit of socio-political 
and cultural order, so much so that Hegel can be considered as the philosopher of the 
Prussian state.78 God becomes the spirit of the people, as resolved in the Phenomenology.  
 Discussing Christ’s divinity in his The Life of Jesus, for example, Hegel writes:  
When you regard your ecclesiastical statutes and positive precepts as the highest law 
given to mankind, you fail to recognize man’s dignity and his capacity to derive from 
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his own self the concept of divinity and the comprehension of the divine will. 
Whoever does not honor this capacity within himself does not revere the Deity.79 
 
Divinity is therefore, not a unique prerogative of Jesus Christ that he makes available to us. 
On the contrary, divinity is already in each and every one of us. What Jesus does is to 
awaken us to that consciousness. Jesus brings this about by pointing out the moral law, by 
calling us to a prioritization of ethics and the moral life through the aid of reason, for “pure 
reason, transcending all limits, is divinity itself – whereby and in accordance with which the 
very plan of the world is ordered (John 1). Through reason man learns of his destiny, the 
unconditional purpose of his life.”80 This purpose of human life is to discover the moral law 
within and to live a life of virtue based on this moral law. For example, in his reinterpretation 
of the confrontation between Jesus and the Pharisees when the latter asked the former about 
his authority to teach publicly in the temple, Hegel has Jesus say to the Pharisees: “Do you 
really believe that the Deity threw the human species into the world and left it at the mercy of 
nature without a law, without awareness of the purpose of its existence, and without the 
possibility of discovering within itself how might become pleasing to him?”81 Here again, the 
tension in the Hegelian dialectic regarding the being of God as a creative Deity emerges: On 
the one hand, Hegel acknowledges God’s existence, but what precisely does Hegel mean by 
the Deity? It seems that even if such a Deity existed as creator, the most the Deity can be is a 
watch maker who allows the watch, or in this context, creation or nature, to unfold based on 
an inner, unaided causality.  
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 To turn to the central event of Jesus’ passion and crucifixion, Hegel has Jesus explain 
his passion in exclusively moral terms, that is, Jesus gives his life to awaken humans to the 
moral law. Hegel’s Jesus says:  
This inner law is a law of freedom to which a person submits voluntarily, as though 
he had imposed it on himself. It is eternal, and in it lies the intimation of immortality. 
Obliged as I am to awaken men to this law, I, like any responsible shepherd, am 
prepared to give up my life for my flock. Perhaps you will take my life; but if you do, 
you will not be robbing me of it, because I offer it freely. You, however, are slaves. 
You stand yoked by a law imposed on you from without; and this is why you are 
powerless to wrest yourself free of bondage to your inclinations through self-
respect.82 
 
Jesus’ passion is therefore, a consequence of Jesus’ dedication to virtue, to his efforts to 
summon his confreres to the path of virtue that is inbuilt in them, but which, over time, had 
become clouded owing to Jewish national prejudices and cultic adulterations and ruinations. 
And the crux of Jesus’ eschatological discourse consists in this:  
But now that I depart from you, I am not leaving you behind as though you were 
orphans; I leave you with a guide within yourselves. The seed of goodness that reason 
has sown inside you I have awakened in each of you, and the memory of my teaching 
and love for you will sustain in you this spirit of truth and virtue – a spirit which 
people do not embrace only because they are ignorant of it and do not search for it 
within their souls. You have become men, able at last to trust in yourselves without 
having need of external restraints. Once I am no longer with you, your developed 
moral sense shall be your guide (…) The Holy Spirit of virtue will keep you from 
stumbling.83 
  
To Hegel, therefore, Jesus, the moralist and virtue ethician has, by his historical life, 
awakened in his disciples the consciousness of the moral law, which constituted the sole 
mission of his coming into the world. Hegel is not concerned that his Life of Jesus finds no 
historical anticipations in the Old Testament, nor any equivalence in the thoughts of the 
Fathers or early Christian writers. And reducing Christianity to morality leaves Hegel with no 
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qualms. If anything, - and very much like Kant – such is the ultimate destiny of Christianity, 
that is, a moral reawakening of a people lost in religious absolutism. 
 It is perhaps striking that like Kant, Hegel has no space for the resurrection of Jesus 
as a particular trans-historical event in the subjective person of Jesus of Nazareth, with 
repercussions for world history, at least, for the believing Christian. If the resurrection is the 
Father’s vindication of the mission of the Son – “You are my Son, today have I begotten 
you,” (Heb 5:5), then its existential absence in the Kantian and Hegelian systems is a further 
indication of the erosion of the unique sense of sonship that Christian orthodoxy understands 
Jesus as the Logos of God to be. The Aufklärung paradigm that emerges from both Kant and 
Hegel, in the final analysis, is one that empties sonship from any exclusive meaning in terms 
of relationship between the Father and Jesus of Nazareth. Sonship is replaced with the 
category of a moralist or an ethicist. It will not be completely out of place to conclude that 
the Hegelian system is a further development of the Aufklärung’s anthropologization of 
religion, in which the human being not only replaces God, but “God” as Feuerbach logically 
concludes from the development of Kant to Hegel, essentially becomes a projection of the 
human mind.84 Christianity is essentially an endless striving for religious perfectionism that 
is centered on the self, and in this sense, egocentric. One can make a distinction between, on 
the one hand, the theocentric faith of orthodox Christianity, and, on the other hand, the 
anthropocentric faith of the Aufklärung, as seen in the preceding paragraphs, embodied in 
Kant and Hegel. But what precisely emerges when the figure of Christ is reinterpreted as one 
finds in the Aufklärung? Essentially, it amounts to a rejection of the historical uniqueness of 
the man Jesus of Nazareth, with the ultimate goal of denying Jesus’ divinity. This is the 
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challenge that these philosophical theological reconstructions of Jesus eventually lead to, and 
this is what constitutes a profound challenge in need of an engaging response, for Ratzinger.  
 To Ratzinger, the challenge of these reinterpretations of the figure of Christ lies not 
so much in apprehension and engagement by these philosophical constructs or 
reconstructions, critical as such a task might be if theology is to remain in dialogue with 
theology. The issue, as Ratzinger sees it, resides in the unsurmountable gulf that such 
philosophical theological attempts bring about between the historical Jesus and the Christ of 
faith, first, in Protestant liberal theology, and later on, in Roman Catholicism. Ratzinger 
wonders: “But what faith in Jesus as the Christ possibly mean, in Jesus as the Son of the 
living God, if the man Jesus was so completely different from the picture that the Evangelists 
painted of him and that the Church, on the evidence of the Gospels, takes as the basis of her 
preaching?”85 In effect, reinterpretations of Jesus such as Hegel’s The Life of Jesus and 
Kant’s Mere Religion as shown above, while certainly constituting a remarkable rational 
achievement in terms of reason’s self-understanding of Jesus of Nazareth, fails to explain 
why the believer must now trust Hegel’s reading of the Gestalt of Jesus rather than the 
portraits of the gospel writers.  
 Such a questioning is necessary for any meaningful evaluation for the added reason 
that the portraits of Jesus that one finds in the gospels constitutes an integral part of the living 
faith experience, from the early Christians to the post-modern world. Following the 
Aufklärung and the spirit of modernity that came with it and the subsequent reconstructions 
of the life of Jesus that followed, Ratzinger points out, “if you read a number of these 
reconstructions one after the other, you see at once that far from uncovering an icon that has 
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become obscured over time, they are much more like photographs of their authors and the 
ideals they hold.”86 Thus, the Jesus of Kant is a moralist exclusively bent on calling us 
towards the fulfillment of the moral law. The Jesus of Hegel is likewise an ethicist, a moral 
exemplar meant to point to the moral law within thanks to which the community spirit is the 
divine spirit. Clearly, what is set aside regarding the person of Jesus is his divine sonship in 
the sense of a reflection of Jesus’ intimate and exclusive relationship and communion with 
the Father, and secondly, in the sense of Jesus’ self-description of himself in a way that 
marks both Jesus’ origin and the destiny of his mission. 
 But what does Ratzinger make of all these and how does he feel about these historical 
reconstructions of the life of Jesus, seen not only in Reimarus but even with others of a later 
date like Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche? Ratzinger acknowledges that all these attempts have 
helped us gain a better insight into the reading of Scripture, as we are able to see the different 
layers of tradition that helped formed and shaped the texts. However, Ratzinger maintains 
that not only has the Gestalt of Jesus become progressively obfuscated with every innovative 
historical reconstruction, but, and most importantly, “the reconstruction of this Jesus (who 
could only be discovered by going behind the traditions and sources used by the Evangelists) 
became more and more incompatible with one another.”87 There is the Jesus who is an anti-
Roman revolutionary who ended up as a failure. There is the Jesus as a meek moral teacher 
who approves everything and ends up in grief.  
 To Ratzinger, most of these reconstructions, rather than uncovering Jesus, ended up 
obscuring him.88 In other words, and this is certainly debatable, many of the reconstructions 
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that followed the sense of the historical that came with the Aufklärung were much more 
subjective psychologizing of Jesus, rather than historical accounts, if by history, we mean a 
disengaged reporting of events past. To summarize Ratzinger:  
All these attempts have produced a common result: the impression that we have very 
little certain knowledge of Jesus and that only a later stage did faith in his divinity 
shape the image we have of him. This impression has by now penetrated deeply into 
the minds of the Christian people at large. This is a dramatic situation for faith, 
because its point of reference is being placed in doubt: Intimate friendship with Jesus, 
on which everything depends, is in danger of clutching at thin air.89 
  
Thus, Ratzinger is keen on the fact that the historical reading of the figure of Jesus, when 
driven to extremes in the sense of the mere historical, ends up leaving us only with the 
personal opinions of the authors. It would seem that even with the best of intentions of 
Reimarus, Kant, Hegel and other Aufklärung figures, the Jesus of Nazareth, the Jesus who 
walked the dusty roads of first century Palestine refuses to become an object in the historical 
laboratory of writers who will subject him to the principles of mere reason. Responding to 
these historical reconstructions of the life of Jesus in the spirit of historical rationality rooted 
in the Aufklärung, Schweitzer incisively writes:  
Jesus of Nazareth will not suffer himself to be modernized as an historical figure. He 
refuses to be detached from his own time (…) He will no longer be a Jesus Christ to 
whom the religion of the present can ascribe its own thought and ideas (…) Nor will 
he be a figure which can be made by a popular historical treatment as sympathetic 
and universally intelligible to the multitude (…) With the specific characteristics of 
his notions and his actions, the historical Jesus will be to our time a stranger and an 
enigma (…)  The mistake was to suppose that Jesus could come to mean more to our 
time by entering into it as a man like ourselves. But that is not possible. First because 
such a Jesus never existed. Secondly because, although historical knowledge can no 
doubt introduce greater clarity into an existing spiritual life, it can never call life into 
existence (…)90 
 
And Schweitzer devoutly concludes:  
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He (Jesus) comes to us as one unknown, without a name, as of old, by the lakeside, he 
came to those men who did not know who he was. He says the same words, “Follow 
me,” and sets us to those tasks which he must fulfil in our time. He commands. And 
to those who hearken to him, whether wise or unwise, he will reveal himself in the 
peace, the labors, the conflicts and the suffering that they may experience in his 
fellowship, and as an ineffable mystery they will learn who he is.91 
  
 
 I think Ratzinger is very much in the same line of thought with Schweitzer, regarding 
questions not only surrounding the historical verification of the figure and deeds of Jesus of 
Nazareth, but even so, the value of such historical reconstructions for the overriding goal of 
enhancement of faith. Like Schweitzer, Ratzinger does not deny the absolute necessity of this 
process of historicization of the origins of the Christian faith. Ratzinger acknowledges that 
the factum historicum is not an interchangeable symbolic cipher for biblical faith, but the 
foundation upon which Christian faith is constructed, for when we proclaim in the Creed, Et 
incarnatus est, we implicitly and explicitly acknowledge the entrance of God into history. 
 Thus, Ratzinger maintains, “if we push this history aside, Christian faith as such 
disappears and is recast as some other religion. So, if history, if facticity in this sense, is an 
essential dimension of Christian faith, then faith must expose itself to the historical method – 
indeed, faith itself demands this.”92 This text is reflective of the overriding approach or spirit 
of Ratzinger towards the Aufklärung, which is one in which, while not rejecting the points 
that the Aufklärung seeks to emphasize, in this case, the historical acuteness of the religious 
claims regarding Jesus of Nazareth as professed by the Church, Ratzinger, at the same time, 
does not allow himself to be boxed in by the claims or hypotheses of the Aufklärer. Ratzinger 
is willing to go beyond, and in the process, widening, challenging, and even offering a course 
correction of some sort. One finds a clear example of this Ratzingerian approach here:  
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The historical-critical method – let me repeat – is an indispensable tool, given the 
structure of the Christian faith. But we need to add two points. This method is a 
fundamental dimension of exegesis, but it does not exhaust the interpretive task for 
someone who sees the biblical writings as a single corpus of Holy Scripture inspired 
by God (…) For someone who considers himself directly addressed by the Bible 
today, the method’s first limit is that by its very nature it has to leave the biblical 
word in the past. It is a historical method, and that means that it investigates the then-
current context of events in which the texts originated (…) To the extent that it 
remains true to itself, the historical method not only has to investigate the biblical 
word as a thing of the past, but also has to let it remain in the past. It can glimpse 
points of contact with the present and it can try to apply the biblical word to the 
present; the only thing it cannot do is make it into something present today – that 
would be overstepping its bounds. Its very precision in interpreting the reality of the 
past is both its strength and its limit.93  
 
Certainly, such a recognition of the limits of the principle of history, will definitely not sit 
well with some of the devotees to the Aufklärung who read human rationality as the final 
arbiter in the establishment of truth claims. Whatever position one adopts, it is difficult not 
see the point that Ratzinger is driving home here, which is that history alone is insufficient to 
get to the deeper meaning and value of biblical texts. This is all the more because even 
though history studies the words of Scripture as human words, at the bottom of it, there is 
something to these human words that prevent them from becoming merely human.  
 That something is the voice of God that human words serve as a channel or medium 
of expression. In fact, Dei Verbum renders a succinct description of this interplay between 
Divine and human words in the drama of revelation, to which Scripture attests to: “In the 
process of composition of the sacred books God chose and employed human agents, using 
their own powers and faculties, in such a way that they wrote as authors in the true sense, and 
yet God acted in and through them, directing the content entirely and solely as he willed.”94 
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In this light, the question of God, of faith, cannot be excluded or set aside for the purposes of 
historical reading of the text. In other words, faith is an integral part of the historical process.  
 To Ratzinger, therefore, these enlightened reconstructions of Jesus that set aside his 
divine Sonship together with the New Testament witness to the divinity of Christ, leaves one 
with the impression that one can have little certain knowledge about the historical Jesus of 
Nazareth who is simultaneously the Christ of faith: “This impression,” Ratzinger opines, “has 
by now penetrated deeply into the minds of the Christian people at large. This is a dramatic 
situation for faith, because its point of reference is being placed in doubt.”95 Thus, the 
scientific research into the Gestalt of Jesus as Son of God made man has had the effect of 
obscuring the portrait of the real Jesus understood by orthodox Christianity as the Jesus of 
the Gospels, whose center of gravity is his communion with the Father. Without Jesus’ 
Sonship which can only be in relation to the Father and hence, guarantee Jesus’ divinity, one 
cannot understand Jesus at all, Ratzinger maintains. And it is only from this communion with 
the Father, this reality of Jesus being Son, that Jesus makes himself present even to us 
today.96 Sonship is therefore the unique and defining understanding of the historical Jesus of 
Nazareth, for this holds both Jesus’ divinity and the fact of his incarnation at the fullness of 
time (Gal. 4:4), into a stable, mutually correlative relationship.  
 Along these lines of the uniqueness of Jesus’ Sonship with the Father, Benedict writes 
in relation to the teaching ministry of Jesus: “Jesus’ teaching is not the product of human 
learning, of whatever kind. It originates from immediate contact with the Father, from ‘face-
to-face’ dialogue – from the vision of the one who rests close to the Father’s heart. It is the 
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Son’s word. Without this inner grounding, his teaching would be pure presumption.”97 In 
other words, for Benedict, the Gestalt of Jesus of Nazareth can only be understood through 
the lenses of Jesus’ unique sonship with the Father. Jesus’ bond with the Father is therefore 
the defining hermeneutical framework that does justice to who Jesus is. Benedict writes: 
This is the context in which we need to read the conclusion of the prologue to John’s 
Gospel: “No one has ever seen God; it is the only Son, who is nearest to the Father’s 
heart, who has made him known” (Jn 1:18). (…) He lives before the face of God, not 
just as a friend, but as a Son; he lives in the most intimate unity with the Father.98 
 
To Benedict, therefore, not only is sonship the defining starting point in understanding the 
divine origins of Jesus, but, in addition, Jesus’ sonship is indispensable if one must 
understand the testimony of the New Testament regarding the words, deeds, sufferings and 
glory of Jesus: “This is the central point, and if we leave it out of account, we fail to grasp 
what the figure of Jesus is really all about, so that it becomes self-contradictory and, in the 
end, unintelligible.”99 The challenge that the New Testament witness poses to the reader is 
whether one is prepared to accept the reality that this Jesus of Nazareth is different, that his 
being is grounded in something entirely different, namely, that of seeing and knowing face-
to-face, the Father, in an intimate and exclusive manner.  
 Benedict further argues that the prayer moments of Jesus are a testimony to Jesus’ 
unique sonship. Jesus’ nights spent in prayer alone with the Father, Benedict maintains, gives 
us a glimpse into Jesus’ filial existence. Jesus’ prayer moments show the Son in conversation 
with the Father, so much so that “his human consciousness and will, his human soul, is taken 
up into that exchange, and in this way human ‘praying’ is able to become a participation in 
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this filial communion with the Father.”100 Thus, Jesus’s words in the Gospels regarding the 
Father owe to the fact of his Sonship. Jesus is able to speak the way he does – Abba, Papa – 
which was seemingly impossible in the Old Testament, only because of the new form of 
intimacy that Jesus was expressing about his communion with the Father that he alone 
possesses as the Son of the Father.101 To Ratzinger, it is the realization of Jesus’ unique 
sonship with the Father that made the early Christians to preserve Jesus’ more intimate usage 
of the Aramaic, Abba, Papa, in its original tongue.102 In this sense of divine sonship and 
intimacy, the Christological dimension, that is, the mystery of the Son as revealer of the 
Father, is therefore present in all that Jesus does and says.103 In other words, not only is the 
sonship of Jesus a mirror into Jesus’ intimacy with the Father, but it is likewise indicative of 
Jesus’ self-description.  
 Sonship therefore asserts Jesus’ divinity and his unicity. Jesus is the eternal Son of 
the eternal Father, and only within this hermeneutical framework can we arrive at the right 
understanding of the Gestalt of Jesus. Only within this framework of Sonship do we discern 
the truth claims of the New Testament in their historical and theological significance. And 
while this intimacy of Abba distinguishes Jesus’ relationship with the Father from those of all 
other humans, it is not meant to be so in an exclusive sense. On the contrary, Jesus’ intimacy, 
as Ratzinger maintains, is designed to include all others in Jesus’ relationship with the 
Father: “It wishes to incorporate them, as it were, in its own kind of attitude to God, so that 
with Jesus and in him they can say ‘Abba’ to God just he does; no set distance shall separate 
                                               
 100 Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI, Jesus of Nazareth, Vol. I, 7.  
 101 Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, trans. J. R. Foster (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2004), 224.  
 102 Ratzinger, Introduction, 224. 
 103 Ratzinger/Benedict XVI, Jesus of Nazareth, Vol. I, 7.  
203 
 
them any longer.”104 Thus, to become a disciple of Jesus is to enter with Jesus into the 
intimacy of the Father.  
 To Ratzinger, the intimacy that Jesus enjoys as Son of the Father is a pointer to the 
total relationality of Jesus’ existence. Jesus is a man whose essence is to be from and to be 
for, in total relativity with the absolute.105 This Son-Christology, therefore, highlights the 
identity of work and being, of deed and person, in Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus as Son keeps back 
nothing from himself, but gives himself completely in his work.106 There is no wedge 
between person and work, for Son means precisely that, namely, one who flows from the 
Father, one begotten by the Father, the Father’s gift to the world who completely offers 
himself to the Father in his work of redeeming the world. Ratzinger writes that, to this extent, 
“there is an ‘ontologization,’ a reaching back to the being behind the ‘phenomenal’ character 
of the mere happening.107 What this implies is that at bottom, Jesus’ teaching is himself, and 
as Ratzinger points out, “he as a totality is Son, Word and mission. His activity reaches right 
down to the ground of being and is one with it. And it is precisely in this unity of being and 
doing that his special character lies.”108 In other words, the whole experience of Jesus is such 
that Jesus’ being itself is service, a service for the world, a service of reconciling the world to 
God and to one another in a new radicalized and universalized understanding of mutual, 
inclusive love. Along these lines, Ratzinger concludes:  
And precisely because this being, as a totality, is nothing but service, it is sonship. To 
that extent it is not until this point that the Christian revaluation of values reaches its 
final goal; only here does it become fully clear that he who surrenders himself 
completely to service for others, to complete selflessness and self-emptying, literally 
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becomes these things – that this very person is the true man, the man of the future, the 
coinciding of man and God.109 
 
To speak of Jesus as Son not only brings to the fore a sonship Christology, but likewise, a 
service-ship Christology, for that, to Ratzinger, is what constitutes the central nexus of the 
person of Jesus, as a man whose intrinsic being is to be for others. Son therefore means an 
identity of service and being. In this Ratzingerian sense, the being of Jesus does not remain 
static, a mythical ontology, but is profound actuality in the concreteness of the service of love 
in which Jesus offers himself on the cross for the salvation of the world. “Jesus is his 
work,”110 Ratzinger tersely declares, thereby capturing the core of the whole concept of the 
intertwining of Son and Service Christologies.   
 Granted this reading of the Gestalt of Christ and the New Testament witness to it 
therefore, one can draw the conclusion that the de-divinization of the Gestalt of Christ that 
emerged with the Aufklärung, as seen above in Kant and Hegel, and the subsequent 
reconstructions of the figure of Jesus and the New Testament in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries marked, in a sense, a rejection of the existential implications of the Christologies 
Sonship and Service-ship that is captured in the formula “Son,” as detailed above. In other 
words, for the New Testament and the Christ portrayed in it to become essentially moral 
tools wanting in the religious dimension as a necessary hermeneutical framework for its 
interpretation to hold sway, the ontological Christology of Sonship had to be set aside by the 
Aufklärung. To Ratzinger, therefore, in spite of its best of intentions, these existential, 
pragmatic and phenomenological readings of Christ cannot suffice for Christology: “They do 
not reach deep enough, because they leave the realm of real ‘being’ untouched.”111 In other 
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words, they miss out the essential aspect of the person of Christ around which the whole New 
Testament if built, which is, this man, Jesus of Nazareth, is the unique Son of God whose 
mission in the world is his very being, in that who Jesus is, is what Jesus is.  
 In this light, one clearly sees that an essential missing link in the Aufklärung’s 
presentation of the Gestalt of Christ, while not overlooking the defects of ethical 
reductionism of the man Jesus of Nazareth, resides heavily in the Aufklärung’s rejection of 
classical metaphysical epistemology. And as McGrath likewise attests, with the Aufklärung, 
the traditional Christian understanding of Christ that largely took on a formal shape with the 
orthodox Christological councils based on a language of ontology was called into question, 
with the aid of critical presuppositions and methods.112 Classical orthodoxy as expressed in 
Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus and Chalcedon had built the Christological dogmas on 
metaphysical language. The Aufklärung contested these metaphysical Christologies of 
Orthodoxy, tilting the scale to the question of the relationship between history and 
revelation.113 It is plausible that his rejection of Greek ontology as a philosophical framework 
helps explain in large measure, Ratzinger’s biting critique for what he calls the attempts at 
dehellenization of the Christian faith, in his Regensburg Lecture. Speaking of these 
dehellenization attempts, Ratzinger says:  
This inner rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek philosophical inquiry was 
an event of decisive importance not only from the standpoint of the history of 
religions, but also from that of world history – it is an event which concerns us even 
today. Given this convergence, it is not surprising that Christianity, despite its origins 
and some significant developments in the East, finally took on its historically decisive 
character in Europe.114 
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In other words, Ratzinger reads in the synthesis between biblical faith and Greek philosophy, 
a providential meeting point that not only shaped and provided Christian orthodoxy with a 
solid framework, but likewise, with a decisive implication for Europe, the ancient heartland 
of Christianity. In this reading of things, Greek metaphysics was therefore essential in 
communicating the orthodox positions of biblical faith, placing biblical faith in its debt. But 
as Ratzinger sees it, the process of dehellenization not only seeks to sever this bond between 
philosophy and theology, but is likewise active in its aggression to exclude metaphysics as a 
vehicle for the communication of dogmatic truths.  
 Ratzinger identifies three movements or stages that exemplify this rejection of Greek 
philosophy and the metaphysical help that it provided to Christianity: Firstly, the sixteenth 
century Reformation, in which, to Ratzinger’s reading, the reformers saw the rapport 
between philosophy and theology as basing the faith on an alien system of thought. Sola 
scriptura was precisely set against this.115 Luther’s sola scriptura which became the position 
of the Reformation as a religious movement, bore the markings of an outright rejection of the 
place of philosophy in understanding and talking about the Christian faith. Sola scriptura was 
clearly a rejection of the framework of philosophy that had hitherto nurtured the nascent faith 
right up to the scholastic era. 
 The second stage of dehellenization was with Kant: “When Kant states that he needed 
to set thinking aside in order to make room for faith, he carried this program forward with a 
radicalism that the Reformers could never have foreseen.”116 Kant’s Critique of Practical 
Reason essentially made faith a postulate of practical reason with no access to the entirety of 
reality. The consequence of this Kantian decision to sever the link between the God of faith 
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and the God of the philosophers is seen in the liberal theologies of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, that essentially sought to rewrite both the life of Christ and the traditional 
interpretations of the New Testament, more or less after the pattern of Kant and Hegel as 
shown above. At Regensburg, Ratzinger returned to his 1959 inaugural lecture, as his 
significant response to this process of the modern, Aufklärung reading of Christ, that 
essentially sought to create an insurmountable wedge between the distinction that Pascal had 
made between the God of philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. 
 Synthesizing this Aufklärung reading of the Gestalt of Christ, Ratzinger writes that 
“Jesus was said to have put an end to worship in favor of morality. In the end he was 
presented as the father of humanitarian moral message.”117 Ratzinger sees these 
reconstructions as attempts “to bring Christianity back into harmony with modern reason, 
liberating it, that is to say, from seemingly philosophical and theological elements, such as 
faith in Christ’s divinity and the triune God.”118 And this is clearly evident, as seen above, 
Kant’s Religion and Hegel’s Jesus. Ratzinger goes on to say:  
Behind this thinking lies the modern self-limitation of reason, classically expressed in 
Kant’s “Critiques,” but in the meantime further radicalized by the impact of the 
natural sciences. This modern concept of reason is based, to put it briefly, on a 
synthesis between Platonism (Cartesianism) and empiricism, a synthesis confirmed 
by the success of technology.119 
 
In this sense, Ratzinger sees a correlation between the Aufklärung’s position of the 
mathematical, intrinsic rationality of matter in terms of necessary causality, as shown in the 
section on Logos and Creative Reason above, and the newfound necessity of presenting the 
Gestalt of Christ from anything other than from concepts such as sonship, that maintain 
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Christ’s divinity. The only truths that must be considered as scientifically true are those 
within the limits of mere matter, and nature therefore had to be exploited to prove this self-
sufficiency and rationality through the process of human experimentation. Given this 
worldview, theology, philosophy and other arts are forced to conform themselves to this 
enlightenment canon of scientificity.  
 However, Ratzinger argues, such a “scientific” mindset naturally excludes God, or at 
least, the God of historical revelation, for since God cannot fit into a chemical reaction or test 
tube, God appears unscientific or pre-scientific. Consequently, says Ratzinger, “we are faced 
with a reduction of the radius of science and reason, one which needs to be questioned.”120 
And to Ratzinger, - and one sees this clearly in the works on Jesus that emerged from the 
spirit of the Aufklärung – these attempts at rendering theology “scientific” ends up reducing 
Christianity to a meager scrap of its earlier self. 
 The third and final stage that Ratzinger identifies in this process of wedging reason 
from faith is what he refers to as cultural pluralism. This position holds that the synthesis 
arrived at by the early Church between Greek philosophy and biblical faith was simply an 
initial process of inculturation that ought not to have any lasting and binding effect. Other 
non-Western cultures, as they come into contact with Christianity, have to return to the 
simple message of the New Testament and inculturate it anew.121 Ratzinger sees this position 
as not only false but also coarse and imprecise. He argues that the New Testament was 
written in Greek and will forever bear the Greek spirit, a spirit that had already come to 
maturity even in the development of the Old Testament. While Ratzinger recognizes the fact 
that there are elements in the early Church that need not be integrated into all cultures, he is 
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of the opinion that “nonetheless, the fundamental decisions made about the relationship 
between faith and use of human reason are part of the faith itself; they are developments 
consonant with the nature of faith itself.”122 In other words, reason is not an added coloring to 
the nature of faith, but belongs to the inner dynamics of faith. To believe, therefore, is not 
antithetical to rationality. Kant did not have to shut the door on reason in order to make room 
for faith. On the contrary, Kant would have seen that faith widens the potentials latent in 
reason, it opens the breadth of reason beyond the limits of the scientificity that Ratzinger 
decries in this Regensburg lecture. And given that the religious phenomenon is always with 
us, a view of rationality that blankets out religious faith could very well bring about an 
existential schizophrenia in which the human person is torn in two essential directions of 
faith and reason that now appear – at least in the Aufklärung reading of things – to be 
irreconcilable.  
 Ratzinger realizes that not all will agree to this proposition of the intrinsic nature of 
reason to faith, especially given that the Aufklärung battle cry of sapere aude certainly 
included even if not limited to, a rejection or rebellion against dogmatic religious faith. 
Ratzinger therefore, points out that his argument that Luther,123 Kant and the broader spirit of 
the Aufklärung did not have to shut the door on reason or on the God of philosophy in order 
to make room for the God of faith, does not constitute a turning back of the clock to a pre-
Aufklärung era. Ratzinger insists that he has no such intentions of rewinding the clock to a 
pre-Aufklärung era. If anything, as Ratzinger explains:  
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This attempt [that is, Ratzinger’s explanation of the dehellenization trend], painted 
with broad strokes, at a critique of modern reason from within has nothing to do with 
putting the clock back to the time before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights 
of the modern age. The positive aspects of modernity are to be acknowledged 
unreservedly: we are all grateful for the marvelous possibilities that it has opened up 
for mankind and for the progress in humanity that has been granted us (…) The 
intention here is not one of retrenchment or negative criticism, but of broadening our 
concept of reason and its application.124 
   
In this light, logos is therefore broader and deeper than mere positivistic rationality. And this 
is the sense in which Ratzinger’s theological metaphor of the Logos as Son enters into the 
fray of the Aufklärung reconstructions of the Gestalt of Jesus, pushing them and urging them 
to open themselves to the broader applications and implications of reason. To all the attempts 
at moralizing the figure of Christ and hence the central core of the New Testament, - a 
moralizing that ends up rejecting the rational character of the dogmas of religious faith which 
is not reduced to ethics - Ratzinger insists, in clear rebuttal of the ethical reductionism of the 
Aufklärung’s Gestalt of Jesus, the New Testament and the Christian faith that:  
Being Christian is not the result of an ethical choice or a lofty idea, but the encounter 
with an event, a person, which gives life a new horizon and a decisive direction. Saint 
John's Gospel describes that event in these words: “God so loved the world that he 
gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should ... have eternal life” (3:16)125 
 
This realization of Christianity as an encounter with a person certainly goes against the grain 
of Christianity as a moral religion, as espoused by the Aufklärung. And while Ratzinger does 
not refute the ethical demands of being a Christian in terms of a conversion to the new life in 
Christ, he certainly does not believe that the central nexus of Christianity lies in the ethical 
postulates that must be put forth as Christian narratives and dogmas are reinterpreted in the 
spirit of the Aufklärung. In this light, Ratzinger believes that the metaphor of Logos as Son 
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offers the moral reductionism of the Gestalt of Jesus and the Christian faith - with the 
resultant consequence of the eschewing of reason in order to make room for faith – a 
possibility of entry into a more dynamic communion of love and knowledge. To Ratzinger, 
these two aspects capture the essential dynamics of the uniqueness that entered history with 
the Son of the Father.  
 Ratzinger points out when commenting about the messianic Jubelruf of Mt 11:25 – 
27, that knowing always involves some sort of equality, for “every process of coming to 
know something includes in one form or another a process of assimilation, a sort of inner 
unification of the knower and the known.”126 For the Son to say he knows the Father 
therefore, presupposes some communion with the Father, some oneness of being with the 
Father. Thus, the perfect communion of knowledge between the Son and the Father is 
likewise a perfect communion in being between the Son and the Father. As Ratzinger writes, 
“unity in knowing is possible only because it is unity in being.”127 In this sense of the dual 
unity of knowledge and being, the will of Jesus becomes the will of the Father. And the will 
of Jesus is that his followers unite their wills with the Father’s will as well, thus becoming 
sons and daughters of the Father.128 Thus, knowledge, being and will are the three defining 
aspects that explain the Sonship of Jesus of Nazareth.  
 Given the understanding that the will of the Son is to draw his followers into the filial 
knowledge of the Father, there is an opening here that clearly brings to the fore, the limits of 
the Aufklärung readings of the Gestalt of Christ. Such is the case because the moral 
intellectualism of Kant or Hegel, for example, restrict the phenomenon of Jesus to knowledge 
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only, leaving out being and will. In other words, the Aufklärung reading of the Gestalt of 
Christ makes Christ an exclusive prerogative of the intellectual experts, inaccessible to 
simple souls who allow their wills to be taken up by Christ into the will of the Father. For 
while the object of the intellect is truth, the object of the will is the good, and that is the locus 
of concrete action and activity. In other words, the Aufklärung lives of Jesus and the biblical 
reconstructions of the quest for the historical Jesus that modeled itself on the spirit of the 
Aufklärung, end up with a Jesus that is suitable only for the academicians who must, through 
employing of their reasoning, arrive at self-sufficient moral truths latent within them, that 
renders the whole experience of the being, knowledge and will of the man Jesus of Nazareth, 
if not irrelevant, at least superfluous. Ratzinger decries these exotic interpretations of Christ, 
with somewhat provocative texts from First Letter of St. Paul to the Corinthians:  
Their great learning distracts them from simply gazing upon the whole, upon the 
reality of God as he reveals himself – for people who know so much about the 
complexity of the issues, it seems that is just cannot be so simple. Paul describes this 
same experience and then goes on to reflect upon it: “For the word of the cross is 
folly to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of 
God.” For it is written, “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the cleverness of 
the clever I will thwart” (Is. 29:14) (…) For God chose what is foolish in the world to 
shame the wise (…).129 
 
It could be that the gauntlet thrown by Ratzinger is the daring to embrace not just the aspect 
of rational knowledge regarding Christ, but more importantly, the aspects of Christ’s being as 
Son which entails an opening of a hitherto unknown experience of the being of the Father, 
and more importantly, the communion of wills that follow such a unity. In precise, therefore, 
one could say that the issue with the Aufklärung’s reading of the figure of Christ is not so 
much its emphasis or more precisely, its moral reductionism, but that in pushing for an 
absolute moral or ethical reading of the historical revelation of God in Christ Jesus, it 
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excluded other aspects. That is, the Aufklärung, in its quest for a moral Christ, narrowed the 
picture and hence, diminished the capacity of reason’s greatness to go beyond in 
comprehending and apprehending the mere rational. In effect, the Aufklärung’s exclusive 
painting of a moral Christ based on a rational faith, ended up closing it on itself. The 
Aufklärung became an autonomous system that severed itself from all other aspects of the 
reality of the life of Christ. It is in this sense that the theological metaphor of Logos as Son 
becomes handy, for Sonship, as Ratzinger repeatedly points out, involves relationality.130 
And such a relationship can only come about in a mutuality of openness of wills.   
 To sum up, one could say, in this regard and in the light of the dialogical spirit 
between the God of philosophy and the God of theology, between faith and reason that 
Ratzinger sought to espoused in his inaugural lecture as seen in Chapter Two, the challenge 
the Ratzingerian metaphor of the Logos as Son as the proper hermeneutical key into 
understanding both Christ and the New Testament could be that of inviting Kant, Hegel and 
their successors to allow their rational faith to enter into dialogue with the simple faith of 
being and willing. In other words, to move beyond ethical formulas into the reality of a Jesus 
who is flesh and blood and whose first invitation is not about us considering where one 
stands in a moral report card, but firstly, to enter into an I-Thou intimate friendship. Only 
from this friendship, this communion of wills, can one properly understand the grandeur of 
the new moral life that the Aufklärer somewhat rightly emphasize.  
 Summarily, there emerges from Ratzinger’s treatment of the Logos as Son the sense 
of uniqueness that characterizes the relationship between the Son and the Father. In other 
words, Jesus Christ, as unique Son of the Father, is the only One who fully knows the Father. 
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Jesus is the One who has seen the Father face to face. And only Jesus can fully reveal the 
Father. Sonship is therefore not a fluid metaphor, as is wont to be perceived or characterized 
by some of the Aufklärung, as shown above. In the final analysis, the quest for humanity to 
“see” God which largely inspired the making of graven images, a quest given voice to by 
Philip, has now been met in the Sonship of Jesus, for to have seen Jesus is to have seen the 
Father, given that Jesus and the Father are one (Jn 14:9). In this sense, Jesus’ Sonship brings 
about a Christological hermeneutic of Father-Son, in other words, a Christology of 
relationship, to the extent that the Father is Father only because of the Son, and the Son is 
Son only because of the Father. At the heart of the Christology of the Son, of the nature of 
Jesus as Son, lies relationality. And as shown above, to Ratzinger, the overriding goal of this 
Christology of Sonship is to invite all into the same union between the Father and the Son, to 
be sons and daughters in the Son, thanks to whose being, all can enter into a relationship with 
the Father.  
 Given this unicity of this Father-Son relationship, one can understand why for 
Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth is not only the unique, but the definitive savior of the world. In 
Jesus, the “surplus” of God’s love for humanity reaches its apogee, in the sense that to be 
Son is intrinsically tied to God’s “surplus” mission of love (Jn. 3:16). To be Son is to be sent 
by the Father (Jn 7:16), out of love for the world. This leaves one with a sense of a mission-
Christology, in which the person of Jesus is viewed primarily through the lenses of his 
mission in the world. In other words, mission defines person and person defines mission. One 
could therefore describe the person of Jesus with the language of a Christology of 
missioning, for only in the “work” of Jesus, do we finally get to the crux of his being, of who 
Jesus is, that is, the Savior of the world. To encounter Jesus therefore, is to encounter 
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concretely, not just the being of the Son of God, but salvation in the flesh. The whole nature 
of Jesus is salvific. When Peter says in Acts 10:38 that Jesus went about doing good, this 
description by Peter captures not only the function of Jesus, but the being of Jesus, for his 
very being brought with it goodness, healing, salvation. In the final analysis, the Christology 
of the Son is a Christology of divinization of human beings. Humanity is able to call God 
“Father” because Jesus has opened his unique relationship with the Father to all of humanity.  
 
4.3 Logos as Person: Ratzinger’s Engagement with the Aufklärung’s Pragmatic Personalism  
 
 While the question of the Logos as Creative Reason had to do with the theology of 
creation of Ratzinger, and the question of the Logos as Son pertains to the philosophical 
Christology of Ratzinger, the question about the logos as Person considered in this chapter 
centers on the theological anthropology of Ratzinger. Writing about Ratzinger’s Christology 
of the logos as person, Collins points out that the pivotal moment when the metaphor of the 
logos takes on the characterization of person begins with the prologue of the Gospel of John 
the Evangelist. Collins writes: 
In this one pivotal moment, then, as salvation history and philosophy meet on a 
scriptural field, a new reality emerges. By the church’s reception of the figure of 
Christ as the Logos itself in the flesh, all of creation and human history begin to be 
reinterpreted in light of this “verbum” who is actually communicated as a person.131 
  
Logos is therefore, not only Creative Reason, but a word that is spoken and in the process of 
this speech, becomes a person. In the Logos of Christ, the Person, personhood therefore, 
becomes the center of humanity, as Benedict writes in Spe Salvi:  
At the very moment when the Magi, guided by the star, adored Christ the new King, 
astrology came to an end, because the stars were now moving in the orbit determined 
by Christ (…) It is not the elemental spirits of the universe, the laws of matter, which 
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ultimately govern the world and mankind, but a personal God governs the stars, that 
is, the universe; it is not the laws of matter and of evolution that have the final say, 
but reason, will, love – a Person. And if we know this Person and he knows us, then 
truly the inexorable power of material elements no longer has the last word; we are 
not slaves of the universe and of its laws, we are free.132 
 
And because logos is person, one can enter into communication with the Logos. One can 
enter into friendship with the Logos, into intimacy, an intimacy that gives meaning to one’s 
life and shapes one’s life in a more humane direction. And it is the Logos, the prosōpon, the 
Person of Christ, who calls humans into this intimacy of a dialogical encounter, by 
universalizing and renewing the faith of Israel to include all the nations and peoples of the 
world.133 To meet the Person of Christ, therefore, is to meet the concrete reality of what 
personhood entails, to allow the self to be caught up into an understanding wherein all 
persons share a common bond of mutual love, mission and destiny to the Father’s house.  
 Turning to the context of the Aufklärung, it should be noted that to Ratzinger, the 
Aufklärung’s understanding of the person, that is, its philosophical and theological 
anthropology, is a logical offshoot of its understanding of the autonomy of nature and the 
matter, based on what might be described as its reductionistic view of science as that which 
is mathematically provable. Ratzinger declares in the Regensburg lecture:  
(…) If science as a whole is this and this alone, then it is man himself who ends up 
being reduced, for the specifically human questions about our origin and destiny, the 
questions raised by religion and ethics, then have no place within the purview of 
collective reason as defined by “science” so understood, and must thus be relegated to 
the realm of the subjective. The subjective then decides, on the basis of his 
experiences, what he considers tenable in matters of religion, and the subjective 
“conscience” becomes the sole arbiter of what is ethical.134  
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It appears that Ratzinger is making the argument that to follow the logic of the autonomy of 
nature, of matter and of causality, eventually produces a relativistic kind of person. Such is 
the case because one cannot affirm the autonomy of the cosmos as an inner necessity 
admitting of no extrinsic causality, while simultaneously making the case for some form of 
heteronomous guiding principle, when it concerns the human person. In other words, when 
creation is not the work of Creative Reason, of the Logos, as seen in the first theological 
usage of Logos above, then what remains of the human being is essentially an ideologically 
conditioned and relativistic person.  
 In other words, to arrive at a proper understanding of the person from the point of 
view of the Aufklärung, any talk of Creative Reason and Logos must be set aside. Granted the 
autonomy of nature and the newfound scientificity of science as Ratzinger describes it as 
seen in the treatment of Logos as Son, the reality that now stands before the enlightened man 
and woman is that of what Nietzsche describes as a mechanistic world, based on the will to 
power in nature, a world in which causality is merely a psychological necessity because one 
finds it impossible to conceive of an event divorced from intent. Creation appears as 
“selection and finishing of the thing selected. This is the essential thing in every act of the 
will.”135 The idea of creation is an idea that came from the human being, because humans 
could not bring themselves to understand the inner necessity of nature: “It was my hand that 
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threw the dice,”136 Nietzsche writes. To Nietzsche, this mechanistic world in which nature 
and science are absolutes, is a triumph over, certainly, a world of Creative Reason, of Logos, 
and of the human being made in the image and likeness of Creative Reason: 
It [mechanistic world] evidently has a good conscience on its side; and no science 
believes it can achieve progress and success except with the aid of mechanistic 
procedures. Everyone knows these procedures: one leaves “reason” and “purpose” 
out of account as far as possible, one shows that, given sufficient time, anything can 
evolve out of anything else, and one does not conceal a malicious chuckle when 
“apparent intention” in the fate of a plant or an egg yolk is once again traced back to 
pressure and stress.137 
 
In effect, the scientific and mechanistic mindset of the cosmos or of nature, produces a 
scientific and mechanistic human being, to the extent that the human being in the grand 
scheme of things, simply becomes, to use Nietzschean terminology, an “analogy” to the great 
event of the physicists.138 The human being is essentially submitted to the same principles of 
atomism which expresses “the calculability of the world, the expressibility of all events in 
formulas.”139 The human being is hereby reduced to norms of a logical-psychical world, 
especially as the idea of the transcendental dimension of the person made in the image and 
likeness of God with an eternal soul is jettisoned:  
Granted that the “soul” is an attractive and mysterious idea which philosophers have 
rightly abandoned only with reluctance – perhaps that which they have since learned 
to put in its place is even more attractive, even more mysterious. The human body, in 
which the most distant and most recent past of all organic development again 
becomes living and corporeal, through which and over and beyond which a 
tremendous inaudible stream seems to flow: the body is a more astonishing idea than 
the old “soul.”140    
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Apparently, an “enlightened” world-view does not have room for the human soul. And once 
the reality of soul is done with, the spiritual dimension that defines humans as images of God 
must be set aside. All that is left now is biological bodylines, which even then, is not spared 
by the mechanistic and scientific process of the absolute atomism of all reality:  
Conversely, even those philosophers and religious teachers who had the most 
compelling ground in their logic and piety to consider their bodies a deception (and, 
indeed, as a deception overcome and done with) could not help acknowledge the 
foolish fact that the body has not gone away; of which the strangest witnesses are to 
be found partly in Paul, partly in the Vedanta philosophy. But what, after all, does 
strength of belief mean? It could still be a very foolish belief! – This should be 
reflected on.141  
 
And as Nietzsche shows, once the soul and the body are rejected, the next step is the 
rejection of God who is believed to have been the creator of the human being endowed with 
bodily and spiritual principles.  
 However, without the Creative Logos in the picture, self-serving ideologies govern 
the human being. And very early on his papacy, Benedict called attention to this: “We are not 
some casual and meaningless product of evolution. Each of us is the result of a thought of 
God. Each of us is willed, each of us is loved, each of us is necessary.”142 Humans are not the 
products of haphazard mistakes or forces, but a divine project from a creating Intelligence. 
Humans are willed. Humans are a fruit of divine love. And later on, in his Message for the 
World Day of Peace, January 1, 2007, Ratzinger further analyzes the current crisis of human 
ecology:  
Many of our contemporaries actually deny the existence of a specific human nature 
and thus open the door to the most extravagant interpretations of what essentially 
constitutes a human being. Here too clarity is necessary: a “weak” vision of the 
person, which would leave room for every conception, even the most bizarre, only 
apparently favors peace. In reality, it hinders authentic dialogue and opens the way to 
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authoritarian impositions, ultimately leaving the person defenseless and, as a result, 
easy prey to oppression and violence.143 
 
With the technological mindset of the scientific, everything becomes possible, to the extent 
that the human mind can think it out and science can bring it about. The autonomy of reason 
has therefore moved beyond the mere ethical realm into the anthropological, so much so that 
what it means to be human in terms of our nature and the form which such a nature takes can 
no longer be spoken of objectively. Ratzinger sees a link between what he characterizes as a 
crisis of personhood with the ecological crisis that has gathered so much attention today. 
Ratzinger maintains in his World Day of Peace message for 2010: “It should be evident that 
the ecological crisis cannot be viewed in isolation from other related questions, since it is 
closely linked to the notion of development itself and our understanding of man in his 
relationship to others and to the rest of creation.”144 Thus, while rightfully paying attention to 
the crisis of environmental ecology, it is necessary to pay attention as well to the crisis of 
human ecology that renders uncertain, not only the nature of the human being in the spiritual 
and bodily forms and givens, but even more importantly, the challenges that such questions 
raise regarding the theology of creation, the theology of the purpose of the human being in 
the cosmos, and eschatology, the destiny of the human being. These could constitute some of 
the related questions, one would imagine, that Ratzinger has in mind, in the text just cited. 
 To Ratzinger, every generation is called to respond to the question posed by 
philosophical anthropology: What is the human being? What does it mean for us to be 
human? The question of what a human being is, Ratzinger points out, is a task for each and 
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every one, a task that appeals to our freedom: “We must each search into our human-
beingness afresh and decide who or what we want to be as humans. In our own lives each of 
us must answer, whether he or she wants to or not, the question about being human.”145 In 
this sense, the rightful place to begin any meaningful engagement with the philosophical 
anthropology of the scientific, mechanistic and autonomous person that emerges from 
Nietzsche is the book of Genesis 2:4 – 9. There, one finds the essential characteristics about 
who the human being is, and hence can arrive at an anthropological theology that finds its 
apogee in Christology.  
 To begin with, Genesis says that the human being is from the earth, from dust (Gen. 
2:7). This is both consoling and humbling, Ratzinger maintains, for it tells us that the human 
being is not God, the human being did not make the self, and the human being did not make 
the universe. In other words, Genesis refutes the thought of natural necessity and its radical 
evolutionism that tangoes with it.  Genesis tells us that the human being, like all things 
living, is destined for death. But Genesis also tells us another truth, which Ratzinger 
describes as “consoling,” which is, the human being is not a demon or an evil spirit, even 
though that might occasionally appear to be the case. One can readily think of the two world 
wars of the twentieth century, the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, Mao’s communist 
revolution, the killings going on in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or more recently, in 
the Anglophone regions of Cameroon, to see, as the Latin adage goes, homo homini lupus. 
But as Ratzinger points out, “the human being has not been formed from negative forces, but 
has been fashioned from God’s good earth.”146 This is the sense in which we can assert and 
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understand the ontological goodness of the human being, and the assertion that evil in all its 
forms is a deprivation, an absence of that creative goodness that ought to be there.  
 Going further, in a world still fractured by racism and ethnocentrism in all its moods 
and tenses, Ratzinger asserts that the Genesis declaration that all humans are from the earth 
points to a sameness and an equality that transcends all racial pathologies: “Despite every 
distinction that culture and history have brought about, it is still true that we are, in the last 
resort, the same (…) Emperor and beggar, master and slave are all ultimately one and the 
same person, taken from the earth and destined to return to the same earth.”147 Irrespective of 
all the lows and highs of history, the human being stays the same  - that is, earth. The human 
being is formed from the earth and destined to return to earth. In this light, says Ratzinger, 
“the unity of the whole human race becomes immediately apparent: We are all from only one 
earth.”148 In the final analysis, humans are not fundamentally different. There certainly exists 
accidental differences of color, space, class, status, and more, but the basic humanness in all 
human beings is same, taken from the earth and destined to return to it, as the antiphon for 
the imposition of ashes on the Ash Wednesday liturgy reminds all. And to cite Ratzinger 
again, “there is only one humanity in the many human beings. The Bible says a decisive “- 
no -” to all racism and to every human division.”149 In the face of so many racially-charged 
and ethnic divisions today, this anthropological theology of Genesis takes on a greater 
urgency.  
 But in addition to the three aspects already highlighted, viz., that humans are 
creatures and not gods; that human beings are not from evil spirits or demons; and that 
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human beings share an equality of nature in their common origin as beings taken from God’s 
one earth, Ratzinger highlights a fourth aspect which is crucial in completing the mosaic of 
the theological anthropology of Genesis: Human beings are made in the image and likeness 
of God (Gen 1:26-27). While taken from the earth, God has breathed his breath into the 
nostrils of the body that was formed from the earth. Ratzinger writes: “In the human being 
heaven and earth touch one another. In the human being God enters into his creation; the 
human being is directly related to God. The human being is called by him.”150 The human 
being is therefore the being called, known and loved by God. This aspect of the relationship 
with God provides a deeper foundation of the unity of the human race, in that God calls all 
human beings into a relationship with God, irrespective of their class, color or status. Thus:  
Human life stands under God’s special protection, because each human being, 
however wretched or exalted he or she may be, however sick or suffering, however 
good-for-nothing or important, whether born or unborn, whether incurably ill or 
radiant with health – each one bears God’s breath in himself or herself, each one is 
God’s image. This is the deepest reason for the inviolability of human dignity, and 
upon it is founded ultimately every civilization.151  
 
In this sense, the intrinsic dignity of every human being is based exclusively on the fact that 
every human being is a thoughtful creation of God. Absent this, the human being risks being 
perceived from a utilitarian perspective. And this is the context in which the survival of the 
fittest mentality can set in, in which the strong trample on the weak, asserting themselves and 
clearing whatever happens to stand in their way. Is this not in reality, the kind of person that 
emerges from Nietzsche’s Übermensch in which the will to power is never satisfied, never 
met, but only results in an endless willing for more power? Nietzsche’s preference for 
Dionysius, the pre-Homeric god of life, in his On the Genealogy of Morals, attests to his 
                                               
 150 Ratzinger, “In the Beginning …,” 44 – 45.  
 151 Ratzinger, “In the Beginning …,” 45.  
224 
 
conception that the true greatness of the human being lies in a life freed of inhibitions, a life 
for which happiness is found in the assertion of power and the absence of Schuld. To the 
degree that human beings are less inhibited, they will be happy and healthy. For the sake of 
happiness, humans must do away with religion and its inhibitions! Christian morality with its 
ascetical ideals is a self-distraction of who humans truly are.152 The core of human identity 
therefore, lies in the pursuit of the vision of Übermensch, of absolute power, which Nietzsche 
sees as the final victory over God.  
 It is very telling that in the process of the coming to be of the Übermensch, it is part 
of the deal that the less privileged, the less endowed, those one will consider to be at the 
margins of society, the less healthy, those unable to stand up for themselves ought to be 
readily and easily set aside. Nothing could be more radically different from the Ratzingerian 
interpretation of the imago Dei as the baseline of human equality as highlighted above. In 
fact, Nietzsche has no scruples pointing this out: 
The sick are man’s greatest danger; not the evil, not the “beasts of prey.” Those who 
are failures from the start, downtrodden, crushed – it is they, the weakest, who must 
undermine life among men, who call into question and poison most dangerously our 
trust in life, in man, and in ourselves.153 
 
Given this perception of life, the best in humans emerges to the degree that only the strongest 
are kept alive. And given that the weak, the poor, the infirm and those at the “bottom” of the 
social ladder nurse a profound resentment towards the strong, the powerful, the rich and the 
healthy, it is in the safety interest of the latter to crush and exclude the former, whom, if they 
have their way, will eliminate the latter.154 Talk about toleration, humility and sanctity of life 
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are merely expressions of vanity, for Nietzsche. In this sense, therefore, “the whole morality 
of the Sermon on the Mount belongs here: man experiences a veritable voluptuousness in 
violating himself by means of exaggerated demands and in then deifying this tyrannically 
demanding force in his soul.”155 While one can set aside the vitriol that is characteristic of 
Nietzschean expressions, it is difficult not to see the effects of this line of thinking even when 
viewed from a “moderate” perspective, namely, the picture of the an autonomous human 
being for whom to be human means to be absolute; and secondly, the picture of a human 
being who, having set the self as the measure of all things, now decided the boundaries of 
right and wrong. 
 Without going into the specifics, are the consequences of these twin realities not very 
much present in the experiences and happenings that marked the twentieth century and are 
marking the twenty-first today? Is the logic underlining this Nietzschean anthropology 
substantially different from the logic that marked the ideologies of Nazism, Fascism, 
Communism and Racism in much of the twentieth century, and more prevalent today, the 
throwaway ideology of abortion and euthanasia, and the indoctrination on the question of 
gender forcefully being pushed today? If science can do it, then it must be done, appears the 
acceptable norm on some of these bioethical issues. And what is startling is that the logic or 
reasoning being the person that must emerge from the godless Nietzschean ideology and the 
logic governing much of these short listed here, are strikingly very similar. Speaking to this 
new technological being for whom science is bequeathing unlimited possibilities, Ratzinger 
says: 
The fate of all of us depends on whether this moral dignity of the human person can 
be defended in the world of technology, with all its possibilities. For here a particular 
temptation exists for our technical scientific age. The technical and scientific attitude 
                                               
 155 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 171 – 172.  
226 
 
has produced a particular kind of certitude – namely, that which can be corroborated 
by way of experiment and mathematical formula. This has given humankind a certain 
freedom from anxiety and superstition, a certain power over the world. But now there 
is a temptation to view as reasonable and therefore as serious only what can be 
corroborated through experiment and computation. This means that the moral and the 
holy no longer count for anything. They are considered to belong to the domain of 
what must be transcended, of the irrational.156   
 
Consequently, while technology has opened up unlimited possibilities for humans, it is 
helpful to note that what is possible need not necessarily translate into what should be done. 
In other words, ethics must not be based on exclusively on physics. Such a view, Ratzinger 
maintains, extinguishes that is genuinely human in humans. It crushes rather than liberates 
humans. Ratzinger writes:  
We must ourselves recognize what Kant recognized and knew perfectly well – that 
there are two kinds of reason, as he says: a theoretical and a practical reason. We may 
call them the physical-natural scientific and the moral-religious reason. It is improper 
to refer to the moral reason as gross unreason and superstition simply because its 
contours and the scope of its knowledge are not mathematical. It is in fact the more 
fundamental of the two reasons, and it alone can preserve the human dimensions of 
both the natural sciences and technology and also prevent them from destroying 
humankind.157 
 
Clearly, Ratzinger is seeking room for the moral-religious reasoning in a fast-paced world 
that easily leaves moral and religious postulates behind. While it is possible to read 
Ratzinger’s line of argument as containing the possibilities that could hinder the development 
of science and so reignite the perennial tension between science and religion, what should be 
noted, irrespective of where one decides to stand on, is that for Ratzinger, the central concern 
is not religion for religion’s sake, nor science for science’s sake, but the human being, made 
in the image and likeness of God, whose inherent dignity must always be preserved. It is 
therefore, not question of being either pro-science or anti-religion and vice versa. It is a 
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question of being pro-the-human-being, pro-person. This is all the more so because of the 
fragility of the order that has to preserve the dignity of the person, made in the image and 
likeness of God.  
 Ratzinger identifies three theological postulates from this theological assertion that 
human beings are made in the image and likeness of God and hence, have a dignity that must 
be preserved, irrespective of the scientific and religious circumstances: Firstly, the essence of 
an image consists in the fact that it points to something else, that it represents something else. 
It is in the nature of an image to go beyond itself and to manifest something other than itself. 
Therefore, human beings as image of God implies that humans can never be closed in on 
themselves, for the image of God in humans implies relationality. It points the person beyond 
the self. The image of God is therefore the capacity for relationship.158 Hence, humans are 
most profoundly themselves when they enter into familial terms with God and are capable of 
addressing God their Creator. 
 Secondly, the image of God in humans implies that humans are beings of word and of 
love, beings capable of thinking and praying, for without these, humans cannot enter into a 
relationship with God which eventually points them back to one another.159 In effect, 
relationality is interwoven with communication and vice versa, and such is the case that 
when humans give of themselves to God and to one another in love, then and only then do 
they receive of themselves back. The consciousness of the imago Dei pushes humans away 
from selfishness to the discovery of the profundity of the self in the “thou” of the other. 
One’s life is not richer when one shuts the self in. A life that is only self-referential misses 
out on the joy of relationality. It restricts the horizon and imprisons self in the self. Joy does 
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not flow exclusively from self-assertion but also from relationality, from the capacity of 
sharing, of the giving of the self through which one discovers the because one is 
complimented. Imago Dei is about self-communication and self-transcendence, the former, 
regarding other persons, the latter, the opening up to a God that is discovered to be love. 
 The third and final postulate of the imago Dei that sheds light on the theological 
anthropology of Ratzinger is the Christological dialectic, which encapsulates the metaphor of 
logos as person. Ratzinger proceeds by noting the exegetical principle common to the Fathers 
of both East and West, that is, that we must read the Old and New Testaments together, and 
only in the New is the full meaning of the Old revealed.160 To Ratzinger, the fact that Christ 
is referred to as the Second Adam, the definitive Adam, as the image of God (cf. 1 Cor 15:44 
- 48; Col 1:15), is very significant. Ratzinger writes:  
It implies that in Christ alone appears the complete answer to the question about what 
the human being is. In him alone appears the deepest meaning of what is for the 
present a rough draft. He is the definitive human being, and creation is, as it were, a 
preliminary sketch that points to him. Thus, we can say that human persons are the 
beings who can be Jesus Christ’s brothers and sisters. Human beings are creatures 
that can be one with Christ and thereby be one with God himself.161 
 
In this sense, the human being is one whose essence is to be in transition, transitioning to 
Christ. The mystery of Easter therefore, enters the metaphor of logos as person: “Human 
beings must die with Christ like a grain of wheat in order truly to rise, to stand erect, to be 
themselves (cf. Jn 12:24).”162 The mystery of Easter is therefore the defining event in the 
theological anthropology that seeks to explain who and what a human being is, for not only 
does it say that the present and the past have a meaning, but it points to the future, a future 
with God forever, gathered into the body of the risen Christ. In this sense, anthropology is 
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essentially Christology, for Christ, the new man, is the hermeneutical framework that sheds 
light on the grandeur of who humans are, and their ultimate destiny to live with God forever.  
 For Ratzinger, at the height of this Christological reading of the metaphor of logos as 
person stands the image of Christ on the cross – Ecce homo, “Behold the man!” Beyond the 
cynicism of Pilate, St. John recognizes something prophetic in these words and passed them 
on as part of the Christian message:  
Yes, Pilate is correct when he says: “Behold the man.” In him, in Jesus Christ, we can 
discern what the human being, God’s project, is, and thereby also our own status. In 
the humiliated Jesus we can see how tragic, how little, how abased the human being 
can be. In him we can discern the whole history of human hate and sin. But in him 
and in his suffering love for us we can still more clearly discern God’s response: Yes, 
that is the man who is loved by God to the very dust, who is so loved by God that he 
pursues him to the uttermost toils of death.163  
 
Ecce homo! In the humiliations that humans suffer, therefore, they enter into the family of 
God as brothers and sisters of Jesus. The question about who humans are, therefore, finds 
response in the following of Jesus. A patient following of Jesus, in his love and suffering, 
teaches humans what it means to be a human being and how to become a human being. 
Chalcedon (451) was therefore right in its formula of Christ as true God and true man, for not 
only is Jesus God’s way of being human, but Jesus is God’s way of teaching humans what 
true humanity essentially consists of, which is, self-giving love, and not the self-assertion of 
Nietzsche’s Übermensch.  
 In conclusion, therefore, the metaphor of logos as person provides the window of 
thanks to which one can more profoundly appreciate the philosophical theology of Ratzinger 
as principally personalistic. Asked by Peter Seewald whether he considers himself a critical, 
modern man, in the sense and spirit of the German critique which is the defining quality of 
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the Aufklärung, Ratzinger responds: “Well, I didn’t want to operate only in a stagnant and 
closed philosophy, but in a philosophy understood as a question – what is man, really?  - and 
particularly to enter into the new, contemporary philosophy. In this sense I was modern and 
critical.”164 This text gives us in a descriptive form, the philosophical hermeneutic of 
Ratzinger: Firstly, it is anthropological. The starting point is about the human person, what 
the person is, in all humanness. Ratzinger certainly seeks to seriously engage the claims 
regarding personhood advanced by secular rational dialectics, and when placed side by side 
with Nietzsche as shown above, it is clear that his theological anthropology is an implicit 
refutation of certain Aufklärung lines of thought regarding the question of who and what is 
the human being.  Therefore, for Ratzinger, the question about the human being, who the 
human being is in terms of being, life and action, is read beyond the compartmentalizing of 
philosophical disciplines and branches, to what he sees as the full measure of humanity in 
both its anthropological, existential and eschatological bearings.  
 Thus, Ratzinger’s philosophical theological metaphor of logos as person is definitely 
not a dry, detached inquiry, but one that takes serious consideration of the human situation, 
one that is attentive to the human being in the concrete circumstances of life and not just in 
the mere abstract. This explains Ratzinger’s affinity for personalism of Martin Buber as a 
philosophical interpretive key, for in it he is able to feel the sense of engagement with the 
practical concerns of the here and now: What is the human being? What constitutes his or her 
noblest goals and aspirations? How must humans live today? What happens after this earthly 
life is over? These are questions that concretely shapes the perception that humans have of 
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themselves as persons, and how they see others as well. And for Ratzinger, Christ is the 
answer to the bundle of questions that is every human being, every person. 
 From the point of relevance, Ratzinger’s Christology of Logos as Person, that is, the 
Person of Christ with two natures, divine and human, is certainly timely today, for it 
establishes the intrinsic dignity of personhood, based on the divine personhood. Over and 
against the tendency to divine the person in terms of utilitarian productivity, one can assert 
that the greatness of personhood resides in the fact that God is, in fact talked about, as a 
communion of persons. And in Christ, human nature has been introduced into this 
community of divine persons, hence safeguarding its intrinsic dignity.  
 In recapitulation, these three theological metaphors, that is, Logos as Creative 
Reason, Logos as Son, and Logos as Person, provide one with what amounts to a 
Ratzingerian Christological portrait of the Gestalt of Christ, to the extent that they help one 
to understand what Ratzinger thinks about the nature and person of Jesus of Nazareth. In 
effect, they declare that this Jesus is the Logos at the source of all of creation. It is thanks to 
this Eternal Creative Logos that all of creation came to be. And this Logos, at the fullness of 
time (Gal 4:4), enters history to recreate the world. The presence of the Eternal Logos in 
history brings about the consciousness that God is Father, Son and Spirit, for, as seen above, 
in the unique Abba experience of the Son, one gets to see a hitherto unknown intimacy that 
reveals Fatherhood and Sonship in their most profound levels in the divine Godhead. 
 However, though Ratzinger clearly is unwilling to push the boundaries of classical 
Christology regarding the person of Christ as defined by Nicaea, Ephesus and Chalcedon, it 
must be noted that Ratzinger is not simply restating or reasserting classical Christology. As 
Ratzinger himself demonstrates in the forewords he wrote introducing the first two volumes 
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of his trilogy on Jesus, his goal is not to reassert classical Christology, but to help post-
Aufklärung men and women to find and enter into friendship with Jesus of Nazareth. In other 
words, Christology for Ratzinger is not simply a systematic science, but a path to 
discipleship. While one can state and repeat the formulas of Creative Reason, Sonship and 
Person, these formulas, if not followed by an opening of the heart, or a “yes” of one’s will to 
the will of Jesus, remain dry, abstract and lifeless. Christology for Ratzinger is therefore, at 
its most intimate core, spirituality. Christology attains its goal if the one who learns about the 
person of Christ can finally become a disciple, a friend of the Lord – vos autem dixi amicos- 
(Jn 15:15). Christology for Ratzinger is a personal search for the face of the Lord.165 
Christology is the theologian’s effort to foster a living relationship with Christ, the Creative 
Reason, Son and Person. 
 And this marks the fundamental difference between the Christologies of the 
Aufklärung be they by Kant, Hegel, and the Christology of Ratzinger. To the former, the 
person of Christ is largely seen, as shown above, from the perspective of a moral exemplar. 
There is no sense of relationality, of personal intimacy, and even less of discipleship. Christ 
essentially emerges as a good man who shows the example of what it means to live a moral 
life in a spirit of absolute heroism and fidelity. This Christ is what the Aufklärer wants him to 
be. This Christ is completely emptied of the divine nature, of the supernatural element of his 
being. This Christ cannot offer any help to anyone, besides pointing all to the moral law 
within every human being. And even when Christ’s divinity is acknowledged, such as with 
Hegel, it is interpreted in such a way that all humans have the same divinity, and there is 
nothing unique about the divinity of Christ. Over and above all, this Christ cannot die for 
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humanity. And if he cannot die for humanity, then he is likewise not raised from the dead. 
The resurrection is essentially, as seen with Kant and Hegel, humanity coming to life, 
returning to itself, restoring itself. It has nothing to do with the Father’s power raising the 
Son. 
 But with Ratzinger, one finds a completely different hermeneutic, even if he 
appreciates the rational interests of the Aufklärung in the question of the person of Jesus. As 
De Gaál testifies, Ratzinger’s position has been that “(…) the self-communication of the 
absolute and sovereign God cannot be reduced or shackled to the immanent categories of the 
German idealist philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804).”166 If for Kant theoretical reason 
could not lead to a personal relationship with God, then the Kantian Christology misses out 
on the most essential aspect of Christology, for in reducing the Christ to a moral exempla, it 
not only reduces Christianity to ethics, but above all, it empties Christianity of its flesh and 
blood, concrete, life, dynamism. In precis, Ratzinger’s Christology is wider and more 
challenging because it calls for a movement from the self-centeredness to other-centeredness. 
One finds the self, one discovers the gravitas of one’s being in meeting and entering into a 
relationship with Jesus of Nazareth, true God and true man, as Chalcedon rightly stated.  
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Chapter Five: An Ecclesiological Reading of Ratzinger’s Theological 
Appropriation of Logos as Unity of Love and Logos as Word vis-à-vis 
the Aufklärung 
 
 The preceding chapter reflected on Ratzinger’s theological appropriations of Logos as 
Creative Reason and as Son. These three usages, that is, Creative Reason, Son and Person, 
present a Christological reading of Christ, to the extent that approaching Christ as Incarnate 
Creative Reason, as Son and as Person, one gains a deeper insight into the nature of Christ. It 
emerges that this Jesus is the Logos of creation; the Son of the Father thanks to whom all 
who believe become sons and daughters of the Father; and finally, that in Jesus of Nazareth, 
personhood has taken a dignity that transcends all human limitations.  
 This chapter therefore, continues Ratzinger’s further adoption of the Logos, only this 
time, as Unity of Love and as Word. The emphasis here is ecclesiological, in that not only is 
love the defining principle of the Church as Benedict demonstrated by the choice of his first 
encyclical “Deus Caritas Est,” but likewise, Logos as word is central to ecclesiological 
thinking because, as will be seen in this chapter, not only is the Church called together in 
response to the word proclaimed, but at the very center of the Church’s life is the worship of 
God, the liturgy, whose fulcrum is the Eucharistic prayer, the oratio, the word. Hence, thanks 
to these two usages of Logos as Unity of Love and Logos as Word, a deeper picture of 
Ratzinger’s doctrine of the Church emerges, a Church defined by love, called together by 
listening to the word, and offers herself to the Father in the name of the Son and by the power 
of the Spirit in the oratio rationabilis. 
 It is important to note that the treatment of ecclesiology in this chapter is not 
exhaustive of the ecclesiological positions of Ratzinger, which could be characterized under 
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various headings, such as, Ratzinger’s Communio Ecclesiology; Ratzinger’s Eucharistic 
Ecclesiology; Ratzinger’s Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council, that is, Ratzinger’s 
interpretation of Lumen Gentium and Gaudium et Spes; Ratzinger’s Mariological 
Ecclesiology; and Ratzinger’s Pneumatological Ecclesiology, to cite a few areas. Due to the 
constraints of pages, this chapter is unable to delve into all these different aspects that taken 
together, provide a richer tapestry of the Ecclesiology of Ratzinger.  
 The focus of this chapter, therefore, or what this chapter seeks to achieve, is to study 
the ecclesiological question in the specific light of the Logos usage vis-à-vis the Aufklärung, 
particularly as it concerns what can be characterized as the Ecclesiology of Love from 
Ratzinger’s usage of Logos as Unity of Love, and the Ecclesiology of the Word, from 
Ratzinger’s usage of Logos as Word, which calls forth the community called the Church, and 
brings about the new sacrifice of praise in the Word as the oratio rationabilis. Therefore, this 
chapter is in no way intended to be a conclusive treatment of Ratzinger’s ecclesiology, but a 
setting the stage for a further exploration of the ecclesiological dimensions and consequences 
of Ratzinger’s Christology on his Ecclesiology, which would be taken up in my post-doctoral 
work on Ratzinger. But first, a word about Ratzinger’s essential perception about the Church, 
will be helpful in situating his theological usage of Logos in his Christo-Ecclesiological 
framework.  
 
 5.1 Ratzinger: The Church: A Story God Himself Has Created   
 
 For Ratzinger, the story of the Church is primarily a story about God. In this sense, 
one cannot give up on the Church, irrespective of the magnitude of the challenges                                                
and problems faced today. The most important word about the Church is not what one says, 
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but what God has said through the gift of his Son in the power of the Holy Spirit, granted that 
the Church is basically what God himself has called into being:  
(…) The word Ecclesia, “Church,” comes from the Old Testament, where it is the 
classic expression for the assembly of the People of God, the prototype and pattern 
for which was the assembly at Sinai, the people congregating at the feet of the God 
who spoke, whose word called people together and united them.1   
 
The Church is consequently that community that has responded to the call of the word of 
God, the people that could be described as “of God,” because having responded to God’s 
summons, they must now live from God and for God. Not only is the nature of this 
community shaped by the vision flowing from the obedience of faith – the only proper 
attitude to God’s invitation, but the very mission and destiny of this people must be 
continuously shaped to conform to what God calls it to be, in the certainty of God’s 
revelation as contained in Scripture that has been borne, nurtured and grown in the living 
Tradition of the Church. Given this perception, Ratzinger maintains that “The crisis 
concerning the Church (…) is a crisis about God. It is the result of leaving out what is most 
essential. What then remains is merely a dispute about power. There is already enough of that 
elsewhere in the world – we do not need the Church for that.”2 Accordingly, a revival of the 
sense of Church amongst Christians and in the wider world must necessarily begin with a 
rediscovery of the primacy of God. Certainly, prescribing quick fix solutions will not 
constitute an enduring resolution. Ratzinger adopts a Christo-centric starting point.  
 To Ratzinger, the figure of Jesus vis-à-vis the Church takes on a forceful symbolism 
in the call of the Twelve, “a symbolic number indicating the new people of God, whose 
pillars they were destined to be. In them, therefore, in a gesture of Jesus which is both sign 
                                               
1 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 105.  
2 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 129.  
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and reality, he inaugurates the ‘People of God’ in a new way, that is, their calling is to be 
seen theologically as the beginning of all that is ‘Church.”3 In this light, ecclesiology begins 
with Christology to the extent that the Church matures in her self-identity through the 
profession of faith in Jesus as the Christ, a product that Jesus himself brought about thanks to 
his choice of the Twelve and their association with him through the various stages of his life.  
But turning to the question of the Church, what is the Church for Ratzinger, what is 
his way of seeing the Church and why did he opt for this way of understanding the Church? 
When Ratzinger looks at the Church, he realizes that it is not the case that the Church has left 
the world, but that on many counts, such as family life, the level of religious literacy, and 
piety and devotion, the world has already left the Church as an institution and for various 
reasons that must be taken seriously and addressed, such as the participation of Christians in 
the atrocities of World War II. Already as a young theologian, he had written an article “The 
New Pagans and the Church,” published in 1958 in the journal Hochland that caused a quite 
a stir and discomfort within the German Church. Ratzinger explains that the source of his 
discernment was the religious instruction classes he was having with the boys and girls as 
curate in his first pastoral assignment. He noticed that what he was saying to the children was 
being contradicted at home by their parents: “But Daddy said you don’t need to take it so 
seriously.”4 Ratzinger reasoned that if such was the state of the transmission of the faith at 
home, then the post-war German people had already moved away from the Church, even if 
they were visibly present in the pews.  
 Regarding the nature of the Church, Ratzinger’s extended reflection on the pre- and 
post-conciliar church led him to coin a description that reveals his deepest ecclesial 
                                               
3 Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One, 18.  
 4 Benedict XVI, Last Testament, 88.   
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intuitions, that is, the hermeneutic of continuity and reform, which he opposed to the 
hermeneutic of rupture.5 Ratzinger sees the Church as an organism that develops in the 
various epochs of history, and it is precisely as such, as an organism, that we can discern a 
true development in the Church, which flows from that which is already there, which has not 
been invented or created by us, but received from the Lord, in the process of revelation.6 In 
other words, the starting point of the Church is not sociology but faith, revelation. The 
Church is herself the mission of God, the masterful plan to restore all things in Christ (Eph 
1:10). In dealing with the Church, therefore, the attitude of mystery and faith takes 
precedence in that we are encountering an organism that exceeds mere human capacity, a 
story God himself has created, as Benedict recently described the Church: 
The encounter with God means also, at the same time, that I myself become open, 
torn from my closed solitude and received into the living community of the Church. 
That living community is also a mediator of my encounter with God, though that 
encounter touches my heart in an entirely personal way. Faith comes from hearing 
(fides ex auditu), St. Paul teaches us. Listening in turn always implies a partner. Faith 
is not a product of reflection nor is it even an attempt to penetrate the depths of my 
own being. Both of these things may be present, but they remain insufficient without 
the “listening” through which God, from without, from a story He himself created, 
challenges me.7 
 
And still talking about this transcendental and religious nature of the Church, Benedict 
further insists to Fr. Jacques Servais, S.J.: 
 
The faith community does not create itself. It is not an assembly of men who have 
some ideas in common and who decide to work for the spread of such ideas. Then 
everything would be based on its own decision and, in the final analysis, on the 
majority vote principle, which is, in the end it would be based on human opinion. A 
Church built in this way cannot be for me the guarantor of eternal life nor require 
decisions from me that make me suffer and are contrary to my desires. No, the 
Church is not self-made, she was created by God and she is continuously formed by 
                                               
 5 Benedict XVI, “Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the Roman Curia Offering them his 
Christmas Greetings,” Thursday December 22, 2005, at http://w2.vatican.va, accessed July 9, 2018.   
 6 Benedict XVI, “Farewell Address to the Eminent Cardinals Present in Rome at the Clementine Hall,” 
February 28, 2013, at http//www.vatican.va, Accessed July 9, 2018. 
 7 Benedict XVI, “Interview by Fr. Jacques Servais,” S.J., 1-2.  
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him. This finds expression in the sacraments, above all in that of baptism: I enter into 
the Church not by a bureaucratic act, but through the sacrament. And this is to say 
that I am welcomed into a community that did not originate in itself and is projected 
beyond itself. The ministry that aims to form the spiritual experience of the faithful 
must proceed from these fundamental givens. It is necessary to abandon the idea of a 
Church which produces herself and to make clear that the Church becomes a 
community in the communion of the body of Christ. The Church must introduce the 
individual Christian into an encounter with Jesus Christ and bring Christians into His 
presence in the sacrament.8 
 
Clearly, notwithstanding the human organizational elements of the Church, Ratzinger sees 
the most important dimension of the Church to be her supernatural origins, that is, a church 
that comes about thanks to the explicit will and design of God. This religious sense can 
definitely not be taken for granted in a post-enlightenment and secularized contemporary 
world. Trust in the Church, even in the minds of many a good and devout Catholic, has been 
greatly eroded by scandals that have plagued the church, as many watched in disbelief the 
betrayal of the gospel by those that should know better.  
 Given this crisis of faith in the Church today, one can draw a similarity to Judah at the 
time of the Prophet Ezekiel, when the glory of the Lord finally departs the Jerusalem and the 
Temple: “The glory of the Lord came out from the Temple threshold and paused over the 
cherubs. The cherubs spread their wings and rose from the ground to leave, and as I watched 
the wheels rose with them. They paused at the entrance to the east gate of the Temple of the 
Lord, and the glory of the God of Israel hovered over them (…) And the glory of the Lord 
rose to leave the city and paused on the mountain to the east of the city” (Ez 10:18-19; 
11:23). There is no denying the fact that scandals have always been a part of our history as a 
church, but the globalization and flow of information following the culture of the social 
                                               
 8 Benedict XVI, “Interview by Fr. Jacques Servais, S.J.,” 2.  
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media have made the damaging actions of church leaders all the more dramatic and 
significant.   
 Amidst these challenges facing the proclamation of the gospel, Ratzinger argues for 
what might be described as an “inconvenient Christianity,” in which the gospel supposedly 
comforts the afflicted and afflicts the comfortable. Ratzinger maintains:  
Anyone who wants Christianity to be just a joyful message in which there can be 
threat of judgment is distorting it. Faith does not reinforce the pride of a sleeping 
conscience, the vainglory of people who make their own wishes the norm for their 
life, and who thus refashion grace so as to devalue both God and man, because God 
can then in any case only approve, and is only allowed to approve, everything. Yet 
any one of us who is suffering and struggling can be certain that “God is greater than 
our hearts” (1 Jn. 3:20) and that whatever my failures, I may be full of confident trust, 
because Christ suffered for me, too, and has already paid the price for me.9 
 
Naturally, one can discern in this view of a “good Church” a very a human-centered 
perspective, in which the Church is almost something that we ourselves are creating. Within 
this perspective, social justice issues such as peace, reconciliation and economic and material 
empowerment and advancement appear very attractive and urgent. Clearly, while not 
rejecting the essential nature of the social engagement of the Church in bringing about a 
more just and humane society, Ratzinger is eager that the Church does not lost its 
transcendental character and mission in carrying out her social doctrine. In other words, the 
horizontal and vertical orientations of the Church must not be set in opposition to each other. 




                                               
9 Ratzinger, Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith, 111.  
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5.2 Logos as Unity of Love: Ratzinger’s Engagement with the Aufklärung’s Notion of 
Self-Assertive Love  
 
With his first encyclical Deus Caritas Est, Ratzinger sought to place the love of God 
as front and center of the ecclesial life of the Church. To the many with previously formed 
negative perceptions about Ratzinger, Deus Caritas Est came as a pleasant surprise. But the 
encyclical itself provides a glimpse as to why love has always been central to the theological 
imagination of Ratzinger. Benedict writes:  
In the critique of Christianity which began with the Enlightenment and grew 
progressively more radical, this new element was seen as something thoroughly 
negative. According to Friedrich Nietzsche, Christianity had poisoned eros, which for 
its part, while not completely succumbing, gradually degenerated into vice. Here the 
German philosopher was expressing a widely-held perception: doesn't the Church, 
with all her commandments and prohibitions, turn to bitterness the most precious 
thing in life? Doesn’t she blow the whistle just when the joy which is the Creator's 
gift offers us a happiness which is itself a certain foretaste of the Divine?10 
 
Perhaps to Ratzinger, Christianity had not yet offered a forceful rebuttal to what appears to 
him to be a mischaracterization of the Christian understanding of love, by the Aufklärung, 
especially by the extremist voices such as Nietzsche. And if love in all its modes and tenses 
is the defining heartbeat of everything human, then clearly the Christian faith had the duty to 
offer anew, the core meaning of Christian love to a skeptical or largely indifferent world. 
And not only is the question about love concerned with providing a response to the 
Aufklärung, but, more so today, the question of love takes on an urgent necessity when in the 
name of God, acts of terror are unleashed on large numbers of peoples in almost every corner 
of the globe. The Christian understanding of love, therefore, can serve as a voice of 
commonsense in a highly fractured world, both nationally and in the internal coldness in the 
                                               
 10 Benedict XVI, “Encyclical Letter Deus Caritas Est: On the Meaning of Christian Love,” December 
25, 2005, 3, at w2.vatican.va, accessed October 9, 2018. 
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private lives of many an individual. The task of promoting a culture of love in contemporary 
world is certainly an urgent one for Christians, because Christianity understands itself is built 
upon the foundation of mutual love (Jn 15:35). Discipleship comes about thanks to mutual 
love.  
 To Ratzinger, therefore, the question of Christian love is one that is not only central 
to his theological imagination but has likewise been consistent. Ratzinger himself attests to 
this when he says to Peter Seewald in Light of the World:  
Two themes have always accompanied me in my life, then: on the one hand, the 
theme of Christ, as the living, present God, the one who loves us and heals us through 
suffering, and, on the other hand, the theme of love (…) because I knew that love is 
the key to Christianity, that love is the angle from which it has to be approached.11  
 
 And as is evident in the corpus of Ratzingerian writings, this angle of love is very much 
present. But how does Ratzinger do this? How does he keep the twin passions of his 
theological career, namely Christ and love, so clearly consistently together? Christopher 
Collins, S. J. provides a plausible response. Collins writes: “With the Logos as the key to his 
approach, Ratzinger’s theology is reasonable, but not abstract. Rather, it is reasonable in a 
manner that becomes personally attractive when communicated in the context of the biblical 
narrative as the Logos shows itself as visible, incarnate love in Jesus Christ.”12 This is the 
basis on which Ratzinger can declare love as the hermeneutical key to understanding 
Christianity. It is because, - as will be seen as this section develops – love, even if it begins 
with the abstract demarcations of eros, philia and agape13 as Benedict points out in Deus 
                                               
 11 Benedict XVI, Light of the World: The Pope, the Church, and the Signs of the Times, trans. Michael 
J. Miller and Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2010), 102.   
 12 Collins, The Word Made Love, 20.  
 13 The expression “Unity of Love” is intended to capture these three facets of love, that is, the sexual 
love of desire, the brotherly or sisterly love of friendship, and the service or caritas love of agape.  
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Caritas Est,14 in the final analysis, love is not an epistemological concept, but an ontological 
reality that demands a deciding consent before the being of love, logos as love. And the only 
explanation for the reality of the logos as love resides in the very being of God himself as 
love. Ratzinger rhetorically asks:  
“The Word became flesh.” Before this revelation we once more wonder: how can this 
be? The Word and the flesh are mutually opposed realities; how can the eternal and 
almighty Word become a frail and mortal being? There is only one answer: Love. 
Those who love desire to share with the beloved, they want to be one with the 
beloved, and Sacred Scripture shows us the great love story of God for his people 
which culminated in Jesus Christ.15 
 
In this light, the theological metaphor of love in its incarnate form, has love as it eternal and 
historical origins. And once again, Ratzinger finds the concept of the logos as an entry point 
for his Christological theology of love. 
 Returning to the commonplace charge against Christianity by the post-Aufklärung 
mindset that Ratzinger references in Deus Caritas Est, one can say that this charge is 
logically consistent with Aufklärung thinking regarding nature, the Sonship of Christ and 
their understanding of what essentially comprises personhood. Such is the case because 
underlining all four aspects is self-assertiveness and the desire for autonomy. Like nature’s 
necessary causality in need of no creator God; like the emptying of any uniqueness of the 
divine Sonship of Christ which is now interpreted as a functional equivalence of the moral 
person; and like the unbridled will to power that characterizes the personhood of the 
Übermensch, the principle of self-assertion largely defines the conception of love that is 
shaped by the spirit of the Aufklärung. And it is perhaps not a sheer coincidence that much of 
                                               
 14 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 3.  




this assertiveness has had to do, not with love as philia or agape, but with love as eros. In 
this sense, one could say that the charge by Nietzsche against the Christian understanding of 
love has become an ideology that cannot account for the communitarian character of how 
humans must live. Such an ideology fails to explain human beings in their innermost core, 
which is the desire to relate, to connect to the other, in a way that he or she finds the self and 
complements the self without destroying the other.  
 The contrast could not be glaring when placed side by side the self-assertiveness, the 
egocentricity that characterizes the vision of love that emerges from the spirit of the 
Aufklärung. And this sense of self-assertion is not limited to Nietzsche. Even with Kant, the 
whole ideology of autonomy of the categorical imperative as discussed above, is built on this 
understanding of the primacy of the individual reading of things. Judgment for Kant is 
exclusively a matter of the individual conscience. One cannot therefore expect such 
individualism not to spill over on the core issue that defines existence which is human love. 
And with Hegel, the whole Phenomenology is essentially the spirit coming into 
consciousness of itself, as seen above. And one can even go as far back as Descartes’ cogito, 
the magna carta of the individual self-assertiveness. De Gaál offers a comprehensive and 
trenchant analysis of the philosophical trajectory of this mindset of self-assertiveness that is 
clearly antithetical to the Christian understanding of love as put forth by Ratzinger. De Gaál 
writes:  
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 – 1900) and Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976) glorified the 
project of human self-determination. Rudolf Bultmann (1884 – 1976) – and other 
theologians in his wake – claimed to liberate people for a better understanding of the 
self through a program of demythologization. All these efforts result only in an 
erosion of the Christian message – and l’ennui (boredom) is the corresponding 
reaction on the part of human beings. Apparently, it is useless for Benedict to 
demonstrate the absurdity of Kant’s transcendental aesthetics. The radical otherness 
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of God utterly surprises. Expressed in Augustinian terms: it is divine love that, as it 
were, enlightens and illuminates people to their actual purpose.16 
 
In this sense, the difficulty of the Aufklärer lay in their inability to perceive of God’s will as 
something other than an extrinsic imposition on human will. Without humanism or 
personalism, the Aufklärer failed to see what Augustine saw, which is, as Benedict 
rearticulates in Deus Caritas Est, that God is more present to me than I am to myself.17 
Without this consciousness, God appears an authoritarian tyrant from outside that must be 
resisted, and this largely explains the rejection of God that logically followed the reasoning 
of some, like Nietzsche.  
 This pattern of the spirit of the enlightenment is clearly not only anthropocentric, but 
essentially individualistic, because by excluding God from the picture, the Enlightenment 
reduced the human being to a political program, especially the French strand of it, with its 
revolutionary maxim of liberté, egalité, fraternité.18 Such a worldview easily produces a 
utilitarian perspective of love, an understanding of love that serves me and my interests, an 
understanding of love that is unable to reach the sublime heights of agape. Love is what 
works for me. Love is the force of my power, what Ratzinger describes as the exercise of 
brute force, the splendor of power, which “signifies being able to do what you want, enjoying 
what you want, having everything at your disposal and being able to choose the place of 
honor.”19 And Ratzinger likewise reads in this utilitarian machinery view of anthropology, 
the basis of a Marxist ethos of life.20 Quite understandably then, when Christianity enters the 
                                               
 16 Emery de Gaál, O Lord, I Seek Your Countenance: Explorations and Discoveries in Pope Benedict 
XVI’s Theology (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2018), 12.  
 17 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 17.  
 18 Joseph Ratzinger, The Meaning of Christian Brotherhood (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 15.  
 19 Joseph Ratzinger, A New Song for the Lord: Faith in Christ and Liturgy Today, trans. Martha M. 
Matesich (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1986), 48.  
 20 Ratzinger, The Meaning of Christian Brotherhood, 16 – 17.  
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fray with talk about love as self-gift and not self-assertion, love as a paschalizing experience 
that pulls one away from nihilism to caritas, to the other, Christianity appears to poison the 
well of the freedom of love as understood by the spirit of libertas of the Aufklärung.  
 And Ratzinger, while refuting the charge that Christianity poisoned eros, rightfully 
remarks:  
Nowadays Christianity of the past is often criticized as having been opposed to the 
body; and it is quite true that tendencies of this sort have always existed. Yet the 
contemporary way of exalting the body is deceptive. Eros, reduced to pure “sex”, has 
become a commodity, a mere “thing” to be bought and sold, or rather, man himself 
becomes a commodity. This is hardly man's great “yes” to the body. On the contrary, 
he now considers his body and his sexuality as the purely material part of himself, to 
be used and exploited at will. Nor does he see it as an arena for the exercise of his 
freedom, but as a mere object that he attempts, as he pleases, to make both enjoyable 
and harmless. Here we are actually dealing with a debasement of the human body: no 
longer is it integrated into our overall existential freedom; no longer is it a vital 
expression of our whole being, but it is more or less relegated to the purely biological 
sphere.21  
 
Thus, while respecting and taking care of one’s body is a Christian necessity, an exaggerated 
exaltation of the body risks turning into a hatred of bodiliness. For Christianity which sees 
the person as a unity in duality, a duality of spirit and matter which is unity in the person, 
true, eros tends to rise “in ecstasy” towards the Divine, to lead us beyond ourselves. But to 
achieve this rise of eros towards the Divine calls for what Benedict characterizes as a path of 
ascent, renunciation, purification and healing.22 And so, the life without inhibitions of Pre-
Homeric Greece that Nietzsche called for, if anything, was at its core, a bastardization and 
debasement of love. It was a divine intoxication, a divine madness, in which at the outburst 
of perceived love, of eros, reason was suspended, and the emotions alone allowed a free 
hand. And this was how the fertility cults were borne. Instead of Christianity destroying eros 
                                               
 21 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 5.  
 22 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 5.  
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in its Pre-Homeric form, eros as lived out in Greek tragedy, Christianity saved and redeemed 
eros by opening eros up to agape. By opening up eros to agape, eros could no longer be 
overpowered by reason; eros could no longer be an intoxication, a madness in which the gods 
wrestled with humans. Benedict writes:  
The Old Testament firmly opposed this form of religion, which represents a powerful 
temptation against monotheistic faith, combating it as a perversion of religiosity. But 
it in no way rejected eros as such; rather, it declared war on a warped and destructive 
form of it, because this counterfeit divinization of eros actually strips it of its dignity 
and dehumanizes it. Indeed, the prostitutes in the temple, who had to bestow this 
divine intoxication, were not treated as human beings and persons, but simply used as 
a means of arousing “divine madness”: far from being goddesses, they were human 
persons being exploited. An intoxicated and undisciplined eros, then, is not an ascent 
in “ecstasy” towards the Divine, but a fall, a degradation of man. Evidently, eros 
needs to be disciplined and purified if it is to provide not just fleeting pleasure, but a 
certain foretaste of the pinnacle of our existence, of that beatitude for which our 
whole being yearns.23 
 
Thus, while it is certainly the case that the Church has had sick expressions of eros in her 
long history, these should be understood as distortions that are not representative of the 
Christian understanding of love, either as philia, eros or as agape, which is the peculiar New 
Testament understanding of love.  
 Regarding Benedict’s theology of the logos as love, the first insight that stands out is 
its anthropological character, that is, the unity of being regarding love. Benedict writes: “It is 
neither the spirit alone nor the body alone that loves: it is the human being, the person, a 
unified creature composed of body and soul, who loves. Only when both dimensions are truly 
united, does man attain his full stature. Only thus is love – eros – able to mature and attain its 
authentic grandeur.”24 This is all the more so because the human being knows that he or she 
is a person loved by a creator God. One is grateful for being a person. One is grateful that 
                                               
 23 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 4.  
 24 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 7.  
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one is not a non-being. One is grateful that one is body and soul, man and woman, individual 
and community. This is the sense in which Benedict decries certain pathological ascetical 
practices that have been present in the Christian experience, which tended to place exclusive 
emphasis on the spirit over and even against the body. Human bodiliness is not a prison for 
the soul, but the unity of body and soul, material and spiritual is what makes for a human 
being. And the fact that Christian tradition professes the resurrection of the body attests to the 
enduring significance of the bodily element in what constitutes the human being. Above all, 
the event of the Incarnation is the prime exemplar of the value of the body. The fact that the 
Eternal Logos of God takes on human flesh shows that bodiliness is not a curse to be shed, 
but a gift to be appreciated and cared for. The Council of Ephesus (431) was therefore right 
in asserting the true humanity of Jesus, God’s Eternal Logos who took flesh in the womb of 
the Blessed Virgin Mary, hence she deserved the title, Theotokos.    
 The second aspect of Benedict’s theology of the logos as unitive love is likewise its 
Christo-centric character. In Christ, God’s eros for humanity attains the fullness of agape by 
his sacrificial self-giving, to the extent that “everyone is loved by him first and each person 
who meets him can therefore respond to love and learn love if he or she wishes to do.”25 One 
is not a Christian because of a religious sense nor because of a theory of an idea of the good 
or the evil, or of salvation. At the heart of Christianity is an encounter, a person, and the 
Church is called to become that place of encounter, where all peoples can meet Christ. And 
the pedagogy of this Christic love resides in the fact that the action of humans is their 
willingness to receive this love. In other words, God initiates, and humans respond to God’s 
offer of love in Christ Jesus: “For God so loved the world, that He gave his only begotten 
                                               
 25 Angelo Cardinal Scola, “The Unity of Love and the Face of Man: An Invitation to Read Deus 
Caritas Est,” Communio: International Catholic Review, 33, 2006, 319.  
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Son, so that whosoever believes in Him will not perish but will have everlasting life” (Jn. 
3:16). The life of the Trinity itself, as Christian tradition following Augustine has come to 
understand it, provides a paradigm for this logic of giftedness: The Father gives Himself to 
the Son in Love and the Son gives Himself to the Father in love. And this love between the 
Father and Son is the Holy Spirit. In this sense, one can affirm with St. John: “God is Love” 
(1 Jn 4:8).  
A third aspect of Benedict’s theology of the logos as love is what Benedict 
understands to be the redemption of eros by agape. Benedict’s vision is that eros, the love 
which unites a man and a woman, cannot be separated from agape, the love that basically 
seeks the good of the other, the love that is oblative, sacrificial and altruistic. The great 
novelty of Deus Caritas Est is that eros and agape cannot be set against each other. As 
Benedict remarks, “love is a single reality, but with different dimensions; at different times, 
one or other dimension may emerge more clearly. Yet when the dimensions (eros and agape) 
are totally cut off from one another, the result is a caricature or at least an impoverished form 
of love.”26 This opinion about the unity of love is worked backward from the experience of 
human love to the mystery of Trinitarian love. 
But there is also another challenging insight from Deus Caritas Est, as Angelo 
Cardinal Scola writes: “The importance of the pope’s teaching on the unity of love becomes 
clear if we keep in mind above all that this unity dispels any kind of suspicion with regard to 
eros: erotic love in its original impulse is willed by God.”27 Consequently, the experience of 
falling in love (however ambiguous and ambivalent that could mean) is the most important 
natural means with which God has endowed us to learn the way of love. Benedict is hereby 
                                               
 26 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 8.  
 27 Scola, “The Unity of Love and the Face of Man,” 326.  
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claiming that the love between man and woman provides the paradigm of understanding the 
true meaning of love. Benedict’s description of eros in this context is inspirational:  
Amid this multiplicity of meanings, however, one in particular stands out: love 
between man and woman, where body and soul are inseparably joined and human 
beings glimpse an apparently irresistible promise of happiness. This would seem to be 
the very epitome of love; all other kinds of love immediately seem to fade in 
comparison. 28 
 
Thus, eros opens me to the irresistible promise of happiness disclosed by the other to me. 
Eros shows itself as desire, as a passion. Agape purifies that movement and makes me 
capable of loving the other for the other’s sake. Through eros and agape, I gain my 
fulfillment as a human being. As David Schindler rightly points out in his commentary on 
Deus Caritas Est, it is not only agape that is good, eros is also essentially good, for “taking 
eros to be essentially imperfect love would imply that human nature is essentially imperfect, 
that is, imperfect precisely as human nature, which is no less difficult to justify within a 
sound doctrine of creation.”29 Eros therefore embraces more than sexuality, which is rather a 
physical image of eros, the physical truth of eros. Put differently, one need not insist on the 
imperfection of nature in order to point out the significance of grace. In the case of a celibate 
or the consecrated virgin, for example, falling in love, eros, forcefully takes on the purifying 
renunciation of agape, leading to a progressive ascent towards the truth of the self in the 
vocation to ordained ministry or the religious life. 
Furthermore, a fourth feature of Benedict’s theology of the Logos as love has to do 
with the question of God, that is, love and the dialectics about how we encounter God. 
Christianity’s uniqueness is not in the sense that it claims that one cannot “see” God (1 Jn 
                                               
 28 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 2.  




4:20) – a claim already discernible in Israel’s faith (Ex 33:20). Christianity’s exceptionality 
lies in the fact that Christian love discovers God in the helpless, the vulnerable, the imperfect, 
the broken, the materially poor, the wounded and the excluded. The God of Christianity, the 
God of Jesus Christ, has radically identified with the broken ones of the world, to the extent 
that in encountering them in love, one encounters God (Matt 25:35ff). Certainly, this novelty 
of Christianity takes on what was best in the Jewish tradition of hospitality as enshrined in 
the Torah and the common experience of human beings, for if the novelty of Christianity had 
no continuity at all with what we already are simply as human beings, it would be completely 
foreign to us.30 And that which is foreign is usually difficult to comprehend and inspire 
positive action and engagement.  
However, Christianity goes beyond the Torah and common human experience by 
seeing in those considered excluded from the society the image of its God, of its poor and 
suffering founder, Jesus Christ. Only in Christianity does one find a God that suffers, a God 
that is rejected, a God that is weak and vulnerable. Precisely in this way, human nature in all 
its vulnerability enters into the very being of God and is thus transformed into God’s own life 
and love and sent back into the world to become agents of God’s transformative presence. 
Caritas, that is, love that descends into human history therefore becomes the main 
determinant in answer to the question about the God of Christianity. Rodney Howsare 
corroborates this reading of things when he writes:  
The human ascent to God, whether through obedience to some law (Judaism or Islam) 
or through transcending what is finite, material and historical (Buddhism), is replaced 
in Christianity by God’s descent to humanity, a descent which culminates, it should be 
added, in the folly of the Cross, an affront not only to human reason but to human 
religiosity as well.31 
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For the Christian, therefore, the question of God is the question about the meaning of love. 
The Christian can answer to the question about the identity of the Christian God by pointing 
to the self-emptying of this God in the history of God’s dealing with humanity, that 
culminates in the offering of God’s Son on the wood of the Cross, following his 
identification with sinners, tax collectors, prostitutes, the sick, the poor, the condemned, the 
weak, and today one could add, the migrants and refugees, the victims of war and terror, 
those excluded from the blessings of the resources of the earth, the young people from Africa 
who risk the dangers of the seas and oceans in search of greener economic pastures in the 
Western world because of the sense of hopelessness in many African countries, still suffering 
under the weight of Neo-colonialism. Daily, their economic resources are being pillaged by 
European nations who, though claiming to have granted political independence to these 
nations, have simply swapped political colonialism with the more insidious economic 
colonialism.  Ratzinger makes a lucid observation about this Suffering God that Christianity 
encounters and gets to know intimately:  
In the figure of Jesus in whom what is said about the Servant of God is fulfilled, (…) 
God is not loud; he cannot compete with the powers of this world. He is the “poor” 
God; the God whose only weapons are the humble weapons of love and truth, and who 
therefore always seems to be the loser. Nonetheless he is the only true saving power in 
this world. We too experience God’s powerlessness; we too seem to see him as the One 
who always comes off worst. We would prefer him to be stronger, more tangible, more 
powerful in the face of all this world’s failures, dangers and menaces. We must learn 
that it is only in the silent, barely noticeable things that what is great takes place, that 
man and woman become God’s image and the world once more becomes the radiance 
of God’s glory.32 
 
The God of Christianity is essentially a God of love and suffering, a God who shows the 
Christian in the life of Jesus of Nazareth that the measure of true existence and humanity, the 
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measure of true love is to love without measure, in patience, love and suffering. A God that 
cannot suffer, a God who does not know that it means to suffer, I believe, cannot be relevant 
to the millions in the continent of Africa who find themselves helpless in a globalized system 
that has essentially kept them excluded from the natural resources of their own lands. There 
are no easy answers to these realities. But perhaps the consciousness that God is not distant 
from their sufferings, God is not extrinsic to their sufferings, is not nothing. It is something. 
For where there is God, there is a future, even if in the present all many can do is to hope 
against hope. It is in this way of hope that the world is transformed from a valley of tears to a 
garden of paradise.  
 At this point, one can make the assertion that central to Ratzinger’s theology of the 
Logos as love is the question of the doctrine of the Church, that is, Ecclesiology. Ratzinger’s 
encounter with Augustine as seen in chapter one, led him to develop a Eucharistic 
ecclesiology. As Pope, Benedict penned Sacramentum Caritatis, which underscored the 
fundamental connection between the Eucharist and the Church: the Eucharist builds up the 
Church and the Church makes the Eucharist.33 In other words, the ecclesia, that is, the calling 
together of peoples from all the nations to listen to the memoirs of the apostles and to break 
Bread, was essential and continues to be essential in bringing about the community called the 
Church. Ratzinger explains the origins of the Church in Eucharistic terms this way:  
On the night before his Passion, Jesus took another decisive step beyond this: he 
transformed the Passover of Israel into an entirely new worship, which logically 
meant a break with the temple community and thereby definitively established a 
people of the ‘New Covenant.’34  
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To Ratzinger, therefore, the institution of the Eucharist is the decisive moment in which 
Christ brings about the new people from the “old” people, the event in which Christ 
universalizes the faith of Israel.  
 As Ratzinger argues in Behold the Pierced One, this establishment of the Church was 
not a founding, an abrogation or even less, a replacement. It was a giving of access to the 
nations to the God of Israel, the Father of Jesus Christ, whose Spirit had guarded revelation 
throughout history.35 In other words, the institution of the Eucharist from which the new 
people of God emerge as the Body of Christ, is a ratification of the historical revelation to 
Israel. In the Eucharist, the God who had spoken to Israel has now taken up a permanent tent 
of meeting in the midst, not only of Israel, but of all the nations. This leads Ratzinger to draw 
this conclusion that might appear startling in its apologetic claim: 
If we grasp this, it becomes clear that Jesus did not need to start by founding a People 
of God (the “Church”). It was already there. Jesus’ task was only to renew this People 
by deepening its relationship to God and by opening it up for all mankind. Therefore, 
the question of whether Jesus intended to found a Church is a false question because 
it is unhistorical. The only proper way to phrase the question would be to ask whether 
Jesus intended to abolish the People of God or to renew it. The answer to this 
question, rightly put, is plain: Jesus made the old People of God into a new People by 
adopting those who believe in him into the community of his own self (of his 
“Body’).36  
 
In bringing about the reality of the Church, therefore, Jesus has entered into existing subject 
of tradition, that is, Israel, and thanks to his proclamation and his Person, renews and opens 
the existing tradition by bringing all the nations into the possibility of a personal relationship 
with his Father, in his body, the Body of Christ. This body is therefore both sacramental, in 
the Eucharistic species, and also a communion of believers. Ratzinger therefore writes:  
The institution of the most holy Eucharist on the evening before the Passion cannot be 
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regarded as some more or less isolated cultic transaction. It is the making of a 
covenant and, as such, is the concrete foundation of the new people: the people come 
into being through its covenant relation to God. We could also say that by his 
Eucharistic action, Jesus draws the disciples into his relationship with God, and 
therefore, into his mission, which aims to reach “the many,” the humanity of all 
places and of all times. These disciples become a “people” through communion with 
the Body and Blood of Jesus, which is simultaneously communion with God.37 
 
The Old Testament theme of covenant hence, takes on a new meaning of covenant with 
Christ’s body. The people of the new covenant take their origin from the Body and Blood of 
Christ. And it is only because Christ is at the center that this people can be called a people of 
God, for in Christ, they are taken up into God. As a consequence of this Eucharistic presence 
that takes up humanity in God making believers a people of God, believers now learn to 
depend on God and not on themselves, for:  
We can live by God because God now lives for us. We can live by God because God 
he has made himself one of us, because he himself, as it were, has become our bread. 
We can live by God because he gives himself to us, not only as the Word, but as the 
Body that is given up for us and is given to us, ever new, in the sacrament.38 
 
In the Eucharist, therefore, truly, God is in our midst, Immanuel. The Eucharist is therefore 
the fullest expression of the name Immanuel. God is truly in the midst of humanity. But even 
more, God feeds humanity in the gathered assembly, the body of Christ as a community of 
believers, and the Body of Christ as Eucharist received. The Eucharist is therefore, the causal 
principle of the Church, given that the Church draws her life from the Eucharist, as shown 
above.  
 In Deus Caritas Est, Benedict taught that agape is another name for Eucharist and 
that in the Eucharist, “God’s own agape comes to us bodily, in order to continue his work in 
us and through us (…) A Eucharist that does not pass over into the concrete practice of love 
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is intrinsically fragmented.”39 Seen from this perspective, the social dimension of Benedict’s 
Eucharistic ecclesiology emerges. If at the center of the institutional narrative stands the self-
giving love of Christ, then to receive the Eucharist is to enter into the reality of giftedness, of 
caritas, of giving of the self to the other in concrete acts of love and service. Given this 
realization, Benedict’s Eucharistic ecclesiology of love constitutes the core of his social 
justice theology.  
 Granted its summons to service, the Eucharist urges and advocates for justice, peace 
and reconciliation in a continent like Africa that has seen and continues to see ethnic and 
regional conflicts that have claimed and continues to claim the lives of millions. What might 
it have meant to celebrate the Eucharist in the context of the Rwandan genocide?  What can 
the celebration of the Eucharist say to the armed conflicts currently going on in Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Chad and the Central African Republic, Somalia and much of other parts of 
Africa? If the Eucharist comes about thanks to the grain of wheat that falls to the grown and 
dies, what hopes can it offer to the countless women subjected daily to rape and all forms of 
sexual violence in the North Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of Congo? To live out 
the theology of Eucharistic Caritas in these contexts will definitely call for a rediscovery of 
the centrality of love and service in the Eucharistic imaginations of many an African. And if 
Eucharistic faith does not translate into concrete acts of mutual love, service and peaceful co-
existence, not only are such Eucharistic celebrations truncated as Benedict says, but they will 
in fact be superstitious, empty symbols governed by a magical mindset that begins and ends 
with what has not become an idolatrous, lifeless devotional object, salt that has lost its 
saltiness. Benedict called the attention of the Church in Africa to the potentials of the 
                                               




Eucharist to bring about reconciliation in Africa when he writes in Africae Munus:  
The table of the Lord gathers together men and women of different origins, cultures, 
races, languages and ethnic groups. Thanks to the Body and Blood of Christ, they 
become truly one. In the Eucharistic Christ, they become blood relations and thus true 
brothers and sisters, thanks to the word and to the Body and Blood of the same Jesus 
Christ. This bond of fraternity is stronger than that of human families, than that of our 
tribes.40 
 
In a continent that has seen and continues to witness so much bloodshed based on ethnic and 
regional lines, this invitation to consider the fact that believers who receive the same Body 
and Blood are made brothers and sisters, is definitely a necessary and an urgent message in 
need of attention. A Eucharistic theology of communion is therefore crucial in terms of a 
spirituality for the African Church. This must be the case, for in its absence, or when the 
reverse is true, it clearly becomes obvious that Eucharistic celebrations that lead to no 
individual and societal fruits of justice, peace, reconciliation and love bear the marks of 
practical atheism, in which God has ceased to have any real meaning in the lives of people, 
even if the external trappings of religion are still present. The observation of Rodney 
Howsare is very expressive here:  
It was obviously not that God had once been alive and had now died, nor was it even 
that most people had ceased to believe in God; it was that thought and action were not 
taking place in a world for which the God question made no real difference.41 
 
In other words, the celebration of the Eucharist should make a difference in the lives of 
African Christians. There is therefore, no substitute for the social dimension of the 
Eucharistic ecclesiology of love, for the reason that caritas, love and service is central to 
Eucharistic faith. In this light, given that the matter of the Eucharist, bread and wine, reflect 
the fruits of the world, in the light of the doctrine of creation, the world takes on a symbolic 
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meaning in Eucharistic theology. Benedict’s Eucharistic theology is therefore essentially a 
theology of God’s love. Hence, the service of charity, the advocacy for social justice is 
likewise an expression of giftedness, for what has been received as a gift propels us to 
become gifts to the other in turn.  
 Given the above insights on Benedict’s theology of the Logos as love, thanks to 
which one arrives at Benedict’s Eucharistic ecclesiology, one can describe Benedict’s 
Eucharistic theology in one word: Self-gift. And the paradigm of this self-gift is the event of 
the Incarnation, in which the Father gives his Son into the world out of love for the world (Jn 
3:16), and the Son, the incarnate Logos of the Father, in turn gives himself as a ransom for 
the many – “The reason the Father loves me is that I lay down my life and take it up again. 
No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord” (Jn 10:17-18). The Church is 
therefore, the place where believers learn to give themselves for one another, in mutual self-
gift. Self-gift is that the origin of the Eucharist which comes about as a fruit of Christ’s love 
for us, and self-gift is likewise what sustains the Body of Christ as a community. Without 
self-gift, there is no Church. Therefore, in response to the self-assertive understanding of love 
that follows the spirit and logic of the Aufklärung, Ratzinger offers self-gift as the true 
measure and grandeur of love, in such a way that the various forms of love are not set up 
against each other in a love-warfare, but find a symphonic harmony in the one being of 






5.3 Logos as Word: Ratzinger’s Engagement with the Aufklärung’s Non-Cultic Rational 
Faith  
 
 The Twelfth Ordinary Assembly of the Synod of Bishops convoked by Benedict XVI 
from October 5th to 26th 2008, was centered on the theme: The Word of God in the Life and 
Mission of the Church. In the post-synodal apostolic exhortation Verbum Domini, Benedict 
XVI taught that in the Written Word of God, God still speaks and responds to our 
questions.42 In other words, Logos as the spoken and written Word of God is the basis on 
which the dialogue between humans and God is established. To cite Vatican II: “The unseen 
God, from the fullness of his love, addresses men and women as his friends, and lives among 
them, in order to invite and receive them into his company.”43 To Ratzinger, this sense of 
dialogue between creatures and the Creator has profound implications regarding the truths of 
God and the truths about human beings, because, “The eternal Logos does not concretely 
become bread for man until he has taken flesh and speaks to us in human words.” 44 
In this sense, we are no longer groping in uncertainty about what God expects of us as 
creatures. We know God’s will because God has used human language, human speech, to 
communicate with us. As Dei Verbum taught, “the words of God, expressed in human 
language, are in every way like human speech, just as the word of the eternal Father, when he 
took on himself the weak flesh of human beings, became like them.”45 In this light, Scripture 
is the book of the Church, for it is the Church that receives the spoken Word, understands it, 
lives it and has the duty to transmit it through the authentic interpretation of the Magisterium 
of the Church, which is received and celebrated in the womb of the Church’s liturgy.  
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Thus, the metaphor of the Logos serves as the entry point into Ratzinger’s liturgical 
theology, for it is the word of God that calls the people into a community, gathered around 
the name of Christ. In his exegesis of Acts 2:42: “They (the early Christians) devoted 
themselves to the Apostles’ teaching and to fellowship, to the breaking of bread and to 
prayer,” Ratzinger points out that it is the word of Scripture that stands in between teaching 
and breaking of bread. It is this word that brings both sides together, that brings about both 
aspects, the teaching ministry and the fellowship of the breaking of bread, two aspects that 
essential to the foundationality of the Church.46 And what animates Scripture by bringing it 
alive, and the teaching of the apostles with inspiration, and the breaking of bread that makes 
Christ’s sacrificial memorial present, is the Holy Spirit that breathes life into all, giving life 
to all and making God’s power operative in all. As Benedict says, “(…) there can be no 
authentic understanding of Christian revelation apart from the activity of the Paraclete. This 
is due to the fact that God’s self-communication always involves the relationship of the Son 
and the Holy Spirit, whom Irenaeus of Lyons refers to as the two hands of the Father.”47 
Thus, the “Spirit of Truth” (Jn 14:16) is indispensable in the understanding of the words of 
the Lord Jesus Christ.  
However, Ratzinger makes a distinction between the Word of God, God’s Logos, the 
incarnate Second Person of the Trinity, and the word of God as Scripture, the word of God as 
written, as a text: 
As the Prologue of John clearly shows us, the Logos refers in the first place to the 
eternal Word, the only Son, begotten of the Father before all ages and consubstantial 
with him: the word was with God, and the word was God. But this same Word, Saint 
John tells us, “became flesh” (Jn 1:14); hence Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, 
is truly the Word of God who has become consubstantial with us. Thus, the 
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expression “word of God” here refers to the person of Jesus Christ, the eternal Son of 
the Father, made man.48 
 
This analogy of “word of God” is theologically significant, for it points to the fact that the 
real center of Christianity is not the written text, but the living Christ whose Spirit animates 
the hearts and lives of believers. This is the sense in which one could say that Christianity is 
not “a religion of the book,” not only for the simple reason that the community of believers 
predated the canon of Scripture and in fact, determined the canon, but more importantly, 
because the event of the incarnation forever places a human being, of flesh and blood, at the 
center of the Christian religious experience. This Christology of the word is captured in this 
text from the Letter to the Hebrews: “In many and various ways God spoke of old to our 
fathers by the prophets; but in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son, whom he 
appointed the heir of all things, through whom also he created the world” (Heb 1:1-2). As 
Benedict comments, here, that is, in the incarnation of the word, “the word finds expression 
not primarily in discourse, concepts or rules. Here we are set before the very person of Jesus. 
His unique and singular history is the definitive word which God speaks to humanity.”49  
Hence, the event of the incarnation explains in large measure why Christianity cannot be an 
ethical choice, but an experiential encounter with a person, Jesus Christ.  
Given this distinction between the Incarnate Logos, Jesus Christ, and the written word 
of Scripture, when Acts 2:42 talks about the believers as devoting themselves to the 
teachings of the apostles, the referent is the word of God as Scripture, the written word, the 
text, the memoirs of the apostles, the writings the apostles left behind. This implies, as 
Ratzinger points out, that the New Testament is the Church’s book, that it presupposes the 
                                               
 48 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 7.  
 49 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 28.  
262 
 
Church as its subject.50 In other words, the Bible grew from the Church, and the unity of the 
Bible is a fruit of the Church’s faith that brings together the diverse elements of Scripture 
into a symphonic unity, over a long period of time in which the canon of Scripture 
developed.  
In this light, therefore, Logos as Word essentially has two significations. Firstly, it 
points to the person of Jesus, the Eternal Word of the Father. And secondly, it points to the 
written Scriptures which are the voice of the Incarnate Word. The Dogmatic Constitution on 
Divine Revelation Dei Verbum, provides a lucid explanation of how these two aspects of the 
Logos as word are expressive of each other:  
In Sacred Scripture, therefore, while the truth and holiness of God always remains 
intact, the marvelous “condescension” of eternal wisdom is clearly shown, “that they 
may learn the gentle kindness of God, which words cannot express, and how far He 
has gone in adapting His language with thoughtful concern for our weak human 
nature.” For the words of God, expressed in human language, have been made like 
human discourse, just as the word of the eternal Father, when He took to Himself the 
flesh of human weakness, was in every way made like men.51 
 
In this sense, word is not only speech that is written, but simultaneously a person that utters 
the spoken word. 
 A further aspect in Ratzinger’s theology of the Logos as word has to do with the 
broad question of the interpretation of Scripture. For the specific purposes of the question of 
this thesis which is that of understanding Ratzinger in the context of the Aufklärung as must 
have become obvious at this point, I will like to highlight what Ratzinger calls the “danger of 
dualism and a secularized hermeneutic.”52 Ratzinger maintains that to distinguish two levels 
of approach to the Bible does not imply that these levels ought to be separated or opposed. 
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Neither do they imply a simple juxtaposition of things. In other words, the work of exegesis 
which spells out the different layers of tradition in the coming to be of the texts must not lead 
to a severing of the relationship between exegesis and theology, between exegesis and 
dogma, which reflects on the faith of the Church.53 Here again, one returns to the limitations 
of the historical-critical method earlier pointed out, in the consideration of the Gestalt of 
Jesus. Ratzinger thus calls for a hermeneutic of faith to counteract the secularized 
hermeneutic. Ratzinger argues that this secularized hermeneutic is:  
Ultimately based on the conviction that the Divine does not intervene in human 
history. According to this hermeneutic, whenever a divine element seems present, it 
has to be explained in some other way, reducing everything to the human element. 
This leads to interpretations that deny the historicity of the divine elements.54 
 
In my judgment, this description of the secularized hermeneutics fits very well, the 
reinterpretations of the figure of Christ, the New Testament and the sacramental life of the 
Christian Church, specifically, the Catholic Church, that emerged from Kant, Hegel and other 
Aufklärung figures. As seen in the earlier sections of this chapter, the ethical and rational 
reductionism of the person of Christ and the New Testament witness to Christ that came with 
the Aufklärung, essentially leaves us with a human, moral Christ, not a Christ to whom one 
can pray to and worship. As Ratzinger points out:  
Such a position can only prove harmful to the life of the Church, casting doubt over 
fundamental mysteries of Christianity and their historicity – as, for example, the 
institution of the Eucharist and the resurrection of Christ. A philosophical 
hermeneutic is thus imposed, once which denies the possibility that the Divine can 
enter and be present within history. The adoption of this hermeneutic within 
theological studies inevitably introduces a sharp dichotomy between an exegesis 
limited solely to the first level and a theology tending towards a spiritualization of the 
meaning of the Scriptures, one which would fail to respect the historical character of 
revelation.55 
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In other words, and as previously highlighted, a philosophical hermeneutic alone, even when 
one presumes its best of intentions, cannot adequately covey the fullest and deepest contents 
of the historical revelation of God in Christ Jesus, and the witness of the New Testament to 
this revelation. Perhaps the difficult might lie in the fact that the postulates of pure reason 
that guided say Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach and other Aufklärung figures, succumbed to the 
tendency of an unwarranted amplification of the concept of rational faith. They ended up 
promising more than they could deliver, for human reason alone cannot fully explain the 
contents and significance of divine revelation.  
 That said, it is important to note that the high point of Ratzinger’s theology of the 
Logos as word centers on the liturgy, particularly the Eucharistic prayer, that is, the 
institutional narrative. In the preceding section, the connection between Eucharist and the 
founding of the Church was considered. At this point, the consideration will focus on the 
how the word, spoken, brings about the Eucharist as a sacrifice that replaces the animal 
sacrifices that preceded it, in the evolution of Israel’s faith and the pagan sacrifices of the 
nations. Essentially, this keeps in mind all that has been said above about the relationship 
between the Eucharist and the Church. What is distinct here is the relationship between the 
Eucharist and the word, the form of speech that comes about thanks to the Incarnation of the 
Logos as word that is spoken, one might say Logos as speech.  
 In this light, reflecting on Jesus’ Eucharistic discourse in sixth chapter of the Gospel 
of John, Ratzinger writes:  
In the discourse at Capernaum, John’s Prologue is brought to a deeper level. There 
God’s Logos became flesh, but here this flesh becomes “bread” given for the life of 
the world (cf. Jn 6:51), with an allusion to Jesus’ self-gift in the mystery of the cross, 
confirmed by the words about his blood being given as drink (cf. Jn 6:53). The 
265 
 
mystery of the Eucharist reveals the true manna, the true bread of heaven: it is God’s 
Logos made flesh, who gave himself up for us in the paschal mystery.56 
 
Logos as Word, that is, as Person, and Logos as word, that is, as speech, find a meeting point 
in bringing about the self-gift of the Eucharist. As the Logos, Jesus gives of himself to us in 
the Eucharist. And speaking in persona Christi, the word uttered by the priest brings about 
the presence of the Logos, the person of the Logos under the form of bread and wine. As 
Ratzinger points out, “it is clear that in the liturgy of the Logos, of the Eternal Word, the 
word and thus the human voice have an essential role to play.”57 The human word therefore 
takes on a divine efficacy at the Eucharistic prayer, in that the human being can speak with 
God, can address God in very personal and relational terms.   
 This human communication with God is possible because God himself is speech, 
word. God’s nature is to speak, to hear, and to reply. And as Ratzinger points out, “only 
because there is already speech, “- Logos, -” in God can there be speech, “- Logos, -” to God. 
Philosophically we could put it like this: The Logos in God is the onto-logical foundation for 
prayer.”58 This implies that prayer is possible because speech belongs to the nature of God. 
Only because God is speech, can the human being speak to God in return. And only because 
of this ontological character of speech can humans enter into prayer. This speech between 
God and humans makes them partners in dialogue. It establishes a relationship between God 
and human beings.  
 In addition, to Ratzinger, human beings are capable of dialoguing with God, of 
entering into communication with God, because God has drawn humans into this internal 
                                               
 56 Benedict XVI, Verbum Domini, 54.  
 57 Joseph Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, trans. John Saward (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2000), 207.  
 58 Joseph Ratzinger, The Feast of Faith: Approaches to a Theology of the Liturgy, trans. Graham 
Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 25.  
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speech with God, which comes about thanks to the event of the Incarnation of the Logos. In 
this context, the Incarnation is the definitive mode of divine-human communication. 
Ratzinger explains:  
He who is speech, Word, Logos, in God and to God, participates in human speech. 
This has a reciprocal effect, involving man in God’s own internal speech. Or we 
could say that man is able to participate in the dialogue within God himself because 
God has first shared in human speech and has thus brought the two into 
communication with one another. The Incarnation of the Logos brings eternity into 
time and time into eternity.59 
 
In this light, the word or the speech between human beings and God is grounded primarily in 
the very being of God, in that it is God who speaks to humans, and humans, in Christ, with 
Christ and through Christ, speak to God in return. One could say that in Christ, the human 
word has definitively responded to the word first spoken by the Father.  
 This is the context thanks to which one can understand the theological unicity and 
significance of the oratio, the Eucharistic prayer, in which in the name of the whole Church 
the priest speaks through Christ to the Father in the power of the Holy Spirit. To Ratzinger, 
the oratio is the true liturgical act that forms the core of the Eucharistic celebration.60 The 
oratio is the essence and center of the liturgy. To call the liturgy oratio is simultaneously a 
refutation of false worship and a declaration for true, authentic, worship. Ratzinger writes: 
The sacrificial animals and all those things that you had and have, and which 
ultimately satisfy no one, are now abolished. In their place has come the Sacrifice of 
the Word. We are the spiritual religion, in which in truth a Word-based worship takes 
place. Goats and cattle are no longer slaughtered. Instead, the Word, summing up our 
existence, is addressed to God and identified with the Word, the Word of God, who 
draws us into true worship.61 
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In other words, the oratio, the word, has now ushered in a sacrifice that is spiritual, a 
sacrifice that reflects a most profound level of interaction between God and human beings.  
This liberates humans from the debasement of animal sacrifices. Most importantly, however, 
because of the word, humans are no longer left on their devices in the worship of God. 
Speaking the word, humans enter into the Word of God, the Eternal Logos, and now address 
the Father with the word of the Son.  
 For Ratzinger, this word, the oratio, is not just word as utterance, as speech, but is 
primarily an action as well, an actio, in which the human action, that is, the person of the 
priest who speaks in the name of the community to the Father, cedes place to the divine 
actio, for in speaking to the Father, the priest speaks with the word of the Father’s Divine 
Son. As Ratzinger explains:  
In this oratio the priest speaks with the I of the Lord – “This is my Body,” “This is 
my Blood.” He knows that he is not now speaking from his own resources but in 
virtue of the Sacrament that he has received, he has become the voice of Someone 
Else, who is now speaking and acting. This action of God, which takes place through 
human speech, is the real “action” for which all of creation is in expectation.62  
 
Given this perspective, therefore, one could say that what is distinctive about Christian 
worship is that it is God himself in the sacramental configuration of the presence of His Son 
in the priest, who does what is essential in the worship of God. God himself does what is 
essential because in the event of the Incarnation, God has become a human being. God has a 
body and the believer is a part of this mystical body of God. And becoming a member of this 
body is not only a gift but also a duty, for it implies that humans “must still pray for it to 
become our sacrifice, that we ourselves, as we said, may be transformed into the Logos 
(logisiert), conformed to the Logos, and so be made the true Body of Christ.”63 Thus, the 
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actio in which the believer is taken up into the Body of Christ is such that in responding to 
the Lord’s invitation, it becomes clear, in the final analysis, that the believer is participating 
in something which only the Lord can do. That is the quintessence of the meeting of the 
human and divine word, in the Incarnate and Risen Christ.  
 Given the above considerations of the Logos as Word that opens the theology of 
worship, it can be stated that the Christological reading of worship, of the cult, provides a 
framework thanks to which one sees the both the life of Christ and the life of the believer 
both as an oratio and an actio. The life of the believer is an offering to God in Christ, and the 
liturgy is the space for that worship. However, in this new dispensation, animal sacrifices 
have lost their efficacy to the oratio rationabilis, to the Word, the Logos, whom, having 
become a man in Jesus of Nazareth, makes it possible for the believer to speak to the Father 
in the name of the Son. The worship of God is therefore, not something peripheral, that 
which could be attended to after all other important concerns have been dealt with. The 
worship of God is central because the sacrifice of Christ, the penultimate sacrifice of the 
Cross, indicates that sense of actio and ratio that becomes the pattern of all human speech 
and action before God.  
 Certainly, this Ratzingerian position build on Justin’s logikē thusia, oratio 
rationabilis, that is, Justin’s understanding of sacrifice as spiritual in which all animal 
sacrifices terminate with the Eucharist, as seen in chapter three. In The Spirit of the Liturgy, 
following a presentation of the historical trajectory of the critique of the externalism and 
syncretism of the cult in the pre-exilic and exilic periods of Israel’s history as it opens up 
towards the figure of Christ, Ratzinger maintains that the concept of logikē latreia (thusia), 
that is, worship and sacrifice understood as worship with spirit and mind as noted by Paul in 
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Romans 12:1, constitutes the definitive Christian response to the crisis of the cult of the 
ancient world.64 Ratzinger makes this conclusion:  
The sacrifice is the “word,” the word of prayer, which goes up from man to God, 
embodying the whole of man’s existence and enabling him to become “word” (logos) 
in himself. It is man, conforming himself to logos and becoming logos through faith, 
who is the true sacrifice, the true glory of God in the world. Israel’s experience of 
suffering during the Exile and the Hellenistic period first brought the word of prayer 
into prominence as the equivalent of exterior sacrifice. Now, through the word, logos, 
the whole philosophy of logos in the Greek world is incorporated into the concept. 
The Greek mind elevates it eventually to the idea of a mystical union with the Logos, 
the very meaning of all things.65  
 
In the concept of the logos, word, therefore, the worship of God has found its fullest and 
most sublime form and expression. Worship is the human being, the logos in humans, 
humans who themselves have become logoi, offering their very selves to God in prayer. To 
worship therefore becomes self-offering. Nothing, no other animal sacrifice, can replace the 
self-offering, the spiritual offering of humans made in speech, in the logos, oratio, to God. 
True worship is therefore a spiritual worship, a worship that engages the spirit of humans 
from the inside, a spiritual worship that conforms to the nature of God who is spirit, and 
those who worship must worship in spirit and in truth (Jn 4:24). Worship is therefore, the 
lifting of the human being in prayer to God. Prayer is the Christian sacrifice. Worship is no 
longer the sacrifice of animals, but the offering of the self to God, the self which is all that is. 
 In the final analysis, as Ratzinger will have it, true worship happens thanks to the 
synthesis of three logoi, that is, “the logos of creation, the logos in man, and the true and 
eternal Logos made flesh, the Son.”66 With the Word, the Logos, thanks to which humans can 
utter the oratio, that is, prayer, worship finally attains its fullest form. Prayer is the sacrifice 
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par excellence, the worship and sacrifice with mind and spirit in which nothing is substituted 
or replaced in the human offering to God. Humans offer their very selves, a spiritual offering 
to God. The oratio therefore goes beyond the cult to a fuller experience of God, a vision of 
glory of God.  
 With this understanding, the oratio, prayer, in other words, the Christian cult can be 
described as a school of humanization, for as Ratzinger says, “worship, that is, the right kind 
of cult, of relationship with God, is essential for the right kind of human existence in the 
world.”67 In other words, a right relationship with God in worship is a guarantor for a right 
ordering of human affairs. Worship is therefore not superfluous. The cult is not something 
that must be set aside so that humans could attend to more pressing concerns. As Ratzinger 
argues, “a life no longer opened up to heaven, would be empty, a leaden life. That is why 
there are really no societies altogether lacking in cult. Even the decidedly atheistic, 
materialistic systems create their own forms of cult.”68 In the spirit of the Ratzingerian 
reading of things, such societies strive in vain to conceal the nothingness that follows their 
rejection of right worship, which is the ordering of their relationship with God.  
 Granted this consciousness, therefore, one cannot be indifferent to largely suspicious 
attitude of the Aufklärung towards the Christian cult, viewed as superfluous and essentially 
superstitious, a “fetish-faith,” to cite Kant: 
Praying conceived as an inner ritual service to God and hence as a means of grace, is 
a superstitious delusion (a fetish-making); for it only is the declaring of a wish to a 
being who has no need of any declaration regarding the inner disposition of the 
wisher, through which nothing is therefore accomplished nor is any of the duties 
incumbent on us as commands of God discharged; hence God is not really served.69  
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To Kant, therefore, the cult is irrelevant because all that mattered is the disposition of the 
heart, that is, the attention one pays to the moral law within us. In effect, the cult is a 
distraction because the human being in the oratio, is according to Kant, seeking to work 
externally upon God by using words. But the real work, the real actio, should be the focus on 
the self, the work on the internal disposition of the self.70 And this does not require words. If 
the cult is to have any value at all, it is simply that it is a moral solemnity. It is not a means of 
grace. It will simply be a space that embraces the moral concerns of all human beings.71 And 
having characterized Christian cult as unnecessary, a distraction lacking in any religious 
efficacy, Kant makes this conclusion about the Eucharist:  
But to boast that God has attached special graces to the celebration of this solemn 
ritual, and to incorporate among the articles of faith the proposition that the ritual, 
though a purely ecclesiastical action, is in addition a means of grace – this is a 
delusion of religion which cannot but work counter to the spirit of religion – 
Priestcraft would thus be, in general, the dominion which the clergy has usurped over 
the mind by pretending to have exclusive possession of the means of grace.72 
 
The Eucharist is delusional because Kant does not see any direct influence that the Eucharist 
can bring on the moral law within humans. It is delusional because it is an external action, 
and only the moral law within is of any value to Kant.  
 And as Kant goes, Hegel follows. In Hegel’s interpretation of the encounter between 
Jesus and the Samaritan woman (Jn 4:1-42), - a text that otherwise could provide a rich 
source for liturgical theology, Hegel has Jesus say to the Samaritan woman:  
Believe me, woman, Jesus answered, a time is coming when you will no longer 
celebrate divine service, whether on Garizim or in Jerusalem – a time when nobody 
will any longer suppose that divine service is limited to prescribed rituals or to a 
specific place. The time will come – indeed it is already upon us – when those who 
truly revere God will worship the universal father in the true spirit of religion. These 
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alone are pleasing to him; their worship of God is authentic, being animated solely by 
the spirit of reason and its flower, the moral law.73 
 
Similar to Kant, Hegel clearly displays a judgment of irrelevancy regarding the cult. Worship 
is reduced to reason and the moral law. In a sense, the human being is a God unto the self. 
Any talk of worship that points the human being to an external God possesses no value. And 
further developing his anthropocentric liturgical philosophical theology, Hegel again writes:  
“So, do not let yourselves be deceived by mere pious words; not everyone who cries out to 
God, who offers him prayers and sacrifices, is a member of his kingdom, but only he who 
does God’s will, which is disclosed to men in the law of his own reason.”74 In other words, a 
good life, an ethical life, replaces the cult for these Aufklärung thinkers.  
 To Ratzinger, therefore, the Aufklärung sought to provide for a radically different 
Church, along the lines of liturgy, the cult, and Christian devotional life. And even when 
orthodox Christianity did not fully embrace the positions of the Aufklärer, Ratzinger believes 
that their thoughts impacted the devotional and cultic life of the German Church. Ratzinger 
writes:  
The Enlightenment had its liturgical movement, the aim of which was to simplify the 
liturgy and restore it to its original basic structure. Excesses in the cult of relics and of 
saints were to be removed, and, above all, the vernacular, with congregational singing 
and participation, was to be introduced.75 
 
In this text, Ratzinger identifies liturgy, biblical hermeneutics and the sacramental life of the 
Church in their traditional forms as being reinterpreted by the Aufklärung currents. For a 
Church man with Ratzinger’s ecclesial and intellectual temperament who holds that the cult 
is primary to Christian living as shown above in his theology of the Logos as word, Ratzinger 
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clearly feels ill at ease with the liturgical theology that emerged from the Aufklärung. 
Ratzinger believes that: 
The rationalism of the Enlightenment had tried to reduce religion to one or two 
universally self-evident propositions. Behind the positive religions it wanted to 
reconstruct a religion of pure reason, which would unite all men. This artificial 
edifice, a religion synthetically manufactured in reflection, had vanished like a soap 
bubble at the impact of Kant’s critique.76  
 
Here, Ratzinger is not taking issue with enlightened reason per se, but the manner in which 
the Aufklärung was interpreting reason and reason’s morality especially in the light of the 
Christian cult. In the sense of the cultic theology of the Aufklärung, the believer eventually 
becomes a mere subject of morality. This eschews the transcendental dimension of the life of 
the believer, whose only God becomes the self, and whose only task is to live according to 
the moral law found within the self. But the worship of a God who is utterly different from 
me and yet, has taken me into God’s self as seen in the liturgical interpretation of the 
Incarnation above, does not detract the believer from the dignity of self-worth, from obeying 
the voice of conscience or the moral law within it. If anything, for Ratzinger, and very much 
for the Christian faith, the one who worships God rises with courage to face not only the 
moral law within the individual, but the vicissitudes, uncertainties and challenges without, 
under Kant’s starry skies. And while this does not eschew morality, it definitely widens the 
basis from which one looks at morality, in the sense, from a humanistic and communal point 
of view. And Christian worship, understood as logikē latreia (thusia), that is, the Logos-filled 
liturgy, is the deepest enlightenment possible, reason being that, as already indicated above, 
is the worship and sacrifice with spirit and mind.  
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 In fact, it is precisely this dimension of communal faith that is lacking in much of the 
Aufklärung, for while the ecclesiology of the Logos as love and the Logos as word helps 
bring about the Church, or more precisely, explains the origins of the Church as shown 
above, - at least from the Ratzingerian perspective – the Aufklärung leaves the individual 
almost in isolation. The individual is either standing alone with a moral law within (Kant); or 
standing alone on a plane of unbridled self-assertiveness or narcissism (Nietzsche); or 
essentially gets trapped in a cyclic process of psychologizing in which the spirit of the 
individual that is also present is divinized, and in the process, creates a God within (Hegel).  
 In summary, this chapter set out to study Ratzinger’s appropriation of the central 
metaphor of Logos, reason, and his application of Logos to the Ecclesiological motifs or 
aspects that Ratzinger’s theology. Given the framework of the Aufklärung which also had 
reason as its central metaphor, the chapter opened up a space for an interaction between 
Ratzinger and the Aufklärer, around the theological themes the centrality of love; and the 
worship of God based on the principle of the spoken word, that is, Logos as word. Love and 
word are seen to be foundational in understanding Ratzinger’s ecclesiology, as argued above. 
 Granted that the overriding framework from chapter two through chapter five has 
been that of a dialogue, a conversation between philosophy and theology, between the God of 
faith and the God of the philosophers, the aim of chapter five was to place the positions of 
Ratzinger and the Aufklärung on an interactive, conversational stage, so that both sides will 
emerge clearly regarding the questions of love and worship, and what that says about 
Ratzinger’s ecclesiology. I believe that this corresponds to Benedict’s initiative of the Court 
of the Gentiles, which, as Pope, he saw as the needed space to foster a dialogue between the 
Christian faith and the heirs of the secular Aufklärung. And herein lies the contributions of 
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not only chapter five but chapter four as well, that is, that Ratzinger and Aufklärer do not just 
talk pass each other but can talk to each other by talking on some common areas such as on 
the identity of Jesus as Son, or on the meaning of love as the strongest human emotion. And 
even when it might appear that they are talking pass each other, the fact that they can talk, 
that Ratzinger can converse with Hegel on the identity of Jesus, is no small achievement, on 
both philosophical and theological grounds.   
 Certainly, as seen in chapter one, Ratzinger is a firm believer that Jesus Christ is not 
only the end of history (Augustine), but Jesus is also the center of history (Bonaventure). It 
therefore should come as no surprise that the positions espoused by Ratzinger when placed in 
conversation with those put forth by say Kant, Hegel or Nietzsche, reflect the convictions of 
a pious soul, a humble and firm believer for whom reason is not just an autonomous entity, 
but one that is, at some point, subservient to faith. As is likely to be the case, not everyone 
agrees with the Ratzingerian rational-faith hermeneutics. And chapter six will shed light on 












Chapter Six: Ratzinger: Beyond the Aufklärung Historical Scientificity 
of Reason – Interacting with Critical Voices  
 
 At this point, it is clear that faith and reason, or the dialogue between the God of faith 
and the God of the philosophers, constitute a central concern in terms of how Ratzinger 
thinks about the figure of Christ and the Church. Faith and reason constitute an indispensable 
framework if one is to properly understand much of the theological positions of Ratzinger, as 
seen in the metaphors he makes regarding Logos as Creative Reason, Son, Person, Unity of 
Love and Word. In other words, one gains a more profound grasp of the conclusions 
espoused by Ratzinger when read in the context of the philosophical postulates of the modern 
and post-modern Western philosophical tradition, which are heavily shaped by the eighteenth 
century Aufklärung movement that swept across much of Western Europe. Thus, Ratzinger’s 
theology has a contextual character, if by context one implies not just sociological trends, 
which Ratzinger clearly has little esteem for due to what he perceives to be their transitory 
nature, but, more pointedly, context as reflected in the critical thinking of the times or the 
age. In a word, context as thought patterns.  
 What stands out thus far is the realization that the concerns one finds in the 
philosophical theology of some of the Aufklärer are similar to what one finds in the 
systematic or dogmatic theology of Ratzinger. In effect, and taken into consideration the 
points treated in chapter three, it is plausible to make the assertion that much of Ratzinger’s 
theology is an engagement with what Ratzinger considers to be interpretations and 
reinterpretations of Christian orthodox truth claims by the Aufklärung, in a spirit of rational 
and critical thinking, in which reason is declared the primary and exclusive basis of 
engagement with the truth claims of Christianity. Given that many of these “new” readings of 
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Christ and the New Testament are decisively at variance with the classical truth claims of 
Christianity in many areas, it turns out that Ratzinger appears to be on the defensive, an 
impression that one might get from reading of the preceding chapter, especially on the 
question of the Gestalt of Christ.  
 However, such a conclusion fails to do justice to the wider picture, which is that of a 
genuine engagement on the part of Ratzinger, with these Aufklärung positions on Christ. As 
is evident from the reading of chapters two and three, Ratzinger adopts a respectful and open 
attitude towards the claims of the Aufklärung regarding Christ and the Church, in that he is 
interested in hearing what they have to say. He is eager to listen to their perspectives, as seen 
in his autobiographical recollections in chapter one. That said, and as seen in chapter three, 
Ratzinger is prepared to challenge the Aufklärung positions by inviting them to what one 
might call an intellectual conversion, that is, a going beyond the limits of mere reason, 
beyond the postulates of scientific rationality.  
 This entails, as one sees in the multiple appropriations of the metaphor of logos, 
adopting a worldview in which transcendental or religious truths are no longer eschewed 
only because they do not fit into the narrative of pure or mere reason. Such must be the case 
because mere reason or mere rationality cannot explain the whole of human reality, even if 
the Aufklärung sought to portray reason as the ground of all things, as seen in chapter three. 
For example, even if reason can explain the processes, reason cannot account for why 
humans are, in the first place, that is, why there are beings and not non-beings. Reason 
cannot explain the mission of humans in the world, that is, the purpose of human live, even if 
it can explain the choices humans make, in terms of practical arrangements and options. 
Furthermore, reason qua reason cannot explain what happens to the human being, when 
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biological life is over. Reason cannot go beyond the grave. If reason must be consistent with 
its inner logic of Aufklärung scientificity, reason must stop when biological life ceases. And 
over and above all, reason qua reason cannot fully explain the two most profound emotions 
and realities of the human heart, that is, love and suffering. The scientific nature of reason 
that emerged from the Aufklärung is one that identified reason with science and hence, with 
mathematics. To be rational implied being mathematical. And love and suffering transcend 
mathematics. Love and suffering are the two realities that explain the human life, for no 
human being can escape these two realities. Therefore, an understanding of rational 
scientificity that understands and limits reason to the laboratory of science, excludes reason 
from the possibility of entering into the dialogue of the human heart, where the human being 
finds his or her most profound meaning. 
 Little wonder, therefore, that in calling forth reason and the Aufklärung to what one 
might describe as an intellectual conversion, Ratzinger essentially presents the postulates of 
faith as an intellectual culture, as seen in his multiple appropriations of the Greek concept of 
logos, as seen in chapter three. In his homily in Washington National Cathedral during his 
Apostolic Visit to the United States, April 17, 2008, Benedict talked about the necessity of 
this intellectual conversion of reason and the challenge rational scientificity poses to the 
faith. Benedict said, inter alia:  
The challenge confronting us require a comprehensive and sound instruction in the 
truths of the faith. But they also call for cultivating a mindset, an intellectual 
“culture,” which is genuinely Catholic, confident in the profound harmony of faith 
and reason and prepared to bring the richness of faith’s vision to bear on the urgent 
issues which affect the future of American society.1  
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But what explains this Ratzingerian call for a new intellectual conversion that sees faith as an 
intellectual culture? Precisely because Benedict believes that truth and virtue, truth and 
morality, constitute a single whole, a synthesis of reality that must not and cannot be 
fractured. In other words, Benedict adheres to the scholastic tradition that saw truth, beauty 
and goodness as one, as a unity, as constitutive of a single reality or expression of reality. 
And conscious of a world in which these are not too evident today, in his homily at St. 
Patrick’s Cathedral, New York, April 19, 2008, Benedict asked rhetorically: “Is not this 
ongoing ‘intellectual’ conversion as necessary as ‘moral’ conversion for our own growth in 
faith, our discernment of the signs of the times, and our personal contribution to the Church’s 
life and mission?”2 In a word, the truths arrived at by reason cannot be such that they are 
contrary to moral truths, to the truths of the grammar of creation and natural law. If it is the 
case that reason turns a blind eye to moral truths, then reason is logically severed from 
freedom, for what is the purpose of the truths of reason if they cannot set one free, and how 
can they set one free if they are unable to adhere to the moral law or if they, for the sake of 
reason’s autonomy, develop a cynical or skeptical attitude towards the moral law, and not 
only that, to the postulates of faith? It is, therefore, a correct interpretation of Ratzinger, to 
hold reason, morality, faith and truth in an organic whole. Such a unity deters a 
fragmentizing of the human person.   
 At this point, and given all that has been said above, the sense of the unfolding of 
revelation in the context of the vicissitudes of history constitutes a central concern for 
Ratzinger. Such is the case because ideas do not operate in a vacuum, but are borne from 
contextual and cultural positions that demand a reasonable response, inspired by the 
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dynamics of faith. But what might constitute the deeper, theological warrants thanks to which 
one can explain this sense of the historical in Ratzinger vis-à-vis the concerns of reason, faith 
and morality? To Ratzinger, the answer to the question lies in the space of God in history, 
that is, the space that society is willing to concede to God in its socio-cultural imaginations.  
Along this line of history and the dialogue between faith and reason, reason and 
revelation that imposes itself on the theologian, Vincent Twomey offers an incisive 
perspective worth citing here at length, because of the light it sheds on Ratzinger’s 
consciousness on the necessity of paying attention to history and the philosophies of history: 
His [Ratzinger’s] theology is marked, first of all, by attention to the whole history of 
human questioning (philosophy) up to and including those questions articulated or 
implied by the situation in which we find ourselves today. Second, this theology is 
characterized by attention to the answers – often partial and inadequate ones – given 
in the course of history by great thinkers of mankind, theologians and otherwise. 
Third, and most important, his theology is given its definitive form by its attempt to 
hear and interpret God’s revelation of himself in Jesus Christ, that is, his design for 
mankind entrusted to the Church and testified to by Scripture read in the light of the 
history of dogma. I have just mentioned the word “history” three times. This is no 
accident. One of Ratzinger’s basic methodological principles – following the 
examples of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas – is that no serious 
philosophical or theological question can ever be adequately posed or answered, 
however tentatively, if the philosopher or theologian does not listen to the objections 
to it; and this implies being at least to some degree aware of the history of the 
question (and of the prior attempts made to answer it).3 
 
One can translate this reading of Ratzinger by Twomey this way: theology for Ratzinger is a 
historical reading of the questions of history; a historical reading of the answers and partial 
answers offered; and a historical offering of solutions based on the historical event of Jesus 
of Nazareth. And one can say that Ratzinger does not shy away from questions because, as 
Twomey again puts it, “all of Ratzinger’s writings betray the courage to face any question or 
objection because of the confidence he has in the truth revealed in Jesus Christ and handed 
                                               
 3 Vincent Twomey S.V.D., Pope Benedict XVI, The Conscience of Our Age: A Theological Portrait 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 39.    
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on by the Church’s apostolic tradition.”4 The certainty of truth as incarnated in Jesus and 
transmitted through the apostolic tradition remains a hermeneutical framework for Ratzinger.  
 What emerges from this Christological attitude of certainty on Ratzinger’s part is a 
characteristically diachronic texture of theology. As Twomey points out, Ratzinger’s 
theology has always been influenced by the whole sweep of theological and philosophical 
history, and not primarily by the intellectual assumptions in vogue today.5 This is the 
perspective from which one can understand Ratzinger’s penchant for reading the Second 
Vatican Council in light of the hermeneutic of continuity and reform as opposed to an 
absolute watershed, with little relation to the past. In effect, Ratzinger’s historical reading of 
theology seeks to reconcile the diachronic with the synchronic movements of faith and 
reason, of the God of faith and the God of philosophers, as seen in the primacy and urgency 
that Ratzinger himself gave to this theme in his inaugural lecture.  
 Nonetheless, assuming all that has been said thus far in the preceding chapters and up 
to this point in this chapter, it must be stated that this Ratzingerian reading of history with the 
eyes of faith, is certainly fraught with difficulties. And this is the point in which Ratzinger’s 
critics often charge at him, that is, of either wanting to turn back the hands of history, the 
gains of history, or worse still, to ignore them, in his theological positions and conclusions. 
At this point, it is not a matter of offering a defense of Ratzinger, but of asking the question 
that Ratzinger raises in the face of such criticisms that have never slackened in their passion 
and fervor. I think that at the root of the criticism levied against Ratzinger stands this 
question of how the theologian must read the rational, autonomous developments of history, 
                                               
 4 Twomey, Pope Benedict XVI, 40.  
 5 Twomey, Pope Benedict XVI, 39.  
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and to what extent the theologian must allow these new claims and positions to influence, 
renew and shape the postulates of Christian faith.  
 Hence, it is needless going into the rabbit hole of ecclesial politics and politicking. It 
is reasonable to stay within the theological question which is essentially this: Given that the 
Aufklärung, as Ratzinger himself says above, marked a watershed moment in the 
evolutionary process of human thought; and given its radical redefinitions of many truth 
claims of Christian orthodoxy; how must one interpret history? How must one interpret 
theological history? In a word, how must one interpret philosophical theology as seen say in 
Kant, Hegel and other Aufklärung figures? What is history? Are there limits to the human 
rationality of the historical, especially when it concerns the question of God, Christ, the 
Church and the life of faith?  
 I think Hans Küng articulates the perspective of some regarding Ratzinger’s reception 
of the gains of the Aufklärung, in a somewhat dramatic and memorable fashion. Küng will 
therefore serve as the representative of the critical voices regarding Ratzinger’s Augustinian, 
Bonaventurian and Aufklärung conclusions, hoping that taken together, one can better assess 
and understand Ratzinger in terms of his point of departure and his theological destiny or 
goal, a spectrum that cannot be set aside even when considering Ratzinger’s theological 
critics. Definitely, given his long and public presence in the theological world, Ratzinger has 
certainly garnered more critical voices overtime. But confronting criticisms of Ratzinger 
regarding issues like liberation theology, ecumenism, inter-religious dialogue, liturgy, and 
other positions that Ratzinger has held will definitely be too broad for the space of this thesis. 
Küng has been selected for the reason that his criticism of Ratzinger speaks directly to the 
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issue of the Ratzinger’s willingness or unwillingness to accept the fruits of the Aufklärung 
regarding the Gestalt of Christ and the question of the Church.  
 
6.1 A Critical Voice: Ratzinger’s Devotion to an Anti-Aufklärung “Old Fashioned 
Bavarian God.”  
 
 James Corkery, S. J. points out that especially in the 1980s when Ratzinger the 
Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith was dealing with the issues ranging 
from liberation theology, moral theology, Christology and inter-religious dialogue, many 
theologians who dissented from what Corkery calls “certain non-infallible teachings of the 
magisterium”6 read things regarding the Church and the science of theology very differently 
from how Ratzinger saw them. Especially after the publication of the famous The Ratzinger 
Report in 1985, there were many vocal voices that disagreed with what was perceived to be a 
bleak, pessimistic and dualistic characterization of the Church by Ratzinger, from 
theologians, journalists and historians of the ecclesial anglosphere such as Nicholas Lash, 
Eamon Duffy, Richard McCormick, David Gibson, amongst others.7 Sampling these less-
than-flattering views of those who saw the reality of the Church as it emerges from their 
lived experiences and interpreted such different from Ratzinger’s, Corkery concludes that: 
Thus, it is not unreasonable to say that theologians were discouraged by the 
pessimistic views that were emerging from Ratzinger in the 1980s, particularly as 
these views appeared to envisage a more constricting relationship of the magisterium 
to theologians, above all in the area of moral theology.8 
 
With no intent of downplaying the voices of the critics of Ratzinger, I am inclined into 
thinking that what most serves the purpose of this thesis is the criticism that is specifically 
                                               
 6 James Corkery, S.J., Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas: Wise Cautions and Legitimate Hopes 
(Dublin: Dominican Publications, 2009), 83.  
 7 Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 82.  
 8 Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 82.  
284 
 
related to the Aufklärung, that is, to the question of how much space mere rationality has to 
be accorded in the Christological and Ecclesiological portraits thus far considered, especially 
in chapters four and five. In other words, the goal is not to study all the objections made 
against Ratzinger. That will be too broad for this thesis.  
 But as Corkery points out,9 Ratzinger’s fundamental attitude towards theological 
criticisms appears to be captured in this conviction of his as articulated in The Ratzinger 
Report:  
In a world in which, at bottom, many believers are gripped by skepticism, the 
conviction of the Church that there is one truth, and that this one truth can as such be 
recognized, expressed and also clearly defined within certain bonds, appears 
scandalous. It is also experienced as offensive by many Catholics who have lost sight 
of the essence of the Church. The Church is, however, not only a human organization; 
she also has a deposit to defend that does not belong to her, the proclamation and 
transmission of which is guaranteed through a teaching office that brings it close to 
men of all times in a fitting manner.10 
 
To Ratzinger, therefore, defending the deposit of faith against what he perceived to have 
been the relativizing tendencies of some theologians, was essentially an ecclesial service of 
correcting what Ratzinger saw as a misconception of the nature and function of the Church. 
Such a misconception, Ratzinger points out, manifests itself in an insidious way in what 
appears to be a parallel magisterium of theologians:  
Today we do not encounter this aforementioned “obstinate denial” and this “obstinate 
doubt” openly. It is to be expected from the outset that they nevertheless exist in a 
multi-layered intellectual age like ours, only they do not wish to appear as such. 
Today one frequently opposes one’s own theological hypotheses to the Magisterium 
by asserting that the teaching office does not express the faith of the Church but only 
“the archaic Roman theology.” It is contended that it is not the Congregation but they, 
the “heretics,” who represent the “authentic” meaning of the transmitted faith. Where 
a still stronger ecclesiastical bond exists, we encounter similar but essentially related 
                                               
 9 Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 83.  
 10 Joseph Ratzinger, The Ratzinger Report: An Exclusive Interview on the State of the Church – Joseph 
Cardinal Ratzinger with Vittorio Messori, trans. Salvator Attanasio and Graham Harrison (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1985), 24.  
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phenomena: I wonder at the adroitness of theologians who manage to represent the 
exact opposite of what is written in clear documents of the Magisterium in order 
afterward to set forth this inversion with skilled dialectical devices as the “true” 
meaning of the documents in question.11  
 
Clearly, the Ratzinger in The Ratzinger Report displays a great unease with what he sees as 
the corrosive influence of theological dissent, and he is not shy to say so, even in the face of 
very critical reactions. Ratzinger sees much of dissent as being influenced by what he 
famously described as the dictatorship of relativism, the central concern to him being its 
inability to recognize anything as definitive and beyond one’s own subjective desires.12 
Definitely, not all saw things the way Ratzinger saw them, in terms of the definitive nature of 
the truth claims of Christian dogma.  
 Hans Küng, Ratzinger’s erstwhile colleague at the University of Tübingen, writing in 
the first volume of his own Memoirs, maintains that what can be described as a confidence in 
the revealed truths in Jesus Christ as transmitted by the Church, resulted in a kind of pious 
instinct that inhibited Ratzinger’s theology. Wondering rhetorically “how so gifted, friendly, 
open a theologian as Joseph Ratzinger can undergo such a change: from progressive 
Tübingen theologian to Roman Grand Inquisitor,”13 Küng makes the conclusion that “even in 
Tübingen my colleague, who for all his friendliness always seems distant and cool, had kept 
something like an unenlightened ‘devotional corner’ in his Bavarian heart.”14 I think that for 
Küng, it was near impossible to truly consider Ratzinger as a dialogue partner for the reason 
that his theological method already shielded Ratzinger from breaking new grounds, of letting 
                                               
 11 Ratzinger, The Ratzinger Report, 26.  
 12 Joseph Ratzinger, “Mass ‘Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice’: Homily of His Eminence Card. Joseph 
Ratzinger, Dean of the College of Cardinals” (Vatican City, Monday April 18, 2005), # 2, accessed March 17, 
2019 at w2.vatican.va.  
 13 Hans Küng, My Struggle for Freedom: Memoirs, trans. John Bowden (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans 
Publishers, 2003), 457.  
 14 Küng, My Struggle for Freedom, 457.  
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the force of the argument to lead him on. Commenting on Hermann Häring’s work on 
Ratzinger, Küng further explains his reading of Ratzinger:  
In an acute analysis of more than 200 pages, Professor Hermann Häring, my assistant 
in Tübingen at the time, shows how from the beginning “Theology and Ideology in 
Joseph Ratzinger” (2002) have been interwoven. He simply didn’t put certain 
questions to himself; he always had a skeptical attitude towards modern exegesis (i.e. 
historical critical) and was open to historical arguments only to a limited degree.15  
     
In Benedict XVI: An Intimate Portrait by Peter Seewald, one finds a further explication of 
Küng’s critical apprehension of Ratzinger:  
There is a break in his (Ratzinger’s) biography, no question. This change is of course 
only contingent. I believe there must still have been, somewhere in his heart, an 
unenlightened shrine to an old-fashioned God. I should say that in my case there is no 
belief on which I have not actually cast the light of reason. But somewhere or other, 
he (Ratzinger) still has his Bavarian shrine to an old-fashioned God, where reason 
ceases.16 
 
I believe Patrick G. McGlinchey commentary on this characterization of Ratzinger by Küng 
is right on target:  
Küng indicates that Ratzinger was consistently reluctant to allow the claims of reason 
(at least when defined by the standards of the Enlightenment) to limit or determine 
the content of revelation. Küng’s words may be somewhat disparaging of Ratzinger, 
not to say repetitive, but they confirm that he (Küng) had always suspected that some 
form of “superstition” had inhibited Ratzinger from accepting the hegemony of 
rationalism.17 
 
Certainly, the reality regarding faith and its relationship with the rationalism of the 
Aufklärung that Küng accuses Ratzinger of being unwilling to embrace is much more 
complex than Küng might be willing to concede. And even with this, it clearly emerges that 
pure reason is unable to account for the whole picture of the symphony of faith. While it is 
                                               
 15 Küng, My Struggle for Freedom, 458. 
 16 Peter Seewald, Benedict XVI: An Intimate Portrait (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 109.   
 17 Patrick G. McGlinchey, Ratzinger’s Augustinianism and Evangelicalism (Bletchley, Milton Keynes: 
Paternoster Lightning Source, 2017), 28.    
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true that the common ground for the Aufklärer is a scientific understanding of reason, it is 
also the case that across the broad, one notices, as seen in chapter three, an unwillingness or 
inability to move from a pure rational faith to a faith that is both rational, but religiously 
experiential. In addition, it is not clear what openness to the Aufklärung might constitute for 
Küng, in terms of a concrete manifestation of such an openness. In other words, at what point 
can one say that one has heard or appreciated the gains of the Aufklärung?   
 Nonetheless, if chapters two to five bear any indications, they testify to the fact that 
Ratzinger clearly takes the dialectical tension between faith and reason seriously, and 
definitely not from a somewhat naïve perspective, as Küng might have us believe. As 
McGlinchey points out, for Ratzinger, “the fusion of revelation and reason properly 
understood was justified in that Christianity was the true philosophy and Christ the Logos 
personified.”18 Even Ratzinger’s inaugural lecture at the University of Bonn in which he 
argued for a reconciliation between the God of philosophy, the One, with the God of faith, of 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, sheds light on why Ratzinger’s theological instincts would have 
deterred him from pitting the faith against reason in such a way that faith appears unable to 
hold its grounds on its own inner consistency and terms, as Küng seems to be suggesting. 
 Within this context of the Küng-Ratzinger controversy on the place of reason vis-à-
vis faith and revelation, one finds an interesting contribution from Thomas Aquinas. The 
Angelic Doctor raises the question why, besides philosophy, any other science such as 
theology should be required? Opposing the position of the self-sufficiency of reason in light 
of the attainment of truth, Aquinas argues that it was necessary for human salvation that 
besides philosophy built up by human reason, there should be a knowledge revealed by God, 
                                               
 18 McGlinchey, Ratzinger’s Augustinianism and Evangelicalism, 29.  
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that is, theology, for the human being is directed to God as to an end that surpasses the grasp 
of human reason. Given that the end must first be known by people who are to direct their 
thoughts and actions to that end, Aquinas maintains that it was therefore necessary for the 
salvation of humans that certain truths which exceed human reason be made known to 
humans by divine revelation.19 Secondly, Aquinas points out that even regarding the truths 
about God which are accessible by human reason, it was necessary that humans should be 
taught by a divine revelation, because the truth about God discoverable solely by reason, 
would only be known by a few, after a long while and with an admixture of errors.20 It was 
therefore necessary that humans be taught, for the sake of their salvation, divine truths by 
divine revelation which exceeds human reason.  
 Given these Thomistic insights, the burden of proof is no longer on Ratzinger and 
Küng’s characterization of Ratzinger’s theological method as a Bavarian shrine paying 
allegiance to an old-fashioned God before whom reason ceases. Quite the contrary, what one 
finds in Ratzinger is the willingness to concede what Pascal so forcefully realized, that the 
heart has its reasons which reason itself does not have.21 Isn’t it telling that from this 
realization of the limits of reason, Pascal is able to encounter the illuming experience of the 
God of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, God of fire and not of the philosophers?22 In a 
word, what Ratzinger is unwilling to do is to transform Christian faith into a thing of the 
“rational experts” only.  
                                               
 19 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. I, art. 1. trans. Laurence Shapcote, O.P. (Lander, 
Wyoming: The Aquinas Institute, 2012). 
 20 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. I, art. 1.   
 21 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (Suffolk: Penguin Books, 1995), 127.  
 22 Pascal, Pensées, 285.  
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 In this sense, Ratzinger certainly believes what Pascal believes, that the organ of 
“seeing” God, of religious experience transcends the mind and is best captured by the human 
heart.23 Within the mind of his “Bavarian Shrine,” – to employ Küng’s image, Ratzinger 
certainly recognizes, with Anselm of Canterbury, that God is than which nothing greater is 
able to be thought,24 for human reason, in spite of its grandeur, has its limits. Rather than 
accusing Ratzinger of rejecting the gains of the Aufklärung, I am rather inclined to see in 
Ratzinger this methodology of Anselm: “For I do not seek to understand so that I may 
believe, but I believe so that I may understand. For I believe this also: that unless I will have 
believed, I will not understand.”25 Little wonder that in the opening chapter of his 
Introduction to Christianity, Ratzinger gives this Anselmian formulation a warm and 
laudable reception.26 Faith is therefore understood by Ratzinger as standing firm and 
understanding. To paraphrase Pascal, faith has its own rationality which reason itself does 
not have, and this rationality is evident most of all in the lives of the saints of the Church. 
 Overall, Ratzinger’s conservatism on the question of the truths of dogma could boil 
down to the following reasons, as enunciated by Corkery: Firstly, that the God of philosophy 
and the God of theology are one. Corkery sees this as a “facial feature” of Ratzinger’s 
theology.27 As shown in chapter two of this thesis which studied the inaugural lecture, 
Ratzinger’s sides with Aquinas against Brunner. For Aquinas, the Christian understanding of 
God complements and elevates but does not destroy the philosophical idea of God. For the 
protestant Brunner, the personal God who has a name, who has revealed himself in the 
                                               
 23 Pascal, Pensées, 127.   
 24 Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, trans. Matthew D. Walz (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s 
Press, 2013), 2.  
 25 Anselm, Proslogion, 1.  
 26 Ratzinger, Introduction, 75.  
 27 Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 30.  
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tetragrammaton, is opposed to the non-personal God of philosophy. As seen in both the 
Inaugural Lecture and the further development of the same theme in the Introduction to 
Christianity, for Ratzinger, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the One God of the Bible, 
is the same One, the Absolute Being, the Logos, of Greek philosophy. As Corkery points out, 
“this ‘facial feature’ constitutes a principle that expresses the radical monotheism of the 
Bible and ensures, thereby, that Christianity’s claim to truth stands and that the Christian 
faith tradition cannot be relegated to the status of one tradition among many.”28 In other 
words, Ratzinger’s conservative attitude to truth, - if one might describe it this way – is 
shaped by his conviction of preventing Christianity from losing its characteristic uniqueness.  
 A second reason that explains Ratzinger’s conservative attitude to truth claims of 
Christian dogma is what Corkery describes as “showing a contempt for God.”29 In other 
words, to give up on the possibility of the objective truths of the faith is tantamount to a 
rejection of the possibility that God can and actually gives us the gift of truth, that God can 
actually make himself known to humans.30 In this sense, it is not arrogant to be definitive 
about the truth. On the contrary, it takes an attitude of humility to be able to receive truth 
from God, for God has done the unimaginable by becoming human, true God and true Man, 
in the historical Jesus of Nazareth.31 And as Ratzinger compellingly asserts in The Nature 
and Mission of Theology:  
To remove from faith its claim to truth, to stated, understandable truth, is an example 
of that false modesty which is diametrically opposed to humility because it refuses to 
accept the condition humaine; it is a renunciation of that dignity of being a man 
which makes human suffering bearable and endows it with greatness.32 
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In a word, for Ratzinger, accepting the definitive nature of the truth claims of Christianity is 
not a sign of arrogance or theological or religious intolerance. Quite the contrary, it is a 
manifestation of humility before God who has revealed himself at the fullness of time in 
Christ Jesus (Gal. 4:4), who is the way, the truth and the life (Jn 14:6).  
 In standing for the objective character of truth claims, Ratzinger is not indifferent to 
the theological and philosophical principle that speaks of the limits of the finite mind to 
comprehend infinity, which brings about the relevance of the principle of analogy.33 As 
Ratzinger maintains:  
True, faith does not remove the essential limitation of man in his relation to the truth: 
it does not, in other words, eliminate the law of analogy. Nevertheless, analogy is not 
the same as metaphor. Analogy can always be broadened and deepened, but, within 
the boundaries of man’s possibilities, it declares the very truth.34 
 
In this sense, to reject theological relativism while insisting on the definitive and objective 
character of dogma is not a denial of human finitude before an infinite God. It is to recognize 
that because of the Incarnation, God has accepted to limit God’s self so that humans can 
know God with certainty. And in a cited remark made by Ratzinger in an interview with 
Alfred Läpple in the magazine 30 Days cited by Tracey Rowland in Ratzinger’s Faith, 
Ratzinger is quoted as saying that “God is not recognized because He is a summum bonum 
that is able to be grasped and demonstrated with exact formulas, but because He is a You 
who comes forward and gets Himself recognized (…) An abstraction didn’t need a 
                                               
 33 Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, 96.  
 34 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 56.  
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mother.”35 In other words, the principle of the incarnation is what explains Ratzinger’s 
conservatism to the definitive character of the truth claims of the Christian faith.  
 
6.2 Understanding the Ratzingerian Claim of the Insufficiency of Aufklärung “Mere 
Rationality”  
 
 In his Christmas message of 2006 Benedict unambiguously stated that “without the 
light of Christ, the light of reason is not sufficient to enlighten humanity and the world.”36 In 
other words, faith has a wider space for operating, than reason, regarding the core issues that 
concern human beings, such as the question of origin and destiny of human beings, the 
question of suffering and love. Commenting on the above cited text by Benedict, James 
Schall, S.J. maintains that Benedict believes that the “depths of reason are discovered more 
under the stimulus of revelation than by science or human reflection, however legitimate and 
valuable these are.”37 In this sense, reason can get to a better realization of its potentials if it 
opens itself to faith, to revelation. Tracey Rowland cautions and comments:  
It would also be wrong to regard Ratzinger as fundamentally hostile to either 
philosophy or science (though he may be hostile to many projects which market 
themselves as a scientific theology). His basic principle is that reason needs to be 
informed by faith and that cultures and cultural practices need to be judged with 
reference to Revelation, but this does not mean that he sees no value in philosophy or 
science. The point is that alone, cut off from Revelation, not only can they not save 
us, but they have a tendency to turn into oppressive ideologies.38 
 
                                               
 35 Tracey Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (New York: Oxford 
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http://www.ignatiusinsight.com/features2006/schallreadingbenxvi2jan06.asp, Accessed October 26, 2018.  
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Certainly, others for whom the Aufklärung constitutes the summit of human rational 
achievement will disagree with Ratzinger. But what should inform one’s evaluation of 
Ratzinger’s position is the reasons he gives for adopting the conclusion of the guiding role of 
revelation regarding philosophy. And this has as much to do with the inherent contradictions 
of the various schools as thought, as well as, as Rowland points out, the tendency of turning 
one’s rational positions into ideologies that justify one’s conclusions, even if oppressive to 
others.  
 According to Ratzinger, therefore, the distinction between the faith and reason, 
between the God of faith and the God of the philosophers, need not have such accents of 
differentiation, because, the net result would be a psycho-social schizophrenia, in which the 
individual person is torn between the energies of faith and reason that, otherwise, could have 
afforded an inspiring life synthesis. Even reason detached from faith cannot account for the 
ethical foundations of society and could end up being very destructive, Ratzinger argues:   
If we have noted the urgent question of whether religion is truly a positive force, so 
we must now doubt the reliability of reason. For in the last analysis, even the atomic 
bomb is a product of reason; in the last analysis, the breeding and selection of human 
beings is something thought up by reason. Does this then mean that it is reason that 
ought to be placed under guardianship? But by whom or by what? Or should perhaps 
religion and reason restrict each other and remind each other where their limits are, 
thereby encouraging a positive path?39  
 
This text, as much as else in Ratzinger, reflects a clear call for a mutual relationship of 
correction and support between faith and reason. It seems to be in the nature of the human 
being to seek unity, to understand the whole picture, to seek commonality, since, as Thomas 
                                               
 39 Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectic of Secularization: On Reason and Religion, 
trans. Brain McNeil, C.R.V. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 65-66.  
294 
 
Aquinas observes in the Summa Theologica, all persons have the same last end.40 This 
appears to be the case, so much so that even for a philosopher like Heidegger inclined to 
drawing a strict line between philosophy and theology, faith and reason, one still finds 
expressions that reflect a desire for a rapprochement between faith and reason. Ratzinger 
appears to believe that the inner structure of reason challenges the subject to truth and the 
adherence to it. Reason therefore becomes a constraint on freedom understood as license, 
because reason demands to know the truth or falsity of a given proposition.  
The rejection or suspicion of the objectively reasonable is at bottom a suspicion of the 
possibility of knowing the truth, that demands a subjective adherence, given that while the 
object of the intellect is truth, truth is not truth for truth’s sake but meant to open the will 
towards that which is good, which is the proper object of the will. Only in this sense of the 
true and the good that we can understand Ratzinger’s bold denunciation of what he coined 
the dictatorship of relativism, in his homily “Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice.”41 This was not 
a denunciation of worldliness as much as an invitation to regain confidence in truth and 
reason’s capacity to know the truth and the will’s possibility of submitting to the truth. In 
contrast to contemporary skepticism regarding human capacity to know and assent to truth, 
Ratzinger continues to believe the contrary. His reasoning seems to be that if the human mind 
cannot know truth, then the very act of creation is delusionary, for why would God create an 
intellect only to render the object of that intellect, which is truth, an impossible dream, a 
Sisyphean Myth, in which we roll the stone up the hill only for it to roll back down? 
                                               
 40 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 1, art. 7. trans. Laurence Shapcote, O.P. (Lander, 
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Ratzinger sees in this rejection of truth and reason, the rejection of the human being, an 
abandonment-philosophy, or an embrace of a philosophy that is closed and cut off.  
 This is the context from which one can understand Heidegger’s famous “Nur ein Gott 
kann uns noch retten” - “only a god can save us now” passage, a confession he made in his 
Der Spiegel interview, shortly before his death in 1976:  
Philosophy cannot produce an immediate effect which would change the present state 
of the world. This is not only true for philosophy but for all specifically human 
endeavors. Only a God can save us now. The only possibility remaining to us in 
thought and in poetry is to remain available for the manifestation of this God or for 
the absence of this God in our decline.42  
 
 But what kind of God are we talking about here, when the adherents of secular Aufklärung 
such as Heidegger talk about God? One cannot be presumptuous on this question, for while 
certainly for Heidegger the God he meant was not the God of theodicy and of 
metaphysicians, for Kant, this God was anthropological, the human conscience, while for 
Hegel, this God was sociological, the spirit of the community, while for Feuerbach, this God 
was psychological, the projection of the human mind. 
 And I think this is where the problem resides, for in advancing a rapprochement 
between the God of faith and the God of philosophers in order to build a bridge with the 
Aufklärung, Ratzinger is willing to concede a large space to reason. Ratzinger appears, in my 
opinion, to be too enthusiastic and trusting that reason, if and when it follows its own logical 
coherence, might one day find itself in the sanctuary of God. Reason, with a reasonable 
openness, might be able to burn incense and dance, to paraphrase Heidegger.  
 But reason can only achieve this profundity of religious expression if reason opens 
itself up to the possibility and necessity of seeing reality, not just with the eyes of the 
                                               
 42 Martin Heidegger, “Only a God,” Der Spiegel, 31 May 1976, in Richard Kearney, Strangers, Gods 
and Monsters, Interpreting Otherness (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2002), 215.  
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rational, but as well with the eyes of love. Without logos understood and encountered as love, 
reason risks remaining at the level of abstractions and syllogisms. This understanding of 
reason in no implies a withdrawal from the dialogue with the heirs of the Aufklärung, 
namely, the contemporary secularists whose Weltanschauung today is largely shaped by the 
outlook of autonomous reason. On the contrary, Ratzinger sees the reality of the ongoing 
effects of the Aufklärung as an indispensable opportunity for what Ratzinger calls, “the great 
task that awaits Christians today,”43 which he spells us thus:  
We must help reason to function in a comprehensive manner, not only in the spheres 
of technology and the material development of the world, but above all with regard to 
the capacity to perceive truth, the capacity to recognize the good, since the good is the 
precondition of law and thus also the presupposition of peace in the world. Our task 
as Christians today is to contribute our concept of God to the debate about man.44   
 
In this sense, within a context marked by what Ratzinger calls a scientificity of reason which 
as seen in chapters four and five tends to limit reason to the empirically verifiable, 
Christianity owes it to the contemporary secularist world to show that reason can be greater 
than what it is thought to be. In other words, reason can encounter the transcendentals, such 
as goodness, beauty, and unity, provided it allows itself to be touched by what that which 
reason in and by itself, cannot bring about, namely, reason’s seeing of things with what 
Ratzinger characterizes as “the heart which sees.”45 Ratzinger’s theological commentary on 
the twenty-fifth anniversary of Pius XII’s encyclical on the devotion to the Sacred Heart, 
Haurietis Aquas as published in Behold The Pierced One, offers a trenchant picture of this 
Ratzingerian position of seeing reality with the eyes of the heart, the eyes of love. Ratzinger 
                                               
 43 Joseph Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2006), 112.  
 44 Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, 112.  
 45 Pope Benedict XVI, “Encyclical Letter On the Meaning of Christian Love Deus Caritas Est,” 
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2005), 31.  
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gleans a wide range of images from the Fathers, which includes some of the following: 
Gregory the Great’s “Amor ipse notitia est” (love itself is knowledge); Hugh of St. Victor’s 
“Intrat dilectio et appropinquate, ubi scientia foris est” (love enters and comes closer where 
knowledge has been left outside); or Richard of St. Victor’s formulation, “Amor oculus est et 
amare videre est” (love is the eye and to love is to see).46 To Ratzinger, these utterances of 
the Fathers – and other examples abound – could be considered as a spiritual exegesis of this 
text from the Letter to the Ephesians, which Pius XII himself cites in his encyclical on the 
Sacred Heart:  
For this reason I bow my knees before the Father, from whom every family in heaven 
and on earth is named, that according to the riches of his glory he may grant you to be 
strengthened with might through his Spirit in the inner man, and that Christ may 
dwell in your hearts through faith; that you, being rooted and grounded in love, may 
have power to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and 
height and depth, and to know the love of Christ which surpasses knowledge, that you 
may be filled with all the fullness of God (Eph. 3:14 – 19).  
 
Employing this text in buttressing his position of seeing with the eyes of love and not only 
with reason, Ratzinger maintains: “This passage had led theologians to stress that reason had 
its limits. This is the origin, in the latter tradition, of the ignote cognoscere, knowing in 
unknowing, which leads to the concept of docta ignorantia. Thus, the mysticism of darkness 
comes about where love alone is able to see.”47 In other words, the heart, that is, love, has the 
capability of seeing when mere rationality cannot see. And one finds this position of the 
centrality of love in Augustine, Bonaventure and Pascal, as shown in chapter one, which, 
together with other Fathers such as Hugh of St. Victor and Gregory the Great, largely 
influenced Ratzinger. And as Millare observes, this primacy of love is a central element in 
                                               
 46 Joseph Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One: An Approach to a Spiritual Christology, trans. Graham 
Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 55.  
 47 Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 55.  
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the Christology, Theological Anthropology, Liturgical Theology and finally, Eschatology of 
Ratzinger.48 And Ratzinger is always eager to keep love and logos together, in a mutually 
enriching relationship: “The primacy of the Logos and the primacy of love proved to be 
identical. The Logos was seen to be, not merely a mathematical reason at the basis of all 
things, but a creative love taken to the point of becoming sympathy, suffering with the 
creature.”49 As seen in chapter five, this identification and transformation of logos into love 
that comes about thanks to the Incarnation, makes possible a relationship of mutual 
enrichment between faith and reason, between the God of philosophy and the God of 
theology even if the former undergoes a transformation at some point, when it encounters the 
relationality of the latter, who is not only the philosophical One, but Person, Love.  
 Ratzinger maintains that such a relationship between Athens and Jerusalem frees both 
reason and faith from the tempting pathologies that affect both religion and reason.50 
Ratzinger warns reason against cutting itself from the insights of great religious traditions of 
the world, and warns religion from severing itself from the purifying influence of reason.51 
And while Ratzinger acknowledges that this worldview of a relationship between faith and 
reason is one largely marked by the two forces of Christian faith and Western secular 
rationality, he likewise cautions against a what he calls a “false Eurocentrism.”52 Ratzinger 
writes:  
These two (that is, the Christian faith and Western secular rationality) determine the 
situation of the world to an extent not matched by another cultural force; but this does 
                                               
 48 Roland Millare, “The Wedding Feast of the Lamb Has Begun: The Relationship Between 
Eschatology and the Liturgy in the Logoscentric Theology of Joseph Ratzinger” (STD Dissertation, University 
of St. Mary of the Lake, Mundelein, IL, 2018), 61.  
 49 Joseph Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions, trans. Henry Taylor 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 182.  
 50 Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion, 
trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 77.  
 51 Habermas and Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization, 78.  
 52 Habermas and Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization, 79.  
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not mean that one could dismiss the other cultures as a kind of quantité négligeable. 
For a western hubris of that kind, there would be a high price to pay – and, indeed, we 
are already paying a part of it. It is important that both great components of the 
Western culture learn to listen and to accept a genuine relatedness to these other 
cultures, too. It is important to include the other cultures in the attempt at a 
polyphonic relatedness, in which they themselves are receptive to the essential 
complementarity of reason and faith, so that a universal process of purifications (in 
the plural!) can proceed. Ultimately, the essential values and norms that are in some 
way known or sensed by all men will take on a new brightness in such a process, so 
that that which holds the world together can one again become an effective force in 
mankind.53 
 
It is noteworthy that Ratzinger does not only maintain the inner necessity of the rapport 
between the dialogue that must go on between faith and reason, but that, while 
acknowledging the European character of the same, Ratzinger consciously points and pushes 
towards the direction of openness to other cultures. Not only is this indicative of Ratzinger’s 
perception that faith can engage reason in a universalist cross-cultural context, but even 
more, that Europe itself, the land of the historical Enlightenment, must rediscover the ground 
of reason by overcoming a paralyzing skepticism regarding the question of truth. I believe 
this to have been a central invitation that Ratzinger made at Regensburg, that was 
unfortunately lost in the politicization that followed the lecture. To put if differently, reason 
cannot surrender before the mystery of the truth claims of faith, but must allow itself to enter 
into the experiences of faith that, as has been repeatedly pointed out, is wider than reason. As 
Ratzinger says: “In the beginning was not the ‘deed’ but, Father, the Word; it is mightier than 
the deed. Doing does not create meaning; rather, meaning creates doing (…) This means that 
Christian faith essentially and originally has to do with the truth.”54 Therefore, for Ratzinger, 
it appears that to hold on to what he perceives to be the truth claims of Christianity in the 
                                               
 53 Habermas and Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization, 79 – 80.  
 54 Joseph Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to a Daily Life, trans. 
Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2011), 94.   
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face of Aufklärung positions that fundamentally differ with the dogmas of Christian could be 
construed as a service to truth.  
 In the light of the tension between Christian truth claims and the dissents thereof, 
Christianity has a crucial role to play, by pointing out that reason is not just mere rationality, 
but, in the encounter in the embodiment of the philosophical concept of logos in the 
Christological interpretations of the same, reason, if it opens itself up, finds a more 
humanizing and life-affirming position in the logos-Christological and the logos-
Ecclesiological positions that have been treated in chapters four and five of this thesis. It is 
therefore not a question of an irrational devotion to an old-fashioned God. Rather, the 
challenge is for reason, for the Aufklärung to open itself up to seeing reality with the aid of 
the eyes of revelation, that is, with the eyes of faith and love, which, as Paul says in his Letter 







Conclusion: Ratzinger and the Philosophical Hermeneutics to Faith – 
The Task for Today  
 
 This thesis set out to examine the assertion that a proper hermeneutical framework for 
understanding the Christological and Ecclesiological assertions of Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict 
XVI is the eighteenth-century movement called the Aufklärung or the German 
Enlightenment. This assertion, as shown in the thesis, is based on the fact that in his 
formative years, Ratzinger displayed a penchant for a harmony between faith and reason, 
between theology and philosophy, as evident in his acute interest for the thoughts and 
positions of modern philosophy. More especially, Ratzinger’s inaugural lecture which often 
defines the intellectual temperament and character of a scholar, clearly indicated Ratzinger’s 
resolve to always seek a harmony of the insights from faith and reason, searching for a 
rapport between the God of faith and the God of philosophers. Given that theology is theo-
logos, the study or reasoning about God, it clearly became evident for Ratzinger, that logos, 
reason, had to be the path thanks to which he would have to engage the concerns of faith that 
stood out for him. 
 The choice for logos, for reason, clearly did not emerge from out of the blue, from 
nowhere. As seen in the thesis especially in chapter two that dealt with the inaugural lecture, 
the choice of the Fathers to embrace Greek philosophy in place of pagan myths, marked for 
Ratzinger, a decisive point of inculturation of the Christian faith, for which there is no 
turning back. That explains why Ratzinger has always come out strongly against what he 
sees as attempts at dehellenization, as seen in his Regensburg Address, treated in this thesis 
as well. The choice for logos, for reason, therefore, places Ratzinger squarely in the thought-
context of the eighteen-century Aufklärung movement, which, following its motto of sapere 
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aude, dare to use your reason, saw reason as everything and everything as reason. As seen 
throughout chapters two to five, the Aufklärung brought about an understanding of reality 
under the name reason that not only absolutized science, but eventually led to what Ratzinger 
characterized as scientificity, that is, reducing all of reality to the laws of Newtonian physics, 
in effect, to the rules of laboratory experiment. 
 Given this newfound understanding of science, of nature and of reason by the 
Aufklärer, it was only a matter of time that Christian dogma was also called into question, 
following these new principles of scientificity. In Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, 
Feuerbach, Heidegger and others, there emerged a consistent attempt to reinterpret 
Christological and Ecclesiological dogma or truth claims of orthodox Christianity. As seen in 
this dissertation, especially in chapters four and five, Christ is reduced to a moral exemplar, 
and the Church, a sociological community of remembrance and comfort that, in 
misunderstanding the primary mission of Christ, has gotten stuck in all forms of religious 
superstitions. The Aufklärer therefore, saw themselves as heralds of liberation, as persons 
that, as it were, having stepped outside Plato’s Cave, and seen reality in the light of the sun, 
in the light of reason, felt it their duty to return to the Cave of traditional Christianity and 
liberate it from the shackles of irrational superstition.  
 As seen in the thesis, while Ratzinger clearly has a profound attraction for the 
position of applying reason to the truth claims of faith, he definitely does not subscribe to the 
conclusions of the Aufklärer. The Gestalt of Christ is much more than a moral ethicist for 
Ratzinger. From a Christological perspective, therefore, Christ is Creative Reason, Son and 
Person. And as shown in the chapter four, Ratzinger employs the concept of rationality, of 
logos, in reasserting these postulates of faith, convinced that both pure and practical reason 
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could lead to these. From an Ecclesiological perspective, owing to the Christ-event, the 
Church emerges as a community that is much more than horizontal. In other words, the 
nature of the Church, the inner logic of the Church runs from a verticalization beam, that is, 
from Christ the Logos as Unity of Love and from Christ the Logos as Word. These 
foundations do not eschew the horizontal dimension of the Church, but rather, ground that 
horizontal dimension on the firmer grounds of what Ratzinger considers to be the vertical. 
 A tension therefore, arises at this point, for how far can reason go? How far can 
reason as pure reason get along? How far can the journey continue between the God of the 
philosophers and the God of faith, of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob? Is there a point at which 
reason must begin to open itself to the wider logic of the transcendent? These questions are 
helpful because they serve to provide an answer to the cynical “what next?” that might be 
asked, following the dialogue between faith and reason. While this might appear as a 
disingenuous strategy for conversion, it still remains true that if one is to be consistent with 
Ratzinger’s pastoral heart and mind, one cannot avoid the logical next step that Ratzinger’s 
ultimate desire is to invite the rationalist, the secular heirs of the Aufklärung and all persons 
into a friendship with Christ, the Incarnate Logos.  
 Accordingly, Ratzinger does not seek to be either a philosopher or a theologian, if by 
these, we mean their academic and professional descriptions. At heart, stands a pastor’s 
heart, the heart and person of a believer, in that for Ratzinger, it is first of all, faith seeking 
understanding. Ratzinger is not interested in looking at ideas and theories as ends in 
themselves. His goal is to first of all, - as shown in chapter five in the treatment of the 
theological appropriation of logos as Son in the context of the Aufklärung’s reinterpretation 
of the concept of Divine Sonship, - to get to know the figure or person of Jesus Christ, and 
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from that starting point, to engage the prevalent philosophical and theological ideas. And his 
argument for a mutually enriching dialogue between faith and reason is ultimately geared 
towards this evangelical intention of bringing men and women into friendship with the God 
of Jesus of Christ. In a sense, one can describe Ratzinger as a commonsense, pastoral, down-
to-earth critical thinker and theologian, with the singular goal of paying attention to ideas that 
were circulating in the Germany and Europe of his theological career, with the intention of 
responding to them from a faith perspective.  
 Furthermore, Ratzinger’s insistence on friendship with Christ as the decisive 
hermeneutical framework as seen particularly in chapter four, likewise implies that Ratzinger 
is convinced of the insufficiency of the positions espoused by the Aufklärung in terms of 
arriving at the center of who Jesus of Nazareth is, and what the Church is, as a community 
gathered by the Holy Spirit in the name of the Risen Christ as a spiritual offering to the 
Father. In other words, even if one finds Hegel’s The Life of Jesus as a work of great literary 
and philosophical value, Hegel’s inability to lead the reader to a discovery of that which is 
most essential, that is, the identity of Jesus as the unique Divine Son of God, a discovery that 
can elicit the only reaction of adoration, is indicative of the limits of these Aufklärer attempts 
and undertakings. In other words, while reason can shed light on the moral demands and 
ethical contours of historical revelation such as the definitive revelation of God in Jesus of 
Nazareth, it is in the nature of reason, without going against reason, to need Divine help as a 
complimentary and widening succor.  And this is the crucial role that faith is called to play. 
As Ratzinger shows in the inaugural lecture as treated in chapter two, the gains of 
philosophical reasoning that arrived at the concept of the philosophical One of Greek 
monotheism, clearly provide a point of convergence between the God of philosophy and the 
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God of theology. But as seen in the same chapter, Ratzinger does not hesitate to move the 
ball beyond mere rapprochement to a transformation of the God of philosophy, a 
transformation of reason, which happens when the concept of relationality is introduced into 
the hermeneutical dialectic of faith and reason, of philosophy and theology. 
 This is the perspective from which Ratzinger argues for that philosophy has to open 
itself to faith. It has to ask the hard questions, the searching questions, and what is applicable 
to philosophy in terms of a spirit of questioning and searching should also be applied to 
theology as well, for a faith that is blind and irrational is not a helpful faith. It appears to be, 
either by instinct or by temperament, that Ratzinger always feels that a process of reflection 
on issues of the present always hold the potentials for a deepening of meaning, of 
comprehension and apprehension, which could ultimately lead to a friendship with Jesus 
Christ. In other words, one faith must not shy away from current problems, because faith is 
life with Jesus Christ, who as the Incarnate Son of God, brings God’s help into all the 
challenges of life. God is with us, Immanuel. Hence, humans are not abandoned to face life’s 
challenges without any external help.  
 There is, therefore, a sense of openness to deepening one’s comprehension of 
theological formulations from the perspective of one’s living context, for Ratzinger faith 
does not imply simply a repetition of theological formulas. Ratzinger genuinely seeks to 
engage the Zeitgeist with the person of Christ, trusting that reason will ultimately find its 
grandeur, its loftiness, its most sublime aspirations in Christ, the Wisdom of God, the Logos, 
Reason, whose incarnation as the “abbreviated” God has made it possible for finite intellect 
to comprehend infinitude. That said, what might be distinctive about Ratzinger perhaps as 
opposed to his critics is that Ratzinger’s intellectual temperament always had the conviction 
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that in the figure of Jesus of Nazareth, God has communicated definitely the possibilities and 
expanse of knowledge that the human mind can come to a full realization of, without 
shrinking the prerogatives of reason. In other words, there is what one can describe as a 
modesty or humilitas of the human intellect in the pursuit of truth or knowledge, because 
Ratzinger turns not to read truth simply as an abstraction, a conclusion arrived at thanks to a 
process of rational deduction or induction, but, over and above all, as a rational experience of 
a what is fundamentally a religious phenomenon. Put more pointedly, revelation offers a 
liberating light for reason, and not the other way, for while the human quest for truth can end 
in admixtures of truth and errors as Thomas Aquinas holds, revelation, because it is God 
communicating God’s self to creation, cannot proceed in such a way that God will 
communicate error. It is the human reception of revelation that can slide into error, not 
revelation itself.  
 While the itches of the mind certainly deserve to be attended to, when all else is said 
and done, the ultimate challenge is to make the leap to faith, to walk through the door of 
mere rationality into the light of absolute reason, whose breadth, depth and length, no eye has 
seen nor ear heard, nor the mind of the human being conceive, what God has prepared for 
those who love him (1 Cor 2:9). Through reason, through Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, 
and others, the intellectual and the searching academician can walk through the door of 
reason into the door of faith – porta fidei, which, for Ratzinger, is certainly not a replacement 
theory, but a broadening experience, in which the contours of reason are rather thrown wider, 
in the meeting of Christ, the Logos, the Reason of God.  
 At this point, the rationalist intellectual who is a seeker must go beyond Christology 
and Ecclesiology, beyond theological formulas and creedal statements, beyond Nicaea, 
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Ephesus and Chalcedon, to Capernaum, and there like Simon, allow the mind and heart to 
utter the profession of the unlettered, unsophisticated Fisherman of Galilee: Domine, ad 
quem ibimus? Verba vitae aeternae habes (Jn 6:68). And if Capernaum is not sufficient, then 
the searching intellectual, the Aufklärer, the Enlightened One, might again allow the self to 
be led by this Unlettered and humanly unenlightened Fisherman to Caesarea Philippi, where 
he could, this time, accept that given that the intellect can only go so far, help from above is 
needed, thanks to which one can confess with the mind and heart: Tu es Christus, Filius Dei 
vivi (Mt 16:16). In Capernaum, verba, word, leads the wondering intellectual to the object of 
the mind, truth. In Caesarea Philippi, Filius, Son, brings the intellect, the mind, into 
friendship, into a personal relationship. And this explains why Ratzinger’s Christological and 
Ecclesiological path is best described as a philosophical hermeneutic to faith, in which 
philosophy continuously opens up to theology and theology continuously opens up to 
philosophy. Ratzinger begins from Capernaum and Caesarea Philippi, moves on to Athens 
and then brings Athens along to Capernaum and Caesarea Philippi, where Athens finds its 
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